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Abstract 
Guided Practices in Facing Danger: Experiences of Teaching Risk 
 
The central problem of this thesis is how a teacher may engage with risk. I offer a 
reconsideration of the term and suggest that risk is individual, perceptual and 
experientially driven. I use a Heideggerian (1962) frame when I suggest that, when 
taking a risk, a person is potentially encountering existential death. Using my own 
practice as a trapeze artist, I reveal how risk is manifested for the students I teach - 
how it can profoundly challenge and unsettle them- and how I as a teacher am 
charged with ensuring that they are empowered rather than stultified or 
domesticated by the risk. I call this enacted skill ‘pedagogic tact’. 
By combining Jacques Rancière’s notion of Universal Education (1991) with Martin 
Heidegger’s ontological appreciation of being-towards-death (1962), I propose that 
what teachers awaken within students is knowledge of the possibility of death and of 
not-death within certain pedagogic encounters. I cannot know, measure or prove 
whether this knowledge has been achieved. However, I can document and describe 
the students’ relationship with the teacher within these moments. This document 
therefore becomes a description of student-teacher encounters when the teacher 
attends towards the emancipation of the student.  The combination of reflective 
research methods from David Tripp (1993), Max Van Manen (1990), Della Pollock 
(Pollock in Phelan and Lane, 1998) and Jonathan Smith et al (2009) provides a 
means for phenomenological hermeneutic analysis. I have reflected upon my work 
with five students over the course of five days of trapeze training, extracted what 
Tripp would call ‘critical incidents’ between teacher and student and considered their 
meaning (1993:3).  This research is a documentation of engaged pedagogy. It is a 
performative thesis that ruminates upon how I teach aerial work.    
There are many findings that seem apparent at the time of writing up. I repetitively 
circulate around the notion of death, failure, rupture, domestication, entrapment, 
sacrifice, vulnerability, sobriety and pain as significant elements that describe my 
work with risk. These concepts are balanced with words such as poetry, liberation, 
love, strength, glory, resolution and joy. There appears to be a second paradox of 
teaching that sits alongside and dialogues with the Kantian ‘freedom through 
coercion’ (1960:699); it is summed up by aerialist and teacher Matilda Leyser in her 
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description of aerial work as ‘strength through vulnerability’ (2007). In order to 
enable the students’ strength to be challenged, witnessed and supported, there needs 
to be vulnerability from them, from their carers, from the teacher and from the 
institution. This vulnerability is not imposed, or bestowed, but is ‘owned’ by the 
student and teacher in their anxiety and in their choice to, in a Heideggerian sense, 
comport themselves to that which matters most (Heidegger, 1962). In these 
moments, anxiety reminds the student that they might die; it also reminds them that 
they can be strong in the face of possible death. This paradox of vulnerability and 
strength is synthesised or ‘held’ by the teacher’s tact. The new knowledge that I 
assert, therefore, is a description and mapping of pedagogic tact. Through this new 
knowledge, I explore the possibility of becoming a better teacher. 
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 Foreword 
In 1996 I began my training as a secondary school teacher of English and Drama. The 
choice to become a teacher was a deeply conflicted one for me. I passionately 
believed in the ability of art to transform young people and I struggled to reconcile 
the often contradictory ways that my schooling impacted on my understanding of 
myself: as a failure and as a success; as weak and strong; as ‘feminine’ and clumsy; as 
clever and low achieving; as a naughty girl, constantly in trouble who always 
intended to do the right thing. Teaching antagonised the pre-existing concerns I had 
about pedagogy because I was able to witness these tensions accreting and dissolving 
in the students that I taught. 
In a secondary school environment I uncovered the first research questions that 
inspired this PhD. I began by noticing the way that young people were expected to be 
‘risky’ with their ideas and yet were not allowed to cross the road without consent 
forms from parents. It was similar thinking that disabled me from hugging a child in 
distress, which ran counter to my instinct. I noticed the way that children who had 
been labelled as ‘naughty’ by certain teachers were able to flourish in drama and in 
sport whereas students who were considered ‘brainy’ were discouraged from taking 
the same subjects because they were a waste of time.  I wanted to understand how 
some teachers were able to work against the tensions of the environment to focus on 
and enable the equality of each student. 
It was an encounter with circus training in 2000 that began to reconcile the warring 
factions within my own identity. When on a trapeze I did not have to perform a social 
self to comply with others’ expectations of me; in truth, I could not because I was 
focussed on my breath, my balance, my alignment and on my relationship with 
gravity. I was strong and I was free but never had I been closer to death. This 
realisation changed my life. It enabled me to relinquish some of the labels that had 
been placed on me at school. I began to see how physical engagement and rational 
engagement are inseparable - how I am an intersubjective, interdisciplinary being 
who is resolute in the face of failure and risk. My trapeze teachers were people who 
knew I could be strong, who expected me to be strong and who laughed with me 
when I fell, lost my balance or tore my skin. Learning to fly was typified by joy rather 
than fear.  
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I wanted to know what circus might do for young people: how it might enable them 
to see themselves as equal to others or to a task, how this may be perceived 
philosophically and theoretically and how consideration of what circus is may enable 
me to be a better teacher.  What follows is pedagogy. It is the description and 
performance of my engagement as a teacher. In it I antagonise the influences and 
formative notions that fuel my passion to teach whilst expressing a commitment to 
learn more and be better in the future. 
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Introduction 
This thesis is a critical and descriptive document charting a five year PhD research 
enquiry that investigates the practice of pedagogy. It is a practice-as-research project, 
submitted through a written thesis.  
 
Early conversations with young people resulted in pilot projects in conjunction with 
Surrey County Arts Stageworks youth theatre and with The Circus Space. This 
confirmed the impression that risk was an ill-defined and over-used term and that 
young people are drawn towards visceral physical challenges, particularly during 
adolescence. I was able to study these issues in depth when working in conjunction 
with Central School of Speech and Drama; I wanted to understand more about 
teaching which focuses on emancipating each student by teaching a specific practice: 
static trapeze.  A consideration of static trapeze and the possible death that the 
practice held led me to ruminate not only upon acts of emancipatory pedagogy but 
also upon social and philosophical discourses concerning risk, culture and 
performance theory.  The foundation for this document is a five day project involving 
five students that they titled Hello Fatty, and some of the findings I have extracted 
from that project are discussed herein.  
 
The research method is an intertwined process of critical reflection on practices and 
practice-driven theoretical work, made clear by the use of varied and numerous 
examples from the much larger generic field of pedagogy, philosophy, sociology and 
performance. Scholars in these disciplines may find relevance in a method of 
researching lived moments, a paradigm of mapped ‘tact’ as a way of describing 
teaching, and a personal account of this tact. It can be read therefore as a 
performative document which reveals the nature of pedagogy through a discussion of 
it.   In this introductory section, I stage and summarise the argument that is gently 
formed through the thesis in a more circulatory way. I make a case for a contribution 
to new knowledge.  I introduce key terms and theorists and provide a rationale for 
bringing the voices together, giving a sense of how the theorists Heidegger, Rancière 
and Freire address specific aspects of the enquiry. I acknowledge that the work is 
interdisciplinary and reflect upon my original contribution to knowledge, given that I 
am straddling a number of different disciplinary fields.  
Hartley,	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For a teacher, this document reads as a personal account of pedagogy which may 
provide a way of viewing the everyday choices a teacher faces in the classroom. 
Through the mapping of my practice, it became clear how the desire to emancipate 
students is an ongoing project in the practice of equality which will never be 
complete. I recognise that, in the momentary, any act by a teacher may be used to 
domesticate students to a certain way of thinking or may be used to free them to 
understanding themselves anew. I acknowledge the ongoing struggle to situate the 
student within the social and personal context of their learning, engage their will to 
learn and to know themselves through the doing of risky work. The practice of 
trapeze work can stand in for any learning activity because the student places 
themself at risk of failure every time they learn something new. I argue that the 
teacher writes and rewrites a ‘map’ of possibilities in each teaching encounter with 
each student and, moreover, that this map enables them to recognise many possible 
right answers in a single moment when there is no singular perfect way forward. I 
state that a certain something drives the engaged teacher forward, though it be 
exhausting and repetitive, so that their students are seen and verified. 
 
The philosophical context of this study has its roots within a practicing of 
Heideggerian phenomenology. I pay particular attention to Heidegger’s notion of 
‘anticipatory resolution’1 (1962:357) and discuss how a teacher may work towards it 
for and through moments with young people. I argue for an active and engaged 
hermeneutic practice that is learnt and challenged in the doing of trapeze. This is 
praxis. In particular, this document reads as an exercise in Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis as discussed by Jonathan Smith, Paul Flowers and 
Michael Larkin (2009) and phenomenological writing as typified by Max Van Manen 
(1993). So a philosopher may read this document for an engagement with praxical 
phenomenology and an example of phenomenological analysis. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Heidegger’s definition of resolution, as it is used here, forces Dasein to acknowledge the possibility of death. It is 
essentially futural: ‘anticipatory resoluteness is not a way of escape, fabricated for the ‘overcoming’ of death; it is 
rather that understanding which follows the call of conscience and which frees for death the possibility of 
acquiring power over Dasein’s existence and of basically dispersing all self-concealments’ (1962:310). Use of the 
term in this context, therefore, acknowledges the developmental potential and possibility of each student. It is 
about bringing the experiences learnt from the ‘now’, a momentary relationship with risk and death, into a 
projected possibility of the future. This future is unknown and unknowable.	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Sociologists may be interested in my exploration of risk as framed by Rancière’s term 
the ‘police order’ (1999: 31).2 I argue that the structures in which the students are 
situated, which include the media, Government, the school environment and their 
understanding of themselves, frame notions of risk positively and negatively in each 
different encounter. I suggest that these positive and negative discourses impact 
upon the way that the students learn - repelling and enticing them to take risks.  I 
have discussed the different social structures as a part of the study to see how the 
macro level impacts upon the micro level of a student’s and teacher’s behaviour and 
understanding. It is a part of the pedagogic map the teacher develops through their 
career. 
 
For a theatre and/or performance researcher, this document raises questions about 
how circus may be viewed. Although my practice and research does not focus directly 
upon the creation of circus ‘acts’, there is a generalised appreciation that 
performance is the goal of any trapeze student. In Chapters 3 and 4 this is most 
specifically articulated. I suggest that the performance of circus is transgressive and 
that the metaphor of circus is a helpful evocation of Heideggerian death and anxiety. 
I use the circus artists, teachers and academics John-Paul Zaccarini and Matilda 
Leyser to dialogue with existential questions from their pedagogic experience. This 
brings depth to what would otherwise have been a very personal account of teaching. 
So this thesis may be read as an analysis of circus as politically engaged praxis.   
 
Throughout the document I question how fragmentation, binary thinking and what 
may be called neoliberalist sensibilities may disable teachers from engaging with 
emancipatory practices in a classroom. Through the following chapters I will explore 
the roots of these sensibilities and state that the primary locus is fear- fear of death, 
fear of failure and fear of accountability. I contend that fear can be used positively 
and creatively by an engaged pedagogue to work against the social conditions under 
which the fear has been generated and I continuously circulate around the premise 
that any and every emancipatory encounter has the capacity to domesticate and 
disable the teacher and the student.  I argue that, by risking death through circus, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  I unpack this term fully on pages 20-21.  For now it is important to note that, for Rancière, the police order is 
not a negative concept  -  it ‘can produce all sorts of good’ (1999:31). It is his term for the way that things are done 
by the codes conducts and values played out in the everyday. As Bingham and Biesta state, ‘One way to read this 
definition of police is to think of it as an order that is all inclusive in that everyone has a particular place, role or 
position in it; there is an identity for everyone’ (2012:34).  
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student or child may know themselves as momentarily resilient. I have summarised 
how risking death manifests itself within my practice and have begun to unravel 
some of the complex scenarios under which resilience may be momentarily mapped 
and challenged by a deliberate ‘act’ of risk. 
In this opening section I identify the original impulse of the research. The main 
thrust has been my own pedagogic development and the daily practice through which 
I have been inscribed and challenged- a practice that accretes over time and 
accumulates in my body. Whereas the driving force of the study has been the 
personal, I strive for an understanding of pedagogies other than my own and the 
potential common ground between past and present accounts of risk-taking by, and 
from, students, teachers and performers. The result has been the possibility of a 
pedagogic map and a description of the pedagogic tact needed to navigate this map in 
the momentary. To that end, the personal has lent me the focus necessary to 
scrutinise the cultural territory and my legacy as a radical part of the teaching 
profession.  	  
0.1 Chapter Summaries 	  
 
In Chapter 1, I define my research methods. I introduce the 5 day project and detail 
how it was designed to give insights into my practice. I detail the ethical implications 
of the work and highlight the practical concerns of placing children on trapezes. I 
account for the selection and representation of the adolescents involved.  I make a 
case for momentary consent; by this I mean that consent is not a part of a paper-
process but an enacted vigilance to the needs of the student. I consider the sureties 
the teacher is charged with when working in this way and articulate that any 
emancipatory practice has the power to domesticate as well as liberate the students 
within it. I offer a model of phenomenological analysis derived from Van Manen 
(1990) David Tripp (1993) and Jonathan Smith et al (2009) as a mode of reflective 
practice that I utilise throughout the thesis. 
 
In Chapter 2, I propose that danger and risk are intertwined and yet divisible terms 
in contemporary discourse, with the tacit presumption that danger is unmanageable 
and risk is manageable. I build an argument that risk is perceptual, individual and 
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temporally dependent and that attempts to manage it may result in risk-aversion. I 
contend that the very idea of risk-aversion is effaced by a neoliberalist discourse that 
cannot take the personal into account, which has implications for children regarding 
their agency. I argue that notions of danger are associated with fear and that this fear 
is the fear of Heideggerian (existential) death. I establish that this fear is located 
within the body and more particularly within the bodies of children: children 
perceive themselves to be vulnerable because they are treated as such. 
 
In Chapter 3, I take forward the premise that fear is located within the bodies of 
children and examine this in reference to a moment from my practice entitled ‘The 
Gazelle’. I consider the strategies that I was taught to deal with touching a child. I 
suggest that they magnify the child’s body and disable her from feeling resolute in 
the face of perceived danger. I move the argument forward at this juncture through a 
consideration of critical pedagogy as a possible counter to these risk-averse elements. 
By considering the contradictions therein, I recognise the complexity of educative 
practices that run counter to cultural influence and counter to determinism. I suggest 
that it is only through acts of ongoing dissensus that young people are able to learn 
about, and therefore begin to reconcile, the way that touch is or has been mediated 
by a teacher. I recognise that these acts of dissensus are potent and could be used to 
domesticate as well as liberate students. I state that that only with an attention to 
equality and ethics in every moment can a teacher ensure the possibility of 
emancipation. 
 
In Chapter 4, I consider circus and in particular the pedagogic and performance 
practices of Matilda Leyser, John-Paul Zaccarini and myself. This is a personal 
account of encounters with fear, in particular fear of and for the body. I describe how 
a circus performer may embody that fear for an audience. This chapter argues that 
circus is a political act because of its ability to transgress the social normative and 
that the aerial student performs a ‘leap of faith’ through their trust of the teacher 
when they are resolved to perform the transgression.  
 
In Chapter 5, I expand upon this notion of leaps of faith by addressing the 
phenomenological elements that are ‘owned’ by the student in the act of leaping. I 
use Peta Tait’s evocation of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s body phenomenology to 
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articulate that that the act of leaping is ‘active, momentary and glorified’ (2005: 150). 
These elements attend to the totality of a student’s body as technical/biological, as 
meaningful for the student and, finally, as being seen as more than the two elements 
by others in the act of performance. This chapter serves as a rumination upon the 
complexities of self that the student and teacher perform/embody/do/are for each 
other within their pedagogic relationship. 
 
In Chapter 6, I describe five critical incidents from Hello Fatty and reflect back upon 
the social, pedagogic, phenomenological and trust-filled discourses of the previous 
chapters. I use phenomenological description to unravel some of the discourses at 
play within the moment a risk is taken. I map these encounters, aware that my 
perception of them has changed over time.  
 
In Chapter 7, I conclude by offering nine learning points or themes that appear to 
me. I close by saying that teaching is an act of faith on the part of both teacher and 
student. I demonstrate at the end of the research where the next stage of the research 
may be by recognising the limitations of the study and proposing that the research is 
an unending project in a pedagogic career. 
 
 
0.2 Contributions to New Knowledge  
 
My approach is primarily pedagogic though it also contributes to performance/circus 
studies, philosophy and sociology. This is because these areas are not distinct 
elements; they intertwine within the practices detailed so that an act of teaching 
becomes an act of performance and an act of sociological analysis. Like all teachers, I 
am an interdisciplinary researcher.  
 
I clarify the term ‘risk’. An interrogation of the literary and cultural discourses 
pertaining to the notion of risk and risk-taking revealed that the term is infused and 
indivisible from discourses that communicate fear. I argue that this fear is a fear of 
Heideggerian death, that it is drawn towards fear in the body and, in particular, the 
bodies of children. New knowledge has been formed in the critique of the socially and 
politically determined definition of the term ‘risk’.  
Hartley,	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  2013	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I appropriate and antagonise the proposition that any emancipatory 
discourse has the potential to domesticate. In his appreciation of the work of 
Paulo Freire, Paul Taylor states that critics focus upon a number of factors with 
which to interrogate Freire’s methods: 
 
They point to the contorted manner of his writing; his lack of human 
experience; his circular logic and confusing repetitiveness. He is too 
obscurantist, too mystifying, too abstract, too psychological, too 
utopian. His method requires a high level of social manipulation and 
can be used equally to domesticate as to liberate. (1993:2)  
This tension has mobilised my research. I circulate around many of these criticisms 
in and through my thesis. The reader will see how I attend to the manner of writing, 
circular logic and repetitiveness as a practice in mapping pedagogic tact. Most vital 
within this whole work is the question of domestication and liberation. From an 
ethical imperative of practised equality, I am continuously vigilant about how my 
practice may manipulate, domesticate or emancipate. It is this attention that is a 
prime focus for the work.  
 
This thesis is the expression of my ongoing commitment to guidance and danger 
through circus and acts of risk-taking pedagogy. In discussing how an engagement 
with the transgressive performance discipline of circus can destabilise the social 
normative, I am intentioning myself towards emancipation. I recognise, however, 
that I may domesticate the students into thinking my way. Biesta reminds us that: 
 
The ingenuity of Rancière’s work lies first and foremost in the fact that he 
is able to show that what is done in the name of equality, democracy, and 
emancipation often results in its opposite in that it reproduces inequality 
and keeps people in their place. What matters, therefore, is not that we are 
committed to equality, democracy and emancipation, but how we are 
committed to these concepts and how we express and articulate this 
commitment. (Italics in original 2010:57)  
 
Students in my work may have acquiesced to a different performative mode rather 
than recognised their possible resilience within the taking of a risk.  This document 
knowingly courts the possibility of domestication in its commitment to radical 
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equality. This document is an expression of that commitment alongside my 
encounters with students. 
 
I have engaged in critical pedagogy in physical situations. Up to now, 
critical pedagogy (as typified by Freire 1970 and Rancière 1991) has confined itself to 
the theme of literacy. In my practice, the written word is not the fabric that mobilises 
emancipation: the body is. The subject of my practice is circus. It is, therefore, doubly 
transgressive, in that it enacts questions of risk specifically towards the locations that 
hold the most fear, the human body, and the bodies of children. I suggest that this is 
where the battle lines are drawn with young people, and so, therefore, this is where 
the learning must be located. This is an act of dissensus which I feel would be 
embraced by Freire and Rancière, who acknowledge the limitations of their practices. 
It is a project that was borne out of my personal encounter with aerial work, and the 
acute opportunities that it afforded me, to challenge my social and fear-driven 
understanding of risk.  
 
I advance the importance of description and lived experience in 
pedagogy through phenomenological practice. Through this thesis, there is a 
tension between the deterministic and analytical frames used to measure and 
prevent risks, and the personal, adumbrated and perceptive influences that are used 
in each individual case to expose and engage with danger. By adding lived experience 
to the discourse, I am balancing the view that sees children as ‘statistically 
vulnerable’; I offer a poetic evocation of tactful practice and state the importance of 
the students’ and teachers’ understanding of themselves in the face of risk. I model 
descriptive refection, which can and should only be viewed in dialogue with scientific 
analysis. 
 
I present circus training as an example of critical and resistant political 
praxis. I identify the technical aspects of circus that constitute risk-taking and 
expand upon them to notice the other elements that appear to be transgressive to the 
social normative. Aside from the fear of death, there is also the complexity of gender, 
of being outside the social norm, of working from passion rather than reason, and of 
exposing your vulnerability to others. Circus works against the social and political 
norm. Consequently, it is a potent agent for dissensus against it. To perform circus, is 
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to appear as transgressive, and it is, therefore, a political act. This in itself is not new; 
the newness arises from the perspective of socially resistant pedagogy. It is the 
application of circus into pedagogic theory that brings forth new knowledge.  
 
I articulate the notion that teacher and student engagement is fluid, 
mobile, temporal and ambiguous. I have gently worn away at the perceived 
social possibilities of being a teacher. In this way, I have come to a more nuanced 
understanding of what that means in a moment of practice. My proposition that 
teaching is dependent upon tact is new. The proposition is that my experience 
accretes, is sacrificed and develops through each encounter. Each teaching moment 
decomposes and recomposes the understandings of both teacher and students about 
their relationship and their equality. It demands a concerned attention from the 
teacher that contains the ‘right kind’ of objective relation, characterised by curiosity, 
will, consideration and forbearance (Heidegger, 1962 and Rancière, 1991).  
 
0.3 Critical Context - Fear Discourses and Death 
 
There are four primary theoretical voices in this thesis: Paul Slovic, Martin 
Heidegger, Paulo Freire and Jacques Rancière. Each addresses a specific aspect of 
the enquiry and each provides different ways of thinking that provided insights for 
the work undergone.  I use three key terms that I will explain in this section too: 
curiosity, tact and trust.  
 
0.3.1 Paul Slovic 
Paul Slovic is the principle academic involved in articulating the complexities of risk 
perception. His research provides the founding premises for the whole thesis,=-  
that, because risk is perceptual and individual, it is impossible to quantify (2000). In 
Chapter 2, I discuss the inherent tensions of risk assessment because risk is a 
contingent concept. Uses of the term ‘risk’ have at their heart a bifurcation of 
meaning: one enables the taker to encounter the possibility of death and the other 
enables the taker to encounter the possibility of failure. The word ‘risk’ is used with 
equivocation for both. The purpose of this discussion is to lay the foundations for a 
practice where there is ‘no right answer’ but there may be many wrong ones (Tripp, 
1993:3). In the practice of trapeze teaching, these wrong answers could result in 
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‘harm’ befalling the young people in my care. What constitutes harm is also under 
discussion in Chapter 2 where I argue that there are many territories of ‘risk’ that 
might be at play within any encounter between a teacher and student, the most 
potent of these is the risk of death. Slovic’s research is formative as a consideration of 
the prevailing concerns of teachers who risk-assess the material and the form of their 
teaching.  
 
0.3.2 Martin Heidegger  
 
So, if risk is ephemeral and perceptual, a methodology that focuses on experience is 
necessary. Descriptions of life as it is lived are the philosophical premise at the heart 
of phenomenology. The second theoretical voice within this work is therefore 
phenomenologist, Martin Heidegger. I selected him from all the phenomenologists 
because his philosophy focuses on the ultimate risk within trapeze teaching: Death.  
Heideggerian thought mobilises my thesis in three ways. Firstly, it opens up the 
debate about death, the nature of life in relation to death,= and the everyday evasion 
of death. This is critical when considering taking risks and, in my case, when 
engaging in practices with students that could result in a student’s death. Secondly, 
Heidegger’s existential interpretation of death, which is not to be conflated with the 
fact of physical dying or mere demise, explains how one of the most potent aspects of 
the work, for the student, lies in the growing awareness that failure, or social death, 
is a real possibility that cannot be evaded and which must be owned. So in 
Heidegger’s thought, whether the student risks failure or indeed physical death, the 
risk is experienced in the same manner: as existential anxiety. Risk brings students 
closer to understanding the often precarious nature of the relationship between the 
self as experienced from the first personal perspective and the social self that is lived 
with and in relation to others. For my work, it is important to articulate that the risk 
of failure and the risk of death are experienced in an identical fashion despite a 
prevailing view that sees them differently.  
 
A Heideggerian emphasis upon care demonstrates the ethical and tactful practices 
that the teacher and student rehearse through circus work. Understanding that 
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Heidegger sees care as the ‘primordial state of Being’ belonging to Dasein3 
(1962:230) allows me to understand that, although both teacher and student may be 
distracted by the social frames imposed upon the work, ultimately the overriding 
concern for both is towards finding the intersubjective meanings of the event for 
themselves and for one another.  Care is an absolute; humans always have a care-
driven attitude to living, even if that attitude is care-less. In order to be careless, one 
must be primordially constituted towards care. Throughout this thesis, a 
consideration of these three elements - literal death, social death and care - as the 
essential determination of the being of Dasein, will form the critical basis for 
engaging with the social and personal impact of risks and the conceptualisation of 
the tactful practice needed to fully engage with them.   
 
Another essential element of Heidegger’s ontology is the notion of being-with-others 
(Mitsein). He proposes that lives are lived both in attendance to and evasion of 
others. This is a vital theme for my work in two ways. The first is within the notion of 
how a student might be distracted from what they are doing by the ‘idle talk’ of the 
they-self (1962: 253). By this I mean that a student is drawn towards and inseparable 
from the way that they think or know that others are understanding or restricting 
what they do: the student’s understanding is formed in their relationship to what 
others do and say.  
 
A second way that Heideggerian Mitsein reveals a theme in my research is in the 
notion of ‘leaping’ that I discuss in detail in Chapter 5. It relates to the question of 
liberation and domination very specifically. In a discussion of alterity, Heidegger 
proposes that two types of ‘concern’ are possible. The first is one that ‘leaps in’ for the 
other and domesticates them (1962:158). The second is a ‘leaping ahead’ of them, 
thereby liberating or, in Heidegger’s terms, ‘freeing’ them to understand the work for 
themselves (1962: 159). The first forces the student to step ‘back so that afterwards, 
when the matter has been attended to, he can either take it over as something 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  In Being and Time, the term ‘Dasein’ is used to denote two interconnected concepts: 1) being, as in 
existence as experienced by humans and 2) the human who has this being and whose manner of being 
is to exist. It is, therefore, both referential in terms of individual persons (individual Daseins), and to 
the mode of human existence, understood in general. It is both singular and plural in that it refers to 
an individual being as well as to the determination of the kind of existence that characterises human 
understanding. Dasein is always ‘mine’, but is not me, because it does not appear as ‘present-to-hand’ 
for me.  
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finished and at his disposal or he can disburden himself of it completely’ (1962:158). 
The second way, however, ‘pertains to authentic care – that is, to the existence of the 
other, not to a “what” with which he is concerned; it helps the other to become 
transparent to himself in his care and to become free of it’ (emphasis in the original, 
1962:159). By considering Heidegger’s position on being with others, I am able to 
reinforce the contention that any act of emancipation can domesticate as well as 
liberate.  
 
Further to this, I borrow from Heidegger the term ‘anticipatory resolution’ to discuss 
what it is that the child, student or aerialist develops in relation to their own 
experience of death and inauthenticity. It stands in for the notion of agency and 
defines it as a state of knowing oneself in relation to a possible future. For Heidegger, 
anticipatory resolution is:  
not a way of escape, fabricated for the ‘overcoming’ of death; it is rather 
that understanding, which follows the call of conscience and which frees 
from death the possibility of acquiring power over Dasein’s existence 
and of basically dispersing all fugitive self concealments. (1962: 357) 
Inwood expands upon this by recognising that resolution is an attention to (or 
comportment towards) ‘intense deliberations, forceful actions and “recollection”’ 
(1999:187). For Heidegger, resolution is an act of attention in the momentary, 
recognition of potential in the future and re-inscription of the learning from the past. 
Therefore, rather than the student having what some teachers would call ‘agency’, 
which is a set state, by using the term ‘anticipatory resolution’, I employ a more 
temporally distinct and fluid appreciation of the student’s ability to know themselves 
in relation to the risk at hand.  
 
My pedagogic and performance practice exists, therefore, in a theoretical and 
ideological tension between and towards the risk of success, failure and 
(Heideggerian) death. It draws out an already-antagonistic relationship between 
reason, science or form (the facts of my existence as given culturally or politically) 
and experience or description of that existence (which I can communicate only 
through poetry) which become a part of my method and methodology of praxis 
detailed in Section 0.3. 	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0.3.3 Paulo Friere 
My theoretical framework broadly falls within the category of ‘radical pedagogy’,  
defined by Timothy McGettigan as ‘an analysis of the deeply politicized aspects of 
educational institutions, policies and practices’ which is aimed towards inspiring 
‘radical social change’ (1999:1). It is typified by academics and practitioners such as 
Paulo Freire (1970, 1997), Henry Giroux (1997), Peter McLaren, (1998) and Ira Shor 
(1992). Radical pedagogy concerns knowledge and education and how they can (or 
should) change to best serve the purposes of both educators and the educated. In 
Chapter 2, some of the central tenets of radical pedagogy are examined with a view to 
understanding how it has evolved, and what critiques are inherent within it or have 
been directed towards it. These critiques,4 as already discussed in the previous 
section, recognise that, rather than radicalise students, such methods have the 
potential to re-inscribe modes of domination. This examination allows me to 
question how a pedagogic relationship can also be a political act, that is one that acts 
towards challenging cultural taken-for-granted concerns and, crucially, how this 
political act can be embodied and performed within my teaching.  
 
The work of the radical pedagogue Paulo Freire is formative in my struggle to 
identify what it means to be a teacher. From reading Pedagogy of the Oppressed, I 
learnt three clear lessons: that a teacher can be a humaniser, that prevailing social 
discourses can prevent humans from understanding and realising their full potential 
and that teaching is a political act (1970). This knowledge gave authority to the 
hunches I articulated in the foreword to this PhD.  Through his writing, I began to 
understand pedagogic praxis; before I had been engaged in teaching practice. In 
Chapter 2, I dialogue with Freire. I interrogate and unsettle some of the instinctive 
allegiances I felt when first reading his work. I carry forward a single word ‘love’ 
(1970: 41) that I repeat and contradict in my writing. The word ‘love’ metaphorically 
houses the tension and investment that typifies pedagogic tact for me.  My 
contention with Freire’s theories creates a key question in my practice: how do I 
engage with emancipation and risk domestication?     
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Gibson suggests that ‘[i]n the world of theory, addressing merely the appearances of domination and oppression 
does not get to the sources in exploitation and authoritarianism’ (2010:23). 
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0.3.4 Jacques Rancière 
 
I have turned to Rancière’s emancipatory proposition in order to open up the fissures 
exposed within the critiques of radical pedagogy. He proposes that: 
We can thus dream of a society of the emancipated that would be a 
society of artists. Such a society would repudiate the division between 
those who know and those who don’t, between those who possess the 
property of intelligence. It would only know minds in action: people 
who do, who speak about what they are doing, and who thus transform 
all their work into ways of demonstrating that is in them as in everyone. 
(1991:71) 
The community of equals is a proposition for a specific praxis in which a student’s 
ability to reason and will to learn are challenged through a process of learning 
rhetoric and poetry in order to emancipate understanding and develop artistry. 
Rancière suggests that, by teaching students as equals, rather than through Socratic 
Method or exposition (both of which reinforce a dynamic of power and subordination 
which result in stultification of the student), the teacher can enable the student to 
find clarity as that of an artist or writer rather than that of a schoolchild. The notion 
of stultification is complex: Rancière uses the term ‘abrutir’, a direct translation into 
English of which is ‘to render stupid’, or ‘to treat like a brute’. There is no direct 
translation that approximates this meaning. Kristin Ross, the translator of Rancière’s 
work, therefore uses the term ‘stultification’ to articulate the idea of ‘deadness and 
numbing’ that the French term implies (1991:7). What Rancière is proposing within 
his use of the term is that, through acts of equality, emancipation is enacted whereas 
in any given circumstance a student can be stultified by inequality. He clarifies this in 
his later essay On Ignorant Schoolmasters by saying that ‘stultification can and does 
happen in all kinds of active and modern ways’. Emancipation, therefore, ‘is a matter 
of relating what one ignores to what one knows; a matter of observing and 
comparing, of speaking and verifying’ and universal education ‘concerns the relation 
between equality and inequality’ (Rancière in Bingham and Biesta, 2010:6). 
Stultification closes down the potential of the student to recognise the possibilities 
that learning discloses about experience.  
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Rancière advances the notion that emancipation is enacted by attending to reason 
above all. I contend that reason is only half of the motor towards emancipation. 
Propounding this split between reason and passion again pre-empts the bifurcatory 
discourses I will discuss through Chapter 2, where risk is seen only in statistical 
rather than experiential terms. The suppression of the emotional or passion-based 
thinking that Rancière disavows is entirely formative when considering pedagogic 
tact. If Rancière limits emancipation to reason, suggesting that ‘everything is done by 
passions, I know; but everything, even follies, would be much better done by reason’ 
(1991:95), he reinforces the dynamic of power and binary opposition imposed by a 
mind-body split or academic and metaphoric dialogue, undermining his intention 
towards equality. For me, therefore, teaching inhabits a dynamic tension between 
passion and reason, quality and quantity, good and bad, literal and metaphoric- 
dialectics that are crucial to explore when working towards engaged encounters with 
Heideggerian death.  
When exploring Rancière’s position through the thesis, I will be using some of his 
key terminology such as politics, dissensus and police order: 
Politics is generally seen as the set of procedures whereby the 
aggregation and consent of collectivities is achieved, the organisation of 
powers, the distribution of places and roles, the systems for legitimising 
this position. I propose to give this system of distribution another 
name. I propose to call it the police. (1999:28) 
Rancière is proposing that, by naming the governing framework as the police, he 
exposes the mechanisms of power at play within any society or institution. Todd 
May’s overview of Rancière’s thinking posits that the traits of passivity and apathy 
are those that result from a police order (2010:3-5). An equalising project is, 
therefore, one which commits to an active engagement in challenge and dissent 
against the police order. Dissent gives the participants or students means to 
recognise themselves within this system. Rancière clarifies that dissensus is ‘a gap in 
the very configuration of sensible concepts, a dissociation introduced into the 
correspondence between ways of being and ways of doing, seeing and speaking’ 
(2010:15).  Dissensus mobilises a recognition of the self, in relation to what is said 
and done, by disrupting the everyday order to ‘not lose sight of the paradoxes that 
give [existence or education] meaning’ (Rancière in Bingham and Biesta, 2010:16). 
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Through the learning of trapeze work, the student acts in dissensus to the social 
norm or police order of fearing and, therefore, fleeing from risky situations.  
May’s appreciation of Rancière’s politics is useful because it takes the discussion 
outside of a pure philosophical recognition of the rhetorical structures at play within 
police orders and places them into practical situations of dissensus. He argues that a 
permanent state of radicalisation demands constant evaluation and rigour. This is 
what I suggest throughout and, most specifically, in Chapter 5 when I suggest that 
pedagogic tact is borne out of an engagement with curiosity and it makes demands of 
the temporal nature of both authentic engagement (Heidegger) and will (Rancière).  
0.3.5  Inherent Tensions between Heidegger and Rancière 
The placing of Rancière and Heidegger in close proximity might suggest a theoretical 
deadlock in terms of their views on equality.  One of the central problematics of this 
thesis is the complexity of defining and practising equality. Heidegger and Rancière 
propose very different ways of being, doing and seeing equality between peoples.  
 
The kind of equality that Rancière is concerned with, which is political equality, is 
not what is at stake in Heidegger.  There are, however, points of compatibility.  For 
instance, seen in formal terms, or 'existentially', the very idea of Dasein shows that, 
fundamentally, there is nothing essential in Dasein to differentiate one from the 
other: equality is implied by the term Dasein in this section of Being and Time: 
 
 
By "Others" we do not mean everyone else but me - those over against 
whom the "I" stands out. They are rather those from whom, for the most 
part, one does not distinguish oneself - those among whom one is too... 
The "too" means a sameness of being as circumspect overly concernful 
Being-in-the-world... By reason of this with-like Being-in-the-world, the 
world is always the one I share with others... Being-in is Being-with-
others (Italics added for emphasis 1962:154-157). 
 
 
Heidegger is not a political thinker, unlike Rancière. Notwithstanding his Catholic 
conservative leanings, and later dalliance with the Nazis, there are radical 
implications in Heidegger's thought that perhaps even he was not aware of. If 
Heidegger does not speak of political equality and emancipation, it is because he 
does not belong to the tradition of thought that is basically French, running from 
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Rousseau to Rancière. So there are cultural philosophical traditions separating them 
too. This does not mean that Heidegger has nothing to contribute to an 
understanding of equality grasped at a fundamental human level of pre-political 
association. I engage with Heidegger’s notion of Mitsein or being-with in Chapter 5. 
Regardless of ideological differences, the two philosophers speak in various and 
different ways to the radical equality that I wish to adopt in my pedagogy. 
 
As reading and practice came together in the process of writing, it became clear that 
what was most interesting to me in Heidegger’s work was that which was closest to 
Rancière’s theory: the shared proposition of a possibility through the methodological 
excavation of will. The possibility of authenticity and the possibility of equality 
enacted through routines of doing, being and seeing.  The proposition that is made 
by Rancière, similar to Heideggerian authenticity, is that equality is not an absolute 
state or final outcome of learning. It is enacted in the moments of engagement in 
which one is communicated with in an equalising way. Rancière suggests that the 
possibility of ongoing equality is, therefore, impossible. It must be constantly verified 
through acts of dissensus and emancipation. Universal teaching is his method for 
equalising only in the moment of its practice.  
I recognise that both theorists place import upon the poetic and descriptive 
ambiguities of life as lived through doing, being, seeing and speaking. In my work 
specifically, this means that I engaged with the phenomenological description of 
seven moments that activated my awareness of the tact needed to encounter risk and 
that engaged with notions of equality.  I recognise and interrogate the seemingly 
deterministic elements that are part of the encounter such as the social pressure to 
conform or the mathematical formula for risk assessment. I map the distinct 
elements which are experienced as a whole and, in so doing, recognise that 
experience for me and for the students involved cannot be easily captured. 
 
 0.4  Terminology 
0.4.1 Tact 
Tact is defined by dancer Erin Manning as: 
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the “ready and delicate sense of what is fitting and proper in dealing 
with others... a skill or judgment when dealing with people or 
negotiating difficult situations; the faculty of saying or doing the right 
thing at the right time”... tact keeps me in the realm of almost-known, 
the anticipated-in-advance. (2007:134/5)  
Tact, therefore, is a skill of prediction, judgment, social understanding, trust, moral 
and ethical propriety which is negotiated in the momentary. It is dependent upon 
knowledge of the past and intention towards the future. The term is useful because it 
attests to the complexity of teaching. It recognises that a moment is lived, 
experienced, witnessed, judged and analysed through the cultural frames that it also 
exposes and which I discuss in the next chapters. Each moment of teaching is filtered 
through the moral heuristics of the teacher and student involved. The outcome of 
taking a risk by touching a student or teaching a dangerous movement cannot be 
predicted but the task of teaching demands that a prediction is made and that the 
risk will engage the student towards self-knowledge.  
The term ‘tact’ is useful in terms of describing pedagogy as temporal and spatial as 
well as emphasising the practical demands made upon the teacher to expose the 
physical interactions at play within the room. In Van Manen’s words, tact emphasises 
‘a heedful, mindful wondering about the project of life, of living and what it means to 
live a life’ (1990:12). Through a discussion of pedagogic tact, I can thoughtfully 
attend to life and the process of living and how this is given meaning within my 
pedagogy. The fact that the term ‘tact’ is etymologically linked with the term ‘touch’, 
which is one of the taboo discourses at play within my practice, means I am aware of 
how touch and touching others can be seen as a lens through which to observe all 
negotiations of curiosity and trust within any pedagogic or dialogic relationship.  
Tact can be viewed as consideration of the ethical structures at play within a scenario 
that permits students and teacher to touch each other as well as taking it beyond this 
to the awareness that touch mobilises trust and challenges a ‘police order’ that 
forbids it (Rancière 1991). Manning suggests that tact ‘abides within the conditions of 
possibility of touch’ (2007:135). Tactful rumination correlates directly with the 
notion of Heidegger’s anticipatory resolution as an articulation of the possibility for 
self-exposure and self-concealment through encounters. The student is free to choose 
whether to fear being touched and touching others or embrace the possibility of 
touch as a vibrant part of the work. The notion of the possibility of touch is opened 
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within the first example given in the second chapter of this thesis: The Slap. It is an 
ethically loaded and culturally dangerous example because demands are made upon 
those who are charged to ‘hold’ the frame under which The Slap is enacted.  
Social context holds and constitutes the definition of trust. This encompasses the 
notions of a mutual assurance within the dialogue and the strata of ensurance and 
vulnerability that are alive/embodied discourses within the room. The issue of a 
temporality that demands that I have known when and how to touch recognises the 
ecstatic engagement I discuss in Chapter 5, where Heidegger claims ‘only an entity 
which is equiprimordially in the process of having been... can take over its 
thrownness’ (1964: 437). Only if I have a memory of our tactile relation can I use 
touch in such a way as not to throw you back to a fear-like state but I can also engage 
it in such a way that we are able to ‘dance’ (in Manning’s practice) or learn (in my 
practice) together. Manning’s5 suggestion that, ‘[t]act embodies this injunction that 
challenges me in advance to have known how and when I should or should not touch’ 
(2007:134), reinforces the need for permission, negotiation and temporality. Tact, in 
this instance, defines the complex web of tensions held by the teacher in a moment of 
practice.  
The student is assured by the teacher’s tactful response to their work in the rehearsal 
and training room and the engagement of the student’s will is ensured through the 
mobilising element of ‘concern’ that is the manner of the teacher’s enactment of the 
pedagogic relation (Heidegger, 1962: 158). A constant attentiveness to the two 
elements of curiosity and tact ensures that the teacher is aware of the mobility and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	   It is important to note that Manning works from the framework of Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘Body without 
Organs’ paradigm:  
The body without organs is an egg: it is crisscrossed with axes and thresholds, with latitudes 
and longitudes and geodesic lines, traversed by gradients marking the transitions and the 
becomings, the destinations of the subject developing along these particular vectors. (1972:13) 
I take this as a reinforcement of Heideggerian principles in the general sense although this is an unorthodox 
position due to Deleuze and Guattari’s scepticism of the phenomenological tradition. It does, however, not only 
play into the hands of a phenomenological description of a poetic scenario but also engages with the ‘body’ of the 
student and teacher as one that performs and flows under political conditions, and is defined and contained 
within them (Ibid:146). Deleuze and Guattari’s proposition is that the body is a site upon which culture resides in 
an act of looking without seeing the whole, the strata that I mention in Chapter 4, that it is impossible to stop or 
fragment because the experience is perceived in a totality. This can be seen as complementary to the 
Heideggerian ‘fall towards the everyday’, where the potential for one’s own death (and, therefore,  humanity) is 
lost within the idle chatter of the everyday. Because I see myself in a totality, unconscious of the social constraints 
imposed upon the act of touching, I ‘fall towards the everyday’ until I am touched. Touch, therefore, ruptures the 
injunction that I may be lost in the everyday concerns; it forces me to confront the notion of you and I in 
communal engagement. Tact is the element that ensures that this touch is made ‘in common’ with the other. 
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fragility of the element of trust, without which the practice is hindered. The need for 
trust calls for a concern towards the student; it demands that the student is ‘seen’ by 
the teacher and that this seeing is used to attend to their development as both a 
learner and a person. 
 
0.4.2 Curiosity 
I suggest that how a teacher is ‘concerned’ relates to ‘seeing’ the student in the first 
instance and being curious towards them in the second (Heidegger, 9162: 158). This 
notion of seeing is fundamental to the debate. For Heidegger, the action of seeing or 
having sight is a method that takes the see-er beyond the notion of seeing with the 
eyes towards a sense of seeing with the whole body. He notes that it is common to say 
‘I see a concert’ rather than ‘I hear’ one, despite the fact that the concert impacts 
upon all our senses beyond only the eyes (1962: 149). Heidegger develops an 
argument that to see is to know. He articulates that quotidian concern suggests that 
knowledge is only related to that which can be beholden through the eyes and 
cautions that this form of sight limits the potential to see in fullness (1962: 154). 
When I use the term ‘see’ in relation to the nature of the pedagogic relationship, I am 
recognising this tension between superficially viewing the student and knowing them 
in full rich depth through the eyes of my embodied understanding. I am creating a 
dialectical relation between observation and full knowledge. This dialectic 
encapsulates all the levels of knowledge that are the ‘truth’ of the student’s being, 
which are impossible to know, and sets it against the quotidian concerns for 
normative codes of assessment.  
I recognise that my intention to view the student in fullness is the mobilising force of 
the dialectic and also suggest that a curious concern ahead of the student enables me 
to engage in the momentary, rather than ‘leaping in’ and leading the student or 
myself towards a specific ‘reading’ that limits our possibilities (1962: 158). This part 
of my thesis is where I diverge from the Heideggerian frame most specifically. 
Heidegger is wary of the term ‘curiosity’, which he warns can lead towards ‘lust of the 
eyes’ whereby the sight is lured by unseen motives due to pleasure and also by ‘not 
tarrying’, which could be seen as distractedness and, therefore, part of the everyday 
idle chatter that categorises inauthentic Dasein. Heidegger’s suggestion is that, by its 
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very nature, curiosity can consequently fall away from authentic looking and 
openness towards lust and distraction (1962:216). 
It is the very character of curiosity which makes it a fundamental part of the 
framework I use within the classroom. I am attentive to newness, which means that I 
am open to receiving information on a number of levels as it comes to view. A change 
in breathing pattern by a student, or a memory that provokes me to offer an anecdote 
rather than a technical solution to the struggling student, are brought to 
consciousness and either attended or rejected by the teacher. These are all deviations 
from a set route from one place to another within my teaching, but curiosity enables 
me to see the individual within the frame. I am thereby able to attend to the needs of 
the six people in the room: my needs and the needs of the five students in my care. 
This does not mean that all the entities that are brought to my view serve to distract 
me from my purpose and intention. They are symbolic of a process of openness that 
demonstrates the fluidity and responsiveness needed to appreciate the tacit 
environmental, temporal, individual and spatial factors that are alive in the moment 
of practice. I reconcile the notion of intention here in Heideggerian terms as an 
enacted choice to work in common with the student.  
Heidegger elucidates that: 
[i]dle talk and curiosity take care in their ambiguity to ensure that what 
is genuinely and newly created is out of date as soon as it emerges 
before the public. Such a new creation can become free in its positive 
possibilities only if the idle talk which covers it up has become 
ineffective, and if the ‘common’ interest has died away. (1962:218)  
He notes that ambiguity creates and closes down opportunities for an authentic 
relationship to being in the moment and cautions that, by being curious, you open 
yourself up to a greater quotidian pull or more demonstrative fall towards the 
inauthentic. He cautions against curiosity because of its draw towards ambiguity, and 
takes a punitive tone with it rather than suggesting the benefits that it can have if the 
negative consequences are regarded in the moment.  
Heidegger is talking about free curiosity, which is one which is severed from concern 
and thereby ‘concerns itself with seeing not in order to understand what is seen... but 
just in order to see’ (1962:216). This type of free curiosity is not what I am 
advocating. Heidegger, however, does not offer a template for concerned curiosity so 
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I am rehearsing one through the journey of this thesis. Concerned curiosity 
champions a search for a holistic seeing of the student, recognises the dialectical 
position of knowledge as seeing and holds firm to the intention to richness rather 
than superficiality. This type of curiosity is, by its nature, doomed to failure due to 
the impossibility of its task but at the same time carries the possibility of depth. This 
brings us back to anticipatory resolution as one that houses the ‘possibility of 
acquiring power over Dasein’s existence and of basically dispersing all fugitive self-
concealments’(1964: 358). It is characterised by joy and sobriety. This joy and 
sobriety, as well as exhaustion, will be articulated through the course of Chapter 6 as 
a poetic strata of emotional rumination upon the nature of pedagogic tact and how it 
was experienced by me through the work. 
Curiosity is impossible to sustain. Like all the attention factors open for discussion 
within this thesis, its ability to respond to newness within an intended concern 
creates exhaustion within the teacher as it does within performers. So it is necessary 
for the teacher to be mindful of her needs within this fluid process, mindful of the 
factors that are at play within the student’s being, and attentive to her own embodied 
experience as a student and concerned (and, therefore, intended) teacher. I want to 
emphasise that concerned curiosity is attentive to personal as well as external 
concerns and how they are felt or seen within the moment. The teacher is embroiled 
within the dynamic of seeing, inextricably bound to the action and resolution of the 
student in the moment. She is responsible, distant, reflexive, embodied, intentioned 
and attentive.  
0.4.3  Trust 
The process of building trust is one that develops through every interaction with a 
student. It is never a finalised end-point but is a journey of negotiations, honesty and 
tact. Although tact and curiosity form a distinct section within this part of the 
chapter, they all serve to intertwine, reinforce and underpin each other. Without tact 
there is no trust, without trust there is no curiosity, without curiosity there can be no 
tact. My intention is towards the articulation of the teacher ‘holding’ a framework 
that allows the tactful negotiations to be fluid, mobile and, perhaps most 
importantly, discursive.  
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Trust, therefore, evades definition in the strictest sense. It reflects the shared 
intention to be safe within the work, and the shared ongoing journey towards self- 
discovery. It encompasses the various notions of ensurance, assurance and insurance 
that I elucidate upon in the next section and declares that all these are subject to 
interrogation at any point in the process. Trust is impossible to objectify. For 
Rancière, trust is defined by the ‘struggle for equality which can never be merely a 
demand upon the other, nor a pressure put upon him, but always simultaneously a 
proof given to oneself’ (199o:43). The proof given to oneself is key to my 
identification of trust as an interlocutor as well as foundation for the work. The 
dialogic exchanges all need to come in the form of an equalising dialogue in order to 
act beyond a simple demand. Trust is the fabric of the relationship. It could be said 
that, from Rancière’s perspective, the demands placed upon me for insurance from 
the institution could have destabilised the equalising process and, therefore, the trust 
within the work is doomed to fail. However, from my perspective, beyond the 
insurance demands themselves was an appreciation and interrogation of the 
demands through dialogue. In such a way, I am engaging with the police order that 
Rancière warns against. This police order sits within the context of the work and is a 
potent discourse within it. How it is challenged, extended, inverted or reinstated 
within the pedagogic process is a tactful negotiation that the teacher is faced with in 
each encounter with the students.  
 
 0.4.4  Mapping 
Throughout this thesis I have used the language of cartography as both a metaphor 
for tactful praxis and a methodological approach to documenting that praxis. The 
metaphorical analogy describes the rigorous and attentive thoughtfulness that a 
teacher engages when working closely with the student. This process takes into 
consideration the social context, past experiences and future intentions of all 
involved within the moments of risk-taking, and it is never finished. Each teacher 
will map the teacher-student relationship differently. Adam Cohen, the flying trapeze 
teacher whom I interviewed when at the Circus Space, consciously observes the 
actions of each student from the minute they arrive in the room. I observe and listen 
in a similar manner, noting the incongruities between what a student says and what 
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they do. I am attempting to make each student present to myself in order to tactfully 
negotiate where the risks are for them and how I can then challenge the student 
safely.  
The map is temporal, spatial and an unending project, because the students’ needs 
and associations change from moment to moment and in different spaces or social 
contexts; they are never set in their ways. My embodied map documents every 
encounter from the past, my awareness of the space and social hierarchy the student 
is in and my attention to them in the present. The map is therefore fluid and 
responsive rather than set and prescriptive.  This thesis represents a part of the 
tangible documentation of my mapping of pedagogic praxis. The other part is lived, 
and is consequently composed and recomposed through its creation and use.  	  
I map the ephemeral territories of the work as it appears for me in full awareness 
that I am on unstable ground. The territory changes moment by moment. In 
discussing and allegorising this map, I am inviting a performative encounter between 
the reader and myself. Chris Perkins suggests that ‘a performative approach sees 
mapping as not only taking place in time and space, but also capable of constituting 
both. New worlds are made every time a map is deployed... [it] is always being made 
and consumed’ (2004:2). The map that I have created over the course of my teaching 
career, through my interviews with John Paul Zaccarini and Matilda Leyser, through 
my experience as a trapeze artist, and through my pedagogic practice on Hello Fatty 
has been remade through the drafting process of this document and is consumed 
within the document itself. It constitutes the meaning of the practice in time and 
space and is also the memory of it. 
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Chapter 1.0 
Research Methods 
My research is practice-led. I utilise the medium of writing to interweave multiple 
strands of reflection upon teaching in order to become a better teacher. The writing 
became a practice in itself. Through it I rehearse a form of phenomenological 
analysis which invites the reader to engage with the problematic of risk and pedagogy 
through the act of reading.  
 
In this chapter, I rationalise my research method and provide a summary of the 
multi-layered hermeneutic and heuristic methods that I used to capture the themes 
of the work. I detail the ethical considerations of the work and outline some of the 
‘sureties’ that I navigated. I will describe the five day project, its purpose and how the 
project design offered opportunities for reflection.   
The project began by engaging with the practical implications of working with 
adolescents on trapezes. I surveyed the paperwork processes of risk assessment, 
rigging assessment, Criminal Records Bureau and ethical consent in order to comply 
with the Central School of Speech and Drama Good Practice in Research policy. I 
realised immediately that these forms are a vital part of the research practice.  They 
are integral to the doing of trapeze. Moreover, reflection upon this doing reveals 
many strata of information that  the teacher negotiates. Filling in forms and 
answering questions highlighted many of the philosophical questions that motivated 
the research: what is risk? What is safety? What is harm? What is acceptable harm? 
What is consent? How can a student consent to potential harm? Because of the 
importance and significance of this process, I began to document it in a personal 
journal.  This is a heuristic research project: I learn from trial and error, and unpack 
each ‘critical incident’ in minute detail (Tripp, 1993:3).  
I designed and reflected upon a five  day project with five young people, which gave 
opportunity for me to explore the practices under debate. This section describes the 
research methods I employed through the project, the design of the workshops, the 
interviews I conducted with teachers, the hermeneutic conversations I had with my 
assistant and the reflections I made in my journal. It outlines a clear mode of 
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dialogical, iterative and progressive investigation that resulted in the performative 
and discursive style of the thesis. 
The questions posed in this thesis concern the nature of pedagogy as it appears to me 
within moments of teaching risk. It is therefore a phenomenological study in as much 
as it concerns a particular interest ‘in what life is like... especially in terms of the 
things that matter to us’ (Smith, Flowers and Larkin, 2009:11). As I noted in my 
foreword, this research fuses my desire to be a better teacher with the desire to 
emancipate students through encounters with risk. It is more than a distant research 
project, it is a momentary celebration and recognition of what matters most for me. 
It has elements of hermeneutics because it is primarily an interpretation of the lived 
moments of my practice and uses hermeneutic circles as a way of clarifying 
interpretations through discussions and interviews. It is also ideographic because it 
is concerned with the particular and. most specifically, with the minute details of an 
event ‘which leads to a re-evaluation of the importance of a single case-study’ (Smith 
et al, 2009:32). So, in this way, I have created a project which has all the features of 
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis as defined by Jonathan Smith, Paul 
Flowers and Michael Larkin (2009). Where my method diverges from this is that 
Smith et al consider research done into what participants think and feel conducted 
mainly from interviews whereas the focus of my study is upon my own 
understanding as it is mapped through the work and in the work. Interviews form a 
part of, but not the whole research form; the rest is phenomenological analysis and 
description of critical incidents within the work. It therefore follows Van Manen’s 
‘systematic, explicit, self-critical and intersubjective study of... our lived experience’ 
(1990:11) in as much as it is framed through the lens of my journey to understand my 
practice through interview, practice and reflection.      
The five day workshop was structured to engage my observation of the relationship 
between myself and the students in a number of ways. One of the problems when 
researching lived-experience is the matter of data collection and discussion. In my 
teaching practice I do many things-  some planned in advance and some not -  with 
many young people over a large amount of time. This is impossible to fully 
document.  David Tripp proposes that the real art of teaching lies within developing 
professional judgment in situations where there is no ‘right answer’ (1993:3). He 
espouses a method of reflection whereby a teacher considers aspects of their practice 
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and begins to unpack all the discourses and possibilities it may hold. He suggests 
that this reflective practice cultivates good teaching practise. The method that he 
offers involves the selection of ‘critical’ incidents from a teacher’s experience and a 
systematic discussion of those incidents. ‘[C]ritical incidents are not ‘things’ which 
exist independently of the observed and are awaiting discovery... [they] are produced 
by the way we look at a situation... an interpretation of the significance of an event’ 
(1993:8).  By applying Tripp’s concept to my practice I am able to identify some 
critical incidents that appear to exemplify my whole practice. Within the single 
moments, I begin to see the themes that may appear through the whole of my 
teaching work. 
The project was designed so that I could teach the seemingly dangerous practice of 
static trapeze and to provide an opportunity for me to witness myself doing this 
teaching. Because the students and I were together for six hours a day, I was able to 
observe the development and progression of each student over an intense period. 
This added depth to the way I was in contact with the students. Simple exercises that 
were repeated offered new insights through repetition over the five days. I was able 
to notice the impact and importance of working with only four other students in 
terms of their perception of risks and their ability to reflect upon their own 
development. In this way, the size of the sample added an intimacy to the 
relationships and, I feel, offered greater opportunities for the development of trust. 
As you will see on reading, it provided too many insights to be considered fully 
within this document. On reflection, I have selected eight key incidents that as if they 
represented the key moments of learning through the five days.  The sample size 
recognises the importance I place upon knowing the student, listening to them as an 
individual and challenging them at their own level. In Chapter 3, I unpack some of 
the contentions within emancipatory discourse and demonstrate the complexity of 
individuisation on a grand scale.  
 
1.1 The Practice – Hello Fatty  
I invited the students to learn trapeze with me for five days. The research project 
itself began before this invitation - with a conversation with the Central School of 
Speech and Drama about what should be in place prior to the project, the results of 
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which can be seen within Chapter 2. I observed and noted in my journal the students’ 
and carers’ responses to the invitation and reflected upon the insights from the 
conversations. This achieved a preliminary layer of understanding about the 
concerns that surrounded these individual children and  individual carers about the 
project.  
The students were introduced to circus training through an induction at The Circus 
Space in Hoxton, London. This induction was designed to achieve a number of 
things. Firstly, it introduced the intense physicality of the work in a highly structured 
manner, in a specialist environment. This specialist environment distanced the 
students from their association of the project with me and reinforced the safety 
practices that I would implement through the further days of the project. It 
introduced the good practices of warm-up and cool-down and some of the 
terminology, whilst heightening the status of the project by offering the ‘glamorous’ 
practice of flying trapeze which I could not offer at the Central School of Speech and 
Drama. It also afforded me the distance to observe each student and their response 
to the aerial practice. This observation became a part of my tactful practice when 
working with them over the following days. 
A full account of the precise scheme of work I used is available in Appendix B. This is 
because I am not attempting to model a way of teaching risk. Instead I hope to 
describe how risk manifests itself within the practice. So I created a structure for the 
sessions that was typical of my practice in classrooms and workshops. I warmed the 
group up, attending to their particular physical presence; we engaged in some 
conditioning exercises to prepare them to be in the air and then we worked on the 
equipment. Usually this means that a couple of the students would be working with 
me at the static trapeze and the others would be climbing the rope. My assistant, 
Dave, and I would be supporting the students and engaging them with doing it in a 
more effective manner. Each of the students would propose a move to me or to Dave 
and we would teach them that move. The details of how certain moves were taught is 
exemplified within the critical incidents discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.  After the 
students had learnt movements, they spent some time in ‘free play’ with the 
equipment - working together and singly to see what they could do. At the end of this 
playtime, we cooled the group down, stretched our bodies and had lunch. This 
structure follows the familiar pattern of creative workshop sessions throughout the 
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world. Following that existing pattern, typical of my practice, allowed me insight into 
how the general experience impacted upon the individual attention I could give to 
each student. Each element of the project design, and session structure pointed my 
observant attention back to equality, the founding premise of this work. 
Each day I spent about 20 minutes giving individual attention to each student on 
either the trapeze or the rope. I did this to provide opportunities for me to ‘see’ them, 
and attend to what I saw. The work was designed to give opportunity for me to 
observe the student and teacher relationship and to reflect upon it. 
The afternoon consisted of a two-hour devising session which I call provocations. In 
this, the students tested their understanding of themselves as actors and people in 
relation to philosophical questions. These afternoon sessions are less intensively 
documented through this thesis, apart from the examples of The Slap used at the 
beginning of   Chapter 2 and The Game used in Chapter 6. The reason for this is that 
I made another discovery through the work: that the aerial sessions enabled me to 
magnify the pedagogic process in a way that the devising sessions did not. The aerial 
work, therefore, became the locus of the whole study.6 However, these ground-based 
sessions were fundamental to the intensity and ephemeral dynamics at play within 
the process. The students would not have been able to sustain a full day of aerial 
training, due to exhaustion. However, in the afternoon, this exhaustion led to honest, 
‘risky’ and open devising between the students which fed-back directly into the aerial 
elements of the work.  
Detail of the specific games and exercises taught can be found in Appendix B. They 
provide the context of the work for a reader who is interested in learning how I 
taught. However, they do not evidence the problematics of the research. This is not a 
thesis upon how to teach students to take risks. It is a description of a relationship 
between teacher and student in which the notion of risk is itself challenged. My 
thesis should not be read as a handbook on how to teach but as a reflection upon the 
way that risk appeared for me in the work and a description of the tact that I needed 
to be able to notice and or engage with it.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Before that point, I had taken a more inclusive view on risk-taking in that I had considered the risks taken by 
actors and the risk of failure associated with clowning. These became supporting elements to the enquiry rather 
than specific chapters, as I had first intended.	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1.2  Critical Reflection 
My research practice and method evolved as the project progressed. That is a benefit 
of phenomenological research: it seeks to honour momentary revelation. I was 
surprised by the insights that being at the Circus Space brought to the research. 
Consequently, I responded by interviewing Adam Cohen, the trapeze teacher who 
introduced the students to flying. His thoughts and practices deepen my 
understanding of teaching trapeze and form a part of the ruminations herein.  
I employed a research assistant, Dave, to work with me on the project. This was for 
practical purposes to document the work, be a supportive pair of hands with the 
equipment, lead some of the warm-ups so that I could observe and as a hermeneutic 
device for reflection. The extra person in the room achieved the possibility of being 
inside and outside the work. I chose a researcher familiar with phenomenology and 
hermeneutics, familiar with aerial work (he was a trapeze student) and familiar with 
teaching (he teaches clowning). He was someone whose insights I trusted and whose 
playfulness, I felt, complemented my own presence in the room. I also chose a man 
for this role. The purpose of this was to gain insight into how gender might become 
part of the discourse at key moments.  
I have written in two ways: phenomenological writing, as described by Van Manen 
(1993) and performance writing as advanced by Pollack (1998).  I use 
phenomenological writing to capture eight incidents from my teaching where critical 
insight was gained or gleaned by me. These critical incidents, as argued by Tripp,  
are mostly straightforward accounts of very commonplace events that 
occur in routine professional practice which are critical in the rather 
different sense that they are indicative of underlying trends, motives and 
structures... they are rendered critical through analysis. (1993:25)  
 
Through the course of the workshops, I took note of many incidents in which I made 
pedagogic judgments. Where I took decisions to stop, challenge, evade or reveal 
social and momentary discourses with the students. Incidents such as these happen 
many times in a single hour in any classroom. In analysis, they provide the personal 
and experiential narrative that brings a teacher’s pedagogic tact to the fore.  
The critical incidents are edited and refined as an elucidation from my journals. They 
are not verbatim transcripts, or reflective accounts of the event written at the time. 
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They are accounts filtered through the many layers of hermeneutic analysis. They are 
therefore not referenced. I wrote them in a different tone from the sections that 
precede and follow them; therefore they are in a different font. There are however, 
citations from my journal which are fully referenced. These perform a different 
function from the critical incidents, they articulate the immediate questions and 
meanings that resounded from the work for me. They perform two functions, firstly, 
by declaring my immediate voice as relevant, and second, as a performance of 
vigilance and reflection. 
The process of drafting and redrafting my reflective journal is a form of 
phenomenological analysis.  What I do is embody the problematic of risk through 
writing. This problematic manifests itself within intense reflection and 
experimentation: I think, I do and I write to think and do.  This is where my research 
diverges from Jonathan Smith, Paul Flowers and Michael Larkin’s Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis most specifically (2009). They provide a framework 
under which the researcher engages a participant in cycles of hermeneutic or 
interpretative reflection in order to extract meaning. What I do is work through 
cycles of reflection myself in order to deepen the understanding of my actions in the 
moments of practice. So, the process followed phenomenological analysis through 
the following hermeneutic cycles: 
1) In the moment I become aware that something interesting is happening or has 
happened.  
2) I follow a process of reflection upon this in the moment. This is what Smith et al. call 
‘intuitive, undirected reflection’ because it is not formed into a specific learning point, 
but moments are witnessed as being important (2009:189).  
3) These intuitive moments are vocalised in a conversation between me and my research 
assistant. This is an attentive, although discursive, reflection where moments are 
considered as significant and noted as such.  
4) At the end of the day, the moments discussed are engaged with as critical incidents in 
my journal. According to Tripp, critical incidents become such because of the 
attention given to them (1993).  
5) The critical incidents are written and rewritten over the course of the research, 
sometimes six or seven times. This is the first layer of written reflection. 
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6) I isolate key strata from each critical incident from which I begin the second weave of 
multilayered writing.  This way of viewing the incident, reveals the nature of the risks 
being taken. It is the mapping of the perception of the moment. 
7) The third level of reflective writing brings the professional, pedagogic and 
philosophical theory into play.  
Moments of practice are reflected upon in seven modes, and through multiple lenses. 
Each level of reflection brings more depth and in turn embodies the tact needed to be 
a teacher.  This research method reveals and articulates the rigour I take when 
attending towards the students in my care. This thesis therefore performs the 
reflective cycle undergone through 5 years of study. Pedagogue and phenomenologist 
Max Van Manen suggests that writing empowers us with embodied knowledge: 
Writing involves a textural reflection in the sense of separating and 
confronting ourselves with what we know, distancing ourselves from the 
[immediacy], decontextualizing our thoughtful preoccupations from 
immediate action, abstracting and objectifying our lived understandings 
from concrete involvements, and all this for the sake of now reuniting us 
with what we know, drawing us more closely to living relations and 
situations, turning thought to a more tactful praxis, and concretizing and 
subjectifying our deepened understanding in practical action... my 
writing as a practice prepared me for an insightful praxis in the world. 
(1990:128/9) 
 
So the process of writing has manifested and accreted new understandings upon the 
nature of tactful pedagogy because it distances me, draws me towards and performs 
my primary concern: the equality of the students. In the moment I become aware of 
an incident, in discussion I begin to reflect upon it; when I write in my journal I 
begin to engage with the possibilities the incident might hold for new ways of 
understanding teaching. I write and rewrite, iterating and exploring the possibilities 
of the incident/encounter and this thesis is a part of that iterative cycle. It discloses 
the vigilance required by the teacher, and performs tactful praxis.  
1.3 Interviews 
The practical experiment part of the research began as soon as I invited the students 
to participate. The invitation itself forms a layer within the reflective processes of the 
work, and the students’ responses to the invitation have impacted upon the way I 
view the matter of the work itself.  Working with children means that there is a 
secondary layer of discourse that involves the children’s carers and deals with 
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informed consent. I discuss this in detail in section 1.4. My conversations with carers 
feature within the material used to add texture within the writing. Although I do not 
formally interview the carers, their voices are heard as a potent part of the discussion 
because of the weight they carry within the meaning-making of the young people.  
Van Manen suggests that in hermeneutic practice conversation and interview 
perform two interconnected functions 1) they serve as a gathering exercise for 
developing and enriching the researcher’s reflections and 2) they are a means of 
establishing dialogue and conveying trust (1990:66). What he iterates is that 
conversations and anecdotes enable the researcher to develop a keen sense of what 
the phenomena being researched is like. He emphasises that what you are doing in 
conversation is refining the point you are considering, and also repeating and 
replaying the significance of dialogue. 
I conducted formal interviews with a number of people whose teaching has impacted 
upon my own understanding of pedagogy and the practices of risk-taking: aerialists 
and teachers,  Matilda Leyser, John Paul Zaccarini and Adam Cohen. The interviews 
served to explicitly locate and reflect upon the I/researcher by acknowledging the 
impact of the professional expectations and codes and of the individual voices of my 
peers within it. In such a way, I am better able to witness the lens through which I 
practice my methodology in the first instance and it has added perspective and depth 
to the practice itself.   
The point of phenomenological research is to “borrow” other people’s 
experiences and their reflections on their experiences in order to better 
be able to come to an understanding of the deeper meaning or 
significance of human experience within the context of the whole of 
human experience (Van Manen, 1990:62) 
 
By utilising the experiences of professional aerial teachers, quoting them directly and 
witnessing the threads of meaning they articulate when considering their practice. I 
place my pedagogy into dialogue with others. It brings new insights into my work, 
gives me new language through which to explore it, and insights into the contentious 
way I may have viewed a critical incident. These interviews provide balance and 
depth to this, very personal, account of teaching. 
 
 
Hartley,	  J.	  R.	  2013	  
	  
45	  
	  
1. 4 Thesis Structure 
	  
This thesis exists as a momentary pause and reflection into the nature of pedagogy, 
risk and tact. In it, the struggle to unravel the meaning and the instincts within the 
practice, the tension between doing, being and saying, becomes apparent. It 
therefore follows an untraditional thesis structure. I have rejected the traditional 
teleological form in favour of something that dialogues with it and through it, in the 
way that life is lived. The rationale for this is that it speaks to, of and through my 
experiences of teaching in order to uncover the nature of teaching as a performed act 
that is needfully fluid. By this I mean that teaching is often mobilised by an intense 
feeling that cannot be explained or described directly, that may slowly become 
clearer through iterative and emerging reflections. This section makes the case for 
writing that works in parallel with scientific analysis and critically describes the 
experience of teaching. The form of the thesis maps the encounter through the 
process of being, doing and seeing the practice.  
The thesis begins with a practical question. What do I need to do in order to safely 
teach static trapeze to young people at the Central School of Speech and Drama? This 
simple question led me down two paths, the practical and existential. My practical 
journey began with a conversation with the Technical Manager of the school about 
risk, and the filling in of a risk assessment form. Therefore the thesis begins with that 
question. What is risk? How is it measured? How is it defined, manifested, rehearsed 
and contained within education?  These questions resulted in a risk assessment being 
made by a professional circus rigger, who acknowledged the possibility of the highest 
level of risk: multiple deaths. My reading at this point led me to recognise that risk is 
not something objectively measured, but fundamentally, something we experience, 
and which can profoundly unsettle and challenge because of its association with 
existential death. Each chapter therefore works as a dialogue between the practical 
and existential frames used to insure, ensure and assure the students safety during 
the work. No element carries more weight. Without insurance, the students, their 
family and mine are vulnerable to financial ruin should the worst possible accident 
happen. Without consideration of the experiential and existential elements I may 
place the students at greater risk of accident.  
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 The form of the thesis performs, reveals and uncovers some of the experience of 
being a teacher and practicing static trapeze. As Pollack suggests, performance 
writing is evocative, metonymic, subjective, nervous, citational and consequential, it  
simultaneously slips the choke hold of conventional (scientific, rational) 
scholarly discourses and their enabling structures. It moves with, 
operates alongside, sometimes through, rather than above or beyond, the 
fluid, contingent, unpredictable, discontinuous rush of (performed) 
experience – and against the assumption that (scholarly) writing must 
or should do otherwise. (1998:81)  	  
I argue in Chapter 1 that risk is experiential, that any attempt to measure, calculate 
and therefore manage it is impossible unless experiential, subjective experience is 
taken into account. It becomes necessary to consider the lived experience of teacher 
and participants within the teaching encounter. Therefore, it would be erroneous to 
attempt to capture experience through traditional scholarly writing alone. Scholarly 
writing dialogues with the more performative aspects, and it is this dialogue that is 
the practice of pedagogy for me: iterative, circulatory, poetic and at times, 
contradictory. 
The descriptive part of my research and reflection follows a modified version of a 
phenomenological method of qualitative research as discussed by Max Van Manen. 
Van Manen advocates a method of ‘systematic, explicit, self-critical, and 
intersubjective study of its subject matter, our lived experience’ (1990: 11). This 
systematic method of documentation is revealed more fully within Chapters 1, 2, 4 
and 6 of this thesis where I describe my practice and identify the territories of risk 
that are tactfully negotiated within pertinent moments of practice as they appear to 
me. These are what Van Manen (1990) calls the ‘themes’ that resonate through the 
work. The themes form the basis for my learning points and conclusions about the 
nature of pedagogic tact in action at the end of Chapter 6.  
My research deals with the relationship between student and teacher when 
attempting ‘risky’ work. A phenomenological approach to the research orientates my 
qualitative findings towards the existential experiences gained by students and 
teachers within the moments of the pedagogic relationship. It does not seek to 
analyse, or empirically prove a hypothesis surrounding risky experiences, so a 
teleological approach to writing would be unsound. I will not bring statistical finding 
or positivist outcomes. For phenomenology is what Maurice Merleau-Ponty calls a 
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‘poetizing project’; it aims to create a dialogic understanding between the researcher 
and the reader (1962:4). In other words, phenomenological description is collected 
from lived experience and evokes lived experience, through rigorous attention to and 
orientation with the life experiences of the participants. It is validated by lived 
experience and it validates lived experience. This existential approach to philosophy, 
which recognises the situatedness of ‘being in the world and of the world’ is the 
overarching philosophical perspective of my methodology due to the complex 
intertwining dialogues of passion and reason that the study of risk evokes 
(Heidegger, 1962). Through an expression of the lived moment, the moment exists 
and is experienced. Drafting and redrafting the moment through seven levels of 
hermeneutic analysis for purposes of documentation is a part of the method of 
remembering and identifying the event phenomenologically: I clarify the experience 
of the situation as it appears to me. Themes begin to emerge through each critical 
incident. Notions of death, failure, pain, rupture, stultification, consent, touch, 
circus, risk and violence reveal themselves in the momentary, they regress, ‘repeat, 
revise, replay and remand’ through the chapters in the way that they do in my 
mapped encounters with the students that I teach (Pollack in Phelan 1998:76).  
Pollack articulates the contiguous relationship between the reader and the writer 
(Pollack in Phelan 1998:86). Echoing Rancière’s notion that the text is the ‘third 
thing’ that mobilises understanding and emancipation between teacher and student, 
the text itself, by being performative, by evoking and embodying the research 
methodology, creates equality through the open spaces that it leaves for the reader to 
place their own subjective understanding. Thereby it closes the gaps:  
in the name of mobilizing praxis... towards materializing possibility in 
and through a kind of writing that is distinctly performative: writing that 
recognizes its delays and displacements while proceeding as writing 
toward engaged, embodied material ends. (Pollack in Phelan, 1998:96)  
 
The writing herein will therefore perform the research undergone. It evokes the 
problematic nature of perception that is often ephemeral and intuitive, the 
fragmentation of meaning that happen when experiences are progressive and the 
false stops and repetitions that occur when rigorous attention is given to those 
experiences. The way this may be captured in the written form is through 
hermeneutic, iterative, descriptive, phenomenological performative writing. 
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1.5  Ethics  	  
There is a singular ethical imperative that drives my work. It therefore underpins the 
research design and the composition, representation and selection of the students I 
have used within the study: that all people are equal.  
The practice of a pedagogy which is committed to equality demands an ongoing and 
open-ended conversation about the choices faced by teachers and the ethical issues 
that are involved in making them. My practice explores the relationship between 
circus, pedagogy, best-practice and ethics. My research was designed to interrogate 
the ethical issues that arise from working with children within situations of risk 
whilst adhering to the Central School of Speech and Drama’s best-practice 
guidelines.  Within the research method, I am supported by an institutional policy 
which is designed to ensure that students’ safety is of primary concern. However, the 
practice of radical equality motivates an interrogation of these policies. I propose in 
Chapters 2 and 3 that, within the framework provided, it is possible to act in 
dissensus to a social normative without placing a student ‘at risk’ because what 
constitutes a risk is different for each individual student. I raise the question of harm 
as a central problematic of this thesis. I do not seek to judge or question the 
procedures laid out to keep students safe; what I do is enact an attention to their 
definition in the momentary. What follows is a meditation upon the possibility or 
impossibility of emancipation and I wish to provoke conversations about the complex 
nature of ethical ‘best-practice’ when working with adolescents. 
The Code of Good Conduct in Research Policy for Central School of Speech and 
Drama reads: 
It is CSSD’s requirement that all research undertaken within the institution by 
staff and students should accord with the school’s equal opportunities policy, data 
protection legislation and general standards of good practice in the treatment of 
others (including non-humans). Because the school encourages all staff and 
students to engage in a process of critical self-reflection in relation to intellectual 
work and practice, it is expected that attention to social and ethical issues in 
research will be at the forefront of academic endeavour. Staff and students 
engaged in research are expected to foster good practice and intellectual integrity 
in all professional circumstances. (http://www.cssd.ac.uk/research/good-conduct-
research-policy)  
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It should be noted from this that the concept of professional integrity and critical 
self-reflection is key.  My research is a process of critical self-reflection and an 
exploration of ethics. I constantly attend and accord with this policy through praxical 
engagement at each stage. Taken in isolation, the practice of placing children on 
trapezes may be deemed to be ethically problematic. When taken in association with 
a practice in pedagogic tact, a focus on equality and an attention to the mobility of 
consent, I am able to argue that my work adheres to best-practice. It is my 
responsibility to apply a diligent focus upon the voice of the students in my care, 
which makes this ethical practice momentary; it is the complexity of attempting this 
in practice which forms a foundation and reason for the research. Moreover, this 
document reveals the complexity of professional integrity itself by offering different 
ways of being according to different scenarios with different students.  
Academic in Education, Priscilla Alterton, states that a discussion about ethics within 
research practices that involve children is often about finding a balance between 
extremes. She suggests that ‘modern standards of research ethics may depend on 
modern transparent research methods and... respectful relationships between 
researchers and children’ (Alderton in Fraser et al 2004: 97). A commitment to 
transparency and building relations between me as teacher/researcher and the 
students in my care is a major theme of this work. From the eight critical incidents of 
practice discussed in this document, and from the conversations mobilised by the 
Informed Consent Letter (Appendix A), I build a model for minute by minute 
consent. By that I mean that the students and carers are given a) a written summary 
of the risks involved. b) a conversation about this and the opportunity to ask any 
questions at any point in the process, c) a verbal commitment to and ongoing 
practice of transparency. d) the recognition that the trust they place in me may be 
taken away at any point and e) the ability to retract consent at any point in the 
process. A relationship with students and carers is therefore established from 
vigilance to the notion of consent. 
Consent is a problematic element to define. It is contingent upon whether a student 
is competent to sign a form to say they are happy to do trapeze. Consent demands 
that they understand the implications of saying yes in terms of the physical 
implications and in terms of the publication implications.  ‘Although children are not 
fully equal to adults, their status only raises when the strength and good sense of 
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many children is respected... [because] ethical research includes sensitive methods 
for discovering children’s own views and meanings’ (Alderton in  Fraser et al 
2004:103/4).  The recognition of the voices and opinions of the young people I work 
with is vital. Best practice when working with children generally hinges on the notion 
of voice. It questions how the researcher engages, listens to, empowers and respects 
the voice of the young people being researched. I recognise that not only are the 
words spoken by the children important, but so are the meanings and tacit 
communications they ascribe to the work. As previously articulated in section 0.4 
and as I will go on to explore in Chapters 5 and 6, there are multiple voices being 
attended to within this work. They pull the diligent researcher in divergent and 
sometimes contradictory directions. However, what my ethical stance and the 
guidance from The Central School of Speech and Drama remind me, is that the 
young people’s voices have higher status than any other. 
The Central School of Speech and Drama document continues: 
Particular principles that should be emphasized by researchers at all levels are: 
care and avoidance of harm; honesty and openness; accountability and 
appropriate documentation; confidentiality; informed consent; avoidance of 
conflicts of interest; compliance with the law and relevant codes of conduct; and 
due acknowledgement of collaborators, informants, participants or others 
contributors. Researchers should also be aware of best professional conduct in 
relation to animal and child welfare. (CSSD ND) 
The salient point articulated here is the importance of having an awareness and 
practice of professional conduct. There is a checklist for ethical approval in research 
at Central School of Speech and Drama, which I have attached as Appendix E. Each 
of the statements is covered by the Informed Consent Letter given to the participants 
and their carers (Appendix A).  What is not covered directly is the avoidance of 
conflicts of interest.  There is an ethical dimension to the selection of students for the 
research project. All were previously known to me, all  have been taught by me and  
consequently have more complex understandings of what ‘the research’ is, means 
and might entail.  
The student sample was selected using the best-practice solution for Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis, what researchers Smith et al call ‘opportunity’ 
(2009:49).  The situation under investigation is the nature of my teaching so 
students I teach would be the effective sample to use. Smith indicates that the 
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questions ‘how easily can they be contacted?’ and ‘[h]ow much variation can be 
contained within an analysis of this phenomenon?’ can drive the selection process 
(2009:49).  My preliminary research in the five years resulted in possible sample 
sizes as large as 98 students, with age ranges from 7-25 years. This was because these 
were the classes I was teaching and the breadth of students I was working with. I 
discovered that this level of variety resulted in excessive interview transcripts, hours 
of video footage, very limited contact with the wider community of the students and a 
superficial analysis of the material. The richness of the material became apparent as I 
reflected upon my relationship with each individual student over a sustained period. 
This was impossible for the vast number of students I taught and so I selected a 
much smaller sample size.  As Smith et al state, ‘The issue is quality, not quantity, 
and given the complexity of most human phenomena, Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis studies usually benefit from a concentrated focus on a 
small number of cases’ (2009:51). I discovered through other preliminary studies 
that, in order for me to consider the students as individuals, the sample size needed 
to be lower than seven. This was because a group of seven or above students started 
to behave like a group, rather than as individuals. Consequently, five students were 
chosen to provide concentrated opportunities for reflection through intense practical 
engagement with me. 
I acknowledge that the intensity of this relationship is of ethical concern. It could be 
suggested that I used past experience as a teacher/director to coerce the young 
people into working with me and also to skew the results towards a specific end-point 
that I had in mind. As discussed in Chapters 2, 5 and 6,that contention is a central 
problematic of this thesis and provides the formative argument that any 
emancipatory dialogue has the potential to liberate or domesticate participants. You 
will see from the examples given in my work that I do not have a specific end-point in 
mind. In Example 2, The Gazelle, I recognise the domesticating potential of my 
practice and the rigorous attention demanded from both teacher and student to 
challenge and declare the power structures at work.  I suggest that this practice, as 
articulated by Rancière and Freire, is impossible with large groups, and with groups 
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that are unfamiliar to the pedagogue. It is the accretion of an ongoing relationship 
that fuels and creates the possibility of trust.7 
The selection of participants is also of ethical concern. I selected a group based on 
their ability to represent ‘typical’ students, but also considered the practical aspects 
of the work, including their ability to easily get to the venues. I therefore ended up 
with a group of three girls and three8 boys, taken from two different areas of my 
professional work: youth theatre directing and secondary school teaching. Three 
students were performers I had directed and three were pupils I had taught. The fact 
that I had only taught in a single-sex school in London meant that I was limited to  
girls only if I chose ex-pupils. Although, as I will demonstrate, gender is a vital part of 
this thesis, I was keen not to limit the research in that capacity because that is not 
typical of my practice. Therefore, adding student performers from productions I had 
directed for a youth theatre meant that I was able to balance the group with equal 
amounts of boys and girls. Alderton emphasises the practical problems concerned 
with ensuring ‘that samples of children are selected fairly, to include ethnic minority 
groups and children of both genders and from a range of abilities, ethnicities, social 
backgrounds or languages’ (Alderton in Fraser et al 2004, 105). The range of ages of 
the students was between 15 and 18. For practical reasons, the students needed to be 
older than 15 in order to participate in the Circus Space induction at the start of the 
research. I was therefore limited to this age range because of that stipulation and 
because I wanted to focus on adolescents. I will define adolescents in Chapter 2 but, 
for purposes of this study, I am particularly interested in those young people of 
school age. So, the young people were aged 15, 16, 17 and 18 (two were 17). They were 
also representative of the ‘typical’ racial and social demographics of students I teach. 
A chart of the demographic of the final sample group is as follows: 
 
Age Gender Ethnicity Religion Free School 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Further	  research	  with	  different	  groups	  of	  young	  people,	  who	  are	  not	  already	  known	  to	  me,	  is	  explored	  and	  
proposed	  in	  the	  Conclusion.	  
8	  It	  should	  be	  pointed	  out	  at	  this	  point	  that	  although	  six	  students	  were	  selected	  for	  the	  project,	  only	  five	  
managed	  to	  stay	  the	  course.	  Effectively,	  one	  student	  withdrew	  consent	  by	  absenting	  himself	  on	  the	  first	  day	  of	  
the	  research.	  As	  you	  can	  see	  from	  the	  consent	  letter,	  I	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  they	  had	  responsibility	  to	  attend	  fully.	  
I	  decided	  that	  his	  unreliability	  was	  detrimental	  to	  the	  group	  and	  therefore	  to	  the	  research	  so	  his	  participation	  
was	  withdrawn.	  Hereafter	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  the	  six	  participants.	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Meals 
15 M White-British Jewish No 
16 F Mixed – Black/Asian 
(Pakistani) 
Muslim No 
17 M Mixed – White/Asian Catholic Yes 
17 F Black British – African None No 
18 F Mixed – White-Black 
(Caribbean) 
Rastafarian Yes 
 
Although I made an attempt to adhere to Alderton’s ‘fair’ selection of students, what I 
want to emphasise is the lack of import I place upon any of the factors within the 
chart above. My commitment to equality demands that I pay no heed to any factors 
other than the individual students and their individual needs. The demography of the 
students is important only to highlight the variety a ‘typical’ student might represent. 
Alan France discusses the notion of risk when researching with young people. He 
suggests that ‘harm reduction is a critical component of any research practice’. He 
quotes the British Sociological Association Guidelines when he says that we have ‘a 
responsibility to ensure that the physical, social and psychological well-being of our 
research participants is not adversely affected by the research’ (France in Fraser et.al 
2004: 184). The question of what constitutes adverse effects upon young people is 
therefore raised. I devote the entire second chapter of this thesis to the negative 
impacts trapeze work may have on the students involved; I detail seven territories of 
risk and exemplify them through a moment of practice. I invoke another premise 
from Central School of Speech and Drama’s Code of Conduct to justify exposing the 
students to any risk at all: 
These principles do not conflict with academic freedom, which allows individual 
researchers to pursue projects that may be unfashionable, provocative or 
unpopular, or which may include elements that open difficult ethical questions. 
I suggest that all work with young people raises ethical questions: mine does so explicitly. 
Work with touch, risk and transgression is designed to open difficult and provocative themes 
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in order to enquire about the very nature of what those things may mean in the world of 
education.   
 
I make a strong case for dialogue through this thesis. It is a commitment to transparency, 
and also to the furthering of my own understanding of ethics in the doing. I created the 
project in collaboration with my supervisory team and with the Ethics Committee at Central 
School of Speech and Drama. It adhered to a ‘common’ understanding of best-practice by 
following the mechanisms laid out. More than that, it recognised that these mechanisms in 
isolation were not ethics but that ethics are practiced in the doing of the work. The consent 
form is not where consent lies: consent resides in a moment of transparency and trust, as 
articulated by O’Neill in the Reith Lectures for the Human Genetics Advisory Commission: 
Informed consent presupposes and expresses trust... we ultimately have 
to judge for ourselves where to place our trust. To do this we need to find 
trustworthy information. This can be dauntingly hard in a world of one-
way communication (O’Neill in Fraser et.al 2004: 22). 
 
My attention to two-way communication does two things. Firstly, it mobilises the trust and 
therefore is the foundation for consent.  Secondly, it practises the equality that is the ethical 
imperative of my research. I recognise that communication about the event or practice is not 
the event itself. So, ultimately, consent is given based on a commitment from the teacher to 
be vigilant and attentive to the equality of the student in the moments of practice. I engage 
with this fully on pages 10 and 11 in the Introduction where I conclude that consent is an 
element of trust between teacher and student and that it is therefore mobile and momentary. 
Although I ‘hold’ the room for the students to work within, they are the ones ultimately in 
charge of whether they participate, take risks, offer research data or do not. I articulate the 
impossibility of the student and myself understanding the full implications of our 
involvement in the project but that we are learning together about what that might mean for 
us. 
 
1.5.1 Surety 
 
In this section, I consider the strata of ‘sureties’ that the teacher ‘holds’ for the work 
in order to comply with legal, ethical and practical concerns. These sureties impact 
upon the working moments of the practice by communicating the tensions detailed 
in Chapter 2. They are the practical and ideological hurdles that were cleared before I 
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could practice safely with the young people. An excavation of these tensions 
generates an all too familiar discourse through the practice -  that these systems can 
stultify or bind students and teachers before the work even begins if they are not 
enacted, lived and practised through dialogue. An acknowledgment of the rational 
discourses at play offers the emancipatory teacher the opportunity to practise her 
tact. This tact acts as a challenge to the possible stultificatory discourses at play and 
works towards developing resolution in the student.  
The mechanisms that ensured the safety of participants were complex and 
hierarchical. I will now detail the practical concerns of rigging and consent that I 
followed to ensure, insure and assure the safety of the participants during the 
workshops. These are the practical technical structures which confine and contain 
the teacher’s concerns. They present the first layer within a stratified and complex 
web of safety factors that form the foundation for my practical research. These 
mechanisms are important because they exemplify the contradictory issues discussed 
in Chapter 1, where I suggest that the ambivalent attitude of Government and 
parents towards risk and risk-taking both entices and repels adolescents and 
perpetuates a cycle of vulnerability if they are taken as a purely box-ticking exercise. 
One of my concerns was that they were covered by insurance for the work done in the 
spaces and through this paper process they were assured that they were financially 
insured for the possible injuries caused by the work. Discussion with the Ethics 
Committee and technical team ensured that I placed the insurance procedures as a 
vital part of the much wider safety mechanisms I needed to employ, namely the 
vigilant attention to the student.  The need to be insured resulted in a full rigging 
certification and risk assessment of ‘The Webber Douglas Studio’. The second 
procedural level that I passed through was to ensure that the work was ethically 
sound. This led to conversations with the research management team about the work 
to be undertaken. I recognise all the social tensions I am ‘holding’ in the room to 
ensure that I am primarily concerned for and in common with the student.  The 
insurance and assurance processes were at all times dialogic, mobile and momentary. 
I was supported by the insurance mechanisms and by the staff who engaged with the 
practice of my practice. 
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In order to insure a building for aerial work, a structural test of the building needs to 
take place. This test rates the building as either fit or unfit for load bearing and 
details where the load can be hung. The load test can either be for a dynamic weight, 
or a static weight. CSSD hired a team to provide a dynamic weight load rating for 
‘The Webber Douglas Studio’ in September 2008. After the dynamic weight load 
assessment was passed, I was permitted to rig a static trapeze and corde lisse. The 
rigging certification assesses whether the fabric of the building can withstand the 
load placed upon it when hanging from points in the gantry or roof of the space. This 
first level of certification insured Central School of Speech and Drama from the 
possibility of the roof falling due to the dynamics of the load - the students on trapeze 
or corde lisse placed within it. My role was to ensure that the insurance was valid for 
the work by reviewing the licensing for weight agreement. 
A risk assessment for circus work which covered my practice was done by a Level 3 
Industrial Rope Access Trade Association qualified rigger, who first put the trapeze 
and corde lisse up (rigged) in the space. The risk assessment formally ensured that: 
a) the equipment was safe to use for this purpose, b) it was hung in the correct 
manner, c) there were no external forces that could be encountered which would add 
risks to the already risky pursuit of trapeze work and d) all bases had been covered 
for insurance purposes in the rare case of a participant being injured whilst working 
in this way. 
This level of certification met the needs set by the insurance company that a named 
person took complete responsibility for the risks being taken. It also led me to an 
important discovery about circus rigging and its failings. The certification is fitted to 
the needs of an industrial context, oil rigs etc (details of which can be found in 
Appendix E). Therefore, the equipment covered in the training is tailored to that 
working environment and purpose. Circus equipment is similar but the materials 
used and the purpose of it are different. It is, therefore, not covered by Industrial 
Rope Access Trade Association training. An investigation of circus riggers revealed 
that few of them were trained to Level 1 status, let alone Level 3. The chief rigger at 
The Circus Space clarified that ‘it costs a great deal of money to train and be certified 
in something that is not fit for purpose’ (Jamie Oglivie 5th August 2009, personal 
communication).  
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Circus equipment is specialised because it needs to comply with creative as well as 
safety needs. Therefore, for an effective and all-encompassing risk assessment to take 
place, my knowledge of the nature of circus equipment and its use becomes a 
fundamental part of the safety conversation. Circus equipment falls outside of the 
remit of Industrial Rope Access Trade Association and circus rigging specialists do 
not feel the need to comply with this certification. Only one rigger in the country is 
qualified at the right level and experienced with circus equipment; he works at 
‘Circomedia’ in Bristol and was brought to Central School of Speech and Drama to rig 
the trapeze, and fill out a risk assessment.  
The paper-driven risk assessment process demonstrates a fissure between the needs 
of the academy, professional practice and insurance mechanisms. In order to comply 
with the needs of the insurers, I could have compromised the specialised nature of 
circus rigging and practical experience. In order to satisfy the needs of the specialist 
equipment, I would have had to compromise the needs of the insurance company, 
who failed to understand the equipment being hung and the valuable experience of 
the rigger doing the hanging. My own experience of trapeze rigging, owning my own 
equipment and placing my life in the balance when I rig in outdoor and alternative 
venues for my own performances, does not figure within the conversation with 
insurers. I satisfied requirements above and beyond the remit of the work in a 
professional context (i.e. those undergone in professional circus venues). This was 
due, not simply because I was working with young people, although that was a factor 
but, for the main, this mechanism was put in place to appease the insurance 
company. The tension is justified because insurance is there to provide for the child 
or carers of the child in the worst-case scenario. Compliance with insurance 
mechanisms is both productive and vital. However, it is not helpful if it is divorced 
from knowledge, experience and, most importantly, from dialogue between the 
institution, the practitioner and the students in their care.  
This understanding has enabled me to ruminate upon the complex nature of the 
overarching frameworks under which we work in education institutions. I unpick this 
further in Chapter 3, where I articulate my personal experiences of ‘safe’ practice and 
how that impacts upon my embodied knowledge and, therefore, upon the students’ 
relationship to risk. In this instance, an adherence to code before common sense and 
personal knowledge could have compromised the safety of the situation to hand. An 
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adherence to structure rather than openness can bind not only the student but also 
the teacher, who may judge herself to be inexpert in this context because she is 
treated as such. Moreover, this lack of expertise may be communicated to the 
students in such a way as to create barriers to the process of building trust and 
equality.  
Sociologists Frank Furedi and Jennie Bristow (2010) propose that a reliance on 
paper proof above common sense, with respect to children, does a number of things. 
It normalises mistrust between adults, children and institutions. It creates 
disconnection between people and it enables people to avoid taking responsibility 
within the community by putting barriers in the way of those who are tempted to 
work in this way. It creates false discourses, they argue, which make people feel safer 
momentarily but do not actually give the assurance needed. Moreover, this 
procedural necessity perpetuates an enduring cycle of social mistrust (2010:46).  
This cycle exemplifies Heidegger’s notion of the deceptive nature of idle talk, where 
attention to the quotidian concerns of socially agreed procedure masquerades as 
‘knowing’ (1964: 222). For Heidegger, the role of concern in instances such as these 
is actually hidden by the very thing that seeks to support it. By solely focussing on the 
insurance of the work, for example, I would have perpetuated an evasion of attention 
to assurance and ensurance, the ephemeral qualities that create trust between 
individuals.  
The risk assessment that was generated by the circus rigger details the risks 
associated with circus as well as performance work. They are: 
• The risk of falling from the equipment. 
• The risk of injury due to not warming-up or not working safely. 
• The risk of falling over safety mats. 
• The risk of trips and falls in the space. 
In Chapter 2, I outlined how risk is ‘calculated’. In my practice, the risk of falling 
from the equipment is rated as quite a high probability due to the fact that the 
students are novices. The potential for injury prior to safety mechanisms being in 
place is also rated very highly; in fact it is rated at the highest possible level, that of 
‘multiple deaths’ (see Appendix D, the Generic Risk assessment Form). This is due to 
the possibility that one student might fall on top of another student. However, once 
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the safety mechanisms are in place, the risk of death is severely diminished, in fact 
almost completely eradicated. Yet the risk of injury is still moderate and the risk of 
slight injury is quite high. This leads me to question the safety mechanisms and 
dialogues within  my practice.  
 
1.5.2 Dialogue 
The question of whether it is ever ethically appropriate to place a young person in a 
context where they are at risk of injury is a complex and nuanced one. It hinges upon 
two inextricably linked factors, the first of which is informed consent and the second 
of which is linked to outcome. If we reconsider the literature by Slovic (2000), it is 
clear that, in this context, the students want to do the work: they volunteer so this 
places them at a lesser risk than if they had been forced to do it.  
Voluntariness or consent is a shifting territory because power operates through the 
social mechanisms at play within any situation, and communicates using joy as well 
as domination. It could be argued that my existing relationship with the young 
people prior to the Hello Fatty project was a powerful disabler of the students’ 
consent. The fact that I had worked, in the first instance, as the children’s director 
and, in the second, as their teacher and examiner meant that the dynamics of 
pedagogic power were clearly already alive within the relationship. They were socially 
conditioned to say ‘yes’ to my requests. But that still does not mean that they did not 
want to voluntarily develop their aerial and performance skills within my practice. It 
is far more complicated than saying that, because I offer enjoyable experiences and 
have worked in imbalanced power situations before, that the students can only say 
‘yes’ to me.  
The students I work with are highly attuned and sensitive to the domesticating 
practices of their schools and home situations. Therefore, their enjoyment of the 
work that I do orients their attention powerfully towards working with and pleasing 
me. Attempting to individuate and activate their learning by provoking and 
questioning creates a discourse that could be as easily used to manipulate and 
domesticate the students as it could to work in common. It is a central problematic of 
this work. But I contend that this is the case if a teacher is set towards an explicatory 
or specific outcome for the student rather than the more open possibility of 
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awareness and attention to will that Rancière advocates. I know that I have the 
power to domesticate but I seek to work against it. An awareness of this power and 
an attention to equalising dialogue focuses my practice towards challenging the 
individual students and makes me more able to work in ‘common’ with them. I am 
aware that the social influences are compelling and I cannot hope to dispel all of 
them. Yet I hope to declare and challenge them.  
The idea of an ongoing radicalised practice that asserts the need for constant 
destabilisation is one that Todd May suggests is impossible. He proposes, after 
Rancière, that radicalisation - and by that I mean an action ‘which acts from within a 
situation of dissensus as a challenge to those who uphold a particular police order’ - 
exists because it inherently sits ‘outside’ of tradition (May 2010: 21). The police order 
mechanisms that are manifest within my practice are the social and institutional 
concerns of neoliberalism: accountability, competition and privatisation that 
manifest in paper processes. These concerns are a constant dialectical tension within 
this thesis because they privilege quantity over quality and analysis over description. 
Radical education theories promote the practice of scepticism through a constantly 
renegotiated attention to the student’s learning. Rancière’s notion of radical 
pedagogy shares, in common with Freire, a limitation in that it only works in fleeting 
moments and in opposition to mainstream methods. It could be argued, therefore, 
that an ongoing radicalising project is unsustainable because it demands that 
attention is paid to newness and challenge by the teacher at all times, and that the 
social order is just too strong to constantly act against.  
This, therefore, poses the question of sustainability. Work inside the workshop, class 
or rehearsal room is often unsustainable once the student moves back to the ‘outside’ 
world. Pre-existing codes may call them back to a less aware frame and threats of 
violence mean that radicalisation is a dangerous state for young people to adopt. I 
contest these notions with a consideration of Heidegger’s ‘conscience as the call of 
care’. According to Heidegger, the call of conscience says nothing and appears to 
come from nowhere yet it insistently attends to the need of Dasein to work towards 
authenticity: ‘If the Caller is asked about its name, status, origin or repute, it not only 
refuses to answer, but does not even leave the slightest possibility of one’s making it 
into something with which one can be familiar’ (1962:319). The call to conscience 
distances the student from what they have known; things that had been taken for 
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granted before are now seen differently and may not matter. It could therefore be 
suggested that the value of a sustaining radicalised process is not within the 
reflections or clarifications in the moment, room or practice but within the student’s 
ability to recognise conscience’s call at a later date.  
The simple model given by a radicalised pedagogy is not of a sustained authenticity, 
which is impossible, but within a focussed attention to the call. The call to conscience 
places demand on Dasein to hold firm to a project that matters to it. This is not 
measurable so cannot be clarified as ‘proof’ for a funding application that the work 
was a success. But where the sustainability comes from is within the memory of the 
student. The student has heard the call of conscience and known themselves in 
answer to it. They can either hold firm to a project that matters or not but they have 
knowledge, experience and, therefore, agency in that choice.  
Heidegger’s discussion of anticipatory resoluteness is useful as a way of uncovering 
my appreciation of the agency created through immersive and temporary practices. 
He argues that, rather than a ‘solution’, resolution is a sober attention and joyful 
understanding of possibility. The locus of his concept of resolution concerns 
possibility enacted through an awareness of choice. Heidegger proposes that this 
possibility mobilises the student or person to be soberly aware of anxiety and 
presupposition, which they are then able to ‘unfold with more penetration’ (1962: 
358). Anticipatory resolution is, therefore, defined by temporality and seen through 
an attention to what has gone before in relation to understanding. It opens the 
student up to possibility rather than closing them down to quotidian concern. The 
resolution is not a coping strategy, or mechanism that is employed arbitrarily, but a 
fluid and ambiguous potential to take action. To resolve is to choose and, for 
Heidegger, it is to choose on an ability-to-be, to make the choice in oneself and for 
oneself.  
To return to the issue of insurance, once the work had been sanctioned by the 
institution, I then approached the carers and students for their permission. Appendix 
A is a copy of the release form which the carers and students signed before 
undertaking the work. This informed consent document declared the following: the 
possibility of injury, the probability of publication, the likelihood of intimate 
touching as a mode of support and the students’ responsibility for safe working 
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practices and for the care of other participants. Each consent document was 
discussed with the carers and with the young people involved, who all had 
opportunity to question me about the nature of the risks being taken. The form was a 
mechanism that provoked dialogue with the students and parents.  
In the conversation with carers and students and in signing the form, I emphasised 
the seriousness of my responsibility and openness with which I would receive 
questions about the work. In discussing the activities with carers and students, as I 
did with the institution, I opened up a dialogue about trust and responsibility. This is 
part of the assurance I used to build-up trust with the carers and students alike. It 
was not simply a paperwork exercise that resonated with the hierarchical formalities 
of an irrelevant system. It became a textual graph of pedagogic tact by recognising 
that ethical practice, trust and safety are not end-points; they are fluid processes that 
began when I first encountered the students and will end when my relationship with 
them stops. Informed consent is not a piece of paperwork, it is a communicated 
assurance although the need to provide paperwork to prove my position and provide 
insurance may frame the discussions.  
Furedi and Bristow (2010) recognise this need to get safety ‘signed off’ as one that 
creates false senses of security within institutions. Their work in schools led them to 
discover that, in particular, Criminal Records Bureau checking9 led to a less rigorous 
process of consultation with students and parents. They propose that, when it comes 
to safety, the paperwork has overtaken common sense, ‘fuelling suspicion between 
adults about each other’ (2010: xxxix). The fact that it is a lawful requirement to have 
‘proof’ that you are safe to work with children erodes the nature of communal 
responsibility and trust, institutionalising mistrust between children, carers and 
professionals. A piece of paper is no replacement for enacted diligence. 
My intentions for the students became institutionally bound by the paperwork 
required to insure and assure my ethical position and by my desire to undertake a 
‘study’ of the work. My privately ‘owned’ purpose for the individual students was 
given through conversation. This was brought out in CSSD’s Policy for Good Conduct 
in Research and this institutional best practice brought about discussions of, for, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Criminal Records Bureau checking was brought in as legislative procedure in 2002 following the abduction and 
murder of two children by their school caretaker in Soham, Cambridgeshire. It lawfully requires anyone who 
works with children, in any capacity, to have undergone a centrally administered vetting process which checks to 
see if there have been any criminal charges brought against them relating to children.	  	  
Hartley,	  J.	  R.	  2013	  
	  
63	  
	  
with and through the young people. It was an equalising discussion based, not on an 
explicatory end-point, but upon the student’s and carer’s individual responses to the 
document at hand. It enabled all participants and carers to see the human surety -  
the assurance -  rather than the paper process that may communicate fear. This 
enabled me to focus on positive assurance which is typified by personal experience 
and ephemeral markers such as laughter and tact; it is dialectically bound with the 
paperwork. It is this dialectical synthesis that I assert is a necessary  condition for the 
enactment of dissensus against neoliberal concerns. Dissensus equalises the 
relationship between the fear-driven discourses which potentially stultify and the 
individual, creative experiences that emancipate. In conversation, the human 
qualities are privileged over the paperwork but the role of insurance is not played 
down or evaded. Insurance mobilised assurance, the two are bound together. 
The discussions I had at Central School of Speech and Drama about the ethics of my 
practice raised questions regarding power dynamics and the discourses that are at 
work in a conversation. The question of who is the work for is posed. I need to 
acknowledge that the person who appears to have the most to gain from this praxis is 
me. My PhD thesis is a huge motivation and I may, therefore, be accused of having 
greater ethical ambiguity and, consequently, having and exerting power over the 
vulnerable young people. My power becomes institutionally bound by my desire to 
work at the school and my need of their safety mechanisms. I work inside a 
hierarchical structure despite my attentiveness to the individual concerns of the 
students. I argue that, in order to sustain the provocative and radical practices that I 
have begun with the students whilst undertaking the research, I would have to 
unharness myself from the institution, from any financial remuneration for the work 
undergone and from any sort of telos or outcome. It could be seen that my intention 
to radicalise the students must also be released in order not to re-inscribe cycles of 
vulnerability so that I do not advance a specific radical outcome. This is especially 
pertinent because of the joy that I, as well as the students, experience from the work 
that we do.  
That is why I am not seeking to prove that my work develops resolution, authenticity, 
agency or autonomy within the student, but I am seeking to ruminate upon the 
conditions under which that situation might happen. Therefore, I am rejecting the 
notion that I can measure student’s responses to the work undergone and why, in 
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Chapter 6, I offer five simple moments where pedagogic tact is negotiated and the 
student is ‘seen’. The practice takes a provocative stance in order to magnify the 
moment of pedagogic tact and its associated conditions. It gives no surety of a 
specific safe or dangerous outcome, neither does it offer an indication of what 
developmental learning the student may take from the work. 
I suggest that, by offering no guaranteed outcome beyond the specific actions of 
encountering a trapeze, working in a group, and learning new skills, I leave myself 
and the students open to what the process may bring. In terms of the paperwork 
required, I recognise that neither a student nor carer can sign their lives into the 
hands of a third party. If a student were to be injured, the insurance provides 
financial support. I am at risk because I have much at stake, the students are at risk 
and the institution is at risk. The conversations that informed consent produced are 
the surety that these risks are the primary concern of the teacher beyond an attempt 
to prove that ‘trapeze is good for you’ in some way.  
Slovic proposes that many factors enhance or restrict the perceptions of risk by 
participants or ‘observers’ according to intention and experience: ‘Perhaps the most 
important message from this research is that there is wisdom as well as error in 
public attitudes and perceptions’ (2000:231). Slovic recognises that, without 
personal and dialogical relations with the risks being taken, the success of risk 
management programmes is moot. ‘Each side, expert and public has something valid 
to contribute, each side must respect the insights and intelligence of the other’ 
(2000:231). By engaging in a conversation with the institution, the riggers, the young 
people and their carers, I opened up a discussion about danger and responsibility. I 
was able to emphasise my concern according to the questions posed by the carers.  
When for example, one parent expressed their concern about the chance of their 
child falling, I offered the statistical likelihood of falling in relation to similar training 
programmes like The Circus Space, who have had only one major injury in the past 
five years. This provided assurance that I knew the field in which I was working and 
had investigated similar programmes. Another parent expressed her desire that her 
child was really challenged: ‘We can’t keep up with him anymore, it will be great to 
see him fail at something’ (Parental conversation, July 14th 2009). To this I 
responded that I would see this as a personal and fun challenge. However, it was the 
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glint in my eye and immediate smile that embodied the response that gave this 
parent my assurance and enabled her to trust me with her child. These minute 
dialogical assurances were needed to express my human investment in the work -  
beyond the statistical analysis, practical framework, embodied knowledge and 
personal experience -  for the people involved in risk-taking.  
These conversations are a manifestation of the quotidian anxieties experienced when 
encountering risk. It is through negotiating these concerns in practice that I am 
made pertinently aware of the discourses of fear that infiltrate pedagogic 
relationships. My responses to these issues form an important layer of experience 
within my mapped understanding of the practice and reinforce my theory that trust 
is fluid and mobile and given in the momentary rather than taken for granted. It is 
through dialogue that pedagogic tact is rehearsed and clarified. 
I regard the carers and parents to be taking risks when placing the teenagers in my 
care. I iterated that they had my phone number and that they could call at any point 
to discuss the work. One parent did this after a young person experienced severe 
muscle pain as a result of The Circus Space induction. In this instance, I was able to 
share my own experiences of the first time I tried flying trapeze and talk them 
through the different types of pain the young person might encounter from the work. 
I emphasised what questions they needed to ask about the student’s pain to work out 
whether it needed medical attention. This dialogue ensured that the parent trusted 
me as a concerned and anatomically knowledgeable mentor for her child. I called the 
following day to follow up the conversation and see how the pain had progressed. 
This again demonstrated a commitment to dialogue and a Heideggerian considered 
and forbearant attitude to the anxiety of the parents as well as those of the students 
(1962: 159). This example enabled me to see how my biological knowledge was an 
important layer within my pedagogic map. Important because it enabled me to be 
distant from empathising with the student, aware of their journey through the pain 
as well as resolute to, and unapologetic for, the fact that the student experienced pain 
as part of the process. I was aware that the carer’s fear was mobilising the dialogue 
and I could carefully attune her to a more attentive concern ahead of the student 
rather than a fear for them. 
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The role of the wider community was vital to the success of my work. One of the 
proposals within Chapter 7 is a study of the influence of parents upon risk-taking and 
young people. I am aware that the teacher’s role impacts on the wider community in 
an important way. I argue that an act of dissensus with a young person is also an act 
of dissensus within a wider frame, that anticipatory resolution enables those outside 
the practice to be aware of their choices; it can open the frame to others who witness 
the choices being made from the outside.  
The journey through paperwork and personal politics allowed me to recognise 
essential themes for my work: the possible mistrust that could be brought about by 
tick-box systems that I needed to be vigilant to, the anxiety that parents and the 
students had surrounding the unfamiliar equipment and safety mechanisms for 
circus work, which necessitated an interrogation of personal procedure. The fact that 
there is no professionally recognised certification for circus rigging in the UK was 
recognised as a potential stumbling block for the possible work Finally, a review of 
past trapeze/aerial related deaths was taken, which listed the fact that all the deaths 
in the world, in the past four years, had been related to equipment failure and that no 
deaths or serious injuries had happened in situations managed by teachers at my 
standard.  
These safety procedures assured the institution and carers so that they were less 
afraid to let me practice. Interwoven with this was a personal narrative that ensures 
that the human context of the work is valued: my personal expertise, my embodied 
memory and my concerned intention towards the staff, parents and young people 
brought a new appreciation of the layers of safety procedure involved and a strength 
in my own ability to do the work. A common sense approach to risk in pedagogy is 
not as simple as working against the popular media myth of ‘health and safety gone 
mad!’ that is thrown at risk assessors and safety watchdogs in common parlance. For 
me, common sense comes from the knowledge and experience that a child’s agency 
can either be effaced and ignored or empowered by the social systems that purport to 
have their best interests at heart. This agency, or resolution to choose, places 
emphasis upon the active choices of participants, rather than asserting their a priori 
powerlessness within a social structure that treats them as though they are 
vulnerable and emphasises an attention to dialogue over paperwork.  
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These first hurdles to the practice were instrumental in establishing the cultural 
context for the work and raised questions about ethics, insurance and consequence 
that are alive throughout all of the praxis in many different forms. By foregrounding 
risk assessment, risk management and ethics, I expose conversations and conflicts 
with the wider social context. The mechanisms were revealed in order to understand 
who and which procedures were being observed to ensure and insure that the young 
people were safe from injury and to create a live discourse on the mechanisms of 
power at play when taking a risk. 
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Chapter 2 
  Risk, Fear and Death 
Critical  Incident  1:  The  Slap    
  
It   is   Day   1   and   we   are   playing   a   ‘warm-­‐‑up   and   getting   to   know   you’  
game.  The  game  involves  saying  someone’s  name  or  touching  someone  in  
response   to   them   saying   your   name.   It  was   introduced   very   quickly   by  
my   assistant,   Dave   as:   ‘when   someone   says   your   name   you   must   slap  
someone  else,  when  someone  slaps  you,  you  must   say  someone’s  name.  
You   cannot   slap   the   person  who   says   your   name,   but   you   can   say   the  
name  of  the  person  who  slaps  you.’  We  all   laughed  when  he  told  us  the  
rules,   but   I   was   conflicted   from   the   start.   The   word   ‘SLAP’   brings  
connotations   of   violence   and   impropriety.   I   was   torn   between  
understanding  how  the  game  could  elicit  riskiness  and  playfulness   from  
the  students  and  the  fact  that  I  knew,  in  my  position  as  teacher,  I  should  
not  encourage  violence  between  the  students.  I  was  aware,  however,  that  
the  students  knew  that  Dave  meant  the  ‘slap’  to  be  a  provocation,  rather  
than  permission  to  physically  beat  each  other,  but  this  was  an  unspoken  
agreement  and,  therefore,  ‘risky’.    
  
It  was  Dave  who  first  transgressed  the  unspoken  ‘rules’  of  the  game  when  
he   delivered   a   surprisingly   hard   slap   on   the   forehead   a   student,  which  
shocked  and  surprised  the  group.  He  did  this  because  he  was  aware  of  the  
provocative  nature  of  the  work  I  was  about  to  do,  and  because  he  wanted  
to   challenge   us   all   socially   and   physically   by   adding   an   element   of  
violence   and   pain   to   the   game.   Enchanted   and   emboldened   by   this  
provocation,  the  students  tested  the  boundaries  of  their  social  relations  by  
slapping   each   other,   Dave   and   especially   me,   less   politely.   When   one  
student  appeared  to   take   it   too  far,  and  left  a  mark  on  another  student’s  
skin,   the  other   students   took   it   as   an   invitation   to   ‘put  her   in  her  place’  
and   the  game  became,   ‘let’s  all   take   turns   in   slapping  one  student   fairly  
hard’.   The   student   said   afterwards   that   she   felt   both   rewarded   and  
punished  by  this  turn  of  events.    
  
This   game   and   Dave’s   response   to   playing   it   became   a   theme   for   the  
whole   practice.   The   students  were   unafraid   to   challenge   the   tacit   social  
boundaries  that  were  present  in  the  room,  especially  those  that  impacted  
upon   their   bodies.   They   became   braver,   more   critical,   more   responsive  
and  more  playful  with  the  dangers  they  were  experiencing.  These  changes  
transferred  into  the  aerial  work  where  they  were  less  fearful  and  trusted  
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the   other   students   to   lift   them  when   they  were   struggling,   grab   them   if  
they  were  falling  and  ‘slap’  them  if  they  were  not  going  far  enough.    
  
Within this chapter, I open up the tacit values that risk discourses communicate 
culturally, socially and momentarily through my practice as a teacher of circus, as 
exemplified in the description above. I posit that rather than encountering risk, the 
students in my care are encountering sociological fear, and that this fear can limit 
their understanding of themselves. As teachers Heather Piper and Ian Stronach 
suggest, the fear of taking risks with young people ‘permeate[s] our lives in 
numerous seemingly incidental ways, and in some instances ‘no touch’ develops into 
‘don’t speak’ or even ‘don’t be’’ (2008:2). Fear of doing the right thing can stop 
people, and especially teachers, from making any choices at all. I locate this fear 
alongside the Heideggerian concept of death and suggest that death, as well as risk 
and fear, is communicated in a fragmented and, therefore, punitive manner. I 
contend that this fear is located in the body, and in particular within the bodies of 
those labelled as vulnerable, such as children. This chapter argues that an 
intersubjective, dialogic and poetic encounter with risk, fear and death is needed to 
begin emancipatory dialogues with young people.  
Is it ever appropriate to place a child at risk? And what does it mean to do so? In my 
work as a pedagogue and static trapeze10 teacher, I am in constant practical dialogue 
with these ethical questions as articulated in my introduction. I work with 
adolescents aged thirteen to sixteen years old, in a practice that enables them to 
encounter Heideggerian death through pain and failure. I encourage them towards 
acts of ‘will’ in the Rancièrean sense, which means that I place them in situations 
where they are able to work towards developing a skill that brings with it fear, 
personal anxiety and possible injury. This skill uses intimacy as a safety mechanism 
and encourages touching across gender and cultural differences. The students risk 
falling, twisting, scraping and injuring their bodies and they risk failure if they are 
unable to master the discipline. I, as their teacher, also run risks. These risks are 
associated with death or injury, and also with accountability and responsibility for 
the young people in my care. They include the risk of insurance claims11 should a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  A full list of circus terminology can be found in Appendix C of this document.	  
11	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  although	  I	  use	  the	  phrase	  ‘risk	  of	  insurance	  claims’	  I	  am	  not	  making	  an	  attempt	  to	  
vilify	  insurance	  that	  would	  ensure	  a	  child	  is	  supported	  financially	  should	  they	  be	  injured	  or	  worse.	  I	  recognise	  
within	  this	  frame	  that	  there	  is	  a	  tension	  between	  reasonable	  regulations	  put	  in	  place,	  and	  between	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student fall and the risk of accusations of impropriety if I touch them regularly 
because ‘we now inhabit a climate where... supportive touch is interpreted as 
extraordinary and potentially abusive’ (Piper and Stronach, 2008:4). The young 
people and their parents have consented to all these risks as discussed in the 
previous chapter, and a copy of the consent form can be found in Appendix A. I have 
been transparent about the potential for serious injury or death when discussing the 
project, along with the details of the possibility of physical contact between 
participants. Parents, carers and students signed forms to say that their lives were 
placed in my hands with full awareness of the risks they were taking: the risk of an 
uncertain outcome. This uncertainty is mediated through the lens of my pedagogic 
knowledge, experience and instinct which I call pedagogic tact.  
2.1 A Definition of Risk.  
This first section opens the debate on the nature of risk in contemporary society in 
relation to notions of value and the complexity of discourse surrounding ‘risky’ 
activity. It considers the methods for assessing risk and the conflicting evidence that 
is taken into consideration when a risk is encountered and a decision has to be made 
regarding whether the risk is worth taking. This section also considers the notions of 
fear and culture as interwoven within discussions of risk, introducing the idea of the 
‘risk society’ (Furedi, 2006) and the ‘police order’ (Rancière, 1991). I raise the notion 
of risk and fear as expressions of existential anxiety (Heidegger) which can only be 
personally, as opposed to culturally, experienced because existential anxiety can only 
be ‘mine’. In this chapter, I distinguish between fear and anxiety in the Heideggerian 
sense. For Heidegger, anxiety raises the awareness of the possibilities in my future, 
whereas, fear results in an avoidance or closing down of those possibilities. Risk 
mobilises both responses, and my suggestion is that circus practice awakens anxiety 
in participants, which leads to development and resolution. It, however, also 
awakens fear, which brings with it boundaries, resistance, stultification and 
ignorance, and this may close down the resolution of participants and the teachers 
charged with their safety.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
unreasonable	  claims	  that	  may	  be	  made.	  It	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis	  to	  discuss	  the	  philosophical	  and	  
practical	  changes	  that	  have	  happened	  in	  the	  insurance	  industry.	  However,	  what	  is	  up	  for	  discussion	  is	  how	  
insurance	  may	  constitute	  a	  part	  of	  the	  Police	  Order	  that	  pertains	  to	  the	  work.	  I	  discuss	  this	  in	  detail	  on	  pages	  
179-­‐182	  of	  this	  thesis.	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The term ‘risk’ is value-laden within society and tacitly loaded with overtones of fear. 
It is used regularly within education and Government discussions to suggest 
recklessness, gambling and chance. Indeed, writers and thinkers tend to use the term 
‘risk’ as a taken-for-granted concept that needs little elucidation (Furedi 2004). 
Words such as hazard, danger, uncertainty or threat are often used interchangeably, 
although some writers have made sharp distinctions between them (Schafer, 1978, 
Benner, 1983). The studies in risk are rich and varied. The term is used, in the 
context of risk assessment, to suggest that there is a mathematical, rational or 
scientific formula for the evaluation of likelihood that an incident or accident may 
occur. It can, therefore, be presumed to gauge the possible severity of the incident it 
would cause. This is problematic on two counts: firstly, sociologist Frank Furedi 
claims that in the media it is rare to have the statistical likelihood pertaining to the 
risks, alongside articles claiming that risks are posed. Therefore, risks are reported 
without recognition of the impact they would have upon everyday life; those that are 
considered by insurers as ‘at minima’ or having a statistical likelihood of less than 1 
in a 1,000, are treated in the same way as those having a statistical likelihood of 1 in 
2. Furedi suggests that this style of reporting contributes to a climate of fear (2004). 
The term ‘risk’ strongly communicates a probability or chance of injury, severe or 
otherwise without necessarily communicating the detail of it. Therefore, it 
communicates only fear of the possibility of death. Secondly, risk analysis is taken to 
be a scientific measure of probability. This, however, is not the case and I propose 
that within risk analysis biases and moral judgment form a part of the decision-
making process, these are culturally and personally dependent and, therefore, skew 
the analysis in favour of risk-aversion.  
Risk is a term that communicates both fear and security depending upon the risks in 
question. It typifies reckless behaviour when used in association with young people 
in the form of ‘risk-taking’ and is a term for safety precautions when used in the form 
of risk analysis. In the context of work with children, the term ‘at risk’ is used to 
suggest that a child’s personal circumstances are such that an ambiguous form of 
harm may befall them at some point in the future. A 2010 report on risk and 
resilience conducted by researchers at the Institute of Education determined a 
number of factors that denoted whether a child was within this ‘at risk’ category. 
These were: sufferance of an exceptionally stressful event; household income falling 
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into the lowest 25% economic range; mother having depression or other mental 
illness or alcoholism; child being diagnosed as having special educational needs 
(Gutman et al. 2010: 7). They also identified that parental support played a large part 
in the mediation of these risk factors and within the build-up of the child’s resilience 
in the face of them. What becomes apparent is that within the definition of risk, in 
this instance, is ‘worst case scenario’ thinking, a negative outcome is attended to and 
proposed, whereas the reality is that the risk does not sit in isolation from the factors 
that minimise it. The child ‘at risk’ is perceived as a victim of circumstance rather 
than a potential success. This communicates very strongly that written into these 
assessments of risk are threats of failure.  
There were two Government funded reports on risk in education published in 2010; 
the Llakes Research 3 Report and the National Endowment for Science Technology 
and the Arts (NESTA) (Rolfe, 2010) report. The Llakes Research 3 Report (Evans, 
Schoon and Weale, 2010) defines risk as experiences that will inhibit or disinhibit 
learning, particularly during adolescence, and consequently something that will 
impact upon the socioeconomic potential of a workforce. The report contextualises 
the work within what they call ‘reflexive modernism’ which is defined as a 
contemporary move of young people’s expectations towards shaping their own 
destiny. This modernism rests upon the agency of the workers (or students) within it 
to take charge of their future potential as employees and as economically stable 
members of the community and that this is dependent upon their understanding of 
their role within the society.  
The report builds its argument upon the research of psychologist Karen Evans (2002, 
2007) who discovered that in hierarchical and structural communities built on blame 
and supplication the resultant psychological profile of the students/workers, which 
she calls ‘bounded agency’, negates the capacity and productivity of reflexive 
modernism itself; the workers become disabled through the framework that purports 
to free them. Evans found these structures within the British and German Education 
systems and within both societies as a whole. The idea of supplication and blame is 
pertinent as it recognises that there is a paradox within the assessment and 
definition of risk. Building from the previous point that risk assessments look for a 
negative outcome, this research suggests that both the measurement of risks and the 
approbation of accountability for failure become mobilising elements that bind the 
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students to ‘safe’ options, therefore, limiting them from understanding their role 
within the institutional frame, and within the context of the risk posed.  
The NESTA report Learning to Take Risks, Learning to Succeed (2010) was 
similarly inclined. It discussed risk in relation to innovation in the work place. What 
the two reports have in common is their focus on economic development and 
individual success, and their glaring omission of corporeality and community. This is 
a particularly salient point for my research. The implication that vulnerability and 
passivity is a state that is imposed arbitrarily upon a group of individuals is one 
territory within the complex discourses surrounding young people, that ties and 
limits them to notions of ‘bounded agency’ as articulated by Evans (2007) or 
‘stultification’ as described by Rancière (1991). Passivity may be magnified within 
education institutions where teachers and managers are charged to ‘know better’ 
than students, alongside the teacher’s own passivity in the face of Government 
‘knowing better’. This suggests that within any learning situation all students and 
teachers may become passive receivers of the responsibility for success within a 
limited economic frame, and bear the brunt of the blame if or when this success is 
not met. The evasion of community and corporeity from the analysis means that each 
participant is seen as the same as any other, and subject to hazards as any other, 
despite research that points to the contrary. What my research recognises therefore 
is the need for a case-by-case analysis of each student, in each pedagogic situation 
with each teacher; bearing in mind, as I have stated that each situation has the power 
to liberate and to domesticate students at all times. 
Philosophers Charles Bingham and Gert Biesta propose that the power structures 
currently ordering all relationships with young people are built on neoliberalist12 
premises. This is complementary to the idea of reflexive modernism proposed by 
Evans above. An economic model for educational improvement within the 
neoliberalist frame is advocated in the following lines: 
[A]ccountability, competition and privatisation have been touted as 
solutions [to student underachievement] over these two decades. The 
result has been more high-stakes testing of students, greater media 
scrutiny of how one school... compares to another. (Bingham and 
Biesta, 2010:19)  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Steger and Roy define neoliberalism as ‘the compelling narrative of inevitable market globalization [which] 
convinces people that the liberalization of trade and minimally regulated markets will result in high economic 
growth and dramatic improvement in living conditions worldwide’ (2010:119). 
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Their assertion is that by placing economic values into institutionalised education 
three negative themes emerge. First, that trust between teachers and students is 
eroded, second, that it assails the autonomy and expertise of teachers and thirdly, 
that teachers begin to teach to standardised tests rather than working towards the 
individual development of each child. They suggest that a reconsideration of the 
imperatives that drive the education process based more fully on equality and 
individuation could result in a better appreciation of the factors that bind and stultify 
students, teachers and communities. I suggest that it is through observation of the 
discourses surrounding risk, and in particular risk involving children, that we can 
identify some of the disempowering processes which may subjugate adolescents in 
their search for equality, empowerment and resolution. The argument above is 
corroborated by philosopher Niklas Luhmann who writes that despite the regularity 
of its use ‘the concept of risk is, however, unclear even today’ (1996:4).  
2.1.1 Risk perception. 
The leading research into risk perception has been carried out by psychologist Paul 
Slovic, who suggests that: 
[t]he ability to sense and avoid harmful environmental conditions is 
necessary for the survival of all living organisms. Survival is also aided 
by an ability to codify and learn from past experience. Humans have the 
additional capacity that allows them to alter their environment as well 
as respond to it. This capacity both creates and reduces risks. 
(2000:220) 
Slovic states that risk perception is linked to survival and leads to management of the 
environment. Developing from this point, accountability, competition and 
privatisation all impact upon the ability of an individual to perceive and, therefore, 
manage risk. Slovic further emphasises that many factors enhance or restrict the 
perceptions of risk according to intention and experience, ‘perhaps the most 
important message from this research is that there is wisdom as well as error in 
public attitudes and perceptions’ (2000:231). Slovic recognises that without personal 
and dialogical relations with the risks being taken or analysed, the success of risk 
management programmes is doubtful. ‘Each side, expert and public has something 
valid to contribute, each side must respect the insights and intelligence of the other’ 
(2000: 231). What is needed is a dialogical relationship between statistical analysis 
and personal experience for the people involved in risk-taking. 
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Luhmann proposes that ‘the term [risk is] itself... a neologism that came into use 
with the transition from traditional to modern society’ (1996:3). This suggestion 
reinforces a theory espoused by sociologist Ulrich Beck (1992) who charts the decline 
towards ‘agent primacy’ from the communal structures for living within traditional 
societies, echoing the reflexive modernism suggested by Evans  and the neoliberalist 
attitudes considered by Bingham and Biesta. The term ‘risk’ has been instated due to 
the need for a specific term to replace those of fortune and prudence, which had 
religious connotations, in order to align itself with the scientific language appropriate 
for an enlightened age. Luhmann extends the argument to emphasise the fact that 
the term has been developed to incorporate the concrete problems of individual 
decision-making and accountability within an emerging commercial society. It is this 
relationship to decision-making that holds the key, for Luhmann, to defining what 
the term ‘risk’ has become within modern society: a marker for asserting that 
economic value has greater significance than personal experience. The way that risk 
is framed by the mechanisms that ‘manage’ it, constructs a misapprehension that risk 
is both measurable and containable, and moreover, that personal experience is 
irrelevant. It assigns the risk-taker to a passive and vulnerable position. This evasion 
of the personal and the focus on the scientific reinforces two premises, firstly, that 
dangers, in the form of risk, can be ‘managed’ by the structures in place meaning we 
should be ‘safe’ at all times, and secondly, that the general populous is unable to 
manage their own safety appropriately. This perpetuates a cycle of fear, blame and 
passivity, rather than empowerment and resilience. What is also evident however, is 
that this is not true at all times, in all schools with all teachers. What the theoretical 
engagement seems to articulate is the potential for every situation to stultify or 
empower individuals.  
The agreed formula for risk estimation is: 
probability of hazard x severity of outcome = Risk 
This formula is generally credited to mathematician David Van Danzig in 1953 and 
has been used in the assessment and management of risks since that point (Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1982; Slovic, 2000). Any calculation of risk is, therefore, a 
construction of the risk assessor who estimates the ranges of possible outcome and 
possible harm according to his or her perception of the risks concerned. The 
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observer, risk assessor or participant uses this equation, consciously or 
unconsciously, to attribute strengths and weaknesses relating to the decision to be 
made. The decision is, however, not as simple as calculating whether something is 
good or bad, dangerous or safe, it requires a consideration of value with which to 
guide, or to use Luhmann’s terminology, to ‘frame’ the observation. These values are 
mobile, subjective and contingent: 
Terms like risk or danger are not indications of ontological facts about 
which one can have only true or false opinions. The binary logic does 
not apply. Risk evaluation is not simply a problem of avoiding error. 
The question is: who uses which frame to guide his observations; and 
then, who observes how others handle causal distinctions and how they 
discriminate external and internal attribution depending upon whether 
they themselves or others make the decisions. (1996:6) 
He develops his point still further by suggesting: 
If risk perception is observer dependent we are able to recognize 
situations in which risky decisions of one system become a danger for 
other systems... The whole problem thereby becomes an internal 
problem of modern society. (1996:6) 
The value placed upon success or failure, participation or non participation, strength 
or weakness of a risk to be taken is entirely a subjective judgment placed upon the 
observer according to the context that they have used. Consequently, risk assessment 
becomes a complex exercise, contingent upon the allegiances or value systems of the 
assessor according to the perceived value of both the activity being assessed and of 
the possible outcomes. It then becomes constitutive of and contained by the wider 
social and cultural perception, the analysis is ‘written’ into the system in which it is 
played, perpetuating prejudices and assumptions. It calls into question the nature of 
the relationship between the assessor, the society and the people at risk.  
The notions of contextual contingency and social value are exemplified through a 
consideration of my trapeze teaching experience and practice. The work is impacted 
by many value perceptions. The young people place a large value upon performance 
skills; this is part of the decision-making process that leads them to work with me 
voluntarily. The students have all worked with me before, some in a traditional 
school environment, and others in a County Council run scheme. These historical 
experiences impact upon the way my ideas are received and judged by the students 
and by their carers. The duration of association with me, between two and seven 
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years, again, impacts upon their decision of whether to work with me on the trapeze. 
Tacitly, they do a risk/benefit analysis. Transforming the information I have given 
covertly and overtly (through working together), and weighing up the value offered in 
terms of enjoyment, skills development and opportunity. This is tempered and 
mobilised by the trust they have in my ability to care for them and to keep them ‘safe’ 
from harm. That trust could outweigh the perceived possibility of injury. As each 
experience and perception is different, each student’s or carer's interpretation and 
appreciation of the risks involved is unique. Therefore each of the students give their 
consent based on a different frame of reference, different values and different 
experiences. The notion of consent is therefore individual, as recognised in the ethics 
section of Chapter 1. It is worth repeating that in thesis, consent is defined as mobile 
and dialogical; it can be given or retracted in the moment or interaction between a 
teacher and student.   
I have a great deal at stake from working with the young people in this way, not least 
the furtherance of my pedagogic and academic career. This puts me in a difficult 
position; attempting to objectively measure the risks associated with the work, and 
offering an unbiased opinion upon it for the young people and their carers. The 
problem is one of ‘outcome’. Within my practice I embody the complex criticisms 
aimed at radical pedagogues. Paul Taylor articulates these criticisms as a 
combination of utopianism and the possibility of ‘domesticating’ practices (1993:2). 
This has been appropriated as a formative question for this thesis, emphasised 
through every chapter. Each pedagogic moment has the ability to domesticate 
students.  Biesta summarises these contraditions in terms of emancipation  as being 
something ‘done to somebody... whose consciousness is subjected to the workings of 
power’ (2010: 44). These criticisms suggest that I am biased by my experience, world 
view, possible personal rewards obtained by the work and by the knowledge I have 
about trapeze and risk. My relationship to that knowledge and how it can be 
encountered by the young people in my care is a potent discourse that could either 
empower or ‘bind’ them. Moreover, I am also held accountable, by the institution 
that I work in and by the students and their carers for the risks taken within this 
environment. This accountability is a force that impacts upon the work undergone.  
Accountability and outcome in dialogue with my association with radical pedagogy 
and its utopian ideal of emancipation (which I discuss in Chapter 3) all come 
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together within my perception and communication of the risks involved within my 
practice. They form a part of the system in which the risk is taken, and, therefore, a 
part of the tacit discourses about risk-taking with young people. I need to be aware of 
this in order to make the risks clear for the students, carers and institution to 
facilitate their own individual risk assessments, and also within my own risk analysis. 
I am subject to moral and judgmental biases that affect the tactful decisions I make 
in the strategic and momentary.  
2.1.2 Heuristics and judgment.  
Biases, experience and references are used to judge whether a decision should or 
should not be made to take a risk. The term ‘heuristic’ is used within psychology to 
define the cultural considerations that are made when making a personal risk-related 
decision. 
People rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which reduce the 
complex tasks of assessing possibilities and predicting values to simpler 
judgmental operations. In general these heuristics are quite useful, but 
sometimes they lead to severe and systematic errors. (Tversky and 
Khanerman 1982) 
Contrasting methods of calculation can be used to quantify the relation between risk 
and heuristics, including the benefit/risk ratio used mainly in medicine, and the Risk 
Cost-Benefit Analysis (RCBA) method which uses money as a way of assessing value 
(Lewens, 2007). These methods vary widely according to the motivation of the 
observer, decision maker and the nature of the decision to be made. The ethical 
ramifications of decisions and their application are subject to discourse and debate. 
For my work, it is important to focus upon the personal decision-making processes in 
terms of the young people involved in this ‘risky’ activity, whilst maintaining a wider 
perspective of the cultural and institutional challenges that pertain to a dialogue with 
fear and with the context of the work. The two are in a dialectical relationship, the 
personal and individual with the public and institutional. It is impossible to divide 
them. This whole document performatively a reveals the heuristics involved in a 
small pedagogic situation. Each piece of information is built into the frame of my 
pedagogic experience, and becomes a part of the way I manage risk in my work.  
Heuristics can be based on three distinct categories, ‘availability’, ‘moral judgment’ 
and ‘representative’ of concepts that are more easily grasped (Slovic, 2002: 218). The 
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availability heuristic relates to the way media coverage or cultural discourse impact 
to make people grossly over-estimate the likelihood of accidents occurring. There 
was no trapeze artist, including me, who failed to check their equipment more 
rigorously, and warm up more effectively, immediately after the death of Roberto 
Valenzuela in 2007. There was little media coverage, but the circus community was 
shocked and stunned. The duration of two years without a trapeze artist death, and 
my knowledge of the fact that most deaths are caused by equipment failure at a great 
height, skew my availability heuristic in the moment of an analysis for my students, 
but the impact of the death of a member of my community also impacts upon my 
perception. This availability heuristic is related to fear. In 2011, as I write, the media 
is covering two stories that raise awareness of the vulnerability of children within 
extra-curricular activities; the 50 year anniversary of a Croydon air crash that killed 
34 young boys on a school trip to Norway and the story of a student from Eton being 
mauled to death by a polar bear in Spitzbergen. Both these occurrences are what we 
would call at minima risks, risks that are so unlikely that it would be almost 
impossible to prevent them. However, wide media coverage makes them ‘available’ to 
anyone concerned with the safety of children. Slovic’s point is that the availability of 
this information impacts upon similar risk-decisions, increasing the likelihood that 
the assessor will exaggerate the possibility of accident in their calculation due to their 
awareness of these incidents. These anomalies are taken into account by the assessor 
as if they were frequent occurrences, rather than very rare accidents.  
Legal theorist Cass Sunstein (in Lewens 2007) proposes that we also use a second 
moral heuristic when making risk-related decisions, but that our moral compass may 
be inaccurate. He suggests that a moral heuristic is one that reflects a cultural 
judgment that may lack logic. For my work, the moral heuristics are represented by 
the cultural context discussed within the next section, mediated by and filtered 
through a pervasive climate of fear surrounding the vulnerability of children. Moral 
judgment influences the discourses directly by emphasising the negative implications 
of placing a child in a ‘risky’ situation on a trapeze where they could fall and be hurt 
for example, or more ambiguously, by emphasising the moral tensions revealed by 
allowing a sixteen year old man to support a seventeen year old woman by lifting her 
onto a trapeze. These moral heuristics are once again culturally and historically 
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contingent and form a tacit layer of meaning which can impact upon the student in 
many ways.  
A representative heuristic, the third type, involves an assessment based upon existing 
knowledge and by drawing an analogy between the possible risk and something that 
we know more about. A fall from a trapeze for example, resulting from equipment 
failure, might be representative, to me, of equipment failure in parachute jumping. 
The two are similar due to the nature of falling and the rigorous checking processes 
that are made by the artist or jumper prior to engagement in the activity. This 
representative heuristic places risk perception into an imaginative and analogous 
realm. A consideration of this third heuristic reminds us how dependent this ‘risk 
assessment’ process is upon the personal experiences and imagination of the 
assessor. What appears to be a rational judgment can be seen as glorified and 
imaginative guesswork.  
These heuristics impact upon the decision-making process for me, for my students 
and for the institution that I work within. They form a conscious and unconscious 
dialogue through the work, and, as will be shown within Chapters 5 and 6, offer 
significant insights into the way my role, as a guide for the students, is in a dynamic 
relationship with the perceptions of the students and their ability to exercise 
judgment about what they are doing, and what they think about what they are doing. 
An important conclusion here is that any appreciation of what denotes risky activity 
is complex. It includes personal, individual, institutional and social perceptions 
which are elusive, contradictory and contextually biased. These appreciations are 
distorted further by cultural discourses that surround the body and most specifically 
the bodies of young people.  
The assignment of the students to a passive role within the risk assessment 
mechanism also impacts upon the taking of the risk itself. Slovic (2000) emphasises 
that the most compelling factor to impact upon risk-taking, is whether the taker has 
knowledge and experience of the risk, and whether they are taking the risk 
voluntarily. It is impossible to generalise about how experienced or willing a group of 
students are or will be (the risk assessment is done in advance of the work) when 
faced with trapeze work, so the teacher is forced to take a ‘worst case scenario’ 
outlook that plans for resistance, passivity and inexperience, again, writing 
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vulnerability into the estimation of risk prior to the event. However, risk assessment 
is for me, not a paper process done in advance; it is a constant attention and vigilance 
towards the student and their safety. If at any point I feel that the student has 
stopped knowingly consenting, or gone beyond their ability to engage with the 
activities, I re-assess and may stop or change the activity.  
 
2.1.3 Risk-taking. 
The terms ‘risk-taking’ and ‘risky’ are used to define certain types of behaviour within 
contemporary culture. Risk-taking behaviours in relation to adolescents are those 
personal choices which place the decision-maker’s health or welfare in danger, for 
example the choice to misuse alcohol or non prescription drugs. German 
psychologist Ru ̈diger	  Trimpop defines risk-taking to be: 
[a]ny consciously or non-consciously controlled behaviour with a 
perceived uncertainty about its outcome, and/or about its possible 
benefits or costs for the physical, economic or psycho-social well-being 
of oneself or others. (1994:9) 
What is pertinent here is the association with voluntary or involuntary decision-
making processes, based on an uncertain evaluation of the possible outcome of a 
project. Studies repeatedly demonstrate that ‘not every person deals with risk in the 
same way, even in identical situations’ (Yates, 1992: 323, see also Politser, 1987). 
Risk-taking behaviours are difficult to predict, as well as difficult to measure. Studies 
suggest that adolescents are more likely to pursue risk-taking behaviours due to their 
desire to develop their own identity, values and opinions (Miller, 1989). So the 
individual’s perception and skill within any risk-taking scenario will impact upon the 
risk. The fact that the students I work with are adolescents impacts upon the risk. 
Their age makes them more likely to volunteer, and, therefore, more likely to manage 
the risk successfully. This is in contrast with Evan’s (2007) perception of educational 
bias to assign students to a passive role within the institution, reinforcing the notion 
that the agency of participants is ‘bound’ when their identity, values and opinions 
remain suppressed.  
The term ‘risky’ is much harder to define. It is both synonymous with risk-taking 
when discussing behaviour and when used within critical pedagogic discourse 
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suggests ethically problematic or contentious material used to challenge students, 
which would typically involve discussions of cultural or gender transgression (hooks, 
1994:198). The impact that this appreciation of ‘riskiness’ has within education is to 
reinforce the notion that certain materials are ‘dangerous’ and should, therefore, be 
filtered by ‘people who know better’. There is guidance on the use of this type of 
material, but the fact that the risk is less easily assessed, in numerical or monetary 
terms, means that teachers are ‘bound’ by tacit rather than prescribed boundaries. 
Consequently, fear of blame may force the teacher to be less ‘risky’ in their use of 
material. It would be easy to assign work fear-driven practices to all teachers because 
the sociology theory seems to attribute it in this way. This forced binary thinking is 
unhelpful to my thesis. I argue for an individuation of teaching and of students. 
Therefore, it must be emphasised that despite the literature containing a bifurcation 
of good/bad practices, I am attempting a more nuanced approach. 
What becomes increasingly apparent within a desire to define risk, risk-taking and 
risky behaviour is that the phrases are intertwined, signalling a subjective 
relationship to fear of an event rather than a rational, statistical probability 
assessment. Risk is not something objectively measured, but fundamentally, 
something we experience, and which can profoundly unsettle and challenge. The 
associations with ‘risky’ work can be related to acts of apparent cultural transgression 
which are critical for engaging the students in a dialogue with danger and notions of 
vulnerability. The fear of blame, however, may bind a teacher to a ‘safer’ path. 
 
2.1.4  Being ‘at risk’. 
The phrase ‘at risk’ is used as a signal of vulnerability, either in reference to those 
who are less able to look after themselves i.e. the elderly, mentally ill or very young, 
or in combination with a raised likelihood of hazardous or dangerous circumstances. 
People who are ‘at risk’ are more susceptible to poverty, abuse or disease:  
Children at risk do not form a self-contained, easily defined group. 
Many children and young people can be vulnerable to risk factors such 
as poor parenting, disability and poverty at some point in their 
development. Without the support of preventative and appropriately 
targeted services, these risk factors can lead to crisis and in some cases 
lasting effects which perpetuate the cycle of deprivation, social 
exclusion and poverty. (HM Treasury, 2009: 28.1) 
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Some young people are placed within the Government’s Child Protection Plan13 by 
social services each year to signal that they need extra contact with social workers 
and that there is concern for their welfare. The notion of  ‘at risk’ is complex. As 
articulated, all these factors taken out of the context of parental and pedagogic 
support mean nothing. A child is able to build resilience and move out of cycles of 
poverty and deprivation if they are given the means to do so or are made aware of 
their own capacity to do so.  What becomes apparent within much literature 
concerning risk is unhelpful and potentially divisive binary thinking.  
Furedi proposes that a discourse surrounding notions of ‘at risk’ is typified by a 
cultural construction of children as vulnerable.  
The emergence of this ‘at risk’ category ruptures the traditional 
relationship between individual action and the probability of a hazard... 
Through these ideas about vulnerability, a sense of fear starts to be seen 
as a normal state of being. The flipside of this definition is the inflation 
of the threat that external forces pose to the individual self. (2007: 6-8) 
This vulnerability is perpetuated by the fact that many groups of individuals are 
considered to be continuously ‘at risk’ of hazard, in particular, Furedi suggests, 
children. Moreover, that the notion ‘at risk’ itself, by taking away the individual’s 
relationship to risk and safety communicates passivity and stultification onto the 
groups involved. The autonomisation of fear is associated with two factors: the 
imperatives of a neoliberalist age that makes specific adults accountable and, 
therefore, fearful of litigation or blame, and the moral and availability heuristics that 
magnify the child’s body as a site to be fearful for. Both signal the child as 
intrinsically vulnerable, and it is assumed to be an ‘essential property of individuals, 
as something which is intrinsic to children’s identity and personhoods, and which is 
recognisable through their beliefs and actions, or indeed through just their 
appearance’ (Frankenberg, Robinson and Delahooke in Furedi 2004: 588). This 
suggestion that children are culturally essentialised as ‘vulnerable’ or ‘at risk’ places 
them in an immovable position where they are lacking in autonomy or awareness of 
their power to change their circumstances. ‘The concept of being at risk reverses the 
previous relationship between human beings and experience. To be at risk assigns to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  There were 37,900 children who became the subject of a plan in Britain in 2009; this compares to 
34,000 in 2008. 13% of these had previously been the subject of a plan one percentage point less than in 
2008. During the year ending 31st March 2009, 32,800 children ceased to be the subject of a plan; this 
compares to 32,600 in 2008.	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the person a passive and dependent role’ (Furedi, 2004:130). The nomination of the 
term ‘at risk’ to all children results in a societal perception that young people are not 
able to take responsibility for their own risk management and that adults ‘know 
better’ about how to keep them safe. This brings us back to the issues discussed 
about my role (and bias) within a risk analysis and its communication to the young 
people. Assigning the role of vulnerable to young people may have the effect of 
constituting those young people into a passive role: thereby, stripping them of the 
resolution to determine or make decisions for themselves. Assigning young people 
into roles where they can make choices to be strong or to consent to managing their 
own risk may, conversely, build resilience. 
As discussed earlier, there are three types of heuristic which people use to determine 
how much risk they are happy to take. Consequently, when it comes to children and 
assessment of vulnerability, an educator may decide that any risk is too much to take 
due to tacit moral values being ascribed to that risk. This means that the young 
person’s development of identity and autonomy is undermined by the cultural 
perception that assigns them to a vulnerable position. If we take Piper and Stronoch’s 
view the relationship between risk and agency is built around the fear of 
repercussion, the fear of doing something wrong rather than a judicial or balanced 
relationship with risk-taking. I propose that, through certain educational situations, 
exemplified by my work, young people become aware of both the social discourses 
and fear surrounding their vulnerability and moreover, that they are given the means 
to act in dissensus to it by taking risks and being responsible for their own safety. 
Alongside this, there are particularly compelling narratives being communicated to 
young people about their physical body, and the bodies of others, in relation to risk, 
riskiness and risk-taking. 
Piper and Stronach argue that ‘the whole body of the child or young person is 
identified as a risk arena’ because ‘it seems that every contact with a child is a 
potential occasion for abuse’ (2010:15). They determine that this is due to two 
components, the fear of litigation if a child suffers from a physical injury, and the fact 
that ‘abuse’, in the context of a child, is often conflated with the notion of sexual 
abuse. The fear of being seen as abusive, and most importantly, as abusive to a child, 
is ‘the worst of all crimes’ (2010: 13). It perpetuates a dynamic where the bodies of 
children and young people are potent signifiers of taboo. They quote the research of 
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Tobin (1997), Phelan (1997) and Leavitt and Power (1997) when they suggest that 
there is an enforced binary spit between body and mind when engaging with 
children, which disempowers both teachers and students from ‘normal’ 
developmental engagement with embodiment, touch and risk. The idea that every 
adult poses a potential threat to every child ‘ruptures the traditional relationship 
between individual action and the probability of a hazard,’ thereby, taking the factors 
of voluntariness and ethical principle out of the equation (Furedi, 2007: 8). 
Teachers, and in particular teachers of physical education, are subjected to intense 
scrutiny as to their motives for working with children. This can victimise and binds 
both teacher and child from establishing authentic relationships through encounters 
with risk. My practice, and the practices of many teachers, act in dissensus to this 
social framework by engaging and challenging the tacit assumptions and fears. I 
contend that although Piper and Stronach recognise a strong and seemingly 
unbreakable social bias of forbidding, they ignore the fact that an imperceptible 
something enables some teachers and many students to fight against the structures 
that bind them, the resolution to act. I liken this something to Heidegger’s ‘call to 
conscience’ and Rancière’s notion of ‘will’, inasmuch as it represents both anxiety in 
the face of stricture, and offers the resolution to challenge it in practice. As I 
demonstrate through the all the chapters there were strong and compelling ethical 
and practical concerns I engaged with in order to allow me to teach a 14 year old to 
climb a rope or swing from a trapeze. The risks to the young people, myself and the 
institution form a complex and compelling part of the terrain that I negotiate. I am 
not alone in this determination to enable students to explore new aspects of their 
identity and values; this is true of many teachers who negotiate risks with young 
people through every encounter with them. The fact that the child’s body is such a 
site for risk-aversion and suspicion, and that the child’s body is the site for my 
practice, enables me to expose and explore these risks extensively.  
Any exploration of risk, therefore, raises questions of political climate, Governmental 
control and the communication of tacit information about the status of knowledge 
and knowledge-givers. Through the next section, I unravel and criticise these 
discourses in order to advance the notion that fear and risk-aversion proliferate 
discussions involving young people.  
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2.2 Risk and Risk-Aversion in Contemporary Britain 
Risk is an entirely perceptive phenomenon and this perception is contingent upon 
and constituted by contemporary values and norms. In this section, I reveal a 
paradoxical tension between the fear of physical demise and the fear of discussing 
death. This tension is located within the physical body and communicated tacitly 
from the ‘police order’ which privileges rational and statistical analysis over personal 
experience (Rancière, 2010). I elucidate upon the implications of teaching in Britain 
in 2011, recognising the impact of the fear discourses upon the everyday teaching of 
children against which many of us work to empower young people 
A definition of risk prompts a consideration of risk-aversion. In 2005, at a speech 
given at University College London, the then British Prime Minister, Tony Blair said: 
I want to talk today about a particular problem my experience has led 
me to identify. It is an issue that seems more of a talking point than an 
issue of policy; that has many facets to it; that is little discussed in the 
way I’m going to discuss it; but which, on the basis of my experience, if 
it goes wrong, has the capacity to do serious damage to our country. 
It is a sensible debate about risk in public policy-making. In my view, 
we are in danger of having a wholly disproportionate attitude to the 
risks we should expect to run as a normal part of life. This is putting 
pressure on policy-making, not just in Government but in regulatory 
bodies, on local government, public services, in Europe and across parts 
of the private sector – to act to eliminate risk in a way that is out of all 
proportion to the potential damage. (2005: n.p) 
Blair’s suggestion to open up a debate concerning the nature of risk and risk 
perception in order to release the pressure it places upon many areas of public and 
private life is also a discussion of public perceptions and fear. He suggests that risk 
aversion has repercussions for the strength of the people, the country and the 
economy because Governmental policy is cautious. It is reasonable to suggest that 
measures are put in place to eliminate dangers that are avoidable and look for ways 
to make the population as safe as possible. It is not, however, reasonable (or 
possible) to attempt to eliminate all possible danger or hazard from life as we live it. 
This imperative to eliminate all risks and to make decisions based upon fear seems to 
be at the heart of debate about, not only risk, but also contemporary education: 
The ethic of ensuring the nonoccurence of disaster is so generalized that 
it can be imposed upon, and morally expected of, everyone. And the 
moral aspect is strengthened by the fact that, after all, one is not 
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thinking about oneself but about others, perhaps even about those yet 
to be born. This can be countered by arguing that this behaviour, too, 
involved confronting unknown and perhaps more immediate risks. But 
– arguing from a moral point of view – this amounts to renouncing all 
willingness to communicate. (Luhmann 1993:3) 
Luhmann’s proposition is that a premise driven from a fear of danger rather than a 
willingness to communicate eliminates the value and practice of individual 
intelligence. Measures to eliminate obvious dangers are based upon a solid ethical 
foundation, where the elimination of avoidable disaster is paramount. The 
elimination of surprise occurrences of unforeseen dangers, however, is impossible. I 
am morally and ethically impelled to put in place measures to protect against 
avoidable or predictable hazard, but I am also ethically committed to ensuring that 
those very constraints do not suppress all possibility of freedom for the participants 
in my work. The proposition can be advanced further by the suggestion that	  without 
a comprehensive dialogical relationship between fear, risk perception and risk 
management (which attempts to eliminate risk), freedom, equality and resolution are 
repressed. In this thesis, I present an argument that is based on a moral and ethical 
proposal for a proportional attitude to risk-taking. This proposition demands that the 
experience of the individual taking the risks is privileged.  
 2.2.1 Risk-aversion, fear and the subjugation of the adolescent. 
Furedi (2007) suggests that the notion of fear is what drives people in relation to 
risk, rather than a rational examination of scientific evidence. He considers that the 
impact of fear is determined as a product of ‘social construction’, due to a negative 
attitude to risk that has not always been the case (2007:24). He quotes Parkin’s 
(1986) essay in his suggestion that ‘as late as the nineteenth century the sentiment of 
fear was linked to respect, reverence [and] veneration’ (2007:3). This transformation 
into a fear-based society is echoed by Beck who argues that we have become a ‘risk 
society’ through the globalisation and individualisation of modernity. This is a 
cultural tension: the more people are aware of risks, the more heuristics come into 
play - impacting upon individuals’ ability to estimate these risks accurately. The more 
I am treated as if I have the same relationship to risk as others by taking away my 
right to choose, the less autonomous I may feel in relation to those risks, thus 
developing my fear and weakening my resilience. Children and young people, for 
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example, are often treated as potential victims rather than autonomous agents for 
their own development.  
The process of individuation for Beck and Furedi, typifies the move from communal 
social experience to one where personal experience is privileged. In particular, the 
personalisation of vulnerability and fear, that has been assigned to children and 
adolescents by an increasingly therapeutic culture, and the break-up of communities 
and old forms of solidarity. Furedi recognises that ‘today even the private sphere has 
become the target of suspicion and relations of dependence are culturally reviled... 
enhanc[ing] the sense of vulnerability’ (2004:132). It would appear that, 
paradoxically, the advances of science and technology, which Government and 
institutions use to predict and assuage danger, may only serve to reinforce feelings of 
vulnerability and fear by eroding the sense of communal responsibility and 
individual agency. 
This notion is, however, contentious, as well as pessimistic. Beck’s suggestion that  
someone who is poking around in the fog of his or her own self is no 
longer capable of noticing that this isolation, this “solitary confinement 
of the ego”, is a mass sentence, that millions of people, in all the highly 
industrialised countries, are also pacing the prison cell of the self 
(1995:40) 
brings with it a hopeless projection of isolation and imprisonment for the future, 
echoing the warning of Evans that agency of students and workers become ‘bound’ by 
hierarchical structures of blame and supplication (2007). It is a suggestion that we 
are trapped in a cycle of fear-driven discourse and that we are becoming increasingly 
risk-averse. As we saw earlier, however, young people who are considered to be ‘at 
risk’ are driven back into cycles of poverty or depravation only if they are not taught 
resilience or made aware of the means to escape it through the community (parents 
or teachers). With knowledge of their own agency, they can develop resilience and 
the capacity to rise above their situation. This analysis, building from my point in the 
last section about the something that compels teachers and students to take action, 
suggests that fear is not a ‘life-sentence’ in the way that Beck advances. It is a call to 
recognise that although each constraint has the potential to stultify people, on an 
individual basis, each person has the ability to understand their situation and 
become emancipated from it.  A consideration of this proposition through a 
Heideggerian philosophical lens, suggests that although Dasein is seduced into 
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falling towards the inauthentic ‘idle talk’ of the everyday (or the everyday heuristics 
that contextualise our judgment of risk), it is also called back into authenticity by a 
call to conscience (1962:174). In this way, Heidegger declares that humanity is 
mobilised into recognition of its state by and through anxiety. He suggests that it is 
anxiety itself which reveals the state of our fragility and, moreover, our possible 
resolution. Hence, these elements reveal a paradoxical tension inherent within risk 
analysis. The anxiety, which reveals our humanity through a relation to death, can 
build either resilience against it, or stultify agency. The risk inherent in any risk 
assessment is not simply the risk of death. It is the risk of being risk-averse and, 
therefore, of closing down possibilities, or the risk of being under-zealous in the 
estimations which could result in one being accountable for the accident of another. 
It is the risk that the teacher may liberate students or domesticate them within every 
single teaching encounter. 
The research of child development expert Tim Gill propounds the notion that we are 
living in a risk-averse society. He gives examples from the press that reinforce the 
findings that activities and experiences which previous generations may have 
enjoyed without a second thought, are being increasingly branded as irresponsible, 
troubling or dangerous.  Gill emphasises that ‘adult anxieties typically focus on 
children’s vulnerability’ (2007: 11). This awareness of the underlying meaning 
ascribed to childhood experience is a central problematic of this thesis. Children may 
become vulnerable and vilified in relation to risks;they are seen to be needing 
protection by adults who know better. What is revealed through these explorations is 
that risk is a phenomenon beneath which there are a host of other forces and fears at 
work, some of which are financially driven, some ideological, some psychological. 
What engenders this fear is similarly complex, and how this constitutes and is 
constitutive of dominating practices that may stultify young people rests upon a 
simple question. If risk is perceptual, how can it be managed? In the next section, I 
argue that the answer is that risk cannot be managed, not in the general sense, unless 
the identity and experience of the individual risk-taker is considered.  
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2.2.2 Cultural context or police order.  
After Blair’s demand that Britain needed to start a ‘debate about the nature of risk in 
policy-making’ (2005:17) a study was commissioned and a subsequently a document 
was published by the Select Committee on Economic Affairs entitled Government 
Policy on the Management of Risks. The objective of the inquiry was ‘to examine the 
scale of the problems highlighted by [Blair] and, particularly, to assess whether 
Government policy deals with risk in an informed, balanced and consistent manner’ 
(2005:1). This document considered the nature of public perceptions of risk as well 
as recommendations for policy relating to risk through two case studies, those of 
transportation and passive smoking. In respect to public opinion the document 
stated that:  
[m]ost of the relevant evidence we received was sceptical about whether 
it is possible to measure public perceptions about risk in any general 
way, or to pass judgements on whether public opinion can be regarded 
as excessively risk-averse. 
We have been unable to find any significant evidence to support the 
widely-held view that Britain has become an increasingly risk-averse 
society. We are also sceptical about whether general risk aversion can 
be measured in a way that would allow such a view to be substantiated. 
(2005:12) 
The position occupied by the committee was one of scepticism that they were able to 
measure perceptions of risk in any way that could be effective, rather than an opinion 
upon whether the public were more risk-averse. The committee consulted with four 
eminent risk management specialists; Kay, Bender, Fairman and Lofstedt, who all 
agreed that risk perception was difficult to measure. However, they did not consult 
with specialists in risk perception or consider the wider nature of the term ‘risk’, 
which as I have already argued, is difficult to define. The resulting conclusions 
reinforced the materialist imperatives in the assessment of risk and risk aversion, 
once again dismissing any consideration of the individual freedom perspective in this 
context. Hence, they forward the suggestion that because risk aversion is personal, 
there is no such thing as general risk aversion. The personal does not exist because it 
cannot be estimated, measured or substantiated for statistical analysis. 
The complexity of this issue is one of perception and management of that perception 
in response to a perception. It is a paradoxical state. The risk-aversion is perceptual, 
but because of an inability to scientifically measure this perception, the risk 
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management specialists were unable to say whether the nation is more risk-averse. 
Therefore, the Government concludes that this lack of evidence proves that there is 
no risk-aversion. It is interesting to note that it was decided that this did not warrant 
further study. The nature of physical experience is a descriptive and, therefore, 
phenomenological state. However, the Government are looking for measurable data 
with which to make decisions. They sought to derive a decision (prescription) on the 
basis of a descriptive (qualitative) and not hard (quantitative) study. Then, lacking 
hard evidence, they assumed the experiential evidence presented was irrelevant, and 
so dismissed the problem totally. The relationship between the prescriptive and the 
descriptive is one that continues to return in contemporary discourse, and evolves 
from a prejudice which rejects experiential evidence. This dominant thinking 
privileges the rational and scientific and in so doing  dismisses the experiential and 
descriptive. I argue that this again perpetuates a binary split within the social 
discourses surrounding work with young people that I will expand through all 
subsequent chapters of this thesis; it is a cultural privilege placed upon the rational 
to the detriment of the experiential. This split engenders scepticism of the descriptive 
or anecdotal evidence and evades the individual agency of each person who may take 
risks. I am not looking to privilege the phenomenological aspects over the 
measurable, that would also be to the detriment of the study, what I advocate is a 
holistic engagement with the qualitative elements in combination with the qualitative 
aspects, because both constitute experience for me, and for the young people in my 
care. 
Psychologist Kurt Lewens developed the notion of rational prejudice through his 
work with force field analysis, where he articulated the aspects that frame and 
connote developmental factors in children: 
Risks do not just ‘exist’ as free floating entities, they are taken, run or 
imposed. Risk taking and risk imposition involve problems of agency 
and interpersonal relationships that cannot be adequately expressed in 
a framework that operates exclusively with the probabilities and 
severity of outcomes. In order to appraise an action we need to know 
who performs the action and with what intentions... Therefore 
traditional quantitative analysis of risk needs to be supplemented with a 
systematic characterization of ethical aspects of risk, including those of 
voluntariness, consent, intent and justice. (Lewens 2007: 27) 
Hartley,	  J.	  R.	  2013	  
	  
92	  
	  
The complex nature of existence means that we live both rationally and 
experientially. The two states are inseparable; the likelihood of a risk affecting me is 
heightened by my relationship to it. If I am forced to take the risk, there is a greater 
likelihood that I will fall or fail than if I have voluntarily placed myself in an 
encounter with it. My intention through taking the risk forms a part of my resilience 
and safety within it, as does my ethical or ideological relationship to the material of 
the risk. A qualitative analysis is indivisible from the quantitative appreciation of 
what that risk is. When taking a risk, we encounter it wholly, by which I mean that it 
becomes a powerful, open-ended, indeterminate process that unfolds and creates 
new situations and actions. The risk unfolds experientially in the momentary, from 
the time it is identified. This unfolding, changing and unquantifiable relationship 
‘maps’ the risk for me until (and often after) the encounter. My perception changes, 
temporally, in relation to my experience. Risk cannot be simply measured, or even 
simply expressed. One way of viewing it cannot be divided from other ways. 
Through my work in circus and pedagogy, I open up a dialogue between these 
complex areas of contemporary existence through practice and reflection; which 
constitutes a mapping of the territories of risk encountered. Whereby critical aspects 
of the work are written and ruminated about so they form a vital part of my 
pedagogic experience.  This approach necessitates an embracing of the statistical 
data as well as experiential description. Through this combination I am able to reveal 
a more open-ended appreciation of life as it is lived through encounters with risk. 
Complexity guarantees contingency, which is to say, creates meaning – 
the difference between potentiality and actuality. We can observe the 
selections that are made; others can observe ours and we can observe 
theirs; we can even use schemas like truth/opinion, correctness/error 
or affirmation/critique to observe others’ schemas. But we can never 
prevent others from observing selections otherwise – unless, of course, 
we operate by way of a “dialectic of betrayal and avenging force” and 
prevent those who differ, who observe otherwise, from 
communicatively participating in society. (Rasch 2000: 33) 
Georg Rasch’s work with psychometry and quantative analysis of personality 
reinforces the premise that risks are recognised, judgments are made, and then risks 
are taken and witnessed according to paradigms of social and cultural concern. 
Working with young people magnifies the social perception of these risks as deeply 
problematic, without necessarily considering the way they may be tackled or the 
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benefits that may be gained from taking them. Although for my work, I am mapping 
the nature of the pedagogic encounter between teacher and student in risky 
situations, I still need to recognise that outcome and intention play a large part 
within the mapped encounter. Although all intentions, outcomes, heuristics and 
social mechanisms cannot possibly be mapped through a single moment, the 
complexities of the moment communicate widely beyond the risk-event or the 
encounter itself. It is through the taking of risks that a person knows how a risk can 
be negotiated, managed and overcome. It is entirely personal. The student or risk-
taker is in dialogue with the risk itself, through their past and future experience, and 
within this dialogue there is a recognition that there is the potential to succeed or fail 
in the face of it. They are aware of both possibilities at once through the act of doing. 
The outcome cannot be predicted.  
The notion of risk and risk-taking is constantly evolving, from the simple assessment 
of fortune and prudence of the 17th century to the intensive risk management 
policies of 2011 (Slovic 2000). As contemporary culture evolves, so the concept of 
risk and risk perception evolves: 
[w]e still have only a rudimentary understanding of the ways in which 
bounded rationality manifests itself. We know much about certain 
types of deficiencies and biases, but not know the full extent of their 
generality across tasks and across individuals of varying expertise... we 
know little about perceived risk, the determinants of societal response 
to threat, modes of communicating information about risk, or the role 
of justifications in decision processes. (Italic are mine, used for 
emphasis, 2000:49) 
So we are brought back to the main problem with risk, that it is impossible to predict 
and bound within a bias of rational privilege. This impossibility is due to subjective 
relationships between the risk-decision and the risk-taker, their experiences, biases, 
heuristics and their cultural frame. If risk is measured in purely economic and 
statistical terms, and these terms fragment intersubjective discourses that ‘bind’ the 
resilience of young people, then an intervention that focuses on bringing together 
reason and experience, through risk, may present a solution for engendering 
resolution and resilience within young people. The financial imperatives of the 
Government, which deny the experiential associations with risk, are potent 
conveyors of meaning within society. They are definitive of a Rancièrean police order 
because they concern ‘the organisation of powers, the distribution of places and 
Hartley,	  J.	  R.	  2013	  
	  
94	  
	  
roles, the systems for legitimising this position’ which result in passivity and apathy 
(1999:28). It can, therefore, be said that the measures taken to defend against risks, 
place us in more risk.  
The ability for risks to clarify cultural contexts and, therefore, transform the 
discourses associated with them is the foundation for the next and final section of 
this chapter. It advances the notions posited in this section, that a risk contains the 
possibility of agency, as well as the possibility of stultification or passivity. It depends 
upon how this risk is measured, communicated and mediated for the person taking 
it. Appreciation of risk is also contingent upon the relationship between the risk-
taker, risk assessor (possibly the same person) and the political, ideological, judicial 
or cultural heuristics they employ. This is particularly pertinent in the field of 
education and pedagogy.  
 
2.3 Risk in Education 
This final section discusses the psychological and sociological research into child 
development and risk-taking. It proposes that risk-taking behaviours develop the 
skills of ‘autonomy, mastery and intimacy’ (Irwin and Millstein, 1991:3). I introduce 
the notions of developing anticipatory resolution (Heidegger, 1962:219) through 
‘guided practices in facing danger’. These guided practices lead on towards the 
extensive study of radical and freedom-based pedagogy within Chapter 2, which 
outlines the nature of ethics, intention and the notion of ‘knowing better’ that 
proliferate this risk discourse. This section surveys the literature on adolescence and 
risk-taking in relation to notions of resolution and resilience as opened up earlier in 
this chapter. It leads to the section that considers death and how the fear of death 
impacts upon the development of resolution. Taking the proposition from Heidegger 
that self-knowledge is created through doing, being and seeing Dasein in relation to 
death, I unravel the notion of risk as a physical action, a concept to be encountered 
through absence and as an intended (rather than experienced) act.  
The literature on adolescence is generally from the 1960s onwards where the first 
acknowledgement that there was a distinct psychological impact when young people 
transition from childhood to adulthood was recognised. According to psychoanalyst 
and child development specialist Peter Blos, who first articulated the need for 
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teenagers to break from their parents and gain independence ‘[t]he term 
“adolescence” is used to denote the psychological processes of adaptation to the 
condition of pubescence’(1962:2). Pubescence refers to the development of primary 
and secondary sexual characteristics. Therefore, for this thesis, I will be recognising 
that adolescence is the time when the individual is learning to cope with the new 
sexual and physical responses from the body. The duration of adolescence is 
individual, and dependent upon the individual’s capacity to learn or cope with 
conflicting intersubjective information. Adolescence is the period from puberty until 
full adult status has been attained, although what constitutes adult status is unclear 
within Blos’ thinking. In Britain in 2011, adult status is an ambiguous term. It could 
be considered to be 16 years of age, when students are able to legally consent to take 
risks without the mediation of a guardian or carer. It could also be 18 years of age, 
when the individual is able to purchase alcohol or firearms, which are signifiers of 
responsibility. The legal age of majority in Britain (with the exception of Scotland) is 
also 18. This is the age that young people are allowed to vote. However, other legal 
permissions are lower; such as the age of sexual consent and the age that you can 
sign up to the military services (16 years of age) and the age at which you are allowed 
to drive a car (17 years of age). It would appear that age, although useful for denoting 
legal status, sends confusing messages to adolescents about the way that they are 
perceived . From a child developmental perspective, different attributes, such as self-
awareness are considered to be more accurate markers of adult status. The confusion 
caused by the mixed messages communicated during adolescence to children and 
young people are heightened when the discourses are considered ‘risky’.  
According to psychologist and educator G. Stanley Hall, adolescence ends 
comparatively late, between the twenty-second and twenty-fifth years. Hall described 
adolescence as a period of Sturm und Drang, “Storm and Stress” (1916:17). In 
German Literature, the Sturm und Drang movement includes, among others, the 
work of Schiller and the early writings of Goethe. It is a literary movement full of 
idealism, commitment to a goal, revolution against the old, expression of personal 
feelings, passion, and suffering.14 This bears a strong correlation to my experiences 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	   Although, as emphasised in the introduction, I do not subscribe to the political foundations of German 
Idealism, I can usefully employ some of the philosophical frameworks to interrogate and complement my 
phenomenological and metaphysical description. Hall saw a correlation between the objectives of this group of 
writers, at the turn of the eighteenth century, and the characteristics of adolescence. The work of Schiller is 
particularly pertinent, in his Letters towards the Aesthetic Education of Man, he suggests that an appreciation of 
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with young people, and in particular, with the young people involved in this research 
who are actively engaged within the process of seeking a new path for themselves. 
They are asserting their need to try new things and form opinions, in particular in 
response to notions of pain and personal suffering.  
The description of The Slap used at the opening of this chapter exemplifies the need 
for self-knowledge; the teenagers were compelled to test their understanding of the 
tacit social boundaries normally imposed upon children and violence, and were 
rewarded and punished by the others in their peer group for doing so. They 
experienced pain, and inflicted pain on the others in the group, they experienced 
surprise at the lack of social constraint upon their actions and they regulated the 
activity through a complex application of ‘justice’ in the form of punishment. In such 
a way, they revolted against the old way of doing things, experienced pain, and built a 
new set of rules in appreciation of the experience that they had. Hall’s application of 
the term ‘Sturm und Drang’, therefore, describes pertinently what I would identify as 
the traits associated with adolescence as they strive for adult status, a relation to 
passion, pain and personal expression, which the nominal legal marker of the age of 
18 does not allow for.  
Adolescence is in this context, therefore, categorised according to behaviour rather 
than biological development or legal status. It starts with the process of genital 
maturity and finishes when the student has learnt to cope with the sensorial 
messages being sent and received. It is a time of identity formation in response to the 
biological and legal transition from child to adult status.  
Gerald Adams, Professor of Family Relations and Human Development (1992) and 
Rolf Muuss, Child Development theorist  (1964) suggest similar ways of looking at 
the idea of adult status in relation to the formation of identity. They emphasise the 
need to distinguish the self from notions of the self as lived with others. Adams 
suggests that ‘identity is conceptualized as an organised, self regulatory psychic 
structure that requires the developmental distinction between the inner self and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
art is foundational within the transformation of man away from the ‘savagery and lethargy’ that is their 
unconscious state (1910:8). He usefully considers the antagonism that I have expressed throughout this chapter, 
between a need for quantitative substantiation for accountability purposes, which is privileged above personal 
and individual qualitative experience. He suggests that ‘where the enlightenment had failed was not in the 
education of the mind and in the increase of knowledge but in the cultivation of the heart, or sensibility. The way 
to the head must be opened through the heart’ ( Schiller in Sharp, 1991:151). 
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outer world’ (1992:2). The idea of self regulation supports my premise that 
adolescence is a time when resilience and resolution can be built up through 
associations with risks and risk-taking. Muus proposes that identity formation is 
typified by the need to identify certain social markers which include:  
• The need to find a place in a valued group that provides a sense of belonging. 
• The need to identify tasks that are generally recognized in the group as having 
adaptive value and that can, thereby, earn respect when skill is acquired for 
coping with these tasks. 
• The need to feel a sense of worth as a person. 
• The need for reliable and predictable relationships with other people, 
especially a few relatively close relationships – or at least one. (1964:6) 
For these theorists, therefore, adolescence becomes a time of reconciliation between 
being and being with others. This runs parallel with my application of Heideggerian 
phenomenology as a lens through which to see my work. Heidegger’s assertion that 
Dasein is lived in the isolation of the individual nature of being, and interdependent 
upon the notion of Mitsein, which is the self as lived with others, serves to highlight 
that identity formation is dependent upon, and distinct from, social construction 
(1962). What is relevant here is how aware the adolescent is of their need to define 
their social position, and how aware they are of the impact that the wider social 
discourses of fear and risk aversion have upon their understanding or resolution 
towards identity formation. 
Adolescence is the process of experiencing this complexity of physical and emotional 
signals and attempting to identify a place within society. The gestalt psychotherapist 
Mark McConville further emphasises the notion that beyond the need to find a social 
identity, there is also the need, within the adolescent, to be different from others; 
‘[a]dolescents present complementary sets of developmental needs that derive from 
the fundamental nature of contact – needs for connectedness and needs for 
differentiation’ (1998:2). These behaviours can be seen as representative of the 
young person separating themselves from roles, identities and situations under 
which they had once been placed, in order to adjust their understanding of 
themselves as physical entities within the world, and advancing the proposition that 
one is able to transform through risk-taking activities and to know themselves in 
relation to others.  
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The academic research from various different fields into risk-taking and adolescence 
can be summarised simply by saying that young people need personal experience in 
order to reconcile and understand themselves in relation to others and the general 
social mien. Three studies into risk prevention are useful in this context. Psychologist 
Laurence Steinberg (2007), Charles Irwin and Susan Millstein, who developed the 
biopsychosocial model of risk taking, (1964) and the work of sociologists Mary 
Rolison and Avraham Scherman (2002) all recognise that although cultural factors, 
personal experience, neurological differences and economic factors all play a part in 
the adolescent’s decision to take a risk, what is compelling is that the experience of 
the risk somehow mobilises self development. Denial of opportunities to take risks 
returns the argument to the notion of ‘bounded agency’ and stultification developed 
within the earlier sections of this chapter.  
Risk taking behaviours fulfil many developmental needs such as 
autonomy, mastery and intimacy. Thus, it is simplistic to take the 
position that all risk-taking behaviours in adolescence should be 
eliminated. Interventions that attempt to meet the developmental 
needs, delay the age of onset of specific risky behaviours, and minimize 
their most negative consequences are not only more realistic, they are 
preferable for the development of the necessary social, psychological, 
and physiological skills in adolescence. (Irwin and Millstein in Blos 
1962:349) 
It is this relationship between risk aversion and risk prevention in contextual 
dialogue, with the admission that risky behaviour serves a tangible developmental 
necessity for young people, which is the crux of my thesis. The idea of ‘autonomy, 
mastery and intimacy’ (1962:349) being created through risky activities; that an 
adolescent needs to test themselves within the police order, in order to know 
themselves within it, is vital for understanding the nature of the trapeze work 
undergone. Unsafe behaviours such as drug taking or unprotected sexual activity, 
and themes of sex and violence are being conflated with the risk-taking behaviours 
that may engender resilience and resolution. Consequently, a risk-averse society 
breeds a discursive mistrust of any situation that appears to advocate the rehearsal of 
risk-taking with young people, despite compelling evidence that a considered 
approach to encountering danger would develop traits of agency, responsibility and 
maturity.  
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  2.3.1 Risk and death. 
Ultimately, if risk is conflated with fear, then what is it that we are afraid of? This 
section proposes that is the idea of death. I take a number of sociological and 
historical perspectives to articulate how death may be considered in this context.  
Sociologist Tony Walter suggests that death is theorised through four different 
frames: the practical, the biomedical, the lay and the semi-psychiatric (1993:38). My 
literature search revealed a convergent division in terms of teaching about death. I 
discovered texts which discuss teaching what death means biologically, looking at the 
impact that dying has on family and friends, and showing how to support a bereaved 
child. I am interested that much of the literature focuses on approaches to the 
terminally ill, to the bereaved, and establishes, that death is trauma, unexpected, 
irreconcilable.  
I found no literature on raising the subject of one’s own death with young people 
directly, although there are many curriculum texts which explore death poetically 
and thematically. Historian Philippe Aries (1974) argues that death (along with sex) 
is taboo because it is one of the times that nature threatens culture, and, moreover, 
that it is only post the Victorian era that we have been able to afford to get close to 
our children; the possibility of their death is now untenable where previously it was 
common. This avoidance of possibility is perpetuated, according to Walter, by the 
media, whose approach is to ‘interpret’ death for us as ultimately romantic or fearful 
(1993).  
My proposition is that a distant, narrative, fragmented and, ultimately, fearful 
relationship with death is constitutive of a social boundary because it diminishes the 
ability to appreciate one’s life, self and potential. If this is linked with a system of 
blame and supplication, then students within this system are being trained to think 
of themselves compartmentally; their appreciation is ‘scattered and dispersed’ 
(Heidegger, 1962:297); they are taught to blame others when things go wrong rather 
than build a resolute appreciation of the situation. Moreover, they are taught that 
there is a binary split between rationalism and experience, where the knowledge of 
an act is given more value than the experience of doing it.  
It could also be argued that this cultural evasion of death is seductive. By this I mean 
that the absence of a reasonable dialogue with death creates a compelling attraction 
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to it by making the subject of death a taboo. In creating an absent or indeed 
forbidden relation to death, we are drawing adolescents more pertinently towards it 
because they are determined to test themselves against a police order that forbids it. 
So, risk aversion not only has the ability to bind the agency of adolescents, it also has 
the ability to draw them towards risky activities outside the institutional framework, 
where they cannot be so easily contained. 
This aversion is constituted and communicated through the discourses of the fear 
society. Educationalist Ken Robinson (2010) notes that educational experiences that 
embrace the cycles of life and death for students allow students to fully engage with 
the concept of death and dying and, therefore, not fear it. He uses the example of a 
care home for the elderly which invited a primary school to make its base within the 
heart of the building. The children, aged between six and eleven years old, interacted 
with the elderly people and, thereby, came to know the cycles of life and death. 
Robinson suggests that such enrichment leads to a more fully realised sense of 
identity in relation to the real existential project of life, which is that we will all die. 
As Heidegger acknowledges, a potent marker of our humanity is that we all live with 
this knowledge that life is finite but we rarely engage with what it means to be mortal 
(1992:297).  
To eliminate the risk of death would be to find the elixir of life. The very thing which 
makes us alive is also the thing that places us at risk: our biology. Hearts fail, bones 
break and skin tears, rips and ruptures. What makes us human, Heidegger proposes, 
is that we are able to live in the knowledge of our own ability to die. We cannot 
escape the fact that our physical existence defines and contains intersubjective 
experience. Furedi proposes that ‘the taking of risks in order to transform ourselves 
is one of our most distinct human qualities’ (Italics in original, 2005: 168). To be at 
risk physically, and to decide how, and when, to place ourselves at more risk, are 
qualities that define human existence. The awareness of the risk-taker’s ability to 
transform, and build of resolution, resilience and an awareness of heuristics and 
biases, through experiences of existential death in response to risk, is what is often 
negated within risk discourse. 
Jungian Psychoanalyst Richard Frankel suggests that ‘[o]ne must know death in 
order to become a powerful and responsible adult’ (1998: 77). The point Frankel is 
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making is not one of observation, it is one of embodied learning. I suggest that ‘to 
know death’ is about understanding, physically, how you are charged, every day, with 
not dying. He continues: 
The uncertain adolescent experiments in order to master his 
uncertainty. By exposing himself to a boundary-disruptive situation that 
is fairly mild and that he can leave whenever he wants to do so and 
proving to himself that he can adapt to and even enjoy it, he builds up 
confidence in himself as an independent entity. (1998:33) 
Knowledge of death is, therefore, constitutive and transformative within human 
consciousness for Frankel. It builds resilience and resolution in the face of it. Death 
is also a familiar and historic theme for those considering transformational or 
pedagogic discourse. The theme may be traced from Plato, whose suggestion was to 
train students to know courage through ‘guided practices in facing danger’ and is the 
method purposely borrowed for the title of this thesis (Robertson 1999:9), to Hegel, 
who suggested that ‘it is only through risking one’s life that freedom is won’ (1807, 
1977:114). It appears that in contemporary society, contact with death is evaded 
through the risk-averse constraints of Police Order policy and practice, due to moral 
and availability heuristics and cultural fear. People become more risk-averse, more 
vulnerable and, therefore, demand more ‘policing’ of decisions concerning risk. The 
people therefore create the demand for the things that bind their resolution. 
I offer students opportunities to encounter death, through learning the dangerous 
skill of trapeze work. This works to compliment the institutional factors that are the 
ultimate surety to prevent students from coming to undue harm, through best-
practice guidance and insurance. In my sessions the students learn, not only how to 
move through the air, a process that offers a corporeal engagement with fear and 
anxiety, but they also learn that the risk is perceptual rather than actual. The 
students also learn how to support or spot15 each other safely, thereby taking 
responsibility for the life of another student; a skill that is valued within the group 
and which offers a very visceral one-to-one relationship with another person. I 
discuss the paradoxical associations of working with the trapeze within Chapter 3: 
the pleasures and pains; the dependence and independence; the strength and 
vulnerability; life and death. All of these are metaphorical and tangible essences 
when working in the air; they engage the rational and institutional elements of risk 
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  Appendix	  C	  for	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with the perceptual and experiential. Introducing students to the trapeze enables 
them to locate themselves within, and reflect upon, these tensions in their lives. It is 
an experience of the descriptive and imaginative constructs that are intertwined with 
the cultural and statistical formulations generally associated with taking risks.  
Artistic creativity intimately involves the body, not only in the sense that a creative 
act can only find expression in some muscular, motoric output, but also in terms of 
the role played by body sensations in motivating and infusing what we call creativity. 
Performing on a trapeze offers students the opportunity to play with the notion of 
death. The circus offers a safe place where students can try on identities and 
encounter death in the spirit of ‘play’; according to anthropologist Victor Turner 
‘[p]lay is a liminal or liminoid mode… in its own oxymoronic style, it has a dangerous 
harmlessness, for it has no fear. Its lightness and fleetingness protect it. It has the 
powers of the weak, an infantile audacity in the face of the strong’ (1983: 27). Circus 
can be ‘dangerous harmlessness’, it can give students an opportunity for anarchy, 
rebellion and emotional exploration, but at the same time, challenge them to face 
fears and risk exposure. It can enable a person to experience the capabilities of their 
body through encounters with pain and suffering, in order to rehearse resilience and 
agency in a given situation. It presents choices rather than absolutes because it deals 
with the practice of human behaviour. It can, if handled correctly, offer students a 
route to exploring and rehearsing resilience and resolution towards authentic 
engagement with their own identity within the pre-existing mechanisms that are 
designed to keep children and young people safe. 
Teachers are caught between the need to develop skills and a desire to protect 
students. This can arguably be conflated with the desire to protect the teacher from 
allegations of impropriety or litigation that are at the heart of an economically and 
accountability driven education system. Piper and Stronach’s study recognises that 
legal and tacit information presented to teachers is at times ‘confused, contradictory, 
based on staff rather than child protection, contrary to known best practice regarding 
child development, increasingly contested and not required by legislation’ (2008:1). 
They also suggested that ‘this fear constitutes and propounds a feeling of mistrust 
between students, parents and teachers which hinders the student’s creativity and 
exploration’ (2008:2). It would appear that the very nature of education, to take risks 
and innovate, is perceived to be in conflict with societal and Governmental 
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regulations. This dichotomy is pervasive within contemporary education research, 
but because of difficulties with quantification, it is evaded by Government. I argue 
that if handled ethically and sensitively by teachers, work on, with and through risk, 
can compliment and reinforce the existing best-practice in schools, and provide 
opportunities for students to know themselves as resilient.  
At the heart of the debate is the nature of ontology, epistemology and methodology in 
contemporary culture with regard to risk and children. This debate is constituted by, 
and constitutive of, the fear discourses that surround bodies, and particularly the 
bodies of children in relation to moral heuristics. It is particularly reflected in the 
fear of discussions pertaining to death, where an absence of discussions that value 
experiential relationships with death and risk result in fear. This fear runs through 
all discourses and attracts, as well as repels, adolescents who are striving to find their 
individual way through the social context of their lives. I argue that what is needed is 
a dialogical relationship to death and risk. Adolescents are at the heart of this 
paradox because they are compelled to take more risks and their bodies are the focus 
for potent discourses that are taboo. Heidegger posits that self-knowledge is created 
through doing, being and seeing of Dasein in relation to death (1962). Risk is, 
therefore, conceived as a physical action, and death is a concept to be encountered 
through absence and as a single possible outcome through the taking of a risk.  
Risk is a culturally bound concept which currently communicates fear of both 
surprise and danger; this fear pertains to the human body and the possibility of 
death. The bodies of children are particularly objectified by these fear-driven 
discourses due to the societal perception of their vulnerability; and evidence proves 
that fear perpetuates vulnerability and stultification, whereas encounters with risk 
and death build a young person’s resilience and autonomy within the face of them. 
These are the premises from which I will be building an argument about the role of 
education in empowerment through the course of the next chapter. What is called 
into question is how best these risks are mobilised by the teacher, bearing in mind 
her, (my), ideological and cultural position. How can a practice situated within a 
risk-averse context hope to counter this risk aversion? And how can I/a teacher 
inhabit the paradox of knowledge that Immanuel Kant recognised as: ‘cultivat[ing] 
freedom through coercion?’ (1960:699). 
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Chapter 3.o 
 
Violent Care - Towards a Dialectical Appreciation of Risk 
Touch refuses a simplified condensation of the encounter between you 
and me, refuses to speak only to the point of departure and the point of 
return. Touch grapples with the impossibility of fusion in the movement of 
desire that is directed towards you and reciprocally toward myself... The 
violence exists in the reaching out toward that which will remain 
unknowable. (Manning, 2007:52/3) 
Risk and the risks associated with teaching aerial work to adolescents form the first 
problematics of my thesis. I am motivated by a desire to explore the possibility of a 
critically attentive relationship between teachers and students that could rupture the 
fear-driven discourses that were articulated in the previous chapter. I wish to explore 
the violence and care that typify any relationship that involves learning in order to 
unravel the territories of risk inherent within this very specific human interaction. 
Use of the Erin Manning quote above emphasises the need to excavate the complex 
narratives and tacit notions that proliferate my practice. Manning’s work in dance 
theory supports the notion that physical contact between people invites a new level of 
communication, and new possibilities for risk. As discussed in the previous chapter, I 
regularly touch the young people in my care and, more than that, the teaching of 
aerial work extends beyond distant pedagogic methods because the corporeal 
relation between teacher and student is formative to the student’s learning regardless 
of the physical contact between them. The practice touches the student’s physical 
identity, both literally and metaphorically.  
 
Manning suggests that touch is inherently violent, not in its outcome but in its 
interpretation. Touch impacts upon both teacher and student because it refuses 
simple classification as ‘I give’ or ‘I receive’; it is a proposition to give or receive 
something unspecific. This is true of dialogical teaching that focuses on the body. The 
lack of specificity within a touch means that it is open to layers, or strata, of cultural, 
interpersonal and moral meaning; new heuristics come in to play. Touch is an act of 
rupture and intercession. Through this chapter, I use an example of touch between 
teacher and student to open up the numerous meanings implicated within the act of 
touching. In the example used, I describe the nature of teaching as one of tactful 
negotiation through intersubjective dialogue.  
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A proposal for an intersubjective, dialogical approach to education which I apply to 
my practice of aerial work is one possible counterbalance to the problems of rational 
prejudice and bounded agency discussed in Chapter 1. The approach is located within 
the site of most fear - the adolescent’s body - and, therefore, requires careful 
negotiation of the territories of risk at play within the pedagogic dynamic. My 
approach proposes that intelligence, will and possibility are all potent discourses 
with which to redress the balance between the prescriptive (rather than descriptive) 
thinking of enlightenment and the perceptual experiences of the individual. This 
approach to pedagogic philosophy is not new; it starts with Platonism. Plato, and 
later Heidegger,16 championed a metaphysical definition of knowledge as an act of 
uncovering or aletheia. This notion is in opposition to a pragmatic construction of a 
totalised known, the resulting reconciliation of ‘knowing’ which David Pugh, in his 
discussion of the work of Plato refers to as a ‘dialectic of love’ (1996:33). He does so 
because it ascertains an individualised, mobile and emotionally connected 
relationship between the knower and the object of knowledge. According to 
Heidegger, only a way of thinking that goes right back to the Greeks will be able to 
disentangle itself from ways of being that are inherently nihilistic (1998: 45); the 
annihilating17 influences, discussed in Chapter 1, are those of a fear-driven and 
rationally privileged approach to education. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  For more information on Heidegger and Aletheia, see Hyland (2004), Richardson (1974), Magnus, (1970) and 
Inwood (1999). The general consensus is that Heidegger reviews Plato’s understanding of Aletheia and suggests 
that this original and formative view of the nature of truth as ‘uncoveredness’ has been changed by contemporary 
viewings, however, Inwood declares that for Heidegger:	  
1. Truth is not confined to explicit assertions and discrete mental, primarily theoretical, 
attitudes such as judgements, beliefs and representations. The world as a whole, not just entities 
within it, is unhidden - unhidden as much by moods as by understanding. 2. Truth is primarily 
a feature of reality - beings, being and world - not of thoughts and utterances. Beings, etc. are, of 
course, unhidden to us, and we disclose them. Heidegger later coins entbergen; Entbergung; 
Entborgenheit, 'to unconceal; -ing; -ment', since unlike unverborgen, they can have an active 
sense: 'aléthes means: 1. unconcealed [entborgen], said of beings, 2. grasping the unconcealed 
as such, i.e. being unconcealing' (XXXI, 91). But beings, etc. are genuinely unconcealed; they do 
not just agree with an assertion or representation. 3. Truth explicitly presupposes concealment 
or hiddenness. DASEIN is in 'untruth [Unwahrheit]' as well as truth. In BT (222, 256f.) this 
means that falling Dasein misinterprets things. 'Untruth' is not plain 'falsity', nor is it 
'hiddenness': it is 'disguisedness [Verstelltheit]' of the truth (XXXI, 91). Later, 'untruth' is still 
not 'falsity', but 'hiding, concealing [Verbergung]' (LXV, 362). (Heidegger in Inwood, 1999:14)  
Truth therefore, for Heidegger, resides within the fact that it is evasive and remains concealed.  
17	  For more information on Heidegger and nihilism, see Heidegger’s work on Nietzsche (1961, 1979) and 
Hemming et al who summarise it neatly for us: 
Heidegger reads Nietzsche’s breathtaking vision of this movement as the common ground of all 
the radical attempts to define the polis in the last century. At the dawn of the twenty-first 
century, when these ideologies seem to have been brought to an end by six decades of peace (and 
when a final form of political organization, ‘democracy’, seems to have been reached, at least as a 
stated goal of the nations at the forefront of political decision-making and organization) – 
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Through the course of this chapter, I excavate some of the historical precedents for 
transformational and risk-embracing pedagogy. I recognise that, for each historical 
landmark discussed, there are five more that I leave untouched. What links the 
theorists and philosophers that I am using - Freire, Rancière and Heidegger - is their 
desire to uncover the dialogical influences of power and emotion that are played out 
in human interactions; they question the relationship between knowledge and the 
knower. This interrogation is at the heart of a pedagogy which encourages risk and 
the inspiration for what I am terming (after Heidegger) ‘anticipatory resolution18’ 
within the student. I argue that this is a phenomenological pedagogic method due to 
the intersubjective nature of risk as experienced by both teacher and student. I have 
proposed that phenomenology is the only appropriate methodology for observing 
risk-taking because physically engaging with doing encourages students to inhabit 
the tensions inherent within a paradoxical state of being - to be both vulnerable and 
safe within the learning experience. The teacher enables both vulnerability and safety 
and is thereby inhabiting the paradoxical state in their attempt to free the student 
through coercive means (Kant, 1960) - to care through violence. It is, therefore, 
dialectical as well as dialogical. A dialectic is the result of synthesising two seemingly 
incompatible or oppositional forces in a dynamic interaction. This synthesis, 
although temporal and spatial, is the location for a momentary appreciation of the 
resolution or will of the student. In this chapter, I consider the propositions of 
Rancière and Heidegger that, through an intersubjective appreciation of one’s 
situation in the momentary, a student is able to counter some of the negative effects 
of instrumentalisation (as in neoliberalism or reflexive modernism) such as bounded 
agency and fear. I propose that, along with the individual attention, as posited in the 
previous chapter, a reflexive and dialectical dynamic of rupture and care mobilises 
the dialectic and exposes the cultural tensions therein. 
This chapter is a study of the practical, pedagogical and philosophical connotations 
of working with risk. It is separated, rather unnaturally, into two parts - the practice 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Heidegger confronts us with the question: who are we, we who stand within the present 
movement of nihilism? (2011:2) 
18	  As discussed in the Introduction. Heidegger’s definition of resolution, as it is used here, forces Dasein to 
acknowledge the possibility of death. It is essentially futural: ‘anticipatory resoluteness is not a way of escape, 
fabricated for the ‘overcoming’ of death; it is rather that understanding which follows the call of conscience and 
which frees for death the possibility of acquiring power over Dasein’s existence and of basically dispersing all self 
-concealments’ (1962:310). Use of the term in this context, therefore, acknowledges the developmental potential 
and possibility of the student. It is about bringing the experiences learnt from the ‘now’, a momentary 
relationship with risk and death, into a projected possibility of the future. This future is unknown and 
unknowable.  
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and the theory; however, I assert that within praxis the two parts are intertwined and 
inseparable. This divisive form is a structural device I am employing in order to 
ensure clarity. Nevertheless, the reader will see that the two discussions overlap. I 
metaphorically explore the ground before I map the territories. 
The first section of this chapter will explore the key considerations that invigorate my 
pedagogic praxis and provide the foundation for the second section which considers 
the pedagogic philosophy in relation to the territories discovered in the rehearsal 
room. Within the first section of the chapter, I will outline some of the critical 
thinking that is central to the application of risk-taking methodologies. I isolate some 
of the areas that are particularly pertinent when working with young people. In order 
to do this, I discuss a particularly informative critical incident from Day 2 of the 
project Hello Fatty. This moment is used to highlight the territories of risk that I am 
exploring and will introduce the key themes of rupture and dislocation, dialectics of 
love19 and a discussion of individuation that forms the basis for the theoretical 
framework of this chapter.  
The second part of this chapter covers the contradictory philosophical arguments 
that proliferate when notions of humanity and authenticity are considered. I will 
clarify my pedagogic position in relation to Rancière’s approach by critiquing his 
proposition that acts of dissensus offer a way to rupture students from stultifying 
patterns of education. Dissensus, in this case, is defined as ‘not primarily a quarrel, 
but... a gap in the very configuration of sensible concepts, a dissociation introduced 
into the correspondence between ways of being and ways of doing, seeing and 
speaking’ (Rancière in Bingham and Biesta, 2010:15). This act of introducing new 
ways of doing, seeing and speaking, according to Rancière, begins the journey 
towards agency and equality for the student.  
I argue that it is through dislocation from, or rupture with, a known world that true 
open-ended learning can take place. This is a risky proposition. A cycle that is 
categorised by Freire as ‘conscientisation’ (bringing to consciousness), perception 
and volition (1970:43). Moreover, it is a technique that is grounded in an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  This	  term	  is	  used	  by	  four	  of	  the	  theorists	  used	  in	  this	  thesis.	  David	  Pugh	  uses	  it	  to	  describe	  Plato’s	  pedagogic	  
strategy	  (1996).	  Paulo	  Friere	  also	  utilises	  this	  phrase	  when	  discussing	  a	  dialogic	  learning	  situation	  that	  intends	  
to	  empower	  students	  (1970).	  Merleau-­‐Ponty	  uses	  it	  to	  describe	  the	  way	  that	  a	  viewer	  knows	  themselves	  when	  
looking	  at	  another	  (1968);	  and	  this	  is	  further	  appropriated	  by	  Peta	  Tait	  in	  her	  description	  of	  the	  observation	  of	  
trapeze	  performance	  (2005).	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appreciation of poetry, which opens meaning up to an equalising dialogue. He and I 
argue that poetry is one way that risk can be encountered without the student and 
teacher being annihilated by fear. I question how I can negotiate and practice a 
poetic teaching and research method within and supporting the often fear-driven 
discourses that I defined in Chapter 1. I will highlight the problematic paradoxical 
role the practitioner/teacher inhabits when they attempt to enable the autonomy of 
students to be challenged safely. If the dialectical relation within this pedagogic 
praxis is between violence and care, then this needs to be synthesised by a third, new 
intercession - tact. 
  
3.1  Territories of Risk  
This first section of the chapter focuses on the practical and experiential elements 
within the rehearsal room relating to a teacher and student relationship. I begin with 
the practice because it enables the reader to see how this is an ephemeral and 
complex discourse that speaks of the experience and for the experience in a lived 
moment. Taking a moment from the practice, I address the key concerns that arise 
from one simple moment of rupture. I use the term ‘rupture’ to signify a 
confrontation or fissure within understanding and within the student’s experience.  
Within the philosophical discourses of Heidegger and Freire, the notion of rupture 
signifies a linguistic proposition of abrupt violence to the self. For Freire, this is clear 
with his polemical rally cries for fighting to recover a stolen humanity. He sees the 
awakening of students as a painful process for both teacher and student, that it is a 
fight against the ‘“fear of freedom” which afflicts the oppressed’ (1970:28). He 
further suggests that this transformation is a form of midwifery20 for the student’s 
childbirth. This is an image which invokes pain, struggle and violence for a happy 
goal. He further admonishes the role of the oppressors (or bad teachers) as perverted 
and sadistic, due to their resolve to transform humans into objects (1970:41). This is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  The use of the term ‘midwifery’ has a long history within pedagogic philosophy. The works of Plato and 
Socrates are discussed by Mintz (2007), who acknowledges a deeply entrenched perception of education as a 
relational birthing process dependent upon clear knowledge and intention.  
As one scholar has put it: “This means that the maieutic art [midwifery] is not something one can 
just learn through so-called ‘education’ courses. It is not one more method one can add to one’s 
repertory.” Socratic education is not merely a method of questioning but also, I contend, the 
reality of being face to face with another human being with whom one must desire to spend time. 
(2007: 97) 
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drawn into a discussion of death and the human relation towards it: ‘Sadistic love is a 
perverted love – a love of death, not of life’ (1970: 41). In this way, Freire emphasises 
that deterministic teaching murders the humanity of students.  
For Heidegger, the term ‘rupture’ is situated within the notions of ‘breaking-up’ and 
‘clearing away’, the process whereby Dasein is able to ‘discover the world in its own 
way and bring it close’ (1962:167). In the example below, the student and I broke 
away from the cultural structures that would normally limit the encounter in order to 
find our own way through the work. Again this is situated alongside notions of death 
in as much as it is the essential condition of humanity that is evaded by the 
structures of the everyday. It brings us closer to death, not in the way that Freire 
espouses by drawing students together into a relation that restricts and, therefore, 
kills potential, but by exposing the tension and conflict in order to ‘bring it close’ and 
reveal the potential (for life and death) that it contains.  
 
Critical Incident 2: The Gazelle 
It  is  Day  2.  The  trapeze  is  five  feet  from  the  ground.  The  student  expresses  
a  desire  to  learn  a  gazelle.21    
‘Sit  sideways  with  your  legs  straight  and  ensure  that  your  bottom  is  either  
side  of  the  bar.’    
She  sits  sideways  with  her  bottom  either  side  of  the  bar.  
‘Now,  raise  the  leg  that  is  furthest  away  from  the  rope,  draw  your  foot  up  
your  body  so  that  the  leg  is  bent,  bringing  your  knee  as  high  as  you  can,  
close  to  your  arm-­‐‑pit,  but  on  the  other  side  of  the  rope.’  
She  attempts  to  do  this.  It  is  a  complex  instruction.  The  movement  is  not  
natural   and   needs   ‘translating’   from   the   words.   It   feels   wrong   and  
unbalanced.  Left  and  right  are  confused.  She  has  no  idea  where  the  rope  is  
or  whether  she  will  fall.  I  touch  her  right  ankle.  
‘This  leg,  draw  it  up  the  other,  bent  and  place  it  by  the  rope.’  
Touching  her  ankle  makes  it  clear.  She  raises  it  straight  towards  her  head  
and  wobbles.  
‘I   am  going   to   fall,’   she   cries.   The   trapeze   swings   as   she   throws  her   leg  
back  into  position,  still  leaning  backwards  towards  the  floor.    
‘I’m   here.   It’s   fine.’   I   stand  with  my   hands   on   her   shoulder   blades;   her  
neck   is   close   to   mine.   ‘Rotate   your   body   back   to   where   we   started,   sit  
sideways  and  try  again,  with  your  leg  bent.’  She  sits  up  straight  and  starts  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  See Appendix C for a full glossary of trapeze terms.	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the  process  again,  sitting  sideways  and  drawing  her  right  leg  up  her  body.  
She   is   leaning   backwards   into   me   again   and   I   can   feel   that   she   is   off  
balance   as   more   of   her   weight   impacts   upon   my   body.   ‘Nearly,   that’s  
great,  sit  up  again.’  She  sits.  
‘I  can’t,  I  don’t  know  what  you  mean.’    
I  reach  out  for  her  inner  thigh  and  am  about  to  touch  it  to  show  her  where  
to  put  it.  I  stop.  I  remember  that  she  is  my  student.  I  remember  that  she  is  
sixteen  and  I  remember  that  it  is  a  sensitive  place  to  touch  her.  My  instinct  
is  interrupted  by  my  training.  I  take  a  ‘stepped’  approach.  
‘Can  I  move  your  thigh  into  position?’  
‘Yes.’  She  breathes  tensely  and  she  closes  down  from  the  experience  as  I  
reach   her   thigh   and   pull   it   towards   the   position   it   needs   to   be   in.   She  
shakes  her  head,  her  muscles   are   resistant   and   I   remove  my  hand.   ‘OK,  
let’s  get  you  down.’  She  descends  to  the  floor  and  raises  her  voice.  
‘Why  did  you  ask  me  that?  I  was  OK  until  you  asked  me  that.’  
 
This moment represents a rupture in pedagogic tact, a rupture between the 
teacher/student’s instinctive and open relationship up to this point in the work, 
between the student’s desire to get the movement right and her physical 
understanding of herself in the moment of the work, between my physical impulse 
and my reasoned cultural knowledge. This rupture is a moment of cultural and 
practical learning about risk for both the teacher and the student. By investigating 
this moment, I can acknowledge the territories of risk at play within this complex 
dialogue. I use the term ‘territory’ purposefully to denote a boundary that surrounds 
an area or location that is ‘policed’ politically by the regulations discussed in Chapter 
1. The term denotes an artificial line within the right and wrong ways of doing 
prevalent in the moment described. I am aware that no clear line is drawn other than 
that of imaginary significance. These artificial territories form a thematic map 
through which I am able to make explicit what is involved implicitly in my practice. 
In the moment of practice there is a transgression, thereby enabling the boundaries 
to be recognised and challenged. It is a moment of disclosure for us both; the 
conventions of touch are questioned and understanding is ‘brought close’ to us 
through anxiety (Heidegger, 1962: 254).  
Primarily, the student is at risk of falling from the trapeze. This risk reveals itself 
within the tension in the student’s body. It is the risk of pain and injury because the 
trapeze is dangerous. This somatic tension embodies and reveals other less 
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transparent and interconnected territories at play within the interaction. The fact 
that the student may fall to the ground if the communication is ineffective between 
student and teacher makes this dialogue pertinent, visceral and loaded. The student 
has to place herself at the risk of failure, which ‘places her in a situation where she 
risks the possibility of ridicule of others. Failure in this instance, despite my presence 
to stop or catch her, may result in ridicule and also in a fall. The possibility of ridicule 
by others is, however, only one layer of this particular risk. There is also the 
possibility of a shifted sense of the student’s identity to ‘one who has failed’ in 
relation to the equipment, the practice, my teaching and her own potential. The risk 
is, therefore, that the social failure can entrap the student into a sense of identity 
diminished by the encounter rather than opened up to a possible future resolution of 
it. So student failure becomes the second territory of risk. 
The third is the territory of ‘touch’ and the risk of inappropriate touching between 
two people, one of whom is seen as having power over the other. The teacher/adult 
has power over the vulnerable student/adolescent. The dynamics of role and 
authority form a constant dialectical relation between the student and the teacher. 
Intertwined with this risk is the perception of the teacher’s role, authority and 
intention and how it relates to the dynamics of power within the teacher/student 
relationship, which is at the heart of the ethical dilemma that I articulate in Chapter 
1. These nuances of power are revealed when I consider the communication and 
miscommunications of the moment. The student’s verbal acquiescence to the touch 
and physical rejection of the activity through physical resistance is contradictory; the 
student said ‘yes’, but communicated ‘no’. The teacher heard the ‘yes’ and acted upon 
it only until she was aware of the embodied ‘no’, and then acted upon the ‘no’ to 
make the student safe.  The consent of the student and her ability to give consent is 
therefore a territory of risk within the work. 
It is also significant to state that, within this territory and power dynamic, gender is a 
concurrent and connected discourse. My gender impacts upon the teacher/student 
dynamic and is fortified by the societal perception of femininity as a safer ‘container’ 
for this type of risky activity. I transgressed a social boundary by touching a female 
student on the inner thigh but the transgression would have possibly been wider had 
I been a man. This offers a fourth territory of risk for us to unravel - that of gender, 
sex and the sexualisation of bodies. This territory is constituted by the complex 
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pervasive view that touch is immediately associated with the sexual and is, therefore, 
taboo when given or received by children. This situation is one identified by Piper 
and Stronach as conditions under which moral panic and misunderstanding in 
schools is perpetuated (2008).22 
Buried deep within the discourses that arise from this moment is the risk posed by 
transformational pedagogy and learning. Educator and gender theorist, bell hooks 
articulates this as ‘some degree of pain involved in giving up old ways of thinking and 
knowing and learning new approaches’ (hooks 1994:43). The pain of 
transformational practice synthesises the physical pain experienced within the aerial 
training, the pain of the hands on ropes and the sensations of a metal bar impacting 
upon the flesh of the student, combined with the potential for a physical impact or 
blow should the student fall. This draws the student toward a painful physical 
encounter with their identity, which is violent, significant and potentially 
transformative.  
 
3.1.1 Failure. 
This section considers the significance of failure in the risk provocation and, through 
the example above, its relationship to falling, the risk of inappropriate touching and 
the significance of power relations because the relationship involves young people. 
Failure holds within it the risk of miscommunication and misinterpretation within a 
dialogical relationship, the risks associated with an exposure of gender and, finally, 
the risk of pain involved in transformative education. I will consider these risks 
phenomenologically through a description of how they appear to me in combination 
with the theoretical paradigm of Rancière’s universal teaching and Heidegger’s 
authenticity. 
Failure is a contentious issue within educative discussions. Without failure, there 
would be no learning. However, it is argued that fear of failure inhibits adolescents 
from taking the risks needed to engender an appreciation of their being towards the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  For more detailed analysis of the debates concerning sex, sexualisation and the absence of permissible 
discussions on intimacy and desire with children, see Phelan. Her discussions demonstrate a ‘concern for order 
that belies a fear of the erotic’ (1997:82). Smith (2000) recognises that young people are educated away from 
using their bodies so as to avoid this confusion of messages for teachers. Crossley (1995) adds that the negation of 
the erotic in children is a distancing strategy, based upon fear, which inhibits child development.	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possibilities of autonomy, agency and resilience in anticipatory resolution. Education 
theorists Allan Collins, Susan Newman and John Brown (1987) developed a model 
for cognitive learning patterns, called cognitive apprenticeships. They articulate that 
errors are essential to the creation of mental strategies in problem-solving. Kurt Van 
Lehn and Panayiotis Gheoriou’s work to understand the learning of speech (2008) 
shows that real learning only occurs at an impasse or rupture during a problem-
solving episode. These two studies exemplify the key theory in the field of learning. 
Without a stopping point, the student is unable to understand themselves as 
learners. Learning, therefore, involves being consciously engaged within a process of 
trial and error and from these errors a student then creates strategies from which to 
solve problems or negotiate life. Janet Collins, Joe Harkin and Melanie Nind 
summarise contemporary pedagogic models Although not mentioning failure 
directly, they declare that the ‘fear of doing something wrong’ can isolate students 
from participating within educative experiences (2002:3).23 In the context of my 
work, failure becomes a potent and dominating discourse that reinforces the 
instrumentalist police order discussed within the first chapter. Failure is highly 
educative and yet to be perceived as a failure is potentially damaging. The difference 
is the need to specify a personal investment that mobilises learning in the first 
instance: I want to succeed and that carries the potential to fail.  The ability to 
separate the act of failing as distinct from personal identity in the second: to fail is 
not to be a failure.  
Sociologist Dan Gardner (2009) suggests that the conscious act of dialectical 
engagement between the immediate (or momentary experience) alongside the 
overarching (or contextual) is a possible counter to the problems of being socially 
dehumanized by failure. He argues, similarly to Freire, that praxical engagement 
enables the student to transcend the pertinent perception of failure and recognise its 
strategic place within learning for life. Any dialectic must be mobilised by a third 
element, the cornerstone of my thesis, which is the tact of the teacher. A discourse of 
trust and mutual respect from the teacher towards the learning of the student 
reinforces the human aspects of learning on an individualised basis and thereby 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  See also Reay and William (1991) who discuss failure in relation to National Curriculum targets and Bruner 
(1996) who discusses failure in relation to perceptions of the school environment. Both these studies show that 
the perception of failure in relation to these areas permeates into a greater failure to reach targets.	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reveals the relevance of a single act of failure as a positive movement towards 
possible agency.  
The idea of resolution being uncovered through a moment of failure is demonstrated 
by exploration of the moments after the example of The Gazelle. After the student 
berated me for asking if I could touch her, I laughed, looked her in the eye and said ‘I 
know, I’m sorry, I’m an idiot! I have been taught that you should ask a student before 
you touch them and, when I realised I was going to touch your thigh, I panicked a 
little (still laughing). I know that you know why I touch you when we work together.’ 
At this point the student laughed too, which broke the tension. I repeated ‘Sorry’, and 
she playfully hit my arm calling me an ‘Idiot!’ At that point, we went back to the 
trapeze and the student and I worked on successfully managing the movement 
through touch and response rather than language.  
The student’s association to failure was shifted by my commitment to trust and 
mutual respect within the relationship. I acknowledged my failure within the 
dynamic and I also acknowledged the social context of the work - fear of her body. I 
recognised the overarching political narrative that had been a dynamic although 
unexpressed force within our relationship through the politicization of touch. I gave 
the responsibility for managing it to the student, letting her choose rather than 
presuming I know better than she does about how to keep her safe. In Rancière’s 
terms, I equalised her.  
 
3.1.2 Touch. 
The pertinence of physical touch is another contentious issue for philosophers, 
educators and academics. Piper and Stronach (2008) outline a comprehensive social 
and ideological framework for reviewing the ‘no touch policies’ that contain 
behaviour within schools and nurseries. Primarily, they argue that the 
essentialisation of touch, divided from corporeal and discursive practices, renders it 
incomprehensible and unmanageable (2008:144). By using the term 
‘essentialisation’ in this context, they instil the notion that, for those who police and 
regulate education policy, touch communicates only in one way - that all touch is 
somehow illicit and, therefore, should be erased from classroom behaviour. This 
makes touch impossible to negotiate in educational practice. Moreover they argue 
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that those teachers or authorities who subscribe to a best practice notion of 
avoidance, fetishise touch to an extent that they inadvertently communicate abusive 
behaviours. As I iterate throughout this thesis, I feel that to treat teachers as a 
homogenised group is problematic. I know from experience that many teachers 
physically engage with their pupils in schools across the country. It is impossible to 
generalise. I do not set myself against institutionalised teaching or imply that my 
work is somehow of higher value. What I intend, from using Piper and Stronach’s 
research as a foundation, is to look at possible solutions within my practice. 
Within the example above, it is clear that the spectre of abusive behaviour entered 
the discourse as soon as I broke my instinctive reaction to touch the student, that is 
when I followed the prescribed safety method I had been taught as best practice - the 
‘stepped’ approach. This sustained the discourse that the student’s body is taboo, 
driven by my fear of being perceived as abusive. It perpetuated my own fear and 
placed the student back into the cycle of vulnerability as discussed in Chapter 2. The 
suggestion that touch always impacts negatively upon the student and so must be 
restricted and regulated negates the possible positive outcomes from the encounter. I 
am not saying that an intimate touch is always good: a different student might have 
been made deeply uncomfortable by the act of touching and this is definitely 
something a teacher should avoid. However, to ascribe all touch as forbidden would 
reduce all student/teacher tactile encounters to ones that are closed from the 
possibility of agency for the student within them. It is the teacher’s responsibility to 
extract meaning from the tactile encounter; her skill to tactfully negotiate the 
encounter with the student enables her to know when to touch and when not to 
touch. Fear of touching only reinforces a sense of the illicit nature of touch and the 
tacit vulnerability of the student. 
Since a moment of non or tentative touch conveys the notion of abuse, the pedagogic 
moment that uses touch has the potential to engender a more truly dialogical relation 
between teacher and student if equality is enacted in the interaction. It provides the 
opportunity for touch to be seen as positive. This is because both teacher and student 
are implicated in the act of doing so that it ‘give[s] not the key to knowledge but the 
consciousness of what an intelligence can do when it considers itself equal to any 
other and considers any other equal to itself’ (Rancière, 1991:39). One person is not 
the active toucher and the other the passive receiver of the touch; the touch is loaded 
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with a careful attention to the equality of the student and brings the theme of trust to 
the surface.  
The attentive teacher will move in such a way that frees the student from falling or 
from failure and challenges the discourses of abuse within the interaction. 
Consequently, the act of touching is similar to that of an intimate tactful duet. It 
demands the full attention of the practitioner/teacher and an acknowledgement of 
the internal and external conditions of the encounter within the momentary. Tact 
mobilises the relationship between teacher and student. The Gazelle example 
demonstrates the potential for communication and miscommunication of 
attentiveness and of humanity from the teacher to the student. The touch becomes a 
potent mobilising agent for the development towards intimacy, equality and 
autonomy for both. 
 
3.1.3 Gender. 
Intimacy and autonomy is also communicated in relation to the gender of the 
touching pair. My femininity connects with the femininity or masculinity of the 
student. Both aerial teachers, John Paul Zaccarini and Matilda Leyser,  articulate in 
the next chapter a gender bias within their descriptions of the teachers that inspired 
them. They appear to favour the ‘feminine’ as a signifier of care and they expose a 
bias within their use of typically gendered terminology. Their use of the metaphor 
container or vessel, which the teacher inhabits, is an image that favours the feminine 
within a caring dynamic. This is reinforced with the reminder of Freire’s use of the 
term ‘midwife’, also a potent metaphor used to describe teachers by Plato and 
Socrates. Teachers seen in this way are essentially feminised within the encounter.  
There have been many studies upon the need for a touch centred dynamic during 
infancy that suggest that consistent touching can reduce various stress related 
diseases in later life (Meany, 2004; Field, 1995). Michael Meany (an epi-geneticist 
working in Canada) has investigated how a mother’s touch can alter the DNA of 
infants (2004). This study is considered by many to recognise an exciting 
relationship between touching and physical well-being. However, by focussing on the 
role of mothers within this dynamic, he ignores the potential for a discussion based 
on a unified, corporeal relation rather than simply a gendered one. It is interesting to 
Hartley,	  J.	  R.	  2013	  
	  
118	  
	  
note also that the gender bias was built into the study because fathers were absent 
from the research.  
In this way it can be seen that it is through acts of absence that the masculine is seen 
as less impactful when considering touch. Manning suggests that ‘[i]n the moment of 
touching an other (with or across space and time), my body re-engenders itself, 
causing a potential fissure in the national body-politic’ (2007:109). This notion of re-
engendering is complex and idealised for the body remains as it was, ruptured only 
by the intimacy and attention of the touching pair. What changes is the self in 
relation to the self as touched, the re-engendering being a changed perspective of the 
student’s understanding of touch. What is significant within the moment of touch is 
the development of authentic understanding of the self generated by this intimate 
rupture. Touch liberates something hitherto expressed about the self. This authentic 
relation may cause a resignification for both the teacher and student based on 
political notions of gender that question the cultural norm.  
This notion of gender is significant within the aerial and acrobatic practice of the 
work too. The traditional strong male and graceful female roles can disrupt 
traditional notions of gender. Circus theorist, Paul Bouissac, suggests that circus acts 
‘communicate as a visual language that encompasses balance and disturbance’ of 
culture (1976b: 107). In this instance, the transformation is the cultural identity of 
the traditional masculine and feminine roles as representations of strength and 
grace. Circus and gender researcher, Peta Tait (2005), recognises that the graceful 
masculine is not problematic within aerial work because it is matched with a 
technical understanding and strength which surpasses the feminine. However, she 
notes what she calls a ‘double gendering’ of the body as a representation of a third 
gender which is permissible only because it appears to transcend the everyday in its 
ability to do ‘unnatural’ acts. It is my suggestion that a double rupture occurs for 
male and female students in their appreciation of me as a strong woman who 
possesses the strength to keep them safe from falling. This is brought t0 focus 
because of the corporeal relation with their own experience in the application of 
aerial skills themselves, which disrupts the cultural or social expectations of gender. 
The use of circus as a practice through which to rehearse equality by its nature 
disrupts perceived cultural norms and engenders a dialectic based on tact and 
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dissensus which, in turn, disrupts the traditional notions of gender difference and 
cultural normativity. 
 
3.1.4 Role and authority. 
The exploration of my role as a teacher who encounters risk is the purpose of this 
thesis. Educationalist Helen Nicholson (2002) suggests that the role of the teacher is 
to build the trust of the students through a dialogical relation and that this 
negotiation is politically significant for the students’ understanding of themselves, 
the learning community and the wider social context. The teacher’s ability to 
influence the wider social context is one that I suggest is a resulting influence of 
transformational education and, therefore, works against the emancipatory 
intentions of this thesis. However, the impact and codification of the teacher’s role is 
pertinent to explore in terms of dialogical ethics and notions of rupture. 
Transformational education suggests that, rather than a teacher’s role being an 
instigator of individual learning, students ‘can learn for themselves and without a 
master explicator when one wanted to, propelled by one’s own will’ (Rancière 
1991:12). This is perceived from the other end of the spectrum too where a teacher 
can be seen as a manager of the education of young people A full interrogation of 
these methods is not necessary at this time. However, because I am not setting 
myself in opposition or judgment of them. I iterate that every educational situation 
has the ability to domesticate or liberate the students within it, especially if that 
situation intends towards emancipation.   
The impact that freedom and authority bring within dialogue has long been 
recognised by educators who articulate that attentive relationships built upon 
authority can engender self-esteem and security in the student which then enables 
them to ‘master’ new skills. I return to the contention that a language of authority 
encapsulated within the term ‘mastery’ is in opposition to a more open-ended 
understanding of knowledge. This contention upholds Rancière’s proposition that 
the language of domination perpetuates a non-discursive acquiescence to a 
prescribed order that ‘shapes’ learning back towards domination itself, as all 
educative practices have the ability to do. A consideration of authority as attentive, 
mobile and turned towards the individualised student, like a partner in a duet, 
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positions the student in an act of becoming, rather than one of closure. In Rancière’s 
vision for universal teaching, the teacher is attentive not only to the student’s care 
needs, but also to their need to be challenged; the teacher is there in order to verify 
that the student has learnt. The student’s ability to reflect upon and express this lived 
moment is opened by the teacher and linked to their ability to respond in a manner 
that best ensures an open-ended educational experience for them, rather than one 
that engenders the fear-driven and determinising possibilities of a neoliberalist 
society. The teacher in universal teaching, therefore, is ‘ignorant’ in as much as they 
do not need to have mastered the skill that they are teaching the student to know 
what can be learnt. Their skill is to ensure that the will of the student is engaged.  
The idea of a teacher being a master is an interesting part of the pedagogic paradox. 
What is it that they are supposed to have ‘mastered’? For Rancière, the term presents 
two options, the first being that the teacher is a master explicator and this ‘mastery’ 
closes down the possibilities for the student. By this he means that the teacher is in 
possession of a secret, ‘to know how to recognise the distance between the taught 
material and the person being instructed, the distance between learning and 
understanding’ (1991:5). Therefore, the teacher is the master of knowing what should 
be known by the student and how to enable the student to learn this predetermined 
knowledge.  
The second definition of ‘master’ comes in his juxtaposition with the term ‘ignorant’ 
in the book’s title The Ignorant Schoolmaster. By juxtaposing the term ‘master’ with 
the term ‘ignorant’, Rancière makes the tension between knowledge and learning 
apparent. In this second way, mastery is an open concept, one conceived as an 
attentive engagement of will (the teacher’s) with will (the student’s). The mastery, in 
this instance, is a method rather than a statement of status or place. It requires 
constant attention to the act of engaging and informing the will of the student 
through his or her learning. This, for Rancière, is where rupture comes into play 
because universal teaching creates a ‘rupture with the logic of all pedagogies’ (1991: 
13). Rupture, therefore, is part of the process of creating tactful educational 
experiences because it forces the teacher to be aware of the social predisposition to 
control and give knowledge to the student. Rupturing from this predetermined frame 
frees the teacher to recognise the will and need of the student within the learning 
experience and enables the teacher to work for that.  Therefore, the possibility to 
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engage the will of the student is latent within each pedagogic encounter with each 
child. This is possible within schools, within parental relationships and within 
friendships. Although I nuance this later in the chapter, I recognise that Rancière’s 
strive towards universality can be engaged in and through every situation. 
 
3.1.5 Violence and care 
Educative experiences which are positioned towards the students’ authentic 
resolution involve an act of rupture from the known world and transformation into a 
new sense of identity as a more individual position. The nature of transformational 
education as a dialectic is one hooks describes as painful. She continues with ‘I 
respect that pain’ (1994:43). In this declaration, hooks confirms an attentive and 
supportive orientation towards an apparent contradiction - that, although she is 
taking students to a new position, there is no responsibility for her to take the pain 
away or stop the pain from happening. This is where the concept of care is drawn 
back into the discussion.  
Care is particularly relevant when considering the critical pedagogies of Rancière and 
Freire. For both, rupture is the result of a realised dissensus with the traditional ways 
of doing things. It is unavoidable if the ontological intention of the teacher is 
concerned with challenging the assertions the student has previously learnt and 
enabling the student to find their own (authentic) relation to themselves and to the 
world. Freire uses the term ‘armed love’ to articulate a relation between the need to 
care and the need to rupture: 
It is indeed necessary, however, that this love be an “armed love”, the 
fighting love of those convinced of the right and the duty to fight, to 
denounce, and to announce. It is this form of love that is indispensable 
to the progressive educator and that we must all learn. (Freire 1998: 74) 
 
The contentions inherent within Freire’s espousal are that, within his practice, he 
seeks to orchestrate a specific annunciation - that of a Marxist ideological excavation 
of power. I, like Rancière, seek for students to engage only their intelligence and will 
in order to find their own way through the material. 
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The term ‘love’ is also contentious.24 Each reader will attach varying qualities to this 
word dependent upon their own pedagogic philosophy and experience. Through his 
use of emotional language, Freire attempts to locate the discourse within the realm of 
the individual teacher and their individual practice, mediated by their professional 
attention to the students within their care. ‘It is not possible to be a teacher without 
loving one’s students, even realising that love alone is not enough. It is not possible 
to be a teacher without loving teaching’ (1998: 28). So instead of ‘care’, Freire offers 
love. I translate Freire’s use of the word ‘love’ to mean the vocational imperative that 
drives us to be teachers, even if it is not something that resonates within my own 
understanding of the nature of care. It is comparable with the something that I 
describe in Chapter 1, this something that enables many teachers and many students 
to fight against the structures that bind them, providing the resolution to act. I liken 
this something to Heidegger’s ‘call to conscience’ and Rancière’s notion of ‘will’ in as 
much as it represents both anxiety in the face of stricture and offers the resolution to 
challenge it in practice. 
Rancière also uses the term ‘love’ in his clarification of the notion of a society of 
equals. He says that ‘it is this [ignition of humanity] that is the just measure of 
similarity, igniting that gentle penchant of the heart that leads us to help each other 
and love each other’ (1991:72). He suggests that it is not love that equalises us but 
that a focus on equality enables us to help and, therefore, love each other. For 
Rancière, acts of emancipation create the conditions under which love for one 
another can flourish. Love, therefore, becomes a description, for Freire, of the state 
of caring for the student in moments of rupture. For Rancière, love is one of the 
possibilities awoken from the method of equalising through acts of will and rupture.  
My own experience as a trapeze novice is useful as a way of emphasising some of the 
themes of will and rupture in relation to the care of the teacher. I strove for a year to 
build the strength in my feet needed to climb a rope, each time breaking the skin and 
bruising the flesh as I worked towards understanding myself as an aerial being. The 
pain diminished as I learnt the technique needed to keep me safe and, although the 
wounds have subsequently healed, my feet are permanently scarred. Similarly, my 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  The term ‘love’ holds many layers beyond those discussed in this chapter. These layers include the spiritual and 
social constructs of romantic and sacred love. The reader may bring these associations phenomenologically to the 
use of the term. I do not. I am, therefore, not using the term to describe the nature of pedagogic tactical 
experience.  
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identity was transformed painfully through the work in a less easily expressible way. 
I moved from being someone who was fearful of movement and falling from a height 
towards one who had a better critical understanding of my ability to remain safe. My 
teacher also recognised the pain as a process through which I needed to travel in 
order to develop the strength required for the next phase of training; she was 
attentive to the tearing and bruising of my flesh but she did not try to stop it from 
happening. She recognised that this was part of learning the trapeze. This places the 
teacher working with young people in a double-bind - that of pain and care. The 
teacher is aware of pain and safety but she is also aware that these are individual 
locations with different boundaries for each student, who may either be mobilised or 
disempowered by the pain.  The ethics of enabling a student to be harmed are 
discussed in detail in Chapter 1 where I state that harm is a mobile and individual 
aspect of the work. One student may be empowered by pain, another may be 
stultified by it. I use an example in Chapter 6 of The Game to interrogate this notion 
more fully and ruminate about the pedagogic choices held therein. 
 
3.1.6 Physical pain 
The metaphorical pain associated with a transformational discourse is synthesised 
and linked to the pain of the physical impact that trapeze training has on the body. It 
is a discomfort caused by a ruptured understanding of identity in the first instance 
and by the body being exposed to a new way of being. Thinking intersubjectively, the 
one is the same as the other; both imaginative and corporeal pain brings a new 
understanding of possibility, social relation and agency for the student. Senior 
Lecture in performance and research at Falmouth University, Joanne Whalley (2010) 
suggests that the skin represents the boundary between safe and unsafe places for 
the student/learner. She proposes that the teacher recognises this place as a fixed 
point and boundary. Manning enhances this suggestion with a discussion for, when 
‘we reach toward to touch, we reach toward that which is in-formation and trans-
formation’ (2007:85). She suggests that the skin holds the threshold between the self 
and the Other and that touch fuses the two.  
Performance artist, lecturer and theorist Dominic Johnson (2010), however, suggests 
that, for him, it is only by breaching the skin that new fusions and transformations 
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are made in his performance practice. He declares his position as a teacher to be 
hypocritical because he considers his role as an educator, along with its safety 
responsibilities, to be one that disallows this same transformational understanding 
to be experienced by the students in his care. This places him in conflict as a 
practitioner that models transformation and as a teacher that is unable to allow 
students to practise it. My suggestion is that the breaching of the skin is a possible 
consequence of trapeze work but it is not its primary intention. The skin, body, and 
moment are an intertwined experience within the learning of the student. The 
boundary that is breached is an imaginary social and personal boundary rather than 
a real one even though blood may be drawn (and was in other instances). 
The experiences of the student in The Gazelle example above were not an 
investigation or a rupture within the student’s skin in the literal sense but were about 
piercing the unconscious understanding of the self. The duet that she and I 
performed was insensitively handled by me: the rupture engendered a 
miscommunication rather than a passage towards understanding. I took away her 
will to act by taking away her equality.  
The territories of risk explored within my work appear to intersect within an idea of 
ruptured understanding, through dialogical communication, supported by a 
relationship of mutual trust and respect (tact) towards the anticipatory resolution of 
the student by the teacher. This dialogue can be described as a ‘dialectic of love’, 
which is a Frierean ideal and pedagogic symbol. This terminology does not describe 
my experiences in the rehearsal room. I prefer to describe it as a dialectic of violent 
care. This description, for me, holds the notion of death as potential violence into the 
possibility of existence and re-inscribes Manning’s appreciation that touching 
between people is a violent act. I propose that the tact of the teacher mobilises this 
dialectical engagement. The next section examines this notion of tact further by 
considering critical and radical pedagogy as a starting point for interrogating 
pedagogic dialogue. 
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3.2 Critical Pedagogy 
The relevance of the educational practitioner and philosopher, Paulo Freire, cannot 
be ignored when working with radical and critical pedagogy for transformative social 
change. The impact of his writing and teaching is significant for Western educational 
practices; his thinking is still placed at the heart of the global political education 
debate (McLaren & Leonard, 1993). Freire’s basic premise that the learner is 
emancipated through dialogic praxical learning has become a key discussion in 
contemporary education practice and training. Freire’s proposition is that through 
radical pedagogy, the oppressed subject becomes critically conscious of their 
oppression and, through the dialogical teaching of literacy, the learner is able to free 
themselves from dominant socially and politically dehumanising forces. Indeed, 
Freire’s ontological imperative of humanisation was a starting point for the praxical 
reflections within my own thesis.  
Through the course of this section, I will explore the principles of Freirean pedagogy 
and argue two points. The first point is a declaration that Freire’s premise that true 
dialogical education cannot come from positions of domination is problematic. The 
second argument is with Miedema’s cognate claim that truly dialogical relationships 
cannot be practised within asymmetrical situations, for example one that involves 
children. I argue that consideration of children, and in particular adolescents, in this 
way perpetuates the cycles of vulnerability discussed in Chapter 1 (Furedi, 2004). I 
consider the social implications of generalised conscientisation and place it next to 
the practice of intimate tactful dialogues that proliferate within my pedagogy. This 
antagonism will allow me to explore the contradictions inherent for the practitioner 
when working dialogically with adolescents in this way. I conclude this section with a 
consideration of the terms ‘will’ and ‘authentic resolution’ and their relationship to 
the ‘autonomy, mastery and intimacy’ discussed within the previous chapter (Irwin 
and Millstein 1991: 3).  
The question has been posed as to the relevance of Freire’s ideologies within a 
Western society (Freire et al. 1998; Lankshear & McLaren 1993; Shor 1986; Shor & 
Freire 1992). Philosopher Richard Gibson argues that Freire’s work is taken by 
academics and used in any way to fit with the point that they are trying to make: 
‘[i]gnoring the transcendent human struggle for freedom from necessity’ which is the 
overreaching location and intention for Freire’s work ‘to the point where each person 
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became a personification of their own separate tiny little capital, with each element 
of the processes of capital embodied in them’ (1999:3). He adds that this 
personification helped ‘create an atmosphere in academia where students learned 
one idea is as good as the next since all is sheer perspective and discourse, social 
practice discounted as a source of truth-finding’ (1999: 3). Gibson’s persuasive article 
claims that Freire’s work is both over-used and under-explored. He emphasises, 
however, that it can offer insight into how questions can ‘deepen insight into 
egalitarian social practices’ (1999: 1).  
The general criticisms of Freire’s work, which include its ability to bend to the whim 
of the teacher and that it led to a diminishing of the quality of learning, articulate the 
need, which is reinforced by Freire himself, to adapt his techniques to each learning 
situation: he ‘ask[s] them to rewrite and recreate [his] ideas’ (Freire,1996: x). 
Moreover, it should be recognised that a Freirean approach to teaching is a 
constantly dialectical and destabilising activity for the teacher who orientates around 
the temporal, spatial, cultural and individual situation of the student at all times. 
Broadly, Freirean pedagogy is not a framework or method for a radicalising 
curriculum but an attitude towards disturbing anything that is taken for granted, 
especially the work of the teacher. 
By disturbing the taken for granted, it could be said that Freire is proposing an act of 
Rancièrean dissensus. However, Rancière denounces transformational or radical 
pedagogy as one which reinforces the neoliberalist concerns of accountability, 
competition and privatisation because it is about learning a specific knowledge which 
will end up being only the knowledge of a schoolchild. Freire’s knowledge 
transmission is primarily that of literacy: acts of dialogue between teacher and 
students create a word list that is then taught to the students in the traditional 
manner. It is arguably motivated by the cultural and historical conditions of the 
learning.  
Rancière’s exemplary practitioner, Jacotot, teaches not that which is known and 
understood by him but that which is not. He is ignorant of the gap between his 
knowledge and those of his learners and takes no steps to fill it. Rancière’s 
proposition is that Jacotot offers equality to his students through acts of will. The act 
of dissensus is not the act of learning something specific, as it is for Freire, but of the 
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student learning to write like an individual artist. The student is, therefore, opened 
by the encounter of wills rather than closed by the encounter with his or her own 
ignorance.  
With this heritage of criticism and warning, it is with caution that I use a broadly 
Rancièrean approach to radical pedagogy. I am attending to two of the five general 
principles that underpin Freirean pedagogy, viewed through the lens of Rancière’s 
emancipatory ideology. Freire’s five general principles are: 
1) the strategic advantages of dialogue as a “problem-posing” method in 
teaching; 2) the question of domination in dialogical settings orientated 
towards mutual respect and a loving relationship; 3) the dialectic of 
authority and freedom that underlines learning; 4) the social semiotic 
aspect of “codification” and “decodification” as a strategy for nondogmatic 
cultural criticism; and 5) the need to connect language and experience. 
(Morrow & Torres, 2002:130) 
By considering each principle in relation to my work, it is clear that there are 
thematic similarities and differences between the work of Rancière and Freire. The 
first principle is the most divisive in terms of Rancièrean ideology, both in its 
terminology (the use of the word ‘strategic’) and in thinking of problems as a way 
through the pedagogic encounter. For Rancière and myself, teaching is not a strategy 
to be applied within any given context. If it were, I could be seen as the ‘master 
explicator’ that Rancière disavows. The problem posed within my practice is not 
simply the trapeze ‘move’ that the student wishes to learn, it is the problem of the self 
in relation to the trapeze that is encountered. The motivation for the teaching 
moment is the students’ autonomy within a new corporeal location and the 
awareness of self it uncovers within them of which I can have no knowledge or 
predetermined outcome in mind.  
The second principle is again problematic within the Rancièrean proposition. For 
Freire, the issues of domination, love and respect are raised by him in the act of 
teaching. However, as Biesta points out, ‘In order to achieve emancipation [in a 
Freirean manner] someone else whose consciousness is not subjected to the workings 
of power needs to provide us with an account of our own objective condition’ 
(2010:44). This, thereby, fortifies the perception that the student is ignorant in the 
face of the knowledgeable ‘master’ who tells us what to think of our cultural 
situation. 
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The third principle is key within the whole of Rancière’s thinking and is at the heart 
of this thesis itself: the role of authority in learning. This dialectical balancing act 
between knowledge and coercion is powerful within Rancière’s thinking. He suggests 
that a proposition of equality does not mean that all intelligences are equal, because 
some people have more knowledge than others, or that one’s intellectual capacity is 
identical to another’s, but that ‘there is only one intelligence at work in all intellectual 
training’ (Rancière in Bingham and Biesta, 2010: 7). It is learning itself that is the 
authority.  
Principle four articulates two main points - firstly, that a teacher can enable students 
to be aware of their social condition and, secondly, that this condition is evasive. As 
you can see from my opening chapter, I have articulated the evasive and constitutive 
nature of the police order within both the classroom and society. The fact that Freire 
attempts to classify and codify this for students is problematic because, once again, it 
emphasises the idea that you can simplify this relation between the self and society 
for all students within one paradigm. I, like Rancière, contest the decodification of 
culture in this way because it annihilates the individuality of the students involved. 
Finally, and most importantly, Freire’s fifth principle links language and experience. 
This is also true of Rancière, who discusses it in two ways. The first point is his 
suggestion that language is overused by the master explicator and he recognises that 
there is a paradoxical relation between power and language: ‘How can we understand 
this paradoxical privilege of speech over writing, hearing over sight?’ (1991:5) In this 
instance, Rancière ascribes language, and spoken language in particular, as being the 
explicator’s primary tool, used in favour of the student’s own being, doing and 
seeing.  
The second point is Freire’s focus on poetic language, which is created by the master 
writer and is able to equalise the relation between people rather than stultifying one 
individual in relation to another: ‘Someone has addressed words to them that they 
want to recognise and respond to, not as students or as learned men, but as people... 
under the sign of equality’ (1991:11). Therefore, for Rancière, there is a difference 
between telling and saying, explicating and describing. The first closes down the 
possibility of the student finding their own way and the second opens it out to be an 
equalising process of recognition and response. For me, too, the need to do, rather 
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than talk about, is paramount. In The Gazelle example above, the student was 
stultified by the intersession of explicatory language into the encounter and was 
freed only through the enactment of a genuine response and rejection of it. 
These five tenets of radical pedagogy, seen through a Rancièrean lens, expand my 
understanding of my practice. They reinforce my commitment to active curiosity 
from the teacher, me, towards the student, to ensure that he or she is the mobilising 
force at the heart of the project. The challenges given are, therefore, individuated 
according to the volition and skill of each student rather than a predetermined 
outcome on my part. The students risk failure and falling within the work. Failure 
and the chance of ridicule as well as risk of falling are significantly reduced by what 
Slovic (2000) calls ‘voluntariness’, which I discussed in Chapter 2. The impact of any 
risk-taking decision is diminished by the act of the students’ engaged will through the 
doing of it. Heidegger makes a similar point, that within the act of expression, the 
experience is not retold or remembered but is experienced pertinently through the 
revelation of the said and the unsaid: ‘only when there is a language is there a world’ 
(1971:3). These suggestions reveal the complex and overlapping impact that language 
has on experience and that experience has on language; the two are indivisible. 
The risk of miscommunication and interpretation within this dialogical relationship 
is perhaps the most significant of principles to consider within Freirean pedagogy. 
The “codification” and “decodification” of speech may be considered as a 
hermeneutic (or interpretive) phenomenological way of seeing. It is pertinent to note 
that interpretation represents another contradiction within Freire’s work. He 
advocates a praxical, intersubjective dialogue between teacher and student but then 
uses a literary communicative model to teach (Morrow & Torres, 2002). The 
contradiction, for Freire and for my own practice, is the question of deterministic 
language being used within classrooms and the proposition that with this the 
dynamic of institutional or political dominance may be rehearsed and reinforced. If 
this police order is reinforced, it nullifies the social impact of the freedom-based 
discourse. My project, as many radical pedagogic modes do, locates the learning for 
the student as a corporeal provocation, enabling the teacher to begin a more 
individualised and interpersonal dialogue which involves touch and silence in 
combination with speech-driven communication, thereby rehearsing interaction 
towards intersubjective understanding and equality.  
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The significance of power relations within this discussion, particularly in a 
relationship that involves young people, resides within the paradox of pedagogy -  the 
dialectical relationship between authority and learning. Freire states that ‘[f]reedom 
needs authority in order to be free’ (Shor & Freire, 1987:91) whereas, for Rancière, 
authority does not mean an act of telling but an act of will towards the student’s 
equality. The teacher does not tell students what to think, they tell him or her that 
they can think and learn as they did when they were a child learning to talk. He goes 
on to say that ‘[h]e will learn what he wants, nothing maybe. He will know he can 
learn because the same intelligence is at work in all the productions of the human 
mind, and a man can always understand another man’s words’ (1991:18). In the same 
way, the students in my care may choose to learn nothing from their encounter with 
the trapeze except for the knowledge that they are equal to the task of learning, 
developing and progressing in the face of the risks the trapeze represents.  
The complexity of authority and authoritarianism is within the nature of the 
pedagogic relation and its intention towards anticipatory resolution. Freire is using 
the language of domination to define and thereby confine his thinking about 
freedom. Can freedom be shaped? And if it is up to the educator to shape the liberty 
of the students, then what power has the teacher been given? The role of the educator 
in my work is to inspire the liberties of my students rather than shape them. As you 
will see in Chapter 4, Zaccarini and Leyser talk about the teacher as a ‘container’ for 
the safety and learning of their students. This language reflects the idea of shaping, 
restricting as well as inspiring the work of the students.  
There is a proposition that it is impossible to talk about the teacher’s role as one that 
is anything other than dominant and restrictive. If this is the case, then the very 
possibility of radical pedagogy for transformative change is questioned. Rancière’s 
thinking addresses this contention. By placing the emphasis away from an outcome 
of specific transformation to an act of equality through the method of teaching, it is 
in the act, not the outcome, that equality is rehearsed. In the doing. It is the student’s 
awareness that equality is a possibility that creates an anticipatory resolution 
because, as I suggest in the Introduction, it recognises ‘a more temporally distinct 
and fluid appreciation of the student’s ability to know themselves in relation to the 
risk at hand’ (2011:12).  
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Freire’s pedagogy demands a subject-to-subject dialogical relationship between 
student and teacher. This is identical to Rancière’s notion of the teacher using their 
intelligence to work with the intelligence of the student. Freire’s practice involved 
working with adults and there is a suggestion that the asymmetrical relation between 
children and teacher means that Freire’s ideology is irreconcilable with working with 
children. Professor in Educational Foundations and Religious Education,  Siebren 
Miedema, questions the possibility of an asymmetrical relationship between children 
and adults within the pedagogic process and notes that true dialogue is impossible 
within an institutional setting (1994: 198). To investigate this further, it is pertinent 
to return to Marx as a way of viewing Freire’s heritage and ideological location: 
The materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and 
upbringing forgets that circumstances are changed by men and that it is 
essential to educate the educator himself. This doctrine must, therefore, 
divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to society. (Marx 
1969:13) 
Freire’s practice cannot be divorced from the Marxist premise that society is divided 
into two parts, one of which is superior to the other, and that this superior knowledge 
is a position from where revolutionary practice is provoked. The teacher in this 
instance is superior. This is the asymmetrical relation of which Miedema writes. My 
contention is that, despite an asymmetrical relationship, dialogue is possible in terms 
of knowledge because there is no superiority of will or inequality between the student 
and the teacher. Both are able to critically engage with their situations and meet each 
other as subject and subject, will to will, if there is an intention towards the learning 
of the student through mutual trust. Biesta advances this notion by attending to the 
fact that Rancière uses the term ‘distrust’ in relation to anyone who ‘assumes 
inequalities and proposes to reduce it’ and states that they, thereby, set up a 
‘hierarchy of inequalities... and will produce inequality ad infinitum’ (2010:53).  
It is pertinent to note that Freire agreed that schools were no place for dialogical 
education, not because he recognised that dialogue with children was impossible but 
because he felt that a culture of dominance was antagonistic to an educative dialogue 
for social change and that cultures of dominance pervade institutional settings. He 
states that ‘[t]he ideal is to fight against the system taking the two fronts, the one 
internal to the schooling system and the one external’ (Freire, 1990:202). My work is 
practised outside of the traditional schooling system; it needs to be so in order to 
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negotiate the complex health and safety concerns raised by ‘dangerous’ pedagogy. 
The work does, however, sit within another institutional frame - that of the 
University at which I am studying and the historical relations I have with the 
students from their secondary schools. This, I suggest, is a potent conveyor of 
empowerment discourse by enabling the young people to step outside their 
understanding of education as boundaried and target-driven and inspire them to 
inhabit the complexities of understanding and identity as spatial and temporal. The 
two are in dynamic relation. This is rehearsed through the removal of the student 
from a possible culture of domination into a new space where different modes of 
behaviour are expected. The work raises the stakes in terms of the asymmetrical 
dialogical relationship. I argued in Chapter 1 that potent discourses within education 
are based on fear and vulnerability and that a possible counter to this is challenge 
and responsibility through aerial work. Within this proposition, the student, despite 
being legally designated as a child and who would in other situations be considered 
‘lesser’ in status to me, the teacher, is empowered through their relationship to risk 
and death. The dialogue is borne from trust and responsibility rather than traditional 
authoritarian structures that may communicate dominance.  
There is another apparent paradox that fuels Freire’s argument for a dialectical 
relationship within the education process: the paradox of objectification. Freire’s 
suggestion is that the student needs to objectify, scientifically, the self in order to 
recognise the self as objectified.25 This scientific objectivity relates to Marx’s (1970) 
critique of subjectivism and psychologism that results from human interaction as a 
constant and evolving social interaction rather than disparate act.  
The separation of objectivity from subjectivity, the denial of the latter 
when analyzing reality or acting upon it, is objectivism. On the one hand, 
the denial of objectivity in analysis or action, resulting in a subjectivism 
which leads to solipsistic positions, denies action itself by denying 
objective reality. Neither objectivism nor subjectivism, nor yet 
psychologism is propounded here, but rather subjectivity and objectivity 
in constant dialectical relationship. (1970:32) 
Here the dialectical location of intersubjective understanding becomes a moment of 
tension between my work and that of Freire. My intention is not to objectify the 
students that I work with or to enable them to see their objectification within the 
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  See also Willis(1981) for a British example of this type of objectification in action, he given the example of 
working class boys who became inculcated into a system as objects to be uncritical Objects.	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wider police order. To me, the object of the interaction is to enable potential ruptures 
of identity to manifest themselves through the skills learnt on the trapeze rather than 
through a possibly conflicting series of ‘conscientisation’ processes that are 
advocated by Freire. I support a process that has no less potential for a rupturing of 
understanding but that does not teleologically bring the student to a Marxist 
perspective on objectification. The student encounters their physical ability through 
risk and their identity through success and failure. They do it voluntarily, following a 
Rancièrean proposition that they will ‘learn what [they] want, nothing maybe’ 
(1991:18). This concept of teaching is very close to what Heidegger would call 
unconcealing. Educational philosopher Ilan Gur-Ze’ev elucidates this by saying 
unconcealing ‘opens free relations between the human and beings in their 
openness... since this kind of teacher in not instrumental and does not transmit 
information’ (Gur-Ze’ev in Peters 2002: 76). Gur-Ze’ev’s view recognises that for 
both Rancière and Heidegger the learning takes place within the student regardless 
of the teacher’s knowledge, ‘[the teacher’s] conduct, therefore, often produces the 
impression that we learn nothing from him’ (Heidegger in Peters, 2002:76). By 
offering the trapeze as a provocation towards possibility, I, the teacher, open certain 
potential futures for the student but I let them learn what they will from it, perhaps 
nothing. The possibility for intersubjective understanding should not be overlooked 
or denied but I argue that a process centred on mutual equality can impact 
pertinently without the need for discussions that objectify the student. The student is 
left open to the discoveries they make for and of themselves.  
The problem that occurs for the educator is one of location, both inside and outside 
of the critical encounter with the student in order to shape the educational event. 
Freire takes a distant position that cultural critic Henry Giroux calls ‘border 
crossing’:  
Teachers become border-crossers through their ability to not only make 
different narratives available to themselves and other students but also by 
legitimating difference as a basic condition for understanding the limits of 
one’s own voice. (1992: 170)  
This vantage point offers Freire the position of anthropologist in the worlds of his 
students and he admits to his own limited knowledge of the students’ culture. It 
enables him to be curious about the structures through which his students live and 
work. For him it is essential that this figurative distance from the culture of his 
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students is retained in order to present a critical encounter that challenges rather 
than reinforces dominant ideology. It is by maintaining this distance from the 
personal experiences of his students that Freire retains his own autonomy as a 
conduit for their learning.  
Giroux suggests that this method reasserts a dominant discourse through the 
language of difference, as opposed to similarity, and he proposes that educators 
reconsider their position ‘outside the geography of rationality and reason’ (1992:178). 
Rancière takes Giroux’s point even further by declaring that the distance seen by the 
educator is, in fact what makes the relationship problematic. This is not an ignorant 
person conveying meaningless ‘poorly disguised’ knowledge or a malignant 
character; on the contrary, it is a person who is in touch with his or her 
enlightenment. Therefore, their ability to stultify is ‘more efficacious, because [they 
are] knowledgeable, enlightened and of good faith’ (1991:7). The distance seen by the 
educator, in this instance, becomes a tool for determinism and stultification rather 
than equality because it asserts that ‘I am not like you, I know better’.  
The notion of good faith also warrants consideration and will be expanded more fully 
within the next chapter in relation to faith as a mobilising element of pedagogic tact. 
As I discussed through the Introduction and first chapter, the intention of anyone 
engaged in teaching is towards the transformation of a student in the momentary. 
This intention is subject and constitutive of the will of the teacher and their 
awareness of the needs, discourses surrounding and individuality of the student. Any 
act of will enacted by the teacher is, therefore, one that contains different knowledge 
from that of the student. I cannot know what the student is or what the interaction 
will mean to and for them. However, a consideration of Heideggerian thinking may 
elucidate this seemingly insurmountable bind. Gur-Ze’ev usefully demonstrates that 
radical education misses the fact that the self as lived with others ‘constitutes the 
human’s eternal companion’ (2002: 73). He continues: 
Counter-education can find in Heidegger’s philosophy a different kind of 
concept of transcendence. In it transcendence is conditioned by 
overcoming authority, any authority especially that of the one who 
“knows” or sets standards, quests or telos. Here it is impossible to 
differentiate between self overcoming as ‘let learn’ and unconcealment as 
let-things-be what they already are in their essence. (2002:77) 
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Gur-Ze’ev emphasises that, although a commitment to non-determinising education 
may be the intention of the radically committed teacher, Dasein will always be 
determined by the others around its person. The impossibility of a truly 
emancipatory dialogue between teacher and student is limited by how far the teacher 
is aware of their ability to determine the knowledge and, therefore, confine it to 
inauthenticity. It is the knowledge that the student is defined by his or her relation to 
others that frees the teacher to work against it. The teacher is resolute to liberate 
rather than domesticate. 
My position is to locate myself curiously into the pedagogic situation in a more fluid 
way. Tact is, therefore, borne out of a teacher or practitioner’s position towards the 
development of the student as a critical agent. It is physical as well as linguistic, 
working integratedly. The appropriateness of fluidity is driven by the need for an 
attentive and involved presence within the student’s work and an avoidance of 
rationalisation. This position is neither involved, nor removed. It is dialogical. This 
dialogical position is defined by its location as practical, intersubjective and reflective 
in the first instance and the ability to be curiously orientated toward the Other within 
the relationship, rather than within a personal appreciation of the discourse as an 
opportunity to show my knowledge 
A desire to equalise the student is practised instinctively rather than analytically as 
such, suggests Rancière; it is more naturally associated with parenting than teaching. 
Through the course of his writing, he repeatedly considers the engagement needed 
from teacher to student to be an attentive engagement of wills. He proposes that 
universal teaching cannot be ‘instituted’ but ‘they can apply it to teaching their 
children’ (1991:106). Instituting ignorance as a ‘framework’ under which all teachers 
could work with all students fails because it demands an invested and situated 
relationship. It involves the teacher being able to intuit the will of the student in 
relation to the teacher’s own learning and, therefore, offer appropriate motivation to 
the student for them to engage their own will for themselves. He does so by ‘knowing 
himself... by examining the intellectual acts of which he is subject... and recognising 
and challenging them in his son’ (1991: 36-37). By constantly placing this dialogue 
within a familial context, Rancière implies that this type of learning demands a high 
level of investment and attention from the teacher. I suggest that this is the level of 
engagement that I bring within the aerial sessions that I teach. The attention is 
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beyond a ‘faith’ in my knowledge, my experience or my instinct but is situated in 
constant reflection and engagement with equality. 
Freire would argue that his praxical engagement is also located towards the student. 
However, it is the fact that his ideology is enacted through deterministic or 
explicatory means that I find blocks the intersubjective nature of the encounter. As 
he says ‘[f]or dialogue to be a method of true knowledge, the knowing subjects must 
approach reality scientifically in order to seek the dialectical connections which 
explain the form of reality’ (1970:32). This reiteration of rational discourses alienates 
the student from their individual position within the encounter. In the dialogical 
moment of the encounter within my work, the student is corporeally engaged in an 
encounter with risk. The rationalisation of this moment through scientific language 
or active reflection reinforces dominant fear-driven discourses. This is exemplified in 
the first section of this chapter, where a fear-driven police order narrative ruptured 
the mutual trust generated by the teacher’s attentive orientation towards the student 
when learning The Gazelle. 
This is a position that Van Manen calls ‘orienting to the phenomenon’ It arises out of 
the ability to question the nature of the encounter and recognise the lessons that it 
has to teach us about our methodology, our experience or the experiences of the 
students (1990:43) -  the ‘know yourself’ or Rancière’s thesis (1991:36). The process 
of writing about an event or phenomena enables the teacher to ‘discover what lies at 
the ontological core of our being. So that in words, or perhaps better, in spite of 
words, we find “memories” that paradoxically we never thought or felt before’ (Van 
Manen 1990:13). I am neither removed from, nor incorporated within, the cultural 
system. The process of writing takes me away from the immediacy of the teaching 
event but allows me to remember with a more thoughtful character: ‘a heedful, 
mindful wondering about the project of life, of living of what it means to live a life’ 
(1990:12). The poetic nature of phenomenological writing enables me to 
communicate the nature of an event for my reader. This final act of communication is 
one that I hope to share with Rancière in order to reveal along with a single moment 
of practice, moments that describe the nature of the pedagogic experience as it 
appears to me.  
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3.2.1 Authenticity and the struggle to become critically 
autonomous, ‘masterful’ and intimate. 
Within radical pedagogy, the role of the educator is to enable the student to be ‘more 
fully human’ (Freire, 1970). Freire repeats this phrase fourteen times in his opening 
chapter of Pedagogy of the Oppressed. His proposition is that people who are 
oppressed are dehumanised and that this dehumanisation can be countered once the 
student is aware of their situation, objectifies him or herself as dehumanised and acts 
to free this self. This idea of full humanity is problematic for can we be anything 
other than fully human within all acts?  
My contention is not that people have experienced dehumanising oppression but that 
this state is somehow ‘outside’ the realm of what constitutes humanity. I suggest that 
a dialectical appreciation of the self as in a constant state of becoming authentic is 
the critical awareness that students are taught through my work. This is derived from 
a Heideggerian proposition, which in turn leads me towards Rancière’s insistence 
that equalising practice is a method of constant verification towards emancipation. 
If, for Heidegger, Dasein is constantly falling towards the inauthentic talk of the 
everyday in avoidance of death and authenticity is the opposite of this, and is an 
impossible state (1962: 174), then what encounters with death through risk provide 
are opportunities towards authenticity and equality.  
When investigating risk-taking in adolescence, as discussed in the last chapter, Irwin 
and Millstein suggest that ‘[r]isk taking behaviours fulfil many developmental needs 
such as autonomy, mastery and intimacy’. They propose that ‘it is simplistic to take 
the position that all risk-taking behaviours in adolescence should be eliminated’ 
(1991:26). They acknowledge that there is a need for young people and adolescents to 
seek out opportunities to rehearse ‘autonomy, mastery and intimacy’ as an ideal state 
of being. For Freire, this is captured within the idea of ‘critical literacy’ and the 
suggestion that, through an awareness of their illiteracy, the oppressed are freed - 
but only when they begin the project of becoming literate. Moreover, he suggests that 
this act of engaged learning can enable the oppressed to begin to fight their way out 
of oppression. Rather like Freire, Irwin and Millstein’s proposition is that 
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adolescents should engage in activities that attempt to meet the developmental needs 
of the students because they ‘are not only more realistic’ than interventions aimed at 
limiting risky activities, ‘they are preferable for the development of the necessary 
social, psychological, and physiological skills in adolescence’ (1991:28).  
The tension between the two ways of viewing emancipation is that of conscious 
engagement. For Freire, the oppressed student recognises and objectifies their 
dehumanised state and works towards an idealised state of humanity. For Irwin and 
Millstein, the drive to take risks is considered an unconscious but entirely human 
condition that rehearses a social presentation of autonomy. For Rancière, and to 
some extent Heidegger, this resultant self-knowledge is orientated towards, rather 
than situated within, humanity. The act is one of verification within the encounter, 
which needs to be practised through every opportunity as an act of ‘will’ (for 
Rancière) and ‘resolution’ (for Heidegger). If will or resolution is engaged then the 
student will be liberated; if not, they may be domesticated. 
Heidegger proposes that the notion of a totalised, united and autonomous self is an 
impossibility. He argues this for two reasons: firstly, that a striving towards unity in 
experience, which is spatial and temporal, fails to recognise the constitutional 
variations within the spaces and times occupied, and the unity of this nature would 
be an inappropriate ‘full stop’ to an inchoate or emergent understanding that is 
transformed by circumstance. Secondly, Heidegger denounces the notions of 
preceding philosophers by concluding that their belief that selfrealisation is 
reconceived through existence and action within expression is yet another false 
relation to the transitory nature of existence. He defines the self in terms of ‘running 
ahead of itself in care’ (1962: 220), which suggests that Dasein is fundamentally 
oriented toward the future. For Heidegger, expression, like unity, is a marker on the 
road towards authenticity. He suggests that the expressive act is a move toward a 
mobile authenticity of self and that the desire for a fully autonomous self is a futile 
project. Consequently, within my proposition for a commitment to ‘anticipatory 
resolution’, I am invoking a Heideggerian phenomenological intention towards a 
momentary dialectical recognition of the self in potential and I am seeking 
equilibrium for the student within this unbalanced or disruptive experience. 
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My proposition is that, rather than a movement towards being ‘more fully human’ 
through critical literacy, the adolescents that I work with are striving towards 
‘anticipatory resolution’ through acts of will. I have broken down the three states -  
autonomy, mastery and intimacy - in order to reveal the tensions that I find within 
them. Although the idealised state of individualised resolution is mobile, and 
continues to be mobile, mastery is something tangible, rather like literacy. Although 
it develops with rigour and hard work, mastery seems to be an objectively targeted 
proposition. To master an act, one has full awareness of it and how to achieve an 
ultimate practice of it. Although this ultimate practice is still an ideal proposition, it 
is grounded in a scientifically measurable question - can I do this? - with a simple 
answer  - yes or no. Mastery is the suggestion of a full stop rather than an open or 
freedom-based proposition. Heidegger pushes this point further: 
What we usually call ‘knowing’ is being acquainted with something and 
its qualities. In virtue of these cognitions we ‘master’ things. This 
mastering ‘knowledge’ is given over to a being at hand, to its structure 
and its usefulness. Such ‘knowledge’ seizes the being, ‘dominates’ it, and 
thereby goes beyond it and constantly surpasses it. (1962:3) 
He asserts that the terminology of the word ‘mastery’ is instrumental within the 
nullification of an open awareness of language itself. The term ‘mastery’, when used 
in either context, closes down the situation to a rational, scientific or end-driven 
discourse. However, it could also be seen that mastery is a proposition for ongoing 
development. For Rancière, the notion is bifurcated into the ability to stultify if taken 
from the Heideggerian perspective above and to emancipate if taken in combination 
with the attitude ‘know yourself’ (1991:36); within the term ‘mastery’ itself, resides 
the educational paradox.  
The proposition that intimacy is a developmental ideal for those taking risks is poetic 
rather than tangible and offers the implication of a life lived in relation to others. In 
response to Rancière, it is my awareness of myself, in relation to others, that provides 
the possibility for intimacy within my work. A pertinent awareness of the possibility 
of failure is magnified when it is put in relationship to failure in front of an Other or 
Others, and the provocation of trust and mutual respect is mobilised by the 
territories of risk, as defined in the previous chapter, and when considered alongside 
Heidegger’s proposition that life is consciously lived with and for others [Mitsein].  
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At the heart of this discussion on pedagogy is a desire to reconcile the paradoxes of 
existence so that the student can reach moments towards ontological resolution. The 
paradoxes of existence are manifest, for me, within some simple tenets: 
• I am a being shaped by my own relation to death, through living. This is what 
Heidegger calls ‘the impossible possibility of life’ (1962). 
• This relation to death is mobilised by my anxiety (rather than fear) in the face 
of it.  
• That I am defined by an individualised self, which cannot be understood with 
another self - my student/my teacher/my friend. The paradox of alterity, 
which makes me both distant and equalised.  
• That expression of an act is both the act and an evocation of the act for 
another; there is both communication and silence in the evocation. In the act 
of communicating, I invoke, being, doing and seeing.  
Heidegger’s proposition is that paradoxes are irreconcilable for any duration, that 
the conscious engagement with them through expression will be cultural, spatial and 
temporally dependent. This is a dialectical26 appreciation, with the synthesis as a 
struggle towards a momentary understanding that is authentic, rather than towards a 
utopian or idealistic specific of what constitutes autonomy.  
For Freire, this autonomous being is manifest through praxical engagement with the 
intersubjective nature of understanding. He uses scientific language, and the 
scientific propositions of Marx, to unpick subjectivism as a negative project of a 
dualistic ideology. His suggestion is that subjectivism, or solipsism, is the state of 
uncritical awareness of one’s situation. This is similar to Heidegger’s proposition 
that, to live authentically, one must have a genuine and critical appreciation of the 
possible impossibility of death and, moreover, similar to Irwin and Millstein’s 
proposition, that it is through the taking of risks that adolescents learn autonomy. 
They agree that authenticity is borne from a conscious act of realisation of, 
communion with or knowing about the situation presented at that moment, in that 
space.  
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  Again, as discussed in the Introduction, Heidegger’s disavowel and ‘embarassment’ at dialectics are usefully 
articulated within the work of Gonzalez (2002). I acknowledge the tension by attributing this method to 
Heideggerian form.  
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My suggestion is that anticipatory resolution, through contact with risk, resides in a 
constant dialectical relationship between the self as intersubjective and between the 
teacher and the student as separate, but ‘united’ towards a mutual goal (the teacher 
is defined by the student and vice versa). This notion of anticipatory resolution 
carries with it the understanding that existence is about authentic relation to a 
possible future rather than a desire to remain fixed within a rationalised discourse. 
The fluidity of this state of resolution is one that is recognised by those who study 
risk and those who teach aerial work. Through the course of the next chapter, I place 
my personal teaching experiences alongside those of two expert teachers. I consider 
the notion of anticipatory resolution and being with others in this light.  
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Chapter 4.0 
Know Yourself: Mapping the Risk Encounter 
The preceding chapters have interrogated the implications of risk and teaching 
within the context of contemporary risk-averse culture. I have argued that dialogical, 
equality-based educational methods which encourage risk-taking are one possible 
way to counter the ‘stultification’ that overregulation and fear may generate, which 
stops students from reaching their full potential (Rancière, 1991:1). These critical 
foundations prepare the ground for my argument that an educative environment, 
outside of the traditional schooling system, which provides an opportunity to 
experience and rehearse risk-taking, is one way of providing for the development 
towards authenticity and anticipatory resolution within the student. This way has the 
power to liberate or domesticate students, and the attentive teacher circulates 
around this tension through their work. This chapter questions the conditions under 
which liberation and domestication, emancipation and stultification may take place.  
I consider the work of two aerial practitioners, teachers and academics, Matilda 
Leyser and John Paul Zaccarini. I critically engage their experiences with my own 
practice. The purpose of this chapter is to unravel some of the personal experiences 
that impact upon my pedagogic practice and touch upon some of the common 
themes that map the experience of being a teacher who engages with risk, pain, 
paradox and metaphor. This more descriptive chapter acknowledges the intrinsic, 
deeply instinctive and anecdotal material that proliferates and defines educative 
experience for Leyser, Zaccarini and myself. I conducted interviews with both 
teachers and also rely on their academic articles, presentations at conferences as well 
as. in Zaccarini’s case, an interview conducted by Tom Ellingsworth for Circus 
Magazine (2009).  
Through the chapter, I interrogate the idea of mapping as a method through which 
aerial teaching and its relation to pedagogic tact may be described. I repeatedly 
return to this cartographic metaphor in order to illustrate that experience is a 
journey that declares the existing tension between actions done in a specific time, 
dependent upon the specific place in which they are enacted. Chris Perkins usefully 
explores the emerging use of maps in order to capture the embodied practices of 
performance-making. He emphasises the appropriateness of the cartographic 
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analogy by saying that ‘meaning is constituted in the actions that mapping processes 
call into being. So the performative and embodied mapping ... is both dynamic and 
enacted’ (2004:1). My application of this way of viewing pedagogic practice is 
representative of a desire to engage with the act of momentary meaning-making, and 
to capture its enactment and documentation in relation to the cultural and personal 
territories or boundaries within the work.  
More than this, however, is the idea that the teacher retains a sense of the journey 
undergone in her memory, collected notes or documentation of each pedagogic 
encounter, positive and negative. This map of the relational journey between teacher 
and student establishes a new terrain under which potential future pedagogic 
encounters are viewed and re-mapped. It is the mapping of the encounter that is both 
a foundation and mobilising force for the tact needed to commit to ongoing risky 
encounters with students. The map is, therefore, a means of describing the attentive 
and committed process of noticing the student, attending to the various pedagogic 
perspectives within the practice, the gathering of different materials to use in support 
of the work and also refers to the documentation of that moment through note-
taking and writing. The examples used throughout the thesis are a part of the map, as 
is my contact with Zaccarini and Leyser,  but they cannot be fully understood without 
the formative structures through which to view and align them. They are the strata of 
an attentive consideration of liberation and domestication. 
In Chapter 3, I unpacked the territories of risk that an encounter with death can offer 
for students and the complex interrelation between these territories and the 
intentions of the teacher.  In Perkins’ terms, ‘the death becomes alive’ when a ‘map is 
called into being to meet particular human needs, flowing from action instead of 
being grounded in power’ (2004: 7). What is made apparent to me through this 
conscious and committed mapping of my practice are the tactful negotiations 
practised by any pedagogue who works with risk and, in particular, the tact needed to 
encompass the flow of different impulses that need to be met within the work, which 
are the human (the student and teacher) and the institutional. These factors impact 
upon the specific choices that are made by teachers in relation to their embodied 
knowledge and observation of the student. Tact is needed to reconcile (momentarily) 
the paradoxes exposed through the work, without leading the student towards a 
predetermined, domesticated outcome (or destination).  
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Interestingly, Rancière employs a cartographic analogy in his discussion of 
explicatory teaching, declaring that: 
[P]edagogic logic appears as the act that lifts a veil off the obscurity of 
things. Its topography is that of top to bottom, of surface to depth. The 
explicator is the one who brings obscure depth to the clear surface, and 
who, conversely, brings the false appearance of the surface back to the 
secret depths of reason. (Rancière in Bingham and Biesta, 2010:4) 
He is cautioning the emancipatory teacher against the bringing of false truths to the 
surface, which have the ‘appearance’ of clarity, as well as advocating engaged 
enquiry, which creates the possibility of clarity. He recognises that there are two 
types of knowledge at play within the bringing of knowledge to the surface: that 
which is known and privileged by pedagogic logic and that which is discovered by the 
student. The first is immobile, fixed in time and space; it is the same for each student 
and each teacher in each learning situation and offers only re-conscription of 
quotidian concern. The second is unique, subject to the individual creativity and 
learning of the student and changes through time and space.  
Rancière warns the teacher not to observe the superficial difference between the 
student’s knowledge and what determinising education would see as the ‘right’ way 
of rationalising the world. He continues to say that giving depth to the superficial can 
bring about the false consciousness (of the domestic) exposed in the last chapter. His 
warning is a reminder to every teacher to focus on equalising the communication 
between herself and the student rather than interpreting the student’s ‘ignorance’ as 
demonstrative of something specific that needs to be countered. Whilst mapping, the 
themes that come forth from my journey through practice, I acknowledge that I am 
in a dual position: first, I am the student who is made aware of her own knowledge 
through the practice of pedagogic tact and, second, I am the teacher who recognises 
that this knowledge is individual, situated, constituted and fluid. My discoveries are 
not an explication of universal knowledge but are a personal chart of my experiential 
landscape.  
The following discussion exposes the similarities and divergences between 
traditional teaching and equality-based teaching alongside the circus and clown 
training experienced by myself, Leyser and Zaccarini. In particular, the territories of 
a teacher’s interpretation, manner and faith are of interest. These areas hold tensions 
that enable me to question how meaning is extracted or made during and after an 
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encounter with a student and, therefore, how I can apply this meaning, challenge it 
or develop it within the next encounter with the student. It leads me towards 
recognising that meaning is impacted by what I do and how I do it. Meaning is 
inscribed and reinscribed through teaching that intends to emancipate. 
The idea of faith becomes apparent when articulated alongside the phrase ‘leaps of 
faith’ used by both Leyser and Zaccarini to describe the moment when a student 
takes a risk. The cultivation of faith from the student becomes a fundamental 
principle for them within the development of their pedagogic tact. It can be linked 
with the idea of will, resolution and commitment, as espoused in the previous 
chapters, because it attends to a decision made by the student to take responsibility 
and to act in full knowledge of the pain, social consequences or death that may be 
incurred as a result. 
In dialogue with Zaccarini and Leyser’s thinking, I map the experiences they have 
had teaching, containing, challenging or performing risk. This prompts the discovery 
that traditional training technique, interpretation and exposition is, for us, less 
important than the momentary understanding and trust felt by the teacher and the 
student. This is a ‘hunch’ felt by the practitioners and recognised by Rancière as ‘the 
community of equals’ because it attends to  the will (or faith) of the student and is 
mobilised by an attentive attitude from the teacher to ignite that will (1991:71). 
Looking back at Chapter 3, it could be said that this instinctual response by the 
teacher comes from ‘knowing themselves’ in relation to the discourses that they are 
subject to and are constituted within. Therefore, the act of mapping itself ascribes 
and challenges the meaning taken from an encounter, so taking us further towards 
an authentic, tactful relation with the student.  
 
4.1 Mapping: The Complexity of ‘Being’ 
As Heidegger suggests, ‘Understanding appropriates understandingly that which is 
understood by it. In interpretation, understanding does not become something 
different. It becomes itself’ (1962: 189). He proposes that, as soon as something is 
understood by the teacher or the practitioner, it becomes the thing itself. Meaning is 
made, not from the momentary experience itself, but from the understanding taken 
from it and the language used to evoke it. For him, understanding is an interpretative 
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activity. He continues, ‘Nor is interpretation the acquiring of information about 
which is understood: it is the working out of possibilities in understanding’ (1962: 
189). Therefore, it can be argued that the meaning made is an interpretation of the 
possibilities of the practitioners interviewed and they are become a working 
description of the understanding of these teachers at the moment of talking. The 
talking creates the meaning in the momentary through interpretation by me, the 
writer, and by you, the reader. I acknowledge that the meanings taken by Leyser, 
Zaccarini and myself will differ in the moment, communication and reception of the 
material.  
I begin by introducing the two artists that I interviewed as a way of drawing together 
and separating their experiences. Matilda Leyser calls herself a ‘performer... [with a] 
physical bias’ and a writer (Leyser, 2009: np). She struggles with the term ‘aerialist’ 
because she feels that it does not truly represent the complexity of her work, 
especially now she is ‘in transit’ from being a performer based in the air to a 
performer based on the ground. As a performer, Leyser has developed an 
international reputation for fragility and poetry, combining circus skills with physical 
theatre and dance. She explores gravity, using it to ‘highlight our weighty existence 
and our relationship to the earth by hovering just above it’ (“Matilda Leyser”, n.d. 
para 1). She aims to reveal within the ‘tricks’ of her art, a human rather than a 
superhuman presence. 
Leyser’s work synthesises the poetics of writing with the ability to appear to defy 
gravity. Her paper, The Paradoxes of the Aerialist, proposed that being seen as 
strong in her performances is in dialectical relationship with her own fragility whilst 
she performs (Leyser, 2007). She claims to exist and be seen in a paradoxical relation 
to death whilst metaphorically personifying life and living. For Leyser, to work as an 
aerialist is to live life in relation to this paradox: liberation through entrapment.  
John Paul Zaccarini calls himself ‘a physical actor’ (Zaccarini 2009:1). Like Leyser, 
he struggles to fix a specific label or genre onto the work that he does. During our 
conversation, it became apparent that the word ‘circus’ held a particular tension for 
him. ‘I'd rather not use it, I have to use it because I have to relate to people... there 
isn’t really any name for what it is but I use circus techniques in what I do’ 
(2009:np). He has a reputation for creating work that is a ‘political, passionate 
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theatrical polemic’ (John Paul Zaccarini n.d: para 4). He blends this practice with a 
teaching career and his research into ‘circoanalysis’, which he defines as an attempt 
to ‘reveal the person who does circus and why they do circus within a circus act’ 
(Ellingsworth, 2009: np). The purpose of this, he continues, relates to an 
understanding of truth and authenticity, and he, like Leyser, acknowledges that this 
is about recognising a human connection in the work ‘so that we can connect to other 
human beings, as opposed to trying to be superhuman’ (Ellingsworth, 2009: np).  
Zaccarini and Leyser are investigating circus as a way of uncovering the authentic 
self, meaning that they strive towards finding an honesty within their performances 
that exposes a part of their humanity. This is framed in different ways - through 
writing for Leyser and through Lacanian psychoanalysis for Zaccarini. They talk 
about the self in relation to death and in relation to metaphor and paradox. The 
physical technique employed in order to perform ‘tricks’ is something that they have 
both rejected in their performance practices and in their criticism of some training 
methods where ‘process is not taught. Just get to the trick. Do what you do to get to 
the trick; ignore the process’ (Zaccarini in Ellingsworth, 2009).  
In circus, commercial value lies within the performance of the ‘big trick’ and the 
ability to repeat it in order to make the audience gasp. What Leyser and Zaccarini are 
looking for instead, however, is where the identity of the performer is placed within 
this commoditised business. They recognise that circus performers can be seen as 
superhuman and that this perhaps engenders and perpetuates a striving for 
superhumanity from the performers themselves. This superhuman drive feeds back 
into the identity of the performer, constituting and thereby fragmenting experience 
away from a universal humanity into an idealised one.  It domesticates and stultifies 
the performer rather than freeing them to be an individual artist. This, they argue, 
perpetuates a cycle that closes down the performer, and Leyser and Zaccarini’s 
educative work serves to open them back up to their potential as students and 
performers in the face of commercial and quotidian concerns.  
Through their teaching, Leyser and Zaccarini hope to challenge some of the notions 
associated with circus as a performance discipline. They recognise that this will be 
rehearsed and repeated by students through their encounter with some teachers and 
then through their identity as performers within the circus industry. They both offer 
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students the opportunity to go beyond the obvious, to perform acts of ‘dissensus’ that 
appear to rupture the cultural fears of the police order in which they are situated. In 
Zaccarini’s work at the University of Stockholm, for example, he challenged the ‘pure’ 
form of circus by encouraging an acrobatic student  never to hold a handstand in his 
final showcase performance piece, something that the student had dedicated his life 
to perfecting. Thereby Zaccarini offered the possibility of dissensus to the student in 
order to fully interrogate what he was in relation to the act of standing on his hands 
and the artistic or career death associated with the student’s failure to hold a perfect 
form. In this way, the handstand itself becomes an opening up of opportunities for 
the student to see themselves anew. Emancipated from the handstand and what it 
represented, the student was able to create an act that questioned the fragility of the 
human form.  Dissensus is also performed through Zaccarini and Leyser’s acts of 
questioning, in terms of naming themselves as performers rather than aerialists. 
They interrogate the normative associations that circus holds for audiences and 
performers to find a more considered appreciation of themselves as potentially 
deadened or enlivened through circus performance.  
This theme of dissensus corresponds with my antagonism to the determinism 
relating to a specific domesticated outcome for the student in relation to an 
assessment of success or failure. Determinism negates the complex nature of the 
work in practice. Zaccarini suggests that it has to do with ambivalence and, when 
talking about ‘traditional circus’, he scathingly attacks the drive for superficiality and 
artifice: 
What it tries to pin down is the jolly or the superhuman or the lovely or 
whatever. It tries to pin that down and says this is what it is and it leaves 
out the ambivalence of it [which] fucking hurts and it’s really dangerous 
and we’re playing with death or failure. Showing just the bright side of it. 
Ambivalence is a more mature attitude rather than a split—good, bad. 
(emphasis in original, Ellingsworth, 2009) 
He recognises that to approach practice with ambivalence is a ‘mature’ attitude to 
take. This pursuit of maturity can be seen as similar to the emancipation discussed in 
Chapter 3 and forms the nexus of a particular research problem. If maturity is the 
state of agency within and through which the paradoxes of existence are 
encapsulated, it could be said that maturity is, therefore, aligned with the notion of 
anticipatory resolution in relation to taking a risk. This premise is that a student or 
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artist may become aware of their strength in a moment and that this strength can 
enhance their ability to see themselves within a relation to death in a possible future. 
It links back to the child development theories already discussed in Chapter 2, where 
Blos (1962) articulates that adolescence ends when adult status is attained and the 
adolescent strives towards knowing themself to be adult through taking risks.  
An attention to maturity places Zaccarini and Leyser’s work into the context of 
calling the student’s conscience, through circus work, towards a more resolute 
understanding of the student’s own potential to succeed or fail, live or die, in the act 
of performing (Heidegger, 1962). Zaccarini and Leyser are concerned with the 
potential of the student to surpass the one dimensional end-point that is given to 
them through contemporary education or the aesthetic of traditions of circus and 
commerce. They want students to engage critically and creatively with their own 
identity through each encounter with circus and in their performance of identity 
through circus.  
A maturing process suggests that the notion of the self in relation to ambivalence is 
something encountered by everyone in the everyday, which is magnified by the act of 
doing circus. Circus, therefore, mobilises the student’s ability to see themself, both in 
relation to death and in relation to the inevitability of death in the future. The 
specific corporeal intensity of aerial or circus training makes certain cultural issues 
manifest in the doing. As discussed in the opening chapter, discourses that 
specifically revolve around the body in relation to death are forbidden, or taboo. A 
negation of the corporeal possibility (or in Zaccarini’s terms, ambiguity) of circus 
performance, performs and rehearses an evasion of the body or embodied 
experience. This constitutes the body as absent. The very thing that could give 
students potent access to cultural discourses surrounding the body is the thing that 
disables the discussion. What Zaccarini, Leyser and I advocate, therefore, is a direct 
and realistic attention to the body for the student through the pain of learning circus.  
It also becomes apparent that, through circus, the teacher is placed in a position 
relative to the pain of the student as they encounter themselves within the complex 
dialogue of good and bad experience. This encounter can be seen as two 
interconnected dialogues relating to pedagogic understanding. The first part relates 
to the student, and their experience of what Heidegger argues is an ‘authentic’ 
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relationship away from the dominant, self-conscious, and one related to ‘being-
towards-death’ (1962: 253). For the student, an encounter with the self through 
circus brings a confrontation with the reality of experience as well as the metaphors 
of death and superhumanity.  
Circus is an encounter between the real and the imagined because it contains within 
it both a visceral encounter with the action and an encounter with a projected image. 
To draw on the Heideggerian principle, it is brought pertinently home to the aerialist, 
that they are alone in that moment because they are the only ones encountering the 
possibility of death. The death, risk or action is essentially ‘mine’ (1962). This act 
throws the student back upon the self rather than towards the act as seen by others, 
or as preconceived by themselves. They are thrown by the action itself but also, if 
considered in relation to the metaphors attributable to the action (superhumanity), 
they can see the personal and tangible experience within the socially constructed 
image. This bifurcation is drawn out more fully within Chapter 5 where I use a 
moment from my practice to consider the notion of the self as being both fragile and 
superhuman through a momentary action.  
The second part of the dialogue associated with pain relates to the labelling of the 
teacher as a teacher within this contemporary education. As discussed, the naming of 
the profession can delimit an understanding of the actuality of the role in practice. 
Within this naming, a practitioner is objectified by others: ‘lurking in the idle-talk of 
the “they”’ (Heidegger, 1962:253). Heidegger suggests that Dasein is subject to a 
superficial understanding that people exist as we do and die as we do. The teacher or 
aerialist is subject to the ‘fugitive’ appreciation of their ‘being’ within the work, as one 
removed from the authenticity of experience of the student (1962:254). I proposed, 
in the last chapter that this can be categorised by Freire and Giroux as a distant 
position or can be seen as seeking to eradicate distance, as advanced by Rancière. It 
is not simply an appreciation of one as removed from another that impacts upon the 
moment but the inauthentic state that alterity is, for Heidegger, ‘fugitive’: running 
and hiding from the other (1962: 254).  
Knowledge that the teacher/self is always inclined towards a distant and fugitive 
relation to the student/other reinforces my premise that pedagogy is an act of will; 
teaching demands constant attention to the equalising dialogue to free the student 
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from a possibly domesticating context of their everyday social existence, as one that 
is defined by others. This tacit definition of any relationship is, therefore, one of 
withdrawal and distance, implying that the generalised perception of others is not an 
attested witnessing of their identity but a desire to hide from, or evade, the humanity 
experienced by the other. It takes an act of commitment and will from both the 
teacher and student to break this possibly stultifying cycle.  
The cultural context of the work ensures I easily fit into a quotidian understanding of 
my practice through the term or label ‘teacher’. It is a term that limits any 
appreciation of what I do whilst bestowing me with a culturally significant role. To be 
a teacher is to be one following a tradition imbued with wisdom on the one hand and 
control on the other. With this label, I inhabit the Kantian paradox of freedom 
through coercion. As Rancière suggests: 
[a] professor is a thing, less easily handled than a book, undoubtedly, but 
he can be learned: he can be observed, imitated, dissected, put back 
together; his person available for observation can be tested... A professor 
is neither more nor less intelligent than another man, and he generally 
presents a great deal of facts for the researcher’s observation. (1991:102)  
This supports the ambiguities that Zaccarini, Leyser and I recognise to be powerful 
cultural dynamics relating to the meaning of the work that a teacher does, how that 
communicates meaning to the students and, in turn, our understanding of ourselves 
as teachers. I become a teacher not by what I do but by the fact that I am called one 
by society. Moreover, because I am a teacher, I am also associated with intelligence, 
good judgment, subject knowledge and an ability to manage students’ learning and 
assess their progress or achievement in accordance with Governmental and 
institutional guidelines. Awareness of these social constructions acknowledges the 
dynamic pulls of my position towards holding the knowledge and the control of the 
students in my care, away from witnessing, engaging and containing the knowledge 
and self-control of the students. This neatly draws the discussion back to the issues 
raised in Chapter 1 in relation to cycles of vulnerability and discloses the full extent of 
the bind that the teacher is in. 
To be a teacher is to be an object for others which communicates a specific meaning, 
regardless of the teacher’s own appreciation of the role. This objectification is 
elucidated by Rancière:  
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Man and citizen [or in this instance teacher or student] do not designate 
collections of individuals. Man and citizen are political subjects. Political 
subjects are not definitive collectivities. They are surplus names, names 
that set out to question or to dispute about who is included in their count. 
(1999: 303) 
The meaning carried within the designation of a person as a teacher carries with it a 
consideration of those who are teachers and those who are not. It could be argued 
that we all teach each other at different points through our life experience. However, 
this does not make us teachers. So the idea here is that the act of teaching is distinct 
from the subjective appreciation of the role of being a teacher. I would argue that 
contemporary use of the term ‘teacher’ can, unless the teacher is resilient and 
vigilant, be designated within the realm of ‘manager’, as discussed within the 
previous chapter, and with its notions of accountability for the management of the 
learning of others. Rancière continues: 
Correspondingly, freedom and equality are not predicates belonging to 
definite subjects. Political predicates are open predicates: they open up a 
dispute about what they exactly entail and whom they concern in which 
cases. (1999: 303) 
For Rancière, politics is not the process of democracy or of Government and 
governance, as it is within contemporary culture; it is defined by the act of dissensus. 
So, in this state, it is not the culture itself that disputes the notion of freedom and 
equality as absolute constructs, but the acts of dissensus that destabilise social 
meaning in the momentary acts of teaching. By questioning the terms ‘teacher’, 
‘aerialist’ and ‘circus’, Leyser, Zaccarini and I engage with the notions of predicated 
and constituted meaning against which we struggle in order to resist a singular, 
domestic, predetermined appreciation of meaning. We are aware that it is not 
through the designation of the title ‘teacher’ but through the act of emancipation that 
for us, is where the meaning of our role resides. We do not wish to be managers of 
education or determiners of a set path for the students in our care. We wish to verify 
the abilities of our students to learn by activating their understanding of the 
possibilities that risk-taking offers. Therefore, as in the notion of authenticity, the 
mapping of the teaching territory is defined by artificial borders within the everyday 
and the territory is overwritten through every act that reinforces it. However, it is 
within the acts of dissensus to these borders that the true pedagogic attentiveness 
resides - within each single specific moment that attends to and questions the 
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authenticity or resolution of the students towards their own verification. We must be 
aware, however, that this has the potential to stultify as well as emancipate. Zaccarini 
proposes the term ‘circoanalysis’ through which to consider his questioning role - 
‘why do circus for me’ (Emphasis in the original Ellingsworth, 2009). Leyser has 
come to the conclusion that she is someone who makes metaphors manifest through 
her performance and teaching work. I engage within the practice of pedagogic tact as 
a form of emancipatory praxis. 
 
4.2 Interpretation: How do I talk about this thing that I do?  
Insofar as man speaks, does he think, and not vice versa. (Heidegger, 
1971:16) 
The practitioners interviewed both utilised paradox and metaphor in the way they 
articulated their practice. A recognition of the paradoxical nature of practice 
resonates with the Heideggerian treatise that meaning is made in the communication 
for another rather than in solipsistic isolation and that this meaning is generative 
and socially constrained. Therefore, the possibility of language expressing or 
clarifying truth is raised. As discussed in the Introduction, Heidegger’s disavowal of 
dialectic stems from his commitment to phenomenology as an engaged exercise of 
experience and expression. This commitment forces him to question how meaning 
comes from experience. For Plato, this comes to light through a process of reason (or 
logos) (Plato in Gonzalez, 2009. Heidegger suggests that there is a possibility for 
greater clarity, a type of ‘pure’ seeing that surpasses the dialectical ambiguities of 
reason, as espoused by Plato (Gonzalez, 2009). I suggest that this ideal of ‘pure’ sight 
is as impossible as the possibility of sustained authenticity. Like Gonzales, I propose 
that this is a crucial element within Heidegger’s thinking - that language and 
expression do not speak clearly enough of true experience and constitute the thinking 
through of experience. Gonzales clarifies that ‘it is not consistent or coherent... if he 
means that dialectic can never attain a completely pure seeing beyond logos [reason], 
then he is requiring of dialectic something that he himself recognises to be 
impossible’ (2009:378). Heidegger’s thinking exemplifies the contradictions and 
criticisms that dialectic and metaphor are permeated with, that they do not clarify 
truth of experience within expression. Therefore, Heidegger reveals the impossibility 
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of finding a universal or true appreciation of meaning through language despite 
language’s attempt at revealing or clarifying the experience further.  
It can be argued that, through the poetics of metaphor used by myself, Zaccarini and 
Leyser, a precise meaning is drawn upon the map for the reader which articulates 
beyond the specific words spoken. This is channelled into a dialectical relation with 
the identities of those writing and those reading or between those speaking and those 
listening. The performance of metaphor, for Leyser, is a proposition of universal 
similarity which enables the audience to recognise themselves within the work. 
Metaphor no longer evokes the ‘fugitive’ elements of the Heideggerian ‘they’, where 
one person is seen as distant from an other, but the ambiguity of metaphor 
precipitates a drawing together of people in recognition of the different meanings 
evoked descriptively (1962: 253).  
Mobile meanings are questioned and challenged through the course of the speaking 
by both the speaker and listener. For Rancière, poetry offers emancipatory 
opportunities for the listener, student or other with whom you are communicating 
because it does not explicate. He states that speech, by attending to personal 
experience, ‘decomposes and recomposes’ notions of reality and produces a ‘fresh 
sphere of visibility for further demonstrations’ (1999:42). The language of metaphor 
can, therefore, make a number of things visible: the culture within which the 
speaking is happening, the relation that the speaker has to the material being 
discussed and the cultural and ideological presumptions (or heuristic judgments) of 
the listener in the hearing of it.  
Leyser discusses metaphor in terms of its ability to evoke the emotions stirred, not 
only within aerial performance but also within her personal embodied experience. 
She states that ‘[m]etaphors, we use to describe our falling, struggling... the 
metaphors that we have encrypted in our language to describe our experience, come 
from physical experience in the first place’ (Leyser, 2009:2). Falling, struggling, 
restriction and flight are metaphors for communicating experience and 
understanding that brings it pertinently back to the physical body. Within metaphor 
we may find individual and authentic understanding as well as obfuscation and 
misunderstanding.  
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In the field of cognitive linguistics, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson research and 
articulate the significance of metaphor for communication. They agree that metaphor 
is part of extraordinary language beyond the traditionally characteristic view of 
thoughts as words. They discovered that an attempt to eradicate metaphor from 
speech was impossible due to its embeddedness in thought because ’[o]ur ordinary 
conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally 
metaphorical in nature’ (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980:3). Metaphor is more than a 
rhetorical device used to add emphasis, create art or score a linguistic point. It is 
indeed the very fabric upon which language is built. In later work, Johnson pushes 
this point further by suggesting that metaphor is the only effective way of subverting 
the dualist language split between body and mind. For him, meaning is embodied in 
metaphor: ‘The power of conceptual metaphor is that it permits us to use the 
semantics and inferential structure of our bodily experience as a primary way of 
making sense of abstract entities, relations and events’ (Johnson, 2007:280). The 
suggestion is that, through metaphor, an individuated understanding is engendered. 
Johnson further suggests that a more literal or quantified meaning-making system 
can be seen as dangerous: ‘It follows on from this that literalism, which claims that 
all our meaningful concepts can be spelt out literally, is false, misleading, and very 
dangerous’ (Johnson, 2007:280). As Zaccarini suggests, ambiguity is a more mature 
way of viewing life as experienced.  
The possible problems of literal meaning is one of the key questions of this thesis. I 
contend that, without a constant attitude of dissensus within pedagogic encounters, 
meaning can become literal and, therefore, deterministic. This determinism is 
exemplified by my argument in Chapter 1 in relation to the word ‘risk’ and its new 
association with fear when once it was used to invoke issues of prudence or courage. 
The way that the term is used in common cultural parlance is deterministic but an 
engagement with the full impact of the experience of risk-taking can emancipate the 
student from possible determinism. The expression needs to be synthesised through 
experience and not divorced from it. The words speak of and for the doing. What 
metaphor does, therefore, is to enable the talker or writer to engage with, and 
describe, the meaning that an embodied experience is for them. Metaphorical 
description reaches out and interrupts the normative, reasoned and fully articulated 
understanding demanded by people in society who seem to privilege accountability 
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and rationality and also evades description and corporeity. To speak in metaphor 
attests to intersubjective understanding and reveals the doing in the telling.  
Literal and quantifiable rationalisation is formative and constitutive within a 
moment of experience due to an overdependence upon scientific or enlightenment 
thinking that dominates certain aspects of society. This formative drive, which 
reinforces the body-mind binary and privileges the rational over the ‘irrational’ 
experience, is pertinent to this thesis because it is seems to be intrinsic to education. 
Consequently, a singularly antagonistic approach is both deeply problematic and, 
because of many teachers’ will to act in dissent, unnecessary. I propose a dialectical 
relation between metaphor and rationality. This means that practically I engage with 
the sureties needed to account for my practice (which I will unpick fully in the next 
chapter) and I place them into dialectical relation with the anecdotal and 
metaphorical elements that describe my practice as it appears to me. I suggest that 
the mobilisation for this dialectic is within my tactful appreciation of how both 
science and metaphor expose elements that contain and free the practice of taking 
risks.  
A consideration of the dialogue between metaphor and literalism within 
communication regarding pedagogy is, therefore, a discussion of the building blocks 
of communicated identity. It becomes increasingly clear to me when I examine a 
moment from my own learning. My aerial teacher was attempting to teach me how to 
perform a back balance. The physics and mathematics of the balance and the 
physiological impact of it on my body was clear in my mind but it was not until 
another classmate offered me the metaphor of ‘water, gushing out of your feet in a 
large arc’ and another suggested that, for her, it was ‘a reverse crucifixion’ that I 
began to imaginatively engage with the movement. The technique of keeping the 
abdominal and core muscles strong, minor adjustments with the arms and enacting a 
full commitment to the move hindered my ability to feel what it meant for me in the 
doing. The metaphors enabled me to know, on a tangible level, what it is to be in a 
back balance. Knowing the technique- the literal, the disembodied and the rational -  
engendered only a fragmented understanding of the movement whereas, when this 
was taken in combination with the metaphorical, I gained clarity. Moreover, there 
was no need for anyone to interpret the metaphors in any way - to intellectualise or 
define them - for me for the meaning to impact upon my embodied understanding. 
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Metaphor became the meaning that I felt rather than expressed or extraverted 
through communication. I was, you could say, emancipated by the equalising 
language of the two students who described their experience of the back balance to 
me whereas I had been confused or stultified by the technical and physiological 
descriptions of the ideal trapeze body given to me by my teacher.  
 
4.2.1 Interpretation as an act of challenge 
The role of interpretation is another interesting theme or territory raised within the 
interviews. Ellingsworth suggests that the communication of multiple meanings, 
dependent upon the audience’s own experience, is the strength of Zaccarini’s current 
research. Leyser takes this a step further with her suggestion that ‘the highest form of 
human intelligence [is] the ability to observe without interpreting - mostly our 
educational system’, she continues, ‘is geared towards the opposite notion - that the 
clever bit is the interpretation, whereas just doing the job demonstrates very little’ 
(Leyser, 2009). She is ruminating upon the illuminating moments in her own 
learning where she was given the space to simply do the work without the need to 
talk about it.  
This is placed in sharp relief against her experience as a student of English, taught to 
‘interpret’ a text and clarify its meaning. She expresses a contradiction between what 
she feels is the role of the teacher and most teachers’ methods. She wants the teacher 
to ‘see’ the student rather than to ‘judge’ them; I want to ‘be seen 
without interpretation for a moment - no more and no less than who I am, being seen 
in fact without any notion of 'more or less' in the picture. I don't mean being praised, 
just as much as I don't mean being criticised’ (Leyser, 2009). Leyser articulates how 
interpretation can lead the student into stultification. She uses the term 
‘interpretation’ to elucidate on two themes: the first is the symbolic distance noticed 
by the teacher between what she knows and what teachers think she ought to know - 
the assessment of her intelligence or expertise as a student. The second use is the 
skill of knowing how to write about, or think about, the material of a class in the 
same way as the teacher or theorist, which is the interpretation of the text - ‘the 
clever bit’ (2009). She articulates that both these forms, to be seen only in relation to 
her intelligence as measured by the teacher and to be heard as a parrot of some 
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predicated notion, are damaging to her will to learn. The notion of measuring, seeing 
and listening in this context places the student in relation to authenticity and 
inauthenticity with the teacher. In acts of emancipatory practice there is no pressure 
on the teacher to ‘judge’ the moment, assess it and articulate a response to it, in the 
same way that the student is equally under no pressure to articulate a specific 
response to the moment either. The moment just is and it resonates as such.  
In my experience, few opportunities have afforded me as clear a moment of un-
interpreted ‘seeing’ as my experience with flying trapeze training. I felt no pressure to 
extrapolate every learning point, connection or theory I was learning through the 
practice. I simply swung, backwards and forwards, whilst my teacher, Adam Cohen, 
spoke the rhythm of the swing for me to recognise it. He enabled me to know the 
swing so that I could navigate it successfully. He saw me fly and we worked ‘in 
common’ to enable me to fly higher (Heidegger, 1962: 174). I did not feel judged 
because I was not measured against some predicated notion of success. I was simply 
allowed to fly and feel and be. Cohen engaged my will to do so by articulating only 
the swing. 
As I elucidated in the last chapter, the importance of this moment is that it had the 
ability to rupture the notions that I may have had of myself in relation to death and 
in relation to some perception of successful flying. The role of the teacher was to sit 
back and let the moment ‘teach’ me what it will about my potential. Cohen’s tact and 
skill was to say and teach nothing specific, similar to Heidegger and Rancière’s 
proposition that the student is the one who learns in the act, rather than the teacher 
telling them what to do or think. All three are aware that the student learns what they 
will, perhaps nothing, if they are left to simply do and be engaged in the learning 
moment.  
This is not to negate the importance of the literal, however. The different approaches 
to practice afford the teacher the ability to work between the two because they are 
not in opposition but are inseparable. Meaning-making is constitutive and formative 
within any pedagogic encounter. The student brings a deterministic expectation 
against which they may wish to measure themselves. The process of stultification 
may, therefore, be internally, rather than externally, mobilised. However, a tact-
driven teacher may notice these personally constructed boundaries and attest to their 
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presence, enabling the student to dissent against them as true markers of identity. 
The teacher may use them as a means through which to listen effectively to the 
student as a supplement to a less deterministic way of working. She may also choose 
to work alongside the determinism, without judgment. The two are in constant 
dialogue. The tact of the teacher is to negotiate both measurement and non-
judgment so as not to ignore the student’s place, will and identity within the doing.  
The opening up of a student’s experience is vital in order to engender the risk-taking 
that we all make possible in practice. For Zaccarini and Leyser, risk-taking is related 
to challenging assumptions and patterns as well as the ‘idle’ perception of risking 
death (Heidegger, 1962: 264). For teachers, the assumption of a primary identity as 
one who ‘cares’ can disguise the fact that risk is present within more than the obvious 
signs of it in the room. I may be aware that a student could fall from the equipment 
but not notice that they express discomfort when I touch the small of their back in 
order to stop them from falling, for example. The fact that I am designated to be a 
person who cares can leave me blind to all the different levels of risk that the student 
is taking.  
This is applicable to all the practitioners who work in this way: on a practical level for 
the aerialist it may resonate in the question ‘when do I take the student off the 
lunge?’ On a personal level, it may reside in the question ‘when do I stop accepting a 
superficial performance from the student?’ These questions typify the intuitive 
moves that are made within the risk-taking relationship. They are based upon the 
landscape that has already been mapped into the teacher’s experience through 
contact with other students, other bodies, culture, etc. They are also representative of 
the intense relationship that the student forms with the teacher when working with 
risk. This relationship is one that, for Rancière, is based on veracity, which is ‘at the 
heart of the emancipation experience’ because it is ‘the moral foundation of the 
power to know’ (1991:57). Experience and the will to seek knowledge of a situation 
free the teacher to really engage with the learning of the student. Decisions, 
therefore, are made consciously and subconsciously by the teacher intuitively and 
instinctively, dependent upon the needs of the individual student in order to 
engender an authentic decision from the student to take a ‘leap of faith’, trusting that 
the teacher/practitioner will support them. 
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4.3 Leaps of Faith 
This section maps the idea of a ‘leap of faith’ that the student takes in response to the 
manner and concern of the teacher. In it, I recognise the dialectical relationships 
between academic achievement and personal understanding, between commerce and 
process and between literal definition and metaphorical concept. I argue that these 
territories are contained and mobilised by the trust that the student has in the 
teacher and the faith that the teacher has in their experience of teaching and of 
performance. Captured within these dialectical negotiations is the fragile, mobile and 
complex proposition that the teacher is a guide through the dangers inherent within 
the work. This is perhaps the most evasive section of my entire thesis, dependent as 
it is upon interpretation, anecdote, hunch and ‘faith’. Such adumbrations do not 
diminish the pertinence of the material but serve to reinforce its humanness through 
ambiguity and paradox.  
The concept of faith is difficult to map as it implies that there is an unknown and 
unknowable element suffusing and constituting the encounter. It is less direct than 
the notion of cultural context, which I addressed in the first chapter, and less 
qualifiable than the theoretical frameworks of Chapter 2. The idea of a ‘leap of faith’ 
suggests that the topography of the teacher’s map wanders into the spiritual realms 
of hope, trust and love, which describe the emotional cartography of a student’s 
relationship with the teacher. They are the texture of the encounter as it appears to 
us in the moment of teaching.  
Zaccarini describes the tensions encapsulated within teaching through an example 
taken from his own training: 
I did injure myself consistently during acrobatics and you have to take 
those risks, you do have to take that leap of faith and you really only get 
injured if you've been taught badly... I think I was taught too quickly and I 
was probably quite good at it because I was a dancer unlike other people 
who were a bit more stiff and a bit more uncoordinated so I was pushed a 
little bit too fast and my injuries weren’t contained, they weren’t dealt 
with, which perhaps reflect upon the teachers need for results, either 
within the school or within themselves, for their own self-respect or self-
satisfaction. (Italics added for emphasis, Zaccarini 2009:np ) 
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The difficulty with a teacher getting it wrong is that the practice may damage the 
student. As Zaccarini suggests, a ‘leap of faith’ is necessary in order to progress and 
this ‘leap of faith’ cannot be done in isolation - it must be contained by the teacher. It 
is therefore clear that, for Zaccarini, the idea of the teacher is someone who is strong 
in their ability to know intuitively what is best for the student and move towards that 
whilst still remaining flexible enough to work with what the student presents. 
Moreover, to go back to the point above, it must be done without the teacher being 
invested in a manner that destroys the faith placed upon them. Zaccarini suggests 
that a teacher’s investment in a ‘result’, either for the academy or for their personal 
satisfaction, inhibits the process the student, was as going through and may result in 
injury.  
It is interesting to note that, despite the risks of being ignored or ‘uncontained’ by the 
teacher, Zaccarini still took the ‘leap of faith’. In doing so, he was able to reconcile his 
own understanding of the embodied movement in relation to the pain he received in 
the process. Zaccarini learnt potently that he was alone within the practice despite 
the designation of the teacher to be in support of him. His understanding of 
pedagogy, of physicality and authenticity, thereby moved towards clarity. He 
suggests that this was done, however, not at the time; at the time he was tempted to 
leave the profession of circus completely because he was stultified and ignored by it. 
The knowledge came about at a later date through the attentive focus of a Lacanian 
therapist. It is possible to develop resolution after or during the doing despite the 
teacher’s determinism or inability to have the right attention to care for the student.  
Taking a Heideggerian perspective upon caring of this nature, we can see how the 
container can restrict as well as free the student - domesticate or liberate. In a 
discussion of alterity, Heidegger proposes that two types of concern are possible. The 
first is one that leaps in for the other. The second is a leaping ahead of them. The first 
ensures that the student ‘steps back so that afterwards, when the matter has been 
attended to, he can either take it over as something finished and at his disposal or he 
can disburden himself of it completely’ (1962:158). The second way, however, 
‘pertains to authentic care – that is, to the existence of the Other, not to a “what” 
with which he is concerned; it helps the other to become transparent to himself in his 
care and to become free of it’ (1962:159). So it could be argued that, within a ‘leap of 
faith’, the student can either be freed to think or ‘disburden’ themselves of the 
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anxiety that mobilised the leap or they will be stultified because the teacher closed 
down the option of fully engaging with the act of leaping: both possibilities reside 
within the encounter.  
The idea of a student stepping back from what they needed articulates the tension 
that is lived by diligent teachers within academic, institutionalised education towards 
different kinds of learning - between the subjective and the objective or between the 
private and the public. It is the problem of domestication and liberation. This conflict 
sets up the dialectical relation necessary to engage in work of a risky nature. 
Arguably, the academy, with its intention towards specific results, drives the student 
towards the “what” and the teacher towards leaping in for them, driving the student 
back from an authentic encounter with the experience. The need for the student and 
the teacher to be recognised as successful is present within most teaching and 
learning experiences. However, it should not be the dominant focus. The student 
must be allowed to ‘leap’ or immerse themself in the messiness of the practice 
without fear of judgment or damage so that they may become transparent to 
themselves within the encounter. And, as I articulated within Chapter 2, a certain 
something mobilises many teachers to act in dissensus to purely technical concerns.  
Leyser moves the discussion into new territory by declaring a conflict between taught 
technique and instinctive knowing. She recognises that, within physical education, 
an understanding of predetermined technique is necessary in order to keep the 
student safe but this can work against the need to leap in and be messy. ‘In theory, 
technique is there to keep you safe, but it becomes an aesthetic in itself, and it 
becomes detached from that very functional nature of [how to move your body]. I 
think that when that detachment happens it stops being useful’ (Leyser, 2009). 
Leyser is expressing the disjuncture between purity of form for form’s sake and self-
expression. I turn to Rancière’s discussion of the political nature of aesthetics for a 
moment in order to unravel this notion further. He claims that aesthetics can be 
seen: 
[a]s the system of a priori forms determining what presents itself to sense 
experience. It is a delimitation of spaces and times, of the invisible and 
visible, of speech and noise,that simultaneously determines the place and 
the stakes of politics as a form of experience. Politics revolves around what 
is seen and what can be said about it, around who has the ability to see 
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and the talent to speak, around the properties of spaces and the 
possibilities of time. (2004:13)  
Therefore, an aesthetic or technical assessment of a priori determinates by the 
teacher towards the student is imbued with the stultifying qualities expounded by 
Rancière. This is because it privileges certain ways of seeing as the only way and 
certain people’s perception of the encounter as the correct way to see it. It could be 
said that, to talk of the form a movement takes according to some prior condition, is 
an explicatory and therefore stultifying act. An emancipatory one would be to 
critique this form and expose it to scrutiny so that the student may be free to see 
themselves within their relation to it. Even if, at that point, the form is adopted by 
the student, the aesthetic form is an act of dissensus because it is accepted in 
knowing relation to the constitutive, cultural elements in which the act resides.  
There is no question that an understanding of technique is a valuable foundation 
from which to work safely. However, what Leyser is arguing is that technique is not 
an end in itself. It has to be synthesised with something else in order to enable the 
student to feel attached, located within it and ‘seen’. She uses the example taken from 
her attempts to learn to perform on a cloud swing and describes how the focus on 
technique amplified her fear: 
I... worked with a teacher who was a technician really, so her focus was 
very much on what I was doing wrong technically, and I became more and 
more scared and I was on the lunge permanently, and I was still terrified. 
She was a fantastic teacher, rated very highly in London anyway as the top 
teacher, but I just got really scared. 
She places this in contrast with a different teacher: 
A man in France, who I went and trained with for just two weeks, who was 
in his 50s and still got up there and demonstrated, he talked about the 
figure of eights; it got all very philosophical. The infinity of the swing, 
which really appealed to me, and it was that, and the quality of his 
presence [which enabled me to really engage]. That's true of all the 
positive training experiences I have had, where the teaching role is able to 
both hold the risk, but at the same time have complete faith in themselves 
and in you at that moment. They hold the paradox in some way. This is 
risky ... there is a level where they have no doubt. There is utmost trust, in 
his teaching, which meant that I did stuff off the lunge that I have never 
done since. (Leyser, 2009) 
The theme that emerges from these examples and which forms a part of my mapped 
understanding of aerial teaching is that, combined with the ability of a teacher to 
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contain the student’s learning and have a clear appreciation of form and technique, is 
a third element. This third element mobilises and synthesises the tension between 
the paradoxical objective and subjective relation and between personal and public 
identity so that the student is not crippled by fear, stultified, domesticated or 
damaged by being pushed too hard. It also allows her to put aside a desire for 
academic, technical, aesthetic or, as Zaccarini discusses, commercial success and can 
feel open to fail, fall or flounder without being told, or feeling herself, that it is wrong. 
The contentious suggestion is that this mobilising third element is faith. 
Faith is articulated by the practitioners I have interviewed in different ways. The 
example from Leyser’s training recalls a teacher who has the ‘utmost trust’ and ‘no 
doubt’ so that he was able to enable her to do things that she has never done since. A 
discussion of the metaphorical elements that the cloud swing represents seems to 
have been the most pertinent influence for Leyser in her teacher’s method. This 
metaphor of the infinity of the swing enabled her to place herself into an imaginative 
relation with the equipment and the teacher to go beyond her expectations. Her faith 
in his ability to contain the learning synthesised with his philosophical metaphors, 
freeing her will to engage with her own learning and artistry.  
For Zaccarini, faith is articulated indirectly and is manifest in a deep concern for the 
furtherance of the students and an antagonism towards superficiality. He places faith 
not only in the Lacanian analytical framework he uses to ‘listen’ to his students but 
also a faith in the student themselves. The Lacanian method is the theoretical frame 
from which he works, similar to my attention to Freire and Rancière’s critically 
engaged pedagogy. This psychoanalytic method is interpretative in a way that my 
method is not. It enables Zaccarini to view the student through a therapeutic frame. 
According to psychotherapist Alice Pitt, psychoanalysis offers education ‘not just a 
rereading of the immediate textual past (although it is that), but also a reading with, 
an openness to exploring with an oft-times eclectic spirit, what psychoanalysis and 
education have to offer one another’ (1998: 2) . Working in this way, however, 
entails:  
moving beyond the ‘what’ of knowledge and beyond the disciplines that 
structure such knowledge within the academy—for the very modes of 
intelligibility and certainty that disciplines offer are, of course, precisely 
what a reading of psychoanalysis with education undermines. (1998 :3) 
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This approach resonates fully with Rancière’s appreciation of an act of dissensus 
because it is a methodical undermining of the certainty of knowledge offered in the 
academy. The Lacanian method emphasises the need for a praxical engagement 
between knowledge and doing so that an interpretation that is borne out of 
experience can be sought by the student. It could be seen that this notion of 
interpretation differs from the Rancièrean perspective. However, the emphasis is not 
upon the teacher or therapist to interpret for the student but upon the student to 
interpret their experience for themselves. In this instance, it brings the student back 
to self-knowledge as an authentic recognition of the situated and constituted nature 
of being.  
This faith in the student’s ability to interpret for themselves, therefore, brings us 
back to Freire and Rancière, whose desire to enable and place faith in the student’s 
will once enabled reflects a philosophical desire to live authentically. For both Freire 
and Rancière, the student’s situated understanding of themself is what is challenged 
within the act of dissensus (Rancière) or conscientisation (Freire); so a Lacanian 
perspective that privileges the student’s voice aligns itself firmly with radical 
pedagogy. The notion of interpretation however, could arguably be aligned with the 
rational privilege of determinism, as discussed in the previous section. A counter to 
this suggestion is that, when Zaccarini’s students interpret their situatedness, they do 
it through movement rather than some arbitrary expression of social convention. The 
student is drawn back to an isolated self and, therefore, meaning is made in the 
expression of understanding for them, through doing circus.  
Following on from the themes raised in the previous chapters and drawing back to 
Rancière’s notions of stultification and will, I can see clear correlations between the 
experiences of the practitioners and the wider philosophical frameworks that 
Heidegger, Rancière, Freire and Lacan propose. These frameworks state that it is by 
privileging the student’s encounter with themselves that emancipatory learning is 
rehearsed, performed and intended towards the authentic or anticipatory resolution 
for the student. The aggravation caused by the singular pursuit of technique, 
literalism or form is recognised both by Freire in his terminology ‘banking concept’ 
(Freire 1971) and by Rancière’s antagonism towards explication (Rancière 1991). 
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Both Rancière and Freire are united in their disdain for mechanical repetition of 
nouns, verbsand adjectives in the teaching of language although, once dialogue has 
been established, Freire’s pedagogic technique is traditionally conducted.  Therefore, 
according to Rancière, it stultifies by appropriating the logic of pedagogy that states: 
I know and you currently do not know. Rancière suggests that instruction of this kind 
is not unnecessary or irrelevant but that, without this being balanced by 
emancipatory discourse, the student is placed in an inferior position which stultifies 
them. He proposes that ‘what an emancipated person can do is be an emancipator: to 
give, not the key to knowledge, but the consciousness of what an intelligence can do 
when it considers itself equal to any other and considers any other equal to itself’ 
(1991: 39).  
From my conversations with Leyser and Zaccarini, it becomes apparent that this 
equality of perception, combined with a faith in their own ability to equal that of their 
teachers (both spiritual and tangible), constitutes and reconstitutes - ‘composes and 
recomposes’ - the momentary equality of both the teacher and the student within the 
relationship (Heidegger 1962:159). Both student and teacher are, therefore, aware of 
the potential to be free, or to be authentic, rather than striving towards a specific 
rational or aesthetic outcome which may close them both down, domesticate them. 
The role of the teacher is to contain, carefully, the potential ‘can do’ of both herself 
and the student. It is a fragile relationship born out of the teacher’s ability to care, to 
have faith and in dialectical relation with damage and pain, fuelled by the student’s 
will to take a leap of faith.  
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4.4 Failure and Pain 
The practitioners interviewed describe a strong relationship between failure, pain 
and damage and their role as, or experience of, being a teacher.  By pushing through 
the pain that failure bestows, the students are enabled to understand their own 
potential within failure. The teacher has gathered strength in their own equality 
through an attentive and authentic relationship with their own ‘known’ failure, which 
can enable them to communicate potential rather than judgment to the student.  
Through my life, I have been constantly attentive to what it means to fail. For me, 
failure brings associations with guilt, embarrassment and shame. It is situated in my 
experiences as a dyslexic student in Cornwall in the 1980s, when dyslexia was not 
acknowledged as a condition by the Cornish schooling system. I was labelled a failure 
because I could not articulate on paper that which I could express in the spoken 
word. I was branded lazy because my handwriting, spelling and presentation were 
haphazard. I can remember distinctly ‘stepping back’ from institutional learning 
because of this contact with failure. I ‘mitched off’ my A level classes and sat in the 
refectory talking to other students. I chose to fail my A Levels because I felt I had no 
place within the system. However, as a teacher, I view this violent and painful 
experience as positive and formative because it enables me to view the possible 
topography that a student experiences in the face of an encounter with failure. I 
know myself within the memory of ‘mitching’ and shame but I am also empowered 
through it by an understanding of the possibility of success that I experienced whilst 
being taught by some emancipatory teachers at a later stage. Learning in this way 
was experientially driven and it is now theoretically underpinned. I reveal my 
relationship to the experiences and make the lack of care that I received during my A 
Level education transparent.  
Leyser and Zaccarini’s experience of failure relates to a form of clown training which 
the three of us again share. It is a provocative method, where the clown teacher asks 
each student to perform and then belittles them in order to provoke a reaction and 
make them learn. In this training method, failure to make the teacher laugh, 
Zaccarini articulates, was formative of his understanding of performance and failure: 
‘to face the most demanding audience and not to feel a kid. It does lessen the impact 
a little bit when you do fail if you've been trained in this way. It does help you to deal 
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with it a bit better’ (Zaccarini, 2009). He defines it as bullying by the ‘silent father’ 
figure, who you want to please but who will not tell you how to please him. This 
training enabled Zaccarini to find resilience within his ability as a performer and to 
seek alternative methods as a teacher. This formative experience did not end his 
cycle of challenging pedagogic relationships.  
Zaccarini’s experience, like my own, would have stultified him as a learner had it not 
been for the Lacanian psychoanalytical therapy he experienced, in another time and 
space, which enabled him to see himself in relation to the lack of care given by the 
‘bullying’ teacher. He articulates that many of his performing experiences have 
involved deterministic encounters with teachers and directors. He talks lucidly about 
working for a particular director who: 
wants us to take risks, really big risks, really, really, really big risks, but 
not in a safe environment. He doesn't hold it. He puts the entire 
responsibility onto you [the performer]. I helped with auditions and it 
made me really sad seeing these young dancers bending over backwards to 
please him. I had to give them a rope workshop because rope was part of 
the show and I put them in catchers27 on the rope. That [position] in itself 
the first time you do it, even if you are a dancer, the pain is improbable, 
but they [the auditioning actors] went up and made not a sound, not a 
peep. Then they would base someone, take someone's full weight, and not 
make a sound... that's not natural and that made me really sad. (Zaccarini, 
2009) 
Here, Zaccarini is witnessing the teacher/director not only provoking the student so 
that they are prepared to take risks but also not taking responsibility for containing 
the risk on an equal footing with the student/performer. He suggests that through 
this exposure, the student is shut down from the experience. In this scenario, the 
status of the director/teacher is oppressive and status hinges upon the teacher’s 
objectification or dehumanisation of the student in order to objectify them. The 
student permits the teacher, due to their status, to mould them into a commodity. 
The student is complicit in the inequality displayed by their silence when performing 
the painful act of ‘basing’ another student.  
The notion of the absent performer’s voice is present within Zaccarini’s example in 
that the performer does not acknowledge the pain that they are in to the teacher; 
they make ‘not a sound, not a peep’ to demonstrate the fact that they are living, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  For a full glossary of trapeze terms, see Appendix C.	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breathing, feeling, corporeal beings. This lack of voice is notable because it 
constitutes the personal experience in performance and reinforces the fact that 
experience has less status than a pure aesthetic or performance for the 
director/teacher. As I articulated in my ethics section, the voice of the student is 
fundamental within ethical practice and research. It becomes apparent from 
Zaccarini’s account that he questions the practice of this particular director and he 
signals the concern by describing the absent voices. This returns us to the 
proposition that, even within corporeal encounters, the subjected student or 
performer can be identified by their relation to a Heideggerian ‘what’ rather than a 
transparency of the ‘now’. The desire of the director is placed above the experience of 
the performer; the silence and distant actions of the performer mask the reality of the 
pain they are in. They are, therefore, objectified, not by the act they perform, but by 
the politics surrounding it, which defines ‘who has the ability to see and the talent to 
speak’ (Rancière 2004:13).  
The objectification of the artist has long been debated in performance theory, in 
particular in relationship to dance. Zaccarini has presented papers on the subject 
that recognise the constitutive relationship between mechanistic training methods 
and the circus industry. Leyser recognises that her bruises and scars are remnants of 
an abusive practice through which she found a genuine relationship to her body and 
the guilt that was located there. She discusses the control and discipline needed to 
perform as an aerialist alongside an autobiographical account of her anorexia (2007). 
The two constitute each other, separate discourses of punishment which are 
performed within the same time and space. She recognises that she made herself 
fragile through not eating whilst she performed fragility for an audience. In the same 
way, she created strength through rituals involving food, a strong resolution against 
hunger, married to the strength in her muscles from training and the strength seen 
by the audience in her evasion of death. The notion of pain is inseparable from the 
act of performing with aerial equipment and the pain of the act is inseparable from 
the identity of the performer.  
Ballet dancer and dance theorist, Emilyn Claid, explores notions of the sacrifice of 
the real for the illusory in traditional ballet. She acknowledges how ‘the ideals of 
perfection failed my body’ and she opens the discussion out that it is not only the 
performing industries but Western culture itself that affects this dynamic of 
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objectification: ‘All are challenged on a daily basis by the contradictions between 
their real bodies and performed illusions’ (Claid, 2006:32). Claid articulates that a 
competitive drive and the pursuit of aesthetic perfection through a method of 
correct/incorrect movement tuition perpetuated the objectification of her as a 
performer. She acknowledges that this objectification abuses the student’s desire to 
be ‘seen’ or, as she describes it, to be ‘loved’.  
This directly links with Leyser’s suggestion that ‘when there are judgements, 
especially implicit rather than explicit ones, flying around, I can feel myself zip up 
inside, withdraw and stay within known limits’ (Leyser, 2009). There is the 
descriptive mapping here of a terrain in which judgment closes off the humanity of 
the performer from the event: a boundary is drawn. This boundary compels the artist 
to become mechanistic and drives them to consider themselves inferior, not only to 
the teacher, but also in relation to the performance discipline or aesthetic. They may 
take a ‘leap of faith’ but are unaware of the discourses that constitute the act that they 
are performing because their individual role or ‘will’ is effaced within the method of 
teaching. They are not enabled to be transparent within the culture that constitutes 
them (Heidegger) and they are not able to use their voice in relation to the aesthetic 
police order at play within their silent acquiescence to it (Rancière 1991). The un-
emancipated or ‘unseen’ artist does not leap towards resolution or creativity but 
leaps instead towards their own stultification; it is an unknowing self-sacrifice.  
A generalised appropriation of Michael Foucault’s use of the term ‘docile bodies’ is 
helpful when viewing the idea of pain and identity because it embeds the argument 
within the body as a site for engaging with the discourses that objectify it (1977:138). 
The movement from intellectual domestication, which is reviewed through the work 
of Freire and Rancière as a proposition for revolutionary practice, is enhanced when 
considered alongside the physical body and pain. Foucault suggests that the body is a 
site for suppression beyond the intellectual, which constructs and carries the political 
signification of power: 
[a] ‘[P]olitical autonomy’ which was also a ‘mechanics of power’ was being 
born; it defined how one may do what one wishes, but so that they may 
operate as one wishes, with the techniques, the speed and the efficiency 
that one determines. Thus discipline produces subjected and practiced 
bodies, ‘docile’ bodies. (Foucault 1977:138) 
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Foucault is interrogating the discipline structures within society as a means of 
describing the way that bodies may be viewed as sites for restriction in all aspects of 
normative behaviour. The distinction within this thinking is that a technique of 
training, which he would call a discipline structure, focuses on a correct/incorrect or 
good/bad aesthetic precision. This structure effaces the possible authenticity and 
equality of the student and creates a ‘docile’ student or performer. The student is 
complicit within this domesticating practice due to their desire for attention, 
recognition or love from the teacher or system that imposes it. Modes of education 
consequently perpetuate not only the deterministic dynamic discussed in Chapter 2 
but also sacrifice the site for meaning-making and knowledge- the body. The 
performance discipline and training enact determinism through use of a mechanism 
of social power and desire which is grounded in the corporeality of pain. 
Part of the experience of being a circus performer, particularly when you are a new 
student to aerial work, is that of encountering pain. Zaccarini and Leyser emphasise 
that pain is constitutive of the experience of being a circus performer: ‘pain and 
pleasure for us I would say are not so much... we have a different relationship to pain 
from what ‘normal’ people have. I think that most of us consider that pain and 
pleasure are just a sensation on a continuum’ (Zaccarini 2009). Pain is a useful and 
moulding part of circus practice for Zaccarini and, moreover, it is only through pain 
that he has engendered a more transparent relation to the cultural context in which 
his performances sit.  
If the ‘normal’ response to pain lies in avoidance, then Zaccarini and other aerialists 
are placing themselves in opposition to the predetermined normative. Working with 
pain becomes an act of dissensus against the fear-driven discourses of contemporary 
society in which danger is avoided at any cost. Recognition of the constitutive and 
fugitive elements of pain within aerial work is developed in Chapter 5. I argue that 
the teacher is charged to enable the painful encounter whilst containing and limiting 
it. A dialogue with how each individual student engages with and understands pain 
is, therefore, necessary. 
Circus work requires the pain of physical repetition which damages the body and 
rewrites it to the aesthetic form of the art. Aerial performance may be an act of 
dissensus against the cultural norms in response to pain but it is also an act of 
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reconstitution when examined in terms of aesthetics. The act of dissensus is effaced 
by the re-performance of a specific form or technique. Through repetition, the 
performer reconstitutes the dominance of superficial aesthetics over the individual 
dissensus. Claid articulates this as 
the pain that occurred when my body transformed itself from one shape to 
another, when it learnt to articulate a language through a codified 
technique that was alien to its pedestrian everyday existence. I am 
speaking about the pain involved when learning and practicing an 
externally driven physical pursuit, challenging my body to enact extreme 
physical feats. I am speaking about an intense activity, repeatedly 
practiced on or by my body where the language learnt required 
engagement a physical discipline at the level of painful somatic sensation 
in order to achieve its expression. (Claid, 2006:38)  
Zaccarini, Leyser and Claid articulate an addictive quality that mobilises the dynamic 
relation to the technique enacted and to the pleasure/pain relation between the art, 
the learning and the teacher. They recognise that the element of control which 
necessitates an act of extreme performance is rehearsed in the painful act of the 
doing as well as any dominance and objectification by the teacher - that it is the 
dynamic of pleasure and pain which keeps them domesticated. For, as Foucault 
suggests: 
If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did anything but 
say no, do you really think one would be brought to obey it? What makes 
power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it 
doesn’t weigh on us as a force that says no, not that it traverses and 
produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge and produces 
discourse. (1981:94) 
 
The pleasure experienced within the power dynamic is, for the student, the 
mobilising factor within the acquiescence to objectification of themselves by the 
teacher. An attention to technique, form and the literal by the teacher, or asked for 
by the student, has the potential to negate the humanity of that student. The same is 
true for a deterministic social mechanism (neoliberalism, for example) which 
rewards the academic proof of success through grades or commerce. Zaccarini 
suggests that the impact of monetary gain on the student, through rewarding ‘tricks’, 
further reinforces the system of power. He again uses the example of the student who 
performs handstands. The student rehearses the movement for years in order for the 
‘trick’ to conform to the technical requirements of his teachers; the student uses this 
skill to busk and earn money to pay his way through circus school. In the final 
Hartley,	  J.	  R.	  2013	  
	  
173	  
	  
showcase, he is set up to commoditise his ‘trick’ and sell it, and himself, to a circus 
company. This is where the school achieves its reputation and proves its worth. 
However, by Zaccarini challenging the student not to do a handstand perfectly in the 
final showcase, he acts in dissensus to both the student’s expectation and the school’s 
marketing objectives. The student really struggled to find himself in this new location 
but the result was a performance that worked beyond the mechanistic trick of a 
handstand and revealed and described the student’s momentary relation and 
resolution towards the truth of the act. He was creatively engaged with the material 
of his handstand in a mature way so as to become more than a schoolchild: he 
became an artist (Rancière 1991). 
This narrative can be driven one step farther in Zaccarini and Leyser’s argument that 
circus performance holds within it the encountering of death for the performer and 
for the audience. However, it is often not an authentic relationship due to the 
performer’s rehearsal process that evades their possible death. The student does not 
nearly die although they may be seen as doing so by an audience. The rehearsal 
process ensures that the performer is safe but it also negates the true experience of 
facing death. As Zaccarini suggests, ambivalence is a more mature way of considering 
one’s relationship to life and to living through artistic work. The striving to bring 
oneself into relation to death alone is not enough to mobilise an individual 
relationship and anticipatory resolution; it must be considered in relation with an 
appreciation of life as lived. It is not enough to represent superhumanity; you must 
also challenge yourself in relation to the concept of superhumanity.  
Faith of, and in, the teacher, which can be developed through the teacher’s own 
relationship to failure, pain or damage, is one possible mobilising agent for 
equalising the learning of the student. This learning, rather than engendering an 
adherence to the objectification of the student, frees the teacher from it, thereby 
allowing her to experience anticipatory resolution too. This is a form of emancipatory 
understanding which, in turn, according to Rancière, can emancipate others. 
Through the course of the next chapter, I begin to map the strata of meanings 
experienced by the student and teacher through a moment of risk-taking practice. 
The descriptions articulate the depth that the experience of corporeal engagement, 
metaphor, interpretation and aesthetic focus can have for the student in the moment 
of doing circus. It is a description that builds upon the mapped territories within this 
Hartley,	  J.	  R.	  2013	  
	  
174	  
	  
chapter and takes us forward towards their reintegration in association with the 
desire to reveal the nature of pedagogic containment, holding or tact.  
Chapter 5.0 
Taking a Leap: Action, Moment, Glory and Fragmentation 
 
This chapter considers what it is that the student ‘owns’ in that moment of ‘leaping’ 
in the doing, being and seeing of risk-taking and circus in performance. I develop the 
description of a depth of knowledge that the teacher has about herself and is able to 
map in relation to the student. An excavation of ownership, therefore, begins to 
uncover what it is that the teacher ‘contains’ (to use Leyser’s terms) for the student 
(although they cannot be a substitute for them) when supporting the leap. This gives 
a preliminary indication of what is at stake within the idea of the leap. I ruminate on 
the different meanings associated with aerial work that are lived in the doing of it 
and, in that way, I circulate around ways of viewing this in association with 
domestication or stultification, liberation or emancipation. I appropriate and develop 
Peta Tait’s (after Merleau-Ponty’s) three different ways of considering the aerial body 
to create the structure for this chapter - the body in action, the momentary body and 
the glorified body: 
An aerial body in action is seen through the bodily fleshing of a 
‘glorified body’ and viscerally with the ‘momentary body’, but 
reversibly, so that the observing body becomes glorified momentarily in 
aerial action. The visible is inhabited by the invisible and experienced 
bodily and expressly and potentially operates in a ‘dialectic of love’. 
([italics my own, used to emphasise the three strata] Tait, 2005:150) 
The three aerial bodies intertwine within the moment of performance action as a 
movement that is biologically lived, ‘witnessed/seen’ and performed for an other. 
This is what the student owns in embodied performance - it is their being. The body 
in action can be seen as the mechanical and biological body; it is what the student 
physically does. This body is discussed in relation to the anatomical language which I 
usually use to describe it and in relation to how language can limit the student’s 
understanding of the physical action. The momentary body is discussed here in 
reference to being with others - the student who is seen or witnessed by the teacher 
and other students - in relation to fear, anxiety and the cultural context in which it 
sits. It is the body that reaches out and expresses something within a social context, 
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as discussed in Chapter 2. The final body is glorified. By this, Tait articulates that the 
body is seen as something more than what it is by the others who witness it; they 
bestow it with certain significance in the moment of watching.  
The superhumanity discussed by Leyser and Zaccarini, for example, describes the 
feeling experienced by an unfamiliar audience that an aerial body in action is 
something more powerful than the normal body. In this chapter, I investigate the 
glorified body in relation to the transgressive nature of circus, how this conscribes 
meaning for the student performing and brings them to understand themselves 
anew. Through an appropriation of Tait’s terminology, I build a framework which I 
will use to discuss practical moments in Chapter 6. I consider the implications that a 
fragmented understanding of aerial performance can have, in terms of anticipatory 
resolution, by drawing the ideas back to discussions of risk, resilience and 
emancipation taken from Chapter 3.  
These three descriptions of the body in aerial performance- active, momentary and 
glorified - taken from Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s discussions of alterity in The Visible 
and the Invisible and advanced by Tait, offer a useful frame through which I view the 
deep strata of experience that trapeze work can have for the student by doing, 
observing and attributing meaning. Throughout my thesis, I have continuously 
placed my personal experience of pedagogy in service of a new perspective upon the 
term ‘risk-taking’. This chapter is no different. It explores the concepts of the body 
and alterity through a single moment of teaching. I place my experience alongside 
that of the theories and practices of other teachers and researchers in order to 
ruminate upon the cultural and social impact of enabling others to take risks. 
Through this methodology, I explore the performance of risk and consider a single 
moment of practice, documented in Figure 1: the teaching of a movement called an 
Eagle. The student performed the Eagle within the rehearsal process and became an 
active, momentary and glorified body through doing so. It is not a fragmented 
experience but one that is known through the doing in its totality. The teacher is the 
locus for making the three bodily knowledges transparent to the student, not by 
explication but by an act of solicitude in the doing. She may, as I did, reference the 
scientific and biological but also instinctively capture and leap ahead of the student’s 
experience of pain and surprise in order to contain it for him without diminishing his 
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possession of it. She is in this moment the witness to the student’s glorified body and 
champion of his potential being towards authentic understanding.  
The teacher is both orchestrator and audience of this moment, responsible for it and 
yet distanced from it. In Heideggerian terms, by devoting ourselves to the same 
project ‘in common’, we  the student and the teacher - ‘thus become authentically 
bound together, and this makes possible the right kind of objectivity, which frees the 
other [the student] in his freedom for himself’ (1962:159). It is this notion of the right 
kind of objectivity that I navigate within the relationship as one caring for the 
student. The right kind of objectivity is one that declares the ‘mine-ness’ of the 
student’s relationship to their own body, to movement, to death, to risk and to 
authenticity, whilst I, the teacher, map the encounter, sustaining and attesting to the 
student’s ability to encounter it. As discussed in Chapter 2, this is a complex 
proposition for the teacher, which can disable as well as enable the student’s 
awareness of their own possibility. 
 
Figure 1. The Eagle.  
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5.1 Action  
The critical incident performed in this instance by the student is the action of a static 
trapeze move called an Eagle. The performer begins by standing on his toes on the 
trapeze bar with his hands loosely placed on the ropes. He then slides his hands 
down the rope so that they lie parallel to the body. During this slide, the student 
wraps his arms once around the rope so that the rope runs from the back of the 
shoulder joint (behind his body), through the arm-pit, down the bicep (in front of his 
body) and forearm (behind his body) to culminate in the palm of the hand (see 
Figure 1.). The move demands that the performer’s upper arms are secured firmly in 
the ropes before his arms are lifted to a 90° angle away from the body in the shape of 
a cross. As his arms move to this perpendicular position, the performer lifts his knees 
through his quadriceps and removes his toes from the bar to release the trapeze from 
the weight of his body. Once the bar is free of weight, the performer is able to 
complete the movement by taking his toes behind the bar as he straightens his legs. 
It is important that the body is held strongly and the chest is raised in order to keep 
the vulnerable shoulder joint safe within the move. The action of the movement is 
delivered as a mechanistic proposition in terms of the student’s physiology and 
muscularity but it is taught through multiple ways of expressing- linguistic, poetic, 
embodied, symbolic and representative.  
Throughout my praxis, I use anatomical terminology to discuss the body of the 
student. This type of language is one that I argue can limit and fragment the 
student’s body as something to be categorised or stratified when not taken in 
dialogue with other more ambiguous choreographic, embodied and/or linguistic 
means. Building from the argument about technique and aesthetics that I opened in 
the previous chapter, I recognise that anatomical language can domesticate and 
liberate the teacher who uses it and the student who hears it. This layer of discourse 
enables a specificity of communication within the telling relating to movement. It is 
useful as a structure through which to articulate the deep level to which the teacher is 
conversant with the body. The biological language contains and secures the safety for 
the student within a linguistic frame. The student trusts that the teacher knows what 
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they are talking about. However, it limits the discourse when considered in relation 
to possibility, performance and performativity for which a more poetic and therefore 
ambiguous language structure may be used.  
The way that a pedagogic instruction is received when delivered with anatomical 
specificity ensures that the student, and in this case the reader, knows not only where 
in the body the movement is enacted but also the intrinsic ‘wholeness’ achieved by a 
body in transition and interrelation. Tait references Foucault (1979) in her assurance 
that ‘an aerial performer is not separate from his or her mechanical equipment, a 
body is a body-tool, part of a ‘body machine complex’’ (2005:7). I knowingly used 
deterministic and biologically specific language when teaching the Eagle, but it was 
used in combination with an attention to the body as ephemeral as well as tangible.  
When I talk to students using biological terms, I am aware of the ‘technologies of 
power’ that permeate the discourse surrounding the fear or absence of bodies and, in 
particular, in relation to the bodies of children. However, I retain a clear focus on 
ambiguity and resist the temptation to diagnose the student as if they were purely a 
mechanical body. This excavation of the biological strata of the perceived body is 
purely that - an excavation of fluid and mutable strata, complete only when seen in 
totality. The transformation of students into biological bodies entails an act of 
derivation and abstraction and could be seen as a form of objectification, which is 
irreconcilable with my emancipatory and phenomenological imperative. I talk in 
these terms in order to recognise the cultural situatedness of the act and to offer 
specificity to the student and to the reader. However, I reiterate that this is only one 
layer of the teaching discourse to which I am attentive. Biological language is a part 
of the act, but it does not define, describe or contain it wholly.  
By recognising the different strata of linguistic possibilities within the act of teaching, 
I pass through what Van Manen calls an ‘interpretative cycle’ whereby the researcher 
orients around a specific question and interprets experience by questioning the 
specificity of the language or expression that is used (1990: 151). Through this 
chapter, I orientate myself towards the strata of meaning conveyed by the seemingly 
derivative or abstracted notions I use, understanding that they work as a whole to 
communicate to the student at all times. 
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The action for the student is one of doing the movements that achieve the Eagle and 
then performing its completion for a few seconds. In this first section, I am 
investigating both the act of doing by the student and the act of enabling it from the 
teacher (which communicates both power and empowerment to the student). I begin 
by uncovering the temporal and spatial nature of the moment of action. 
 
 
5.1.1 Trust, temporality and space 
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, trust bred from tact and faith are the mobilising 
elements within the pedagogic relationship that enables true risk-taking to be 
encountered. This trust is temporary and spatially dependent and is defined as a 
process to be uncovered and worked with. It cannot be perceived as a fixed end 
point; the pedagogic relationship is one of tactful negotiation of the boundaries of 
trust. Manning’s definition of tact is that it ‘embodies this injunction that challenges 
me in advance to have known’ the conditions under which I have agreed to work 
(2007:134). Trust is an act that unites participants temporarily in agreement. This 
temporary agreement is fluid and mutable within the teaching relationship; it 
emerges as a presence that mobilises the pedagogic dialogue whereby the Eagle is 
taught. But it is momentary and, as we saw in the example of The Gazelle in Chapter 
3, can disappear if the teacher is distracted by cultural concerns. The teacher cannot 
jump in for the student. The student must enact the movement for themselves and 
risk the ‘fall’ that will be failure should the teacher’s exposition and support not 
enable them to know how to encounter and move towards mastering the movement. 
The student, therefore, takes the ‘leap of faith’ articulated in the last chapter and they 
trust the teacher to catch them.  
The move, the Eagle, is not one typically tackled by the novice trapeze artist because 
it demands a reasonable standard of core strength and balance. It is also extremely 
painful, leaving bruises and/or tears to the skin on the first attempt. Consequently, 
the teacher needs to be sure that the student is both strong enough in terms of 
muscularity and in terms of tolerance to pain. I needed to judge the value of this 
move as one that would challenge the student in the right way at this time. It is a 
decision made in the moment to provoke and engage his will and artistry without 
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overloading or disempowering him and thereby stultifying his learning. The decision 
was instinctive and reflective due to my knowledge of this move as a powerful symbol 
of masculinity. Tait suggests that certain aerial movements perform as gender 
representation. Gender in this instance is performed as a symbol of the ‘masculine’. 
This is due to the socially acceptable muscularity it places in view for the Eagle 
highlights the shoulders, biceps and pectoral muscles of the student (2005:89). 
My decision was also informed by my appreciation of the student’s individual 
learning needs in response to what was going on in the room at that time. An 
understanding of temporality, therefore, recognises that the challenge given to the 
student resides in a decision taken in the momentary, which proposes an intention 
towards a possible future. The decision to teach the Eagle reflected the student’s 
desire to be pushed beyond the level he had previously worked at and to try 
something unique to his personality and physical type. I was also attentive to his 
need to regain some status having failed to grasp a move that another student could 
do. I saw it to be a moment for him to compete with others, extend his repertoire and 
confirm his ability.  
This is not an objective decision, if we take objectivity to mean a rational calculation 
of a possible outcome. I do not objectify or diagnose the student at the moment of 
‘seeing’, I attempt to humanise him. Heidegger uses the terms ‘considerateness’ and 
‘forbearance’ to define the attributes necessary within an authentic and common 
pursuit (1962: 159). Etymologically, Heidegger emphasises the proposition that 
‘considerateness’ and ‘forbearance’ are both resonant with the notion of ‘seeing’ 
rather than judging and that to see is to know beyond the visible. This is not to be 
confused with empathy, which is a self-involved interrelation: leaping in for the 
student rather than ahead of him conflates one’s own understanding with the 
student’s. The teacher does not see herself through and in the student; she attends to 
the student in the moment from her own experiential, historical map. The decision 
is, therefore, temporally dependent. For now, it is important to emphasise that the 
teacher, through whatever means, judges the appropriate move to teach the student 
at that time. The mode of this judgment is made through an appreciation of the self 
having experienced the movement for itself and an acknowledgement of the 
mechanisms at play within the movement for the student that need to be managed 
within the teaching of it. My past experience and my understanding of the student 
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are elements of the tactful observation I use to decide whether to propose the Eagle 
to him. My memory and embodied ‘knowing’ of the movement are bound temporally 
within the decision to teach and onwards within the mode of teaching the action.  
The spatial nature of the decision-making process also merits consideration at this 
time. The term ‘space’, in this instance, is used to denote a place which is inscribed 
with the cultural and historical resonances of what people have done there, the way 
that the room has been used. The space was one in which the student had worked 
with me on a semi-regular basis over the preceding two years. He had performed 
there as well as rehearsed there. Over the previous days, all the students had written 
on the walls in chalk, which you can see in the picture. They had claimed ownership 
of the space. In this instance, the space carried with it Helen Nicholson’s notion of an 
utopian ‘empty space’ which is ‘designed to liberate the soul and the imagination by 
isolating actors and audience [in this case students] from the restrictions of history, 
the regulation of place and the materiality of everyday life’ (2002:125).  
The space impacted upon the moment of action with the student to communicate 
social and cultural value to the student for the work undergone. The Webber Douglas 
Studio, where we worked, communicates the institution in which it is situated in 
London as well as offering opportunities to ‘liberate’ by being a metaphorical empty 
space. I would suggest that the notion of a truly empty space is impossible. However, 
a space can be inhabited by and created by the dissent and transgression enacted 
therein - those opportunities to rupture (through acts of risk-taking) the student’s 
known relation to the social or cultural determinates in which they are normally 
situated. To that end, an appreciation of the nature of the space as one that envelops 
and impacts the student is integral to the notion of tactful trust. Trust is temporal, 
spatial and processual. If conditions are not met, then trust is broken and the student 
is prone to falling, to failure, to stultification and to inauthenticity. My observation of 
the student is, therefore, spatially dependent, and the space forms an integral part of 
the tactful knowledge I have.  
 
5.1.2 The fall or drop 
Circus performance is encapsulated within the vision of a body falling and flying 
through space to thrill an audience. In Tait’s words, ‘The suspension of the body 
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seems to heighten its aesthetic qualities and beauty’ (2005:1). It is as if, in the 
performance (which is also reality) of possible death, the audience is able to view the 
body with clarity as well as imagination. The fall is the means to make the audience 
thrilled and invigorated, it is the factor that places the artists at risk and it is the 
action that could bring death into the room.  
The Eagle is a movement that enables the student to momentarily resist gravity and 
restrain himself from falling to the ground. An investigation of what could be 
considered the phenomenology of the fall reveals the tensions inherent for the 
student and teacher. Falling is defined in relation to dropping or descending, under 
the force of gravity, to a lower place through loss or lack of support. Falling is, 
therefore, what the student materially encounters both in the act of aerial work and 
within the pedagogic relationship. Falling can be enacted in three modes: the self in 
relation to gravity, the self in relation to failure and, finally, the self in relation to the 
other, where the other in this instance is both the teacher and the audience. The 
momentary action of the Eagle is a resistance to falling because, in the action, the 
body is suspended to look as if it defies gravity but gravity is constantly acting upon 
it, as shown in the photograph above. Falling is also a philosophical and 
metaphorical proposition that imparts meaning onto the action, which I will discuss 
later in this chapter in relation to moment and glory.  
The action needed to successfully perform an Eagle is to wrap and hold the arms 
correctly in order not to fall. The teacher instigates the wrapping and holding to 
ensure the movement is completed carefully. The student is entangled in the ropes of 
the trapeze and lifted by their trapezius muscles to momentarily give the illusion of 
weightlessness. In actuality, the forces of gravity are both enabling the illusion and 
disabling the fall. Gravity draws down the ropes so that, once wrapped, the 
downward pull stops the student from falling. It is gravity which enables the ropes to 
secure the arms of the student. However, once the arms are tied in, gravity’s 
enactment on the core body is such that the arms are pulled away from the 
shoulders, which are restrained upwards. The artist/student engages the trapezius 
muscles to lower the shoulder and carry the full weight of the body through a 
combination of muscles, rather than solely through the tendons in the shoulder joint.  
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As you can see in the image above, the student’s shoulders are lowered and his chest 
is lifted. This results from engagement of the pectoris major and minor from the 
front of the body, and the sub-scapularis deep within the body, to retract or draw in 
the scapula, which would ordinarily protract or extend if hanging with ‘dead’ weight. 
By retracting the scapular and lifting the chest, the student is able to stabilise the 
shoulder joint, ensuring that, not only does he not fall, but that his entanglement 
does not rip the humerus away from the shoulder’s glenohumeral socket and damage 
the stabilising semicirculare humeri ligaments therein. The student engages these 
key muscle groups in order to support the vulnerable shoulder joint. He may not be 
able to rationalise that he is doing so in these terms. He simply knows to keep 
himself safe.  
Without this strength within these key muscle groups, the performer risks severe 
injury to the shoulder. A slight miscalculation can result in the student dropping 
through the chest and dislocating the shoulder, tearing his muscles and skin and 
falling through the air whilst still attached to the trapeze. The student is vulnerable to 
the force of gravity yet his power is demonstrated through a ‘tonic’ or fluid and 
balanced engagement of the shoulder stabilising muscles. This tonic is an active, 
engaged use of the key muscles in order to provide an active rather than dead weight 
for the shoulder socket to manage. It is this tonic engagement of muscles which 
consolidates the illusion of weightlessness that I will discuss in the next section. 
The anatomical language that I use sits within my body and is useful as the 
foundational strata of knowledge of what it is to be an aerialist and, therefore, what it 
means to teach aerial work. My role is to keep the student safe. I do not need to 
articulate all of the anatomical resonances within the teaching of the Eagle. In fact, I 
do not, for fear of projecting a hierarchical and value-laden objectivity towards the 
student’s body that may, in Foucauldian terms (and as discussed in the last chapter), 
turn him into a docile body (1977:138). Anatomical knowledge is inscribed within my 
pedagogic body in the moment of teaching. I communicate it through simple 
instructions and physical prompts. Rather like a complex choreography, I transcribe 
my physical understanding into the texture of the student’s performance of the Eagle. 
The movement is uniquely his but it holds a trace of my understanding, as my own 
movement holds the traces of the movement and the knowledge of my teachers.  
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The tact that I employ to negotiate the move with him is one that is rehearsed and 
explored throughout every contact with every student. This tactful negotiation places 
the student at the heart of the concern and is underpinned by the teacher’s embodied 
knowledge. Throughout this thesis, I express and inhabit the tensions between the 
descriptive and prescriptive modes of discourse. The scientific is a part of my 
embodied knowledge, a knowledge that is synthesised in my physical memory of 
what it is to be in the moment of performing an Eagle. In an attempt to map this 
terrain, I am drawn away from description into analysis. I do this knowingly because 
of the dominance of this type of discourse within physical training and pedagogy and 
because the scientific informs my understanding. However, this does not mean that 
analytical thinking is privileged above the embodied; the two are indivisible layers of 
discourse that impact upon the student. It would be inappropriate of me to ignore 
the scientific in favour of the descriptive.  
In The Eagle, gravity restrains the student and he resists its downward force through 
a tonic engagement of his entire body and through the ropes of the trapeze. The 
student has tethered himself within the ropes and resists the downward pull through 
his shoulders, chest and back. Viscerally, he experiences pain as the ropes bite his 
flesh and the weight of his body rests within the joints of his shoulders and back. He 
is entrapped by gravity, by the ropes and by his very body. He actively, knowingly, 
resists the fall. 
In Heideggerian terms, the fall represents the essential human condition to evade 
death. ‘Dasein has first of all always already fallen away from itself as authentic 
ability-to-be-itself and fallen into the “world”’ (1962: 175). Heidegger’s suggestion is 
that, in the everyday, the self is inherently drawn away as if drawn by gravity, from 
acknowledging the possibility of death; it has no choice, as the student has no choice, 
but to work in opposition to the forces of gravity. Taylor Carman’s (2003) appraisal 
of the Heideggerian fall is that it is distinct from alternate ways of seeing the world 
because it ‘does not mean falling from a prior authentic self-understanding into 
inauthenticity. Instead, it means being always already embroiled and entangled in 
the world of quotidian concerns’ (2003:309). The falling, in Heidegger’s case, is not a 
loss of stability, it is the stability against which being or Dasein is able to be 
destabilised through anxiety. This specificity of the term ‘fall’ is useful as it 
recognises the mobile tension between the self and self with others as well as the pull 
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between authentic and everyday that is both a neutral state of possibility and 
impossibility.  It is, however, the opposite of the action of the student for whom the 
potential fall is the destabilising key.  
The fall associated with The Eagle is similar to Heidegger’s notion of a ‘call to 
conscience’ and calls Dasein away from the everyday evasion of death in authenticity 
of existence (1962:254). The fall for Heidegger is normal, as it is for the aerialist, but 
what they are falling towards is the opposite. The aerial student falls towards possible 
death and knowledge of himself in relation to death whilst the Heideggerian premise 
suggests a fall towards inauthenticity and evasion of death. The call to conscience 
mobilises the self not to fall in Heideggerian terms whereas doing The Eagle enables 
the student to ‘hold’ firm against literal falling and understand the fragility of 
existence (1962:254).  
If the student were to accidentally fall, to lose control, their response would turn 
from anxiety to what Heidegger calls ‘fear’. The relationship between fear and anxiety 
is complex and almost imperceptible; fear is grounded in the world and has the 
ability to make us flee to inauthenticity in the face of it whereas anxiety is not rooted 
in the world and, therefore, brings us to authenticity (1962: 230). Following on from 
discussions in Chapter 1, we can see that fear is a condition that is socially 
constituted within acts of risk-taking; it takes the student away from their personal 
relation to the act of possible success and places them in relation to vulnerability. 
Fear stultifies the student whereas anxiety is something less specific. It brings the 
student in contact with their experience and it makes the experience vital in 
recognition of possible failure or pain. The student is emancipated by the fact that 
anxiety reveals the risk for him in the moment of practice. The potential fall is 
therefore considered in terms of anxiety as opposed to fear.  
Heidegger develops the notion of Dasein as being one already fallen by suggesting 
that anxiety is the only thing that stops Dasein from constantly falling towards 
inauthenticity. ‘The turning away of falling is grounded... in anxiety’. In this he 
declares that something unspecific, in this case the potential fall, enables the student 
to find authenticity (1962: 230). Anxiety is a grounding attention and concern, the 
basic affective way Dasein is experienced in the world. It is Dasein confronted with 
its own finite possibility and the demand that stems from itself to be what it must be 
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by choosing a possibility of being. In the practical sense, by deciding to take a ‘leap of 
faith’ and try The Eagle, the student overcomes fear and finds a resolute 
understanding of death through his anxiety whereas the specific - in this case an 
actual fall from the equipment - would lead instead to fear: 
Anxiety does not ‘see’ any definite ‘here’ or ‘yonder’ from which it 
comes. That in the face of which one has anxiety is characterized by the 
fact that what threatens it is nowhere. Anxiety ‘does not know’ what 
that in the face of which it is anxious is... it is so close that it is 
oppressive and stifles one’s breath, and yet it is nowhere. (1962: 231) 
In the case of The Eagle, it is not a genuine contactable and tangible understanding 
of the fragility of muscles that makes the student anxious but the unknowable 
possibility of what might happen which stifles his breath. If the student were to 
contemplate the possibility of tearing, rupturing and hitting the ground, the emotion 
felt would be a Heideggerian fear which would paralyse him. Instead, anxiety for 
some unknown future exists. Anxiety mobilises the action towards authenticity, 
therefore developing the self towards anticipatory resolution. 
So if anxiety is what stops Dasein momentarily from falling in Heideggerian terms, 
then it can also be what keeps the student safe as a circus performer. Anxiety is 
useful in terms of self-preservation from falling but, again like Heidegger, it does not 
translate to an abject fear because the teacher’s role is to ensure against that 
possibility. The teacher keeps the student in contact with authenticity and falling and 
with the possibility and impossibility of their situation, engendering resolution 
through a relation to positive and negative outcome. The teacher is the container and 
‘holder’ of the anxiety and is the one who stops the student’s fear of falling from 
taking over and disabling the moment. In Rancière’s terms, the teacher is able to 
mobilise the will of the student towards defining their own outcome and deriving 
their own meaning from it. Therefore, the student is opened up to the possibility of 
their own death through an engagement with it but they are not taught what to think 
about it.  
 
5.1.3 The catch  
One of my trapeze teachers refused to use the terms ‘drop’ or ‘fall’. Instead she 
insisted that the student, I, thought and spoke of the movement as a catch, thus 
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turning the linguistic proposition from passivity - I fall - into activity - I catch. This 
simple repositioning enabled me to recognise the agency and choice I had within 
trapeze work, and to see that the difference between falling and not falling was a 
simple mechanical skill: the catch. It became more than a semantic point that the 
teacher underlined; it became the locus of an embodied activity and a moment that 
clarified my conceptual understanding of my potential. I do not propose that a 
reclassification of a drop as a catch brings the student a more authentic or indeed 
more positive appreciation of the movement. It does not do so but it shifts the 
dynamic ‘provided that its assertions are to make a claim to conceptual 
understanding’ (Heidegger, 1962:224). What the teacher had done was reveal the 
conceptual structure that was informing my relation to the movement in a similar 
way to the metaphors discussed in the previous chapter. In revealing the concept, she 
spoke to me beyond my physical being into a realm of intention and possibility. I saw 
myself as potential towards catch, rather than towards fall. 
Within the agency of the catch, I, as a student, developed and inhabited an authentic 
relationship that took me away from being annihilated by the notion of the fall as a 
fear response. It repositioned me in relation to my fear of gravity and enabled me to 
know myself in relation to the notion of falling. I knew myself to be in the presence of 
a possible fall to my death but in possession of the simple mechanical stopping point 
against it: the catch. A consideration of the traditional language of trapeze training, 
where moves are called ‘drops’ and ‘falls’, pulls the conversation interestingly back to 
Heidegger’s consideration of the self in relation to the everyday. He reflects upon 
how the self can become tranquilised, entangled, alienated and tempted by the 
everyday, which has the essential characteristics of a ‘downward plunge’ towards 
inauthenticity. Moreover, tranquilisation and entanglement serve to conceal the fact 
that we are living inauthentically. Heidegger writes: 
Dasein plunges out of itself, into the groundlessness and nullity of 
inauthentic everydayness. But this plunge remains hidden from Dasein 
by the way things have been publicly interpreted, so much so, indeed, 
that it gets interpreted as a way of ‘ascending’ and ‘living correctly’. 
(1962:223) 
In this, Heidegger proposes that the interpretation or conceptual framing of the self 
in relation to the self is authentic but it becomes distorted by the structures used to 
define it. According to my proposition in earlier chapters, these are the influences of 
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a neoliberalist education system, deterministic or technical language and the 
discourses that perpetuate fear of the child’s body. For example, a trapeze move can 
be categorized as a fall, which signifies it as negative due to the factors above, or it 
can be seen as a catch which signifies it as positive in relation to ownership. Trapeze 
training mirrors the metaphorical downward plunge of the Heideggerian fall. 
Through a tangible, corporeal engagement with the reality of falling, the student 
faces the plunge that remains hidden from students not engaged in risky pursuits. I 
argue that a corollary of both the action and the conceptual framing of the catch is a 
movement towards authenticity. Although a complete authentic understanding is 
momentary, fragmented and incomplete, encapsulated within both the concept and 
the action of the catch it brings knowledge of the self as both possible and impossible 
in relation to death. In Heideggerian terms, as in my teacher’s emphasis, the student 
‘catches’ him or herself. They are not limited by the notion of the self as 
disempowered or subject to the fall. They are the catch that stops the inevitable 
accident that would occur if the movement relinquished itself to gravity. They are the 
catch that stops them being tranquilised by fear. They are the catch that stops the 
physical body being wounded by falling to the ground. They know themselves as 
potentially resilient and equal to the task within the doing of circus. 
The catch is also a description of the trust needed to mobilise the encounter between 
the teacher and the student. The student trusts that I will catch him should he fall 
from the equipment. This is both literal and figurative, I may not be strong enough to 
literally catch the falling student, but I am able to leap ahead, through my 
observation of his encounter with the equipment to spot or rebalance a move before 
he is subjected to the fall. We perform the catch together as the student leaps into 
The Eagle, we are responsible for his safety in common with each other. 
 
5.1.4 The wound. 
It is essential for the teacher to understand the biological forces that are acting on the 
action of the student in the moment of doing because of the wounds that can be 
inflicted through aerial work. I do this in order to leap ahead of the student in terms 
of anticipated common understanding. The teacher brings her memory of the 
movement and knows that the student will presently have an experience of the 
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trapeze in common with her. To teach a single position, I must know the technique of 
the movement, which muscles need to be engaged in order to keep the student safe, 
what it feels like to ‘be’ in the movement as a novice: the pain of the contact between 
the bar or ropes and the flesh of the student, the surprise when the bar swings and 
feels unstable and what happens when the body experiences fear and how this can 
impact upon the action and response of the student.  
In the practice of The Eagle, I guided the student through three things: how to wrap 
his arms within the ropes to make them safe, how to move his arms and body in 
unison to achieve the position and how to safely return his toes to the bar to 
complete the movement. These are a set of simple instructions that enable the 
student to own a movement. Further to that, on his descent, we discussed the 
movement and he showed me the bruises he received when performing it. 
The student engages his core muscles in order to present a picture that has the 
appearance of ethereality and weightlessness. In actuality, the student here creates 
tension in the ropes through strength in his arms and then uses his own body weight 
and its relation to gravity in order to appear to defy it (gravity). The student is highly 
conscious of his physical body  through the friction caused by the cotton ropes on the 
arms, by the need to maintain a fluid, ‘tonic’ position and by the need to bring his 
arms parallel to the ground in order to create a satisfactory aesthetic. In the 
performance of The Eagle, the student was wounded by the elements of the ‘catch’ - 
the rope burnt his flesh. He was bruised by the mechanisms that kept him safe from 
death. The rope ruptured the student’s skin, biting into his flesh and marking him in 
a way that left visible scars.  
In terms of the whole practical process, the bruises experienced by this particular 
student when performing The Eagle were the most severe injury, in medical terms, 
that we suffered during the course of the practical sessions. The student, however, 
was completely unconcerned. In fact, he was very proud of the way that his bravery 
and skill had been marked upon his skin. His lack of concern and veritable gloating 
about his injury encapsulated many of the tensions experienced when working in this 
way. The students go through a process of risk assessment and risk management 
training and dialogue in order to comply with the Central School of Speech and 
Drama’s Good Practice in Research. They are made aware of the possibility of slight, 
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moderate or severe injury as well as the probability of it. They anticipate that they are 
more than likely to get bruised or have torn flesh from the work.  
In this instance, the student articulated his pride at ‘being a real aerialist now’ after 
he had bruised his flesh. This meant that it was the process of injury, he felt, which 
defined his contact with the work rather than his ability to perform The Eagle. The 
wound in this instance ‘marked’ him as one who could. It changed his perception of 
himself in relation to aerial work and his understanding of himself. It was as if the 
marks on his body physically inscribed his transformation. He carried the trace of 
this wounding within his identity from that moment. This is the physiological 
manifestation of the wound experienced in relation to death.  
The student has the wound in common with the teacher too. Both have been scarred 
by the contact with trapeze equipment. I did not let the student know that this was a 
painful move that would leave bruises but anticipated that it would impact upon his 
movement and performance. It was one of the pedagogic choices I faced, prior to 
teaching the move,  not to speak of the possible damage he might incur but to let him 
discover them for himself. I knew that this student might be afraid if I explicated the 
possibility beforehand and anticipated that he would be reconciled to the pain within 
the movement itself. I knew he had the confidence and strength to stop if the pain 
was too great. I offered the move to the student as a challenge to his identity in all 
respects. I did not explicate what that might mean for fear of stultifying his response 
to it.  
It is useful to bring the notion of woundedness back into a discussion of performance 
theory - what the performer is and presents through an act of extreme physical 
performance. The act of performing, in Adrian Heathfield’s conceptual terms, 
‘articulate[s] a certain wounding in the nature of sexual (and social) relation’ 
(2006:189). In the instance of trapeze performance, the wound is inscribed upon the 
performer’s body in a way that may leave permanent scars. The articulation of social 
wounding is transformed into the scars carried by the aerialist’s body. In light of the 
pain and wound inflicted, Heathfield contends that I am awakened from the 
tranquilisation of the everydayness of my existence which stops me from living in a 
way that enables me to encounter death by taking risks. The scarring makes me 
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aware of the entanglement of my identity and embodiment within a societal 
construct that has the potential to disable me.  
In The Eagle example, the young man may be experiencing himself through three 
different social constructs. A first self in relation to the vulnerability he experiences 
through a teacher thinking for, rather than of, him (as discussed in Chapters 3 and 
4); a second self constituted within a social structure that has a taboo relation to the 
self regarding his (child’s) body, his possible death and to injury (as discussed in 
Chapter 1) and, thirdly, his experience could be framed as one that exists only as a 
medical wound to be tended. These frames are indivisible from a fourth narrative 
frame: the student’s own experience of himself as strong, of having the will to 
attempt the movement and of being marked by the attempt. The wound empowers 
him to a different understanding of himself in newness, ambiguity and power.  
Heathfield’s wound is a leitmotif of physical theatre and it is created by the dualistic 
‘interdependence of presence and absence, masculinity and femininity, sex and 
death, attainment and loss’ (2006:189). His suggestion is that, through the 
performance of a wound, the artist embodies the possibilities of both life and death. 
It is the identical paradox that Leyser exposes in the last chapter. The performer is 
inside and outside the paradox at the same moment in the performance, unable to 
move away from the impact of gravity without rupturing the fabric of the material 
and socially constructed self.  
Tait claims that aerial performers are compelled to complete an action despite the 
physical repercussions that action might have upon their body (2005: 119). In her 
perception, this is enhanced on the one hand by normative notions of gender 
inscribed onto the performer in the act of performance which are confined within the 
social construct of male muscularity or fragile femininity and, on the other hand, by 
the responsiveness of an audience, who are in ignorance of the strata of anatomical 
corporeality within the action: ‘a performer’s aches and pains, the physical effort of 
difficult tricks, remain unseen and accentuated by a cultural perception of lightness’ 
(2005: 119). Pain is a part of the aerial process that is lived and known by the student 
learning The Eagle. It is remembered by the teacher, who is holding the student’s 
learning and is also suppressed in the act of the performance. The suppression of the 
genuine pain is written into the text of the work to conscribe masculinity and 
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superhumanity. The student is a performer-construct that hides rather than reveals 
his authentic relation to his body.  
This brings us back to the paradoxical state of between life and death described by 
Leysar and Zaccarini, where the act of aerial circus appears to embody the 
paradoxical positions of life and death, fragility and strength. The job of an aerialist 
is to present lightness through an act that contains weight. This is what the student 
learns through their painful contact with the equipment - that no teacher can leap in 
and take pain or death in their stead. Moreover, the student discovers that the very 
act that marks his skin and inscribes his fragility is the one that will have him seen as 
powerful. The notion of power is both inscribed and described within the act of 
performance through the fact that it is seen as such by others.  
5.2 Moment  
If the active body of the student and teacher are magnified within the pedagogic 
moment of teaching The Eagle, in terms of the self in relation to gravity and falling, 
then the momentary body of the performer is that which reaches out and attests to 
the bodies of others in performance. In Tait’s words, the body is ‘visceral’ and 
‘fleshed’ in order to glorify it or to bestow it with a significance that is more than a 
normal appreciation of the body (2005:150). This section considers the way that the 
aerial body may be received by others, such as the teacher, co-performers and 
audience, in the moment of performance. For Heidegger, Dasein is constituted 
within and for its relation to others and this can be considered fundamental to 
recognising how the student’s understanding of their identity is resolved within the 
moment of the action.  
The aerialist’s body is a site for meaning-making and spectacle; the aerialist appears 
to exchange their own safety for the entertainment and experience of others. When 
observing the performance of The Eagle, the audience responds in two ways: with the 
fear response provoked by observing a body in peril and with a release response after 
the move has been completed. This move is then layered with complex symbolic 
references that the artist/student has no control over and may be glorified or seen as 
representative of the ‘ideal’ by an audience. The idealised masculine, via the notion of 
superhumanity, is represented in the description expressed by Zaccarini, for example 
and the idealised feminine trait of fragility within the examples given by Leyser in the 
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previous chapter. In the momentary action of the Eagle, the observer is locked into a 
reversibility that Tait calls ‘a dialectic of love’ (2005:150). The observer sees 
themselves within the movement; moreover, the observer feels the jeopardy of the 
performer, physically, within their own body. Interestingly, the notion of a ‘dialectic 
of love’ is one that I have already detailed as a Platonic pedagogic ideal in the 
Introduction and Chapter 3, where I emphasise that this is an individualised, mobile 
and emotionally connected relationship between the knower and the object of 
knowledge that resides within the notion of aletheia or uncoveredness. What is 
uncovered within Tait’s suggestion is the reversible relation between bodies- those 
observed and observing. What is revealed in aletheia for Plato and Heidegger is the 
relation between knowledge and the known. So, within a trapeze act, knowledge is 
dialectically exchanged between audience and artist-- between observer and 
observed. The dialectic of love therefore has all the categories of Heideggerian ‘right 
kind of concern’ because it has both ‘joy and sobriety’ (1962: 358). 
Enjoyment comes to the audience from the release of endorphins caused by 
experiencing the jeopardy of the aerialist within their bodies, through a primal 
engagement of the autonomic nervous system. When observing a body in peril, the 
body of the audience responds by signalling the amygdala within the brain. The 
amygdala responds by signalling the body to perform the fight or flight mechanisms 
of the autonomic nervous system. The heart beats faster, pumping more blood 
around the body to prepare for quick responses, the lungs breathe faster and more 
shallowly, the muscles tense ready to receive a physical blow or engage in running 
away, the stomach decreases digestion to send energy to the key fight or flight areas 
and sweat glands increase perspiration in order to cool the body in readiness for 
attack. The audience responds physically, as if the performer were in danger.  
The response is to what they have seen as dangerous and, therefore, the response 
develops as the danger accretes. This response relates to both physical memory and 
risk assessment by the observer and is commonly known as the cortical pathway for 
it passes from the eye to the thalamus, through the visual cortex to the amygdala. 
This pathway is used to assess the situation after the initial rapid response. It allows 
a body to consider how to respond. In the case of the observer witnessing the danger 
of the aerialist, the danger appears genuine. The height of the equipment is assessed 
rapidly by the spectator as is the motion of the equipment. The performer 
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manipulates this response within the observer to perform calculated ‘catches’ with 
which to surprise them. These are to sustain the response for the audience, who 
would otherwise begin to relax when their assessment of danger had proved 
unfounded. 
This experience, however, belongs to the audience and not to the aerialist who is 
consciously engaged with the equipment, their body, the momentum of the 
equipment and gravity. The performer’s trained body responds to the minute 
changes needed to perfect a movement or successfully articulate the manoeuvre. 
They strive to provoke the response in the audience that they do not feel within 
themselves. For the novice aerialist, the sympathetic nervous system is activated by 
the new contact with a dangerous situation; sweaty palms and tension in the hands 
result in painful and dangerous contact with the equipment; the exertions of 
climbing a rope are impacted by shallow breathing and increased heart rate. The 
beginner expends a great deal of energy ‘fighting’ the equipment in order to feel 
control over it and the danger it presents. Greater exposure to the situation and 
developed competence over the equipment mean that the sympathetic nervous 
system is not engaged although the danger is present; it is assessed in the cortex and 
disregarded. However, should the performer become too relaxed, mistime a 
movement or provoke excess swing on the equipment, the direct pathway is 
provoked in order to keep the aerialist safe: the body fights to retain control, the 
senses are sharpened and the reflexes honed. The body acts reflexively. This is 
however, rare. The aerialist does not ‘nearly die’ every show, seven shows a week; 
they are not anxious in the way the novice or the spectator is anxious. They provoke 
feelings of anxiety within the audience as either a corollary to, or intention of, the 
piece.  
The teacher is neither an innocent spectator to the action nor a passive observer of it. 
The specialist understanding that I have of myself in aerial contexts makes me 
conversant with the tricks used and, therefore, when watching a professional 
aerialist, it does not provoke an autonomic response within my body because I 
understand the danger. However, when working with a student, my body responds in 
a different way, through attentiveness and memory. I remember the novice’s 
response as my own response to the equipment of my past and seek to contain the 
anxiety that they may have when they encounter it. This takes me back to 
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Heidegger’s considerateness and forbearance. Solicitude, he contends, is borne out of 
knowing yourself in relation to being with others. Therefore, solicitude stands in for 
the fact that Dasein is always intended towards itself within the communit, and 
always, therefore, subject to the ‘idle talk’ of the everyday (1962: 224).  
To combine the term ‘solicitude’ with notions of consideration and forbearance is to 
suggest that Dasein can be both aware and unaware of itself in relation to others. It is 
in authentic relation to others only when it has consideration of the impact those 
others have in relation to the self and then forbears the effects or impacts this 
community performs upon it. The example given by Zaccarini in the last chapter 
helps to clarify the terminology. The handstand student who was unaware of the 
determinative (and, therefore, stultifying) nature of his performance discipline in 
relation to culture, through solicitude with Zaccarini, understood his situation. He 
then needed to consider and forbear the effects of the community in order to discover 
his authentic relation to handstands. I suggest that equality in this pedagogic 
relationship ‘helps the other to become transparent to himself in his care and to 
become free for it’ (Heidegger, 1962: 159). 
In The Eagle example, the act of care from the teacher towards the student is one 
that must not leap in and stultify them. If I were too attentive to the position of the 
hands or to stopping the bar from swinging, the student would not be able to have a 
genuine encounter with the movement; I would be doing the move for him. 
Considerateness is the right kind of objectivity. In this case, it is an attentive 
observation of the student, their breathing primarily, so that I am aware of their 
autonomic response and their level of focus. When teaching the Eagle, I stood in 
close enough proximity to be aware of the student’s breath but  distanced myself so 
that I did not impact on the his field of vision. I used my voice to make contact with 
him, to reach out towards and impact upon the anxiety that he felt, especially when 
taking his toes away from the bar. This vocal contact does two things: it reminds the 
student that I am present and considerate of him as well as ‘holding’ the instructions 
that he may have forgotten when he first felt the pain of the ropes biting into his 
flesh. The student is reminded of the performance elements and the importance of 
breathing by the teacher’s own breath and by her positive comments ‘well done’ or 
‘breathe’ or ‘smile’.  
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After The Eagle is completed, the student tends to rush themselves out of it. In this 
instance, the student wanted to quickly get back to the bar to stop the pain. This is 
the moment of forbearance for me. Forbearance is what stops me from rushing in to 
‘solve’ the issue of returning his toes to the bar. The faster the student attempts to get 
back to the bar, the more reckless their attempt, the more prone to failure they 
become and the likelihood of falling increases. In this example, the student 
attempted to simply reach his legs to the bar without lowering his arms. This places 
huge strain on the core and biceps which is almost impossible to maintain. If I had 
wanted to, I could have stepped in and raised the bar to meet his toes. Forbearance 
reminds me that the movement is owned by the student. I am there to support only; I 
cannot leap in and do it for him. I needed to trust that my judgment of 
appropriateness was secure and that the student had the strength needed to get 
himself out of trouble. By standing back, supporting him with my voice by saying 
‘breathe, you know how to do this, lower your arms and then you can reach the bar’, 
having the movement in common with the student and working in common with the 
student, I applied considerateness and forbore my anxiety in order to maintain the 
‘right kind’ of objective care. We performed the momentary action together, unified 
and in common. To put it in phenomenological terms, I do not see myself as 
performing in that moment; I am distant and yet ‘deeply concerned’ with the 
student’s movement and action (Heidegger, 1962: 158). In my commitment to 
equality, I emancipate the student to discover the potential of the movement for 
himself. 
Phenomenology identifies that, within performance, the self and the other are linked. 
They are both within and without the encounter; the observation is a part of the 
experience. It is a contentious area and one that a Heideggerian appreciation fails to 
reveal entirely. He proposes that ‘everyday Being-with-one-another maintains itself 
between the two extremes of positive solicitude’ which are leaping in for, and leaping 
ahead of the other and that ‘it brings numerous mixed forms to maturity; to describe 
these and classify them takes us beyond the limits of this investigation’ (1962:159). 
Carman proposes that Heidegger’s focus is upon the individual, with constant 
reference to intention, and that intention rests in the being-with-others-ness 
(mitsein) of the everyday (2003:42). Intention is significant because it is suggests 
purpose and that purpose is sometimes confused by others. Heidegger sees Dasein as 
Hartley,	  J.	  R.	  2013	  
	  
197	  
	  
solely driven by and attendant to its intention. He rejects the idea of intentionality as 
being ‘conceptual’. Therefore, he uses the term ‘comportment’ rather than intention.  
The intention of the teacher within The Eagle is to enable the student to encounter 
the equipment honestly, safely and for themselves. Therefore, the individual location 
of the self in relation to the other is constitutive of comportment ‘so any 
understanding of being will necessarily be an account of our understanding of our 
comportment toward entities’ (Carman, 2003:43). Carman develops this in a 
discussion of the self’s ability to get ‘lost’ within the intentionality of the other as a 
kind of ‘depersonalised social anonymity’, which recognises that intentionality is 
fluid and mutable in its interdependence with others (2003: 140). What complicates 
the matter is that, in a moment of performance, the otherness of the performer for 
the audience is also discursive in that it communicates directly with the audience, 
who then take meaning from it.  
I am turning, as Tait does, to Merleau-Ponty’s poetic notion of ‘fleshed’ worlds for 
the development of the idea of self in relation to loss and alterity. Merleau-Ponty 
writes that:  
the body is lost outside of the world and its goals, fascinated by the 
unique occupation of its inside and outside. And henceforth movement, 
touch, vision, applying themselves to the other and to themselves, 
return toward the source and, in the patient and silent labour of desire, 
begin the paradox of expression. (1968:144) 
When watching the Eagle, the audience experience the act through a visceral and 
corporeal relation to the body of the aerialist, as if they themselves were in peril and 
as if they themselves had ‘caught’ the rope. When operating in this dialogue with the 
performer, attention toward the self and the other is given so the physical reality of 
both bodies is recognised. Moreover, the watcher responds to the others within the 
audience. Losing themselves in the sharing of this, being intentioned towards the 
body of the performer, they are both towards the performer and towards the other 
audience members. The loss of goals and appreciation of them, the inside and the 
outside, the individual and the communal, all form a whole within the paradoxical 
relations between self and other: the paradox of expression as Merleau-Ponty calls it.  
When Merleau-Ponty talks about the momentary glorification in a dialectic of love 
(advanced by Tait, 2005:150), he exposes a paradoxical physical connection between 
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the bodies of people. In this example, the connection is between the bodies of the 
audience and those of the performers. When watching someone move through space, 
he suggests, I am able to project myself into a dialogue with the physical body of the 
other. As I observe, I merge (or in Merleau-Ponty’s terms ‘flesh’) the visual 
information with a physical knowing of my own embodied experience. Because I am 
and always have been a body, I know what it is to be one. This embodied knowing is 
proof that the observed body is the same as mine. It responds to danger and pain as 
mine does. Merleau-Ponty’s assertion is that, within this ‘dialectic of love’ between 
the observer and the observed, both bodies are momentarily bound or ‘fleshed’ 
towards mutual revelation and knowledge (1964: 504). It is a visceral embodiment of 
Platonic aletheia.  
The knowledge gained by the audience is a dialectical relation between performer 
and audience, not a response or rationalisation of observation. As Merleau-Ponty 
suggests, ‘this dilemma, which is given as part of the human lot, is not one for me as 
pure consciousness; it is still I who makes another for me and makes each of us be as 
human beings’ (1964: 505-6). The aerial act is momentary and we experience it as 
such. However, our communication and understanding of it is developed through 
this articulation. He quotes Antoine de Saint-Exupery when he continues, ‘Your 
abode is the act itself. The act is you... You give yourself in exchange... Your 
significance shows itself, effulgent. It is your duty, your hatred, your love, your 
steadfastness, your ingenuity’ (1964: 530). Merleau-Ponty recognises that the 
meaning of the act is shown in relation to others and in relation to understanding, 
which is both removed from the act itself and an expression of it in relation to 
culture, experience and memory. For the aerialist, the pure moment is the drop or 
somersault which they perform for an audience, who then attribute their own 
meaning to it.  
This awareness enables communication from a position of shared knowledge that 
Merleau-Ponty calls ‘reversibility’: 
Meaning is not layered on the phrase like butter on bread, like a second 
layer of “psychic reality” spread over the [experience]: it is the totality of 
what is said, the integral of all the differentiations of the verbal chain; it 
is given with words for those who have ears to hear... there is no 
dialectical reversal from one of these views to the other; we do not have 
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to reassemble them into a synthesis: they are two aspects of the 
reversibility which is the ultimate truth. (1964:155) 
Merleau-Ponty’s description of a reversible body-to-body phenomenology, whereby 
the observer is lost in the momentary action of the performer, finds an affinity with 
the Heideggerian self-limited appreciation. Carman suggests that Heidegger was 
‘right to insist on the irreducibility of the first person’, which underpins his writings 
on alterity: ‘he was wrong to ignore those aspects of sociality that inevitably mingle 
and complicate’ them (2003:168). I would suggest that Carman is forgetting the 
ambiguity and openness that is within Heidegger’s writing on this matter. Despite 
Heidegger’s response to the mature forms that are attributable to being with others, 
he recognises that loss of the self as an individual is an essential element within the 
everyday. He suggests that ‘being with another which arises from one’s doing the 
same thing as someone else’  can, in authentic relation, ‘free the other in his freedom 
for himself’ (1962:159). This proposition of possibility declares that Heidegger is fully 
aware of the complication that the self with others proposes to the notion of an 
authentic, isolated first person self. Where Heidegger fails to fully develop the notion 
of self with others is within the nature of what the otherness means to the self. This 
notion is more fully developed within Merleau-Ponty’s thinking. 
Heidegger could easily be seen to leave an opening that Merleau-Ponty’s poetic 
excavation serves to articulate within momentary, fragmented understanding, an 
opening which invites the suggestion that we are able to ‘know’ the body of another 
when we see it move, that our understanding of ourselves is magnified in the 
momentary reflection through the body of another. In Merleau-Ponty’s words: 
This concentration of the visible... this bursting forth of the mass of the 
body toward the things, which makes me follow with my eyes the 
movements and contours of the things themselves, this magical 
relation, this pact between them and me according to which I lend them 
my body in order that they inscribe upon it and give me their 
resemblance. (1964:146) 
Paradoxically, the aerialist is both mover and observer of the moving, which 
Merleau-Ponty calls a ‘being in latency’ (1964:136). He recognises that this latent 
potential intertwines with active potential. For Heidegger, this being in latency is 
Dasein, in that it is comported to, as well as potential in, the moment. Dasein is 
paradoxically both lost and found within the momentary because of its association 
with others and with death. 
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When the aerialist performs, they present their fearlessness and grace, falling and 
wound, in the face of seeming danger. When the audience watches this fearlessness 
and grace, they lose their individualised being to both the performer and the other 
audience members. They give themselves wholly over to the momentary body, the 
body that is perceptually caught within the aerialist’s fall. The teacher also suffers a 
loss within the relationship: she loses the ownership of the movement and ‘comports’ 
her attention towards, with ‘considerateness and forbearance’ (Heidegger 1962: 254), 
the ‘will’ of the student (Rancière, 1991). The student’s momentary body is captured 
within the photograph of The Eagle. But in the capturing of this momentary body, it 
is transformed and glorified with the meanings that are layered on top of it.  
5.3. Glory 
The ‘glorified’ body, in this instance, is that of the student performing The Eagle 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 148). He becomes such because he is not an ‘ontological void’, 
according to Ponty: he makes meaning for and with others (1968:148). The student 
performs The Eagle with and for the teacher and for the other participants. He then 
performs it for his parents in a small ‘showing’ at the end of the course, where this 
photograph was taken. The student has followed mechanical and choreographic 
instructions, he becomes momentary in that he is observed performing the 
movement and then a meaning is applied to what is seen in the moment of 
performance. This meaning is a complex part of the movement, a layer of 
understanding that resonates with the performer to take him beyond the notion of an 
intentioned self. He is seen as something. The perspective shifts here from the body 
as lived, to the body as viewed. However, this is experienced in a reversible totality. 
5.3.1 Circus and meaning. 
There have been many different readings of circus that consider the semiotic or 
metaphorical implications of it as a text in the moment of performance. Paul 
Bouissac suggests that ‘a circus act is the performance of a set of rhetorically ordered 
‘actions’ which, like a language, can be performative because they accomplish what 
they refer to’ (1976a:107). The notion of performativity is pertinent in this instance, 
because it is suggestive of a trained body, one that has been inscribed with the 
cultural and political codes of culture that are repeated in the moment of 
performance. In the moment of the action, a performative code is inscribed upon the 
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performer’s body to reveal it to an audience. It is not a demonstration of the action 
because, in circus, the action is real and tangible. For Bouissac, the performer and 
the act are mutually indistinguishable. The performer is invisible; he becomes the 
action. I contest this assertion that the performer’s sole accomplishment is to reveal 
an action. The act of circus performance is one that disrupts normative codes of 
behaviour. It therefore speaks beyond action and attests to the social and corporeal 
limitations of the everyday. It reaches out to the audience members, who recognise 
both themselves and the performer as fragile bodies in the world. 
Performance theorist, Yoram Carmeli, writes that circus performance is a cultural 
representation of other that disenfranchises it from a bourgeois audience. He claims 
that a performer fulfils a role as a ‘tamed, fully alienated and... idealised other’ 
(2006:214). Carmeli continues that this is a ‘precarious and nostalgic’ view of both 
the cultural tradition of circus and of the practical observation of the technical skill 
employed by performers. His assertion is that a traditional framework of culturally 
prescribed ‘viewing’ has been used by the masses to disenfranchise the circus arts as 
ones not worthy of either critique or praise because they stand outside the realm of 
generalised understanding or mainstream. Carmeli refers to the ideological construct 
of the notion of ‘circus’ but does not deal with the notion of bodies at risk 
encountered in space. He argues that circus is a ‘romantic’ notion and ignores the 
fact that it is a transgressive performance discipline that phenomenologically 
resonates within the bodies of the audience members. His suggestion that circus 
represents ‘contractual enchantment, erotic pleasure and illicit desire’ (1990:4) is 
developed in his 2001 essay on circus talk, where he states that: 
[t]hrough the dissociation and exclusion of a player who is totally 
played, an illusionary totality is conjured for the circus spectators, a 
totality for which the spectators in the fragmentary, industrial order 
nostalgically yearn. This totality is also sustained... in the circus talk 
itself. (2001:1) 
In this he proposes that the rhetorical application of the metaphor ‘circus’ within 
society is a stand in for simplicity, chaos and excitement and that the circus 
performer is ‘used’ by the audience as a mechanism for social determinism - ‘they are 
real, yet constantly objectified through their play’ (2004:276). The performers are, to 
Carmeli’s thinking, existentially isolated by the act of repetition that distances them 
and yet entices the audience. This is a salient point with which to return to what 
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circus offers to an audience in way of recognising the self in the other in a 
phenomenological way. If we consider the aerial act as one that embodies alterity, 
then it could be seen as alienating from an audience perspective. If the intention is to 
perform a representation of masculine strength and frailty, then this leaves it open 
for the audience to see themselves within it. My suggestion is that a simple binary 
opposition does not work here. Greater recognition of ambiguity is needed to attend 
to what is shared in the moment of aerial performance. The artist is both 
superhuman and vulnerable, other and self. They inhabit this ‘paradox of expression’ 
of which Merleau-Ponty writes (1968:144). 
Journalist and theatre critic Kevin Little’s discussion of the circus and spectacle 
ensemble Archaos demonstrates an acknowledgment that the nature of circus is 
viscerally transgressive (1995: 16). The contemporary rupture that Archaos provokes 
can reveal a political moment of Foucauldian hierarchy. Archaos’s work combines 
the traditional circus skills of aerial, juggling, acrobatics and contortion with 
‘dangerous’ looking props i.e. chainsaws, axle grinders, motor-bikes and spikes. They 
have been credited with inspiring the move towards a new view of circus in Britain28 
(1995: 14). When visiting Toronto, the company and performance were treated as if 
they were a ‘danger’ to the public, and Little suggests that this demonstrates the 
impact their work has within communities. 
Like Carmeli’s appreciation of ‘traditional’ circus in pre-war Britain, Archaos can be 
viewed as living ‘outside’ the realms of hegemonic understanding ‘positioned literally 
and figuratively on the periphery’ (Little 1995: 19). The inscription of circus as 
transgressive marginalises and limits the discourses that surround the action, in as 
much as it engenders a social distancing between the performing bodies and those of 
the people watching. Little’s assertion is that, by creating distance in this way, circus 
draws an audience towards it. This brings me back to the discussion in Chapter 1 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Joseph Seelig writes that:  
Archaos claimed to reject all tradition, but Bidon's genius was as a moderniser of tradition. His 
Mad Max gang of artists juggled chainsaws, not hoops or Indian clubs; rode motorbikes, not 
horses; flew from forklift trucks and cranes; survived freak "accidents"; and set themselves on fire. 
But behind all the trappings of punk and clashing metal, Archaos expressed their ideas with good 
old feats of physical skill. Bidon himself was an old-style, larger-than-life showman, unrolling a 
heavily hyped, "shock-horror circus crazies come to town" media campaign in advance of their 
shows. (2010: NP) 
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about death, risk and taboo. I return to the suggestion that a structuring of ‘safe and 
unsafe’ practices whereby certain elements are hidden, policed or censored from 
young people in particular is instead a potent draw for them. It is the fear of 
transgression that entices the audience to observe Archaos in action. Archaos 
knowingly represent risk in all its forms in society through failure, disease and 
perversion and, as such, act as both an enticement and repellent to socially 
determined communities.  
Little extends Carmeli’s argument in his suggestion that, by inhabiting a repellent 
and enticing form, circus- and in particular Archaos - offer the opportunity for the 
individual audience member to find a very personal relationship to the acts seen. It is 
not possible in Little’s mind to suggest that circus is merely a signifier and site of 
cultural transgression: ‘[I]n the [ambiguous] process, the observer becomes the 
observed and the surveilling eye, confronted with a return gaze of circus artists, finds 
its mastery and completeness compromised’ (1995: 24). Little’s argument implicates 
the audience in a dialogue about the impossibility of existence and the fragility of 
social constructs that mask humanity. This supports my point that circus offers an 
authentic engagement for the student but also for the teacher and for the audience, 
through the notion of individualisation. Ambiguity, in this case caused by 
transgression, enables the audience to ‘find memories’ of themselves that they never 
‘thought or felt before’ (Van Manen 1990:13). 
Hubert Montagner’s (2001) writing seems to consolidate this view of circus as 
something that reaches out and attests to the fragility of being. He makes several 
claims as to why circus is able to construct and reform the identity of the solitary or 
dormant child, both through the watching and from the doing. This is due to what he 
calls the vertiginous moments, where the child is able to form and reform their sense 
of self in time and space as one who is growing, journeying and vulnerable. 
Vertiginous moments are those where you become disorientated, dizzy and 
pertinently aware of your intersubjective and vulnerable self. Usefully, Heidegger 
works to underpin this thesis by suggesting that death brings us closer to that which 
is solely ‘mine’ although we can never be fully or completely aware (1962). The act of 
observing can make the audience member vertiginous and respond with a 
phenomenological delight in the act of being disorientated.  
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It would be pertinent at this juncture to reflect upon gender and the performance of 
gender in circus. I am taking a reflective (and by that I mean a non-essentialised) 
view on gender as attributed to Butler (1990), Phelan (1993) and Foucault (1997). I 
subscribe to the idea that gender is performed according to the social constructs that 
limit it, and is, therefore, a potent vehicle for cultural value to be attributed within 
performance disciplines. Moreover, the contact with risk and danger provides a 
magnifying aperture to the performance possibilities of gender according to Tait, 
who suggests that aerial action can transgress assurances that ‘female bodies have 
things done for them for beautification and that bodily action brings about male 
muscles and thus masculine social power’ (2005:7). I would add that, because circus 
performance and gender performance are both opportunities for transgression of the 
social normative, they can also be potent vehicles for repetition and absorption of 
popular cultural dynamics and values. In opening up the discursive power of 
gendered bodies, it is also possible to re-inscribe binary oppositions.  
The move, The Eagle, differs in many ways from the ‘usual’ static trapeze moves that 
demand flexibility as well as core strength from the performer. This move only 
demands core and upper body strength. It presents the body to magnify the chest 
and upper arms, a position that mimics the stances taken by Strongmen and, 
therefore,  attributes the ‘body genre involving sweat, muscles, shows of strength’ 
that typify the romantic understanding of the masculine (Hunt 1993:66). The Eagle 
is a potent masculine stance, according to these codes, because it signifies strength 
rather than fragility in the face of falling.  
Tait’s circus research addresses gender in terms of a disruption to the binary offered 
within our socially perceived and value-laden cultural reception of normativity. She 
focuses on the way that the female performer is permitted to transgress the 
normative values of fragility. She uses Circus Oz’s performances as an example of 
this. Although there is scope for further investigation of the way circus can be used to 
disrupt cultural assumptions, it is not in the trajectory of my thesis to focus on it at 
this time. The female students in my care did experience a shifting sense of their own 
femininity (relating to strength) during the course of the work. They articulated it in 
relation to expectations of themselves and within the competitive status play 
discussed in the next chapter. However, although I am attentive to the potency of 
aerial work to forefront a learning point about gender, I am attempting to focus on 
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the nature of risk and risk-taking rather than push a specific predetermined political 
agenda onto the young people. Aerial work may reveal these debates and they are 
vital and pertinent to the students’ understanding of themselves through the act of 
performance. However, the meaning that is specifically derived from the encounter is 
the student’s alone; it resides in his or her self-knowledge rather than some 
predetermined social outcome or meaning explicated by me.  
 
5.3.2 Phenomenological glorification. 
If the momentary body reaches out in a primal act of body-to-body phenomenology 
that extends into the response of an audience, the glorified body is one that is 
symbolic of more than just the act and the moment. The glorified body of the 
moment of The Eagle is that which acts as a potent symbol for the other, or for 
audience, as they are watching the performer or student. It reveals a complex map of 
cultural and performative watching that codifies the act of performance in the eyes of 
the audience. I suggest that The Eagle has cultural implications in terms of its 
relation to gravity, falling and transcendence, to gender, to failure, all in an 
ambiguous relation to paradox and binary opposition. An excavation of this glorified 
moment, which seems to convey more than it is, cannot hope to capture all the 
complex personal and global significations within the movement. Each moment is 
incomplete, ephemeral and unique in the eyes of the audience. It is an art form which 
is akin to physical theatre in that it, in Heathfield’s words, ‘epitomises transience and 
thus perturbs the cultural mechanisms and economies that seek to name, place and 
capitalise it’ (2006:188). Heathfield is referring to dance theatre and, most 
specifically, to the work of Pina Bausch in his article After the Fall. I am purposefully 
borrowing his appreciation of dance to align it with circus, due to their shared ability 
to reflect and magnify cultural traces inscribed upon and through the bodies of 
performers. Moreover, the discipline of circus pushes the phenomenological impact 
of the artist’s potential death in its magnification of the moments of risk and in 
provoking the physiological response of an audience. 
Heathfield describes falling in terms of its relation to European theatre-making as an 
inscription of failure: ‘The fall contained an imperative like all sacrifices for the social 
body (the audience): the imperative to recognise, remember, repair’ (2006:189). His 
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analysis is easily transferred to circus performance because circus mobilises the 
physical body-to-body, remembering that is provoked by a knowing of fragility in 
response to gravity, and also fragility in response to cultural codes and mores. In a 
sense, circus, by provoking the fight or flight systems discussed previously, is of 
greater service to cultural memory and sacrifice.  
Where circus diverges from Heathfield’s analysis, however, is within the catch. He 
recognises that the fall in dance-theatre is categorised as violent, in terms of the 
audience’s disregard for the other, in that they do not catch the fall of the performers, 
who again and again emblematically sacrifice themselves. In aerial performance, the 
artistry lies within the three parts - the social sacrifice, the paradoxical act of falling 
and/or flying and, finally, within the catch. This, I argue, is where the redemptive 
and glorified elements of aerial performance lie: within the fact that the aerialists are 
able to repeat the death defying fall and redeem both themselves and the audience 
with the audacious catch. This holds true for solo performance, as with The Eagle, 
but also with collective acts where one performer may hold and/or catch the fall of 
another artist. The audience, although implicated within the fall, also bears witnesses 
to itself being ‘saved’ by the audacious catch. 
This draws the discussion back to the moment of The Eagle within time and space for 
the teacher and for the student. They are, for a moment, suspended from the impact 
that a neoliberal or police order culture has on their actions - how that might se or 
speak of what is happening. This is due to the space, the trusting relation within the 
space, the action in the doing and the action in the momentary observation. All these 
interconnected and contingent forces intertwine in the moment of glorification, to 
transport the student into an authentic moment, a moment without fear that is 
rooted in his relation to his own death. It also has the capacity to do this for the 
audience, who are, in Carmeli’s terms, ‘yearning’ to feel the possibility of social 
redemption within the catch of the aerialist (2006:276). The notion that a linear, 
progressive accumulative time as suspended in the moment is interesting too. It 
states that the performer is able to take the audience away from the system that 
contains them whilst also referencing it. 
In the previous chapter, I discussed the binary oppositions known through circus by 
Leysar and Zaccarini, how these paradoxes were inscribed upon the aerial body 
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through the wounds inflicted and through repetition in performance, as well as 
through their ability to free the body from its inscription. The aspect of timelessness 
is fundamental to the notion of paradoxical encounter in phenomenological thinking. 
For it is only when aspects of the world are distanced that, in Heideggerian terms, 
the self is released from its historical everyday and from the possibility of an 
intentional future:  
Only an entity which, in its being is essentially futural so that it is free 
for its death can let itself be thrown back upon its factical “there” by 
shattering itself against death – that is to say, only an entity which, as 
futural, is equiprimordially in the process of having been, can, by 
handing down to itself the possibility it has inherited, take over its 
thrownness and be in the moment of vision for ‘its time.’ (Italics and 
bold in the original, 1962:437) 
Heidegger asserts that a moment of vision is almost impossible within the ‘idle talk’ 
of the everyday, which forces the intentionality of existence to be towards the future 
(1962: 174). Moments are rarely attended for themselves but always in relation to 
what is to be done next. He suggests that ‘shattering itself against death’, not just 
witnessing it or attesting to it, but shattering against it, can bring being back to its 
time. This shattering ruptures the fabric of the moment as being towards future and 
locates being within the ‘now’, which he equates with a moment of vision. Vision is 
suggestive of clarity, seeing, attesting as if for the first time. This ‘now’ is also a 
possibility for death in the future; it is simultaneously looking forwards and marking 
the now in its immediate circumstance.  
I suggest that a phenomenological view of aerial performance is that it reaches out 
from time, culture and space within the moments of performance. At the same time it 
draws the audience or performer towards death, towards the possibility of death and 
into an understanding of the self as both fragile and superhuman. This ambiguity 
mobilises the glorification of the performers and the audience’s bodies, ‘in a 
reversible body-to-bodies phenomenology’ (Merleau-Ponty 1964:149). Alongside 
this, the aerialist draws attention to the social constructs and constraints of 
contemporary society, the aerialist and the audience are implicated in a fall, and then 
the superhuman catcher saves them. The audience are awed and thrown by the 
transcendental nature of the picture provided whilst the aerialist retains the 
permanent scars, bruising from the ropes and aches within muscles that are the 
reality of the metaphorical catch.  
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5.4 Fragmentation  
To conclude this chapter, I would like to move the discourse away from what the 
student owns in the moment of performance and turn the discussion back to what 
the teacher is charged to do ‘in common’ with them (Heidegger, 1962: 159). This 
suggestion draws my thesis towards Chapters 6 and 7, where I reference my practical 
work as a teacher of students who take risks and I unravel what is at stake for the 
teacher within the encounter. 
The locus of this chapter has been primarily within ambiguity and meaning. In it I 
have opened up many ways of describing circus performance as a power discourse 
and phenomenological event. By drawing upon Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, I have 
described the complexity, not only of the student’s being, but of the social and 
performative implications of being seen and being seen ‘as’ something; experience is 
effaced by the nature of this interpretation. I have captured some of the territories at 
play within these discourses that may emancipate, domesticate, stultify or free the 
studentand which, I argue, resonate within the doing of circus as they appear to me. 
They are the strata of knowledge which are the doing of it and, reversibly, the 
meaning of it.  
The trifocal influences of Rancière, Foucault (as formative to Merleau-Ponty) and 
Heidegger promote a tendency towards openness, dialogue and ‘ignorance’. 
However, fragmentation of experience to single elements of being and the inability to 
see the student in their totality create problems for the student’s resolution. For 
Rancière, fragmentation becomes an opportunity for the teacher to verify their own 
knowledge rather than uncover the knowledge of the student because it requires that 
the teacher ‘sees’ the student in a certain way. For Foucault, fragmentation results in 
the distribution of value and power within certain modes of discourse, particularly 
the medical or scientific, for example. Borrowing from Heidegger, fragmentation 
results within both the attitude of the teacher as one who ‘leaps in’ for the student, 
engendering domination and dependence, and within the notion that ‘sight’ is not 
something which comes from having seen everything but is nuanced to denote 
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meaningfulness rather than knowledge of the sensory.29 Therefore, it must be 
emphasised that, throughout the encounter with the student, the teacher needs to be 
constantly attentive to the totality of the student’s experience, to counter the possible 
negative effects of fragmentation.  
The notion of bounded agency, emancipation and anticipatory resolution are ones to 
which I return throughout this thesis. Risk-taking can offer oppositional experiences 
for young people that either ascribes them as beings that are capable or beings that 
fail in the face of risk. Evans’s (2002) discussions of the way that a child or worker 
becomes dominated, domesticated and disempowered by the hierarchical structures 
in which they work serves to reinforce the notion that a truly freedom-based dialogue 
with young people is utopian. I argue, however, that it is by revealing some of these 
technical, cultural and meaningful structures to the young people in my care that I 
can engender a mobilised concern and awareness of their ability to become 
independent learners, unstultified in the face of risk. Through fragmentation the 
student learns how they are fragmented by others and exist in dialectical synthesis 
with their own totality.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  Proveti clarifies this in reference to Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty in his suggestion that:  
The order that places this first is not innocent – the sight of the corporeal-sensible vision: second 
“sight” in a different sense, that is, as a metaphor for existential understanding: third, “sense” as 
the direction in which that metaphor transmits sense – the direction in which it shifts meaning 
between the sensible and meaningful realms. (1998: 211) 
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Chapter 6.0 
Hello Fatty: Experiences of Teaching Risk. 
Equality is fundamental and absent, timely and untimely, always up to the 
initiative of individuals and groups who... take the risk of verifying their 
equality, of inventing individual and collective forms for its verification. 
(Rancière in Bingham and Biesta 2010: 14)  
Rancière’s assertion is that a practice founded on equality must be unique. It is, 
therefore, mobile, intangible and impossible to capture. As soon as the form is 
captured and set, it becomes subject to, and derivative from, the forms of an 
institution or the Government order that it once sought to undermine. This chapter 
uncovers the nature of my practice in relation to socially constructed and 
experienced risk and how I can attend to the way it has accreted, unravelled and 
accumulated over the course of one piece of practical research: Hello Fatty. The five 
scenarios presented within this case-specific chapter offer a tiny snapshot into the 
tensions and possibilities inherent within such an ephemeral and dynamic practice. 
 
I recognise that there have been more stages to the practical development of my 
knowledge, which have taken me from the traditional drama classroom in 1997 to the 
Conservatoire in 2011. These stages, although not actively documented in this 
chapter, form the basis for it and are active strata within the map of my teaching 
experience. I began the research for this thesis by exploring creativity and theatre, 
circus as an art form and possible accredited qualification as well as the therapeutic 
responsibility that befalls a care-driven pedagogue. I now pause to reflect upon the 
single moments below in response to Rancière’s ideology, death and an investigation 
of pedagogic tact. This is a verification of an enacted pedagogy that intends to 
challenge and to provoke in order to assert that ‘equality is not given, nor is it 
claimed; it is practiced, it is verified’ (2003:xxvi).  
 
Each of the five moments presented will be placed in relation to the four different 
arguments within this thesis - pedagogic, social, fear-driven and descriptive. The first 
moment (Fear of Flying) will be as a practical excavation of emancipatory pedagogic 
practices as they appear within the moment. The second moment (The Game) 
articulates the social pressures and constraints that are recognised within the 
encounter discussed. The third moment (The Chalk) acknowledges how death is 
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brought to the student through the playing of games and to the teacher in memory. 
The fourth moment (The Planche) and, finally, the fifth moment (My Body) draw a 
more poetic line by documenting how an equalising practice may be ‘held’ by the 
teacher in the moments of practice. I thereby uncover what it is that a teacher did 
within the moments of a dialogic teaching encounter and question how it may be 
possible that they are able to ‘hold’ the anxiety of the student. I am 
phenomenologically describing the momentary, fleeting and fragmented perceptions 
I had in order to outline the nature of pedagogic holding.  
6.1 Critical Incident 4: Fear of Flying 
It   is   the   very   first   day   of   the   practice.   The   students   are   at   the   ‘Circus  
Space’   being   coached   by   Adam   Cohen   on   the   trapeze.   This   particular  
student  is  the  last  one  to  attempt  to  leave  the  flying  platform  for  the  first  
time.  She  has  been  standing,  very  nervously,  watching  as  others  step  from  
the  platform  and  swing.  She  places  a  hand  on  the  trapeze  as  requested  by  
Adam.  
‘Now,  place  your  other  hand  on  the  bar,’  he  calls.  She  does  so.  ‘And  when  
I   say   three,   simply   step   off   the   platform   and   hold   on.’   She   nods.   ‘One,  
two,  three.’  The  toes  of  her  right  foot  are  poised  as  if  about  to  step  off  but  
she   does   not.   ‘One,   two,   three,   and   step   off,’   Adam   repeats.   Still   no  
response.  ‘One  two,  three  and  step,’  he  suggests  for  a  third  time.  And  she  
hesitates  again.    
At   this   point,   the   other   students,   in   an   attempt   to   be   helpful,   are  
encouraging  her  with  calls  of  ‘it’s  ok’,  ‘just  jump,  it’s  easy’  and  ‘come  on,  
you  can  do  it’.  But,  Adam  realises  that  this  is  not  helping.  It  appears  to  be  
putting   additional   stress   on   the   student.  He   uses   her   name   for   the   first  
time.  
‘It’s   alright   ***,   listen   to  my   voice,   and   only  my   voice.   I’ve   done   this   a  
thousand  times  and  never  dropped  anyone.  Focus  on  my  voice.  One,  two,  
three  and  step  off.’  At  this  point,  the  student  steps  from  the  platform  and  
swings.  There  is  a  huge  smile  on  her  face.    
Two  hours  later,  when  asked  what  she  experienced  most  clearly  from  the  
session,   the   student   replied   that   ‘Adam   reminded  me   that   I   could   stop  
listening   to   all   the   voices   in  my   head   telling  me   not   to   do   something   I  
wanted   to  do.  He   reminded  me   that   I   could   just   let  go  and   trust  him   to  
catch  me.’  She  added,   ‘I  wasn’t  scared  of  falling,  I  was  scared  of   looking  
silly,  and  I  knew  he  wasn’t  going  to  let  me  fall.’     
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This example demonstrates a rupture in understanding for the student, a moment of 
dialogic communication between her and the teacher, and also demonstrates the 
attention needed by the teacher. Cohen’s skills are practical and perceptual: those 
needed to enact his promise not to drop her, his skill as a handler of the lunge rope 
around her waist and those more subtle and tactful,  supporting her to take a ‘leap of 
faith’. He recognised that the student was impacted by the voices of her friends in a 
negative way and gave her a simple route to blocking them out. He was unaware that 
the student had too many ‘voices in [her] head’, as well as the ones from the ground, 
stopping her from stepping from the platform. His open suggestion to listen only to 
his voice proposed more to the student than he understood at that moment. These 
voices needed to be muted before she was able to take the step. Cohen shut them 
down for her and enabled her to just be with her physical focus and with the 
equipment. He engaged her will to choose to step off the platform and take a ‘leap of 
faith’.  
 
The social pressures that the student and teacher encounter in the moment resonate 
with perceptions and constructions of failure. The student questions what it will 
mean to fail and look silly and she also encounters the possible failure of not 
attempting the move in front of her friends. This is not a moment where she appears 
to fear for her physical health. She is not scared of dying or hurting herself; she does 
not feel vulnerable in that sense. She is exposed, however, to possible failure. This is 
the ‘idle talk’ towards which the student is drawn (Heidegger, 1962:224). I am 
mindful too that this idle talk is manifest most pertinently by, in her words, the 
voices in her head. It seems that this student has learnt that her behaviour has been 
determined by powerful forces of social dialogue that she acknowledges are flawed. 
The voices in her head are telling her not to jump but also not to fail. They conflict. 
What she needs to do is take the ‘leap of faith’ into Cohen’s care in order to rise 
against and challenge the social pressures that she experiences.  
 
Cohen’s skill is to enable the student to encounter the risk with surety - not to tell her 
what to do, how to think or to ‘bestow’ the experience upon her but to drive her will 
in relation to her motivation. He enabled the student to see herself within the 
problem needing to be solved. This instance demonstrates an equalisation of the 
relation between the teacher and the student in a number of ways. To view this 
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instance from a critical pedagogy framework, we could say that Cohen made the 
student aware of the power relations within the experience and, thereby, she was able 
to encounter them and reposition herself in relation to those power relations in such 
a way as to escape their oppression. She was able to recognise that there was a 
personal, cultural or social pull on her to perform or behave in a certain way - to 
avoid stepping from the platform - and that she had the choice of whether to conform 
to these social pressures by refusing to step or to free herself from them by stepping 
off.  
 
I would suggest that this is a naive and teleological viewing of this incident which, in 
forcing the notion of cultural politics into the frame, is neither helpful nor 
empowering for the student in the long run, as I discussed in Chapter 2. From 
Rancière’s perspective, Cohen simply activated the student’s will to choose in the 
moment of the practice in a way that acknowledged her equality with him as a 
potential flying trapeze artist. It was this activation of equality that enabled the 
student to step from the trapeze platform rather than a momentary political 
radicalisation that consolidated the encounter for her.  
 
What Cohen did was leave space for the student to hear her own perspective ‘as 
though the other can always understand arguments’ through the ‘acceptance of 
separate worlds’ (Rancière, 1995:50). He gave a proposition, the trapeze, and allowed 
her to find a way through it with his guidance, rather than direction. The simple 
instruction ‘focus on my voice’ was direct enough to be clear but left spaces for the 
individuality of the student to remain present. It allowed her to take meaning as she 
needed it rather than bringing a direct intervention of cultural politics into the 
moment. In such a way, the student brings to the encounter a simple attentive and 
focussed will and takes from it a changed perspective of herself as a flying trapeze 
artist. It may be that a corollary of this encounter with an authentic moment, that the 
student sees herself in relation to the politics of power more clearly. However, this is 
neither the point of the action nor is it a realisation ‘bestowed’ upon her by the 
teacher.  
 
Gert Biesta (2010) emphasises that, for Rancière, although emancipation entails a 
rupture within the order of things and is, therefore, understood as a process of 
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subjectification, it is very different from identification. Biesta states that 
‘identification [for Rancière] is about taking up an existing identity, that is, a way of 
being and speaking of being identifiable and visible that is already possible within 
the existing order’ (2010:47). It positions the student within a teleological relation to 
cultural politics. By this, he clarifies that identification reinforces a domestication of 
the student within a given social order. Subjectification, however, which is felt when 
the student is ruptured from a given social order without being told how to think or 
feel about it, ‘decomposes and recomposes the relationships between the ways of 
doing, or being and of saying that define the perceptible organization of the 
community’ (Rancière, 1995:40). In this moment of practice, Cohen proposes that 
the student focuses solely on his voice, not in order for her to learn from his words or 
for him to ‘tell’ her what to think or to feel but in order for her to do and be within the 
moment of rupture precisely, free of any existing order. He is able to free her from 
the voices of her friends, the voices in her head and from any social pressure other 
than ‘when I say three, you step from the platform’. This demonstrates an equalising 
practice. He ignites her will to leap.  
 
I also felt it was important to uncover the nature of the experience Cohen has of 
teaching in this way. When invited to discuss the moment and explain why he said 
what he did, he is a little uncertain. ‘I guess... I guess... it’s just an instinct really’. He 
begins: 
 
I watch each of the students from the moment they enter the space, 
checking to see who is looking nervous - who is presenting as bold or 
courageous. I observe them when they warm-up to see how flexible they 
are, how strong, how good their stamina is. All the time I am taking in the 
subtle cues they are giving off with each other and when left alone. 
When they come to the flying platform, I have direct contact with them. I 
can see how their body image impacts upon their relationship to the 
equipment by the way they put on the lunge belt. Many women approach 
the larger belts, presuming that they will be too big for the small one, 
despite me giving the correct size to them. In this instance, this student 
did that too. She went for the larger belt so I could see that already there 
was a possibility that she was feeling physically out of place/shape.  
I observe how they climb the ladder. Again, this student did it very 
tentatively but with an alternating smile and frown. I could see that she 
was both nervous and excited by the prospect of flying. She interacted well 
with the other student on the platform, calmly and clearly supporting 
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them to take the leap. She seemed excited when the other student was 
swinging, but her mouth tightened up when the student descended and 
she realised that it was her turn. 
I could see that there was a conflict going on between the idea of flying 
and the actual doing of it. When the other students distracted her from her 
focus, I just brought her back to it. 
It is a common occurrence, and I guess I just felt I could make her relax by 
focussing on my voice. (Cohen 2009)  
 
There are many areas that Cohen is curious about and consciously mapping in 
response to each student he will be working with. Like me, he is building from a 
foundation of physical, anatomical knowledge in attending to the student’s physical 
ability. This is not a judgment of skill or an appreciation of the student as different 
from other trapeze artists, but is a concerned curiosity about how the student is. 
Cohen takes his own trapeze training into account as he distinctly notices each 
student. There appears to be no desire to change or transform the student or to see 
them as a problematic that needs to be ‘fixed’ in some way. He makes no judgment 
about courage or shyness being good or bad states for the student to be in. He simply 
sees them in order to encounter them as fellow trapeze artists fully within the shared 
act of flying. He notices them in this way, purely to know how best to support them.  
 
Tact, as discussed in Chapter 1, is a skill of prediction, judgment, social 
understanding, trust, moral and ethical propriety which is negotiated in the 
momentary. It is dependent upon knowledge of the past and intention towards the 
future. Cohen uses his experience in order to be curious and attentive to the student, 
and thereby engage her will towards a shared outcome with him. His ability to 
balance his knowledge towards the student rather than some teleological end-point is 
a perfect example of tact and concerned curiosity in action.  
The discussion about the harnesses presents an interesting social comment - that 
some women see themselves as larger than the lunge belt that they are given. Again, 
in his discussion of the particular student, there is no attempt to intervene or change 
the student’s appreciation of her size and no comment is made to the contrary. He 
simply gives her the correct belt and notices that this will impact upon the way she 
behaves as a trapeze artist. These cues offer the student to the teacher, not as a 
problematic that needs to be ‘solved’ but as a set of circumstances that he uses to 
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‘map’ the encounter and present it back to the student. In this way, the encounter is 
revealed gradually and progressively through the cues and signals that are given by 
both  - the ‘coming into presence’ that Biesta, after Rancière, defines as ‘true 
subjectification’ (2010).  
 
So it can be said that the first part of the pedagogic encounter is defined by the 
teacher’s curiosity, allowing the student to ‘come into presence’ for them in a shared 
goal. The presence, for Cohen, is a visceral appreciation of the cues taken in 
consciously and unconsciously each time he teaches. He sees the student in terms of 
their potential, not as a judgment of their being but as an embodied response to the 
action they are about to encounter together. The goal is defined by doing and being 
in an activity together without judgment or prescribed social or political meaning. 
Although meaning or subjectification may be a corollary of the encounter, they are 
not the motivation for it. 
 
6.2 Critical Incident 5: The Game 
The second moment from the three-days of practice reinforced the idea of ‘coming 
into presence’, non-judgment and corollaric subjectification experienced by the 
student in response to injury and pain.  
It   is   Day   2   of   the   practice   and   we   are   playing   a   warm-­‐‑up   game   that  
involved  making  contact  with   the  others   in   the  group.  One  student  was  
preoccupied  during   the  game  because   she  had  broken  a  nail  during   the  
physical   warm-­‐‑up   section   of   the   day.   So,   distracted   by   the   pain   and  
irritation  of  a  broken  nail,   she  began   the  game   focussed  on   the  nail   and  
speaking  very  quietly.  She  was  playing  the  game  by  the  rules  but  was  not  
playing   the   game  with   a   playful   attitude.   Rather   than   address   this,   the  
group  continued  playing  and  included  her  manner,  stance  and  imitation  
of   her   quiet   voice   into   the   game.   It   became  her  way   of   playing   and  we  
played  with   her   in   that  manner.   This   recognition   of   her   distracted   state  
and  acceptance  of  it  within  the  group  dynamic  reinforced  her  place  within  
the   hierarchy   of   the   group   so   that   we   could   get   on   with   playing.   This  
acceptance  allowed  her  to  be  drawn  into  the  game  fully  and  her  identity  
was  written  into  the  new  rules  of  the  game.  
The   following  day,   during   the  warm-­‐‑up,   she   pointed   out,  with   a   smile,  
that   she   had   cut   all   her   nails   short.   The   other   students   appeared   very  
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surprised.   at   this   saying.   ‘You   only   just   got   them   done,’   to   which   she  
simply  smiled.    
  
The ruptures represented within this moment are many. They recognise the 
communal nature of the pedagogic act as well as the individual learning of a single 
student. It could be seen that the student had experienced a visceral relationship to 
the act of trapeze training that stopped her from fully participating within the next 
few hours of the work. By tearing a nail, she had the marks of the training inscribed 
upon her body and it took her time to adjust to the subjectification of the moment. 
She encountered a new moment through pain and by having a part of her identity 
questioned within the practice. Again, this was a corollary of the work, not an 
objective for it.  
The nail presents an interesting social discourse about the student’s body. In tearing 
the nail, the student is taken away from her normal physical presence. We can see 
that this impacts upon her by her distractedness and can infer from the other 
students’ surprise the following day that she had challenged her own identity by 
cutting her nails. The social discourses that pertain to an acceptable adolescent 
female’s physical presentation appear to be extremely deterministic for this young 
woman. She adheres tightly to them until her will to challenge them is engaged by 
her choice to abandon perfect nails in favour of the trapeze.  
The student’s distractedness was a challenge for me as a teacher to engage with, and 
for the other students who were collectively working to explore the game. By not 
addressing the student’s behaviour directly, we did not revert to the structures of 
discipline commonly employed by contemporary institutional education. We treated 
the student as an equal who had a valid response which we recognised and attended 
to within the group. By mirroring her behaviour in such a way as to make it a part of 
the game, the student felt supported and respected as an equal rather than ‘trained’ 
to think about her injury as humorous, irrelevant or counter to the culture of the 
group. Her relationship to her torn nail and the way it changed her behaviour was 
playfully explored by the group and welcomed as another experience for us all to do, 
be and, in this instance, also say.  
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How does this moment relate to death? Death is neither the biological final point, 
nor dying in the literal sense, but the death of possibilities within being: ‘To say that 
Dasein is always dying is to say that you can be dying, even dead precisely when you 
are in perfectly good health’ (Carman, 2003:284). Failure is constitutive of a rupture 
within a symbolic understanding of our self with others. For Heidegger, this rupture, 
typified by anxiety, allows us to see more clearly what he calls the evasiveness of the 
everyday. The student breaking a nail brings a perspective upon failure through an 
encounter with it. In both, the student projects herself into a future which, in 
Carman’s words, ‘is defined by possibility and impossibility’.  
Carman suggests that ‘Dasein’s self understanding can either be scattered and 
dispersed or focused and unified’ through an encounter with the impossible 
(2003:282). It could be said that the student in this instance experienced an 
immediate scattering and dispersal of her understanding of herself in relation to the 
pain, the destruction of an important part of her identity (the manicured nail) and in 
relation to how this was perceived by the group. Mindful of how this relates to the 
notion of rupture in Rancière’s work on subjectification, it could be argued that the 
student encountered the momentary possibility that her identity could ‘die’. 
Moreover, this was declared and celebrated by the others within the game in a way 
that attacked and verified the student’s behaviour. It was a ‘decomposition’ (1995:40) 
of the relationship between doing, being and saying. This decomposition of the 
‘normal’ social dynamic left a space open for her to make her own meaning of the 
event and allow for the possibility that she could ‘be’ without her nails for the 
duration of the work and that this transformation was ‘seen’ and attended to by the 
group, bringing the group together in quite a powerful way. 
This momentary encounter allowed for a number of social and power relations to 
come into my view. The first clear stratification within the map of my pedagogic 
identity is the traditional, institutional frame within which I worked within 
secondary school education for many years, namely that of my training and 
experience of the ‘correct’ way of ‘managing’ behaviour within a secondary school 
classroom. This training would have had me step in and ‘correct’ the student through 
a number of direct or indirect means. Directly, through addressing the behaviour as 
inappropriate and applying consequences if the correct modification was not made 
by the student, for instance by asking the student to ‘play properly or not play at all, 
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please’. This response is almost second nature to me as it is the way I was taught as a 
child, the way it was modelled to me in my PGCE training and the way I 
rehearsed/performed through my time as a secondary school teacher.  
This method, however, runs counter to my desire for the students to be equal 
participants within the practice. It meant that I had to know myself and drive myself 
towards my primary intention, rather than fall back towards the possible stultifying 
practices of my own education. It initially required a conscious act of will to stop 
myself from framing the encounter in a negative way. This conscious engagement 
thereby ruptured my own relationship to discipline through a conscious engagement 
with Rancière’s notion of the police order in combination with Heidegger’s 
appreciation of the ‘idle talk’ that keeps Dasein falling towards inauthenticity (1962: 
224). 
The police order is defined by Rancière as ‘an order of bodies that defines the 
allocation of ways of doing, ways of being, and ways of saying, and that sees that 
those bodies are assigned by name to a particular place and task’ (1999:29). The 
police order does not allow for multiple ways or modes for involvement from 
students and teachers within a given environment, i.e. that of a learning situation. 
Although in this instance we are discussing discipline directly, it is not strictly within 
disciplining environments that the police order comes into force; it is ‘a rule 
governing their appearance, a configuration of the occupations and the properties of 
the spaces where these occupations are distributed’ (1999: 29). My initial cultural 
response to the given situation was both spatially and occupationally dependent, in 
the same way that the student’s policing of her ‘injury’ could be seen as a part of this 
police order too  for instance, she behaves according to set rules of behaviour in this 
space. I must ensure that all students participate fully. The student must ensure that 
she is both safe from harm and appropriately dressed (with attractive nails) when in 
this particular space. The police order is made visible and, therefore, is able to be 
mapped for us both through the student’s encounter with the pain.  
Other aspects are brought into view for me as the teacher within this event. The 
community of students was brought together through a single encounter with pain. 
Without exception, all of the students were interested in the young woman’s ‘injury’ 
and wanted to play with the change in her identity. This curiosity enabled the group 
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to reinforce their relationship and will towards the act of doing the trapeze. There 
was some small celebration within the curiosity expressed by the other students, and 
the young woman was given status as one who had been injured/marked by the 
work. She attained status as one who had the courage to take risks.  
A further example of this celebration/appreciation of the injuries suffered happened 
on Day 4 of the practice. It is also the next stage of the example taken from Chapter 4 
of this thesis: The Eagle.  
Following  successful  achievement  of  the  move,  the  student  is  emboldened  
to  take  it  to  the  next  level  by  doing  a  transition  that  involves  sliding  down  
the  ropes.  He  is  warned  that  there  is  no  way  he  will  achieve  this  without  
getting   rope  burns  on  his   arms.  This   appears   to   excite   the   entire  group,  
himself   in   particular.   He   dresses   himself   in   a   long-­‐‑sleeved   top   in  
preparation  for  the  encounter  and  is  talked  through  the  movement  before  
he  tries   it.  With  a   little  hesitation,  he  rehearses  pulling  his  arms  towards  
his  body  and  loosening  his  grip  on  the  ropes  before  he  tries  it  without  his  
feet  on  the  bar.  The  others  encourage  him  and  ask  if  it  hurts.  This  seems  to  
spur  him  forwards  with  it.    
After  a  fast  descent,  it  is  clear  that  he  has  injured  his  upper  arms  and  this  
is   greeted   with   great   delight   from   everyone   except   me.   The   students  
crowd  around  him   to   see   his   arms   as   he   takes   the   long-­‐‑sleeved   top   off.  
They   are   scraped   raw   across   his   biceps.   His   response,   after   an   almost  
forensic  observation  of  his  wound,  is  ‘Brilliant,  now  I’m  a  proper  aerialist.’    
  
The pedagogic realisation within this moment is very simple: that the encounter with 
pain offers something very specific to the student if done  voluntarily. The student 
engaged with the action in full knowledge of the pain that it could cause. It is a 
corporeal and visceral engagement of doing and being that is enacted without the 
need to speak or frame the action in words for the others in the group. The bruises or 
markings offer what Rancière would call a ‘poetic’ invitation that the social order can 
be divided. The students recognise how he is socially conditioned to see pain as a bad 
thing when, in reality, an encounter with pain has enabled him to learn something. 
This something is still unspecific or ‘open’, and he has his own space to make 
individual and subjective meanings within the encounter.  
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Two points emerge from these examples of injury. First is that the strata of 
knowledge that forms the map of the teacher’s sureties in the classroom can work 
against, as well as for, the emancipation of the students. This tension between my 
educative inheritance and ideology is pertinently felt within many pedagogic 
encounters. The emancipatory teacher ‘holds’ this tension, but can never be fully free 
of the police order which she is often falling towards or against. I question whether a 
teacher can ever be wholly emancipatory or radical in their approach to the work, 
especially when the ‘safety’ of the students is at stake. I challenge the notion that 
equalising practices such as these are ever complete or finished.  
This experience is one of constant vigilance and attentive focus towards the act of 
emancipatory practice however, fully engaged equalising practices are almost 
impossible within Western education. They are, in Rancière’s sense, ‘political’ 
because they are ‘determined action antagonistic to policing’ that ‘breaks with the 
tangible configuration, whereby parties and parts or lack of them are defined by a 
presupposition that, by definition, has no place in that configuration’ (2003: 29-30). 
It is the ‘concern to test this equality’ which I am engaged in (2003:30). I question 
how this is manifest within the work, and whether it is possible within the 
institutions and spaces configured in this way. I acknowledge that an intention 
towards equality could be to the detriment of the students during the practice 
because it would mean a negation of the vigilance and distance needed to engage in 
true dialogue. It could be said that, if emancipatory practice is concerned with 
dissensus, that it is the teacher who feels the dissensus most pertinently within the 
struggle I have discussed.  
Secondly, Rancière himself suggests that ‘no party or Government, no army, or 
school, or institution will ever emancipate a single person’ because universal 
teaching can only ‘be directed to individuals, never to societies’ (1991:105). It could, 
therefore, be argued that the teacher ‘holds’ the tension between the individual and 
the institution within the risk-taking encounter. Again, I am responsible for holding 
and focussing the doing and being of the individuals associated with the practice, not 
the institution. 
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6.3 Critical Incident 6: The Chalk  
It   is   Day   3   of   the   practice   and   a   new   game   breaks   out   between   the  
students.   They   throw   the   chalk   at   one   another.   This   begins   as   a  way   of  
relieving  tension  from  attempting  to  climb  the  corde  lisse  and  becomes  a  
status  game  between   the  students.   I  do  not  discourage  or  encourage   the  
activity  because  I  am  mindful  that  they  are  using  it  as  a  strategy  to  pause  
and  reflect  upon  the  practice  as  well  as  to  bond  with  each  other.  However,  
when  the  chalk  is  thrown  to  me,  I  feel  tension.  To  be  truly  equal,  I  would  
play.  However,   it   feels   as   if   it   is   not  my  place   to   play   in   the   same  way  
because  I  need  to  keep  the  space/rehearsal  room  ‘safe’  for  all  participants.  
Rather   than   attempt   to   control   the   game,   I   play   ignorant,   as   if   I   was  
unaware  of  the  game.  I  thank  them  for  passing  the  chalk  back.    
The throwing of chalk is a tension reliever. The students use it to bond with each 
other and to physically release the hold that their attempts at climbing the rope has 
on them. Chalk is used to blot sweat and enable grip to be enhanced. For the 
beginner who feels that they will never be strong enough to hold on long enough or 
tight enough, chalk can be a ‘crutch’ and placebo that makes them feel safer. That 
night, I reflected in my journal upon what the process of interacting with the chalk 
gives to the trapeze learning: 
I had forgotten until today, the importance chalk has when you are either 
learning or are particularly challenged by a movement. To place chalk on 
your hands is to feel safe. To place chalk on the hands is a moment of 
pause, a moment to recognise the importance of the hands, a moment to 
cherish that contact with your skin. It is a moment to walk away from the 
intensity of the trapeze and process the act of trapezing. (Not necessarily 
through thought!!) It is comforting. (Hartley, 2009:np)  
My own relationship with chalk is a part of the map of experience brought into the 
room. The reflection above enabled me to remember a time when I had a different 
relationship to chalk from the simple practice of chalking hands or ankles when 
needed. For me, the role that chalk plays within my own trapeze practice has shifted 
from something that I used regularly as a beginner, but didn’t really need, to 
something that I use rarely or sparingly when I am attempting something that will 
really challenge my purchase on the trapeze (such as a toe or heel hang). The 
memory of this relationship brings me a different appreciation of the students’ 
behaviour and allows me to invest my curiosity into the game that they play in 
recognition of the developmental processes that they are going through.  
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This recognition of the levels of involvement that are being played by the students 
also distances me from the process. This distance is problematic as it has 
associations with Socratic method, as discussed in Chapter 2. By recognising what 
the students are doing, how they need to interact with the chalk and with each other, 
it could be said that I am distancing myself from the act of seeing them as equals in 
intelligence to me. It tells of the ‘mastery’ that Rancière was hoping to avoid: 
The master’s secret is to know how to recognize the distance between the 
taught material and the person being instructed, the distance also between 
learning and understanding. The explicator sets up and abolishes this 
distance – deploys it and reabsorbs it in the fullness of his speech. (1991:5) 
The difference is that I am not using this distance to explicate for the students upon 
their knowledge of the acts or upon their role within it. I am not ignorant of the 
reasons for the game, nor should I pretend to be, in order to enable their learning 
through risk. By ignoring the game, I am enabling the students to find their own path 
within it. In a sense, I brought the possibility of the game to them by bringing the 
chalk to the space. It could also be said that, had I played the game in full knowledge 
of the role that it played in relaxation and in status, I would have been modelling 
dissensus from the normal institutional frame. However, this felt counteractive to the 
fact that the students’ relationship should be based within trust. I wrote: 
But is it my role to play? What should I have done? Block the game, 
reminding them of my different relation to the game from them? Play 
along and break the tensions? Within the act of blocking the ‘play’ the 
tensions of my position are exposed. I need to keep them safe from the 
relaxation or inattention that could cause a fall. (Hartley, 2009: np) 
Although I make the students responsible for each other directly within the physical 
activities, I also make the decisions about how the day is run or time-tabled and how 
the space is ‘organised’. This is part of the tacit and explicit contract that I have with 
them to keep them safe. In the same way that I check the floor for nails before I ask 
them to take their shoes off, I am also mindful of when a playful dynamic needs to be 
calmed or cautioned in order to retain focus. Again, this is rarely done directly; it is a 
layer of the vigilance and tact discussed in the previous section. The tension here is 
clear and one that Kant expressed in the formulation of his educational paradox: 
‘How do I cultivate education through coercion?’ (1960:711).  
The fact that I have more experience and am engaged with the pedagogy of the 
scenario in an attentive manner makes my ‘knowledge’ different. The imbalance in 
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status marks me out as a constantly identifiable reminder of the police order. This 
instance with the chalk was insoluble. There was no perfect right answer because 
safety was my guiding and primary concern, before equality, before risk: it was, if you 
like, my base imperative. The pertinent point here is that a permanent state of 
emancipatory dialogue is impossible within the scenario presented. So, in a sense, I 
walked away from the dialogue and let the moment of rupture and play impact upon 
the students directly. My intervention was unnecessary. It was necessary for me to 
feign ignorance of the game in order for the rupture to be present. I needed to know 
when to walk away from anything other than my role as a ‘safety’ mechanism and 
trust that the students’ experiences would be open enough for them to find the way 
through by the acts of being and doing in dissensus. The students colluded with my 
pretence at ignorance; they understood the tensions of my role and were happy to 
playfully engage with breaking social codes.  
Again I am mindful of the different type of knowledge that I am holding, in relation 
to the students each moment that I am engaged with them in the room. As Biestra 
states: 
The idea of the equality of intelligences does not mean “that all the actions 
of all intelligences are the same” but rather highlights “that there is only 
one intelligence at work in all intellectual training.” Explanation, on the 
other hand, operates on the assumption that students themselves are not 
(yet) capable of what the teacher is capable of, and therefore are in need of 
explanation. Emancipatory schoolmasters do nothing more (but nothing 
less) than demand that their students make use of their intelligence. They 
forbid “the supposed ignorant one the satisfaction... of admitting that one 
is incapable of knowing more.” (Rancière in Bingham and Biesta, 2010:54) 
The tension I feel when I recognise the distance between my experience and the 
experience of the students offers me the realisation that there is always something 
more to know about every learning situation. If my role is to demand that the 
students make use of their intelligence, then the question becomes could I have 
engaged the students in the circle of knowledge regarding the game that they were 
playing? This brings me back once again to the point that I made within the first 
section of the chapter: that, by not discussing the learning situation specifically 
according to ‘pedagogic logic’, I am leaving little space for the students to engage 
with the action as an action for itself in the doing of the action, rather than within the 
reflection upon it. The student learns something unspecific rather than being guided 
Hartley,	  J.	  R.	  2013	  
	  
225	  
	  
towards a predicated ‘known’ that I have assessed and extraverted as a 
developmental point. By omitting reflection from the game, the student is able to 
find meaning that is individuated rather than telegraphed or determined by me. The 
question, therefore, becomes, how do I mobilise the will of the student in a 
Rancièrean sense? 
The action of throwing chalk at one another is ‘risky’ because it opens up the 
opportunity for students to rupture their sense of a) space and what is permitted 
within it, b) identity in relation to the game being played, and c) the status of the 
other participants. This presents an opportunity for the group to test themselves in 
relation to Heideggerian death. They are severing themselves from the idle talk of 
institutional behaviour by acting in dissensus to the normative expectations that you 
do not throw things at other students in a classroom. In such a way, they open 
themselves up to being towards a more authentic relation in the moment - because it 
brings anxiety as well as joy in the activity. Anticipatory resolution houses the 
‘possibility of acquiring power over Dasein’s existence and of basically dispersing all 
fugitive self-concealments’(1962: 358). It is characterised by joy and sobriety.  
They are rupturing themselves from the sense of themselves in relation to the corde 
lisse and the emotional impact that the challenge of climbing it holds. It could be 
argued that the students are re-socialising themselves, reasserting the given social 
norms by playing a game that does not challenge their sense of failure – but the 
anarchic nature of the game works both to stabilise and destabilise the students’ 
identity within the moment of doing. I notice that the students’ eyes light up and that 
they laugh (see Figure 3), meaning that there is satisfaction as well as focus 
generated in the activity presented by the chalk.  
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Figure 2. Chalk Fight 
 
Play is a potent force for dissensus towards, and re-conscription of, the perceived 
status quo. Brian Sutton-Smith (1997) recognizes that, in the playing of games, 
certain communicative structures such as ambiguity and oppositions are revealed. I 
may insult you playfully, for example, and it is both an insult and a game. I can mark 
you with the chalk when it hits you and it is both an attack and a badge of honour  
you are marked and included, you have failed and succeeded. The playing of games 
allows people to explore these paradoxical positions. This game was generated by the 
students’ need to relieve tensions and, as such, it functions as a commentary upon 
society but could also be seen as a conveyor of socially prescribed norms. It does this 
because the students are ‘acting themselves’ in relation to their perceived status 
within the group. Sutton-Smith quotes Neitzsche to frame his discussion: 
Innocence is the child, and forgetfulness, a new beginning, a game, a first 
moment... the game of creating which is at the same time a game of 
destroying... creation and destruction each time anew, without remorse, in 
blissful self-forgetfulness. (Neitzsche in Sutton-Smith, 1997: 113) 
The young people destroy and create the social context of their experience through 
this means. They step outside of the structure that I have created for them and create 
Hartley,	  J.	  R.	  2013	  
	  
227	  
	  
their own. They are heedless of the social constraints of safety or acceptable 
behaviour, which is my responsibility alone at this time. The students remind me 
that my anxiety is unfounded. Sutton-Smith suggests that play is a potent conveyor 
of meaning and dissensus within the playing He uses the term ‘cruel play’ (1997: 56) 
to re-inscribe the act of game-playing with the tensions that it inhabits. For the 
player, the game is safe, but also unsafe, because it can bring a greater appreciation 
of the self within the doing. This discussion on the ambiguous nature of play in 
relation to dissensus, disobedience and disorder brings the conversation back to the 
notion of death. Sutton-Smith suggests that play of this nature, unstructured, 
selfdetermining, heedless and joyful, disperses the self away from everyday concerns. 
He refutes the Heideggerian and phenomenological project in general by questioning 
the possibility of play being a to and fro hermeneutic development of the self (1997: 
184). I contend that this is exactly what was happening in the moment described 
above. Metaphorically, for the students, the to and fro of the chalk mimics the 
creation and destruction of selves. The reckless abandonment and passion 
communicated in the throwing suggests that the throw is a direct challenge.  
The expressions of both joy and sobriety (characteristics of Heideggerian resolution) 
when the chalk comes in their direction can be seen as a paradox in itself - the chalk 
is a welcomed danger. It represents inclusion and exclusion. As such, it could be said 
that this anxiety expresses the student’s understanding of themselves as fluid in 
relation to the death of a possible future. They choose to engage with possibility and 
impossibility, within the context of playing the game. The possibilities of success and 
failure, high and low status, exposure and hiding, social acceptance or social 
rejection are all encapsulated within the game. They are brought in close proximity to 
an identity as solely theirs, and death too as such, by inhabiting these paradoxes. 
They risk Heideggerian death. If Heideggerian death reveals what matters, what is 
seriously at stake in any choice or commitment, it could be argued that the game is 
not serious because it doesnot really matter. However, I contest this and I propose 
that the game reveals exactly what does matter to the students and that, through the 
playing of it, they are able to know themselves in relation to the evasive police order 
that is normally hidden.  
As noted in the beginning of this section, watching this game unfold within the safe 
space that I have created for the young people brings tensions to the fore for me as a 
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teacher. This, therefore, enables me to really interrogate my role as the teacher and 
holder of the anxiety felt by the students. In this instance, the holding appears to be 
terribly fragile and is strengthened momentarily by an act of playful ignorance. By 
that I mean that, when the chalk is thrown at me, I pretend to be ignorant of the 
game rather than a conversant player. This, I felt, served to allow me the role of 
tension breaker without specifically addressing it.  I recognise that there is a 
profound gap between my traditional teaching past, which would have seen me 
directly address and dismiss the game, and with my desire to really engage with the 
individualised learning that is about death, rupture and dissensus for the young 
people involved.  
Much of the behaviour that I describe, and the emotional and physical impetuses for 
it, is the result of varying levels of engagement with the actions of teaching the 
trapeze. Therefore, the negotiation of these levels of engagement can be seen to be 
inscribed upon my teaching map during the course of these four days of contact with 
the students. At the time that the game began, I was primarily focused on the 
teaching of another student. This meant that I was engaged within the act of 
negotiating their anxiety, challenging at the right level, and I was attentive to all the 
cues that the student was giving me as to their state within the learning. The chalk 
game only came into my focus when it interrupted the small range of attention under 
which I was needfully working with this other student. We watched the game for a 
while and brought our small session to an end prior to the lunch break. It was at that 
point that the chalk was thrown at me and I made the decision to pretend I did not 
understand the game and move on. My fake pretence enabled the students to collude 
with me and permitted me not to reinstate a police order.  
It is not unusual for a moment within the teaching to linger within my reflection 
through the course of a few days and this incident, as you can see from my reflective 
journal, was no different. The tension I inhabited caused me to compose and 
recompose myself in relation to my own identity, in the memory of the encounter. 
Through writing I articulate, but do not hope to resolve, all the apparent conflicts. I 
recognise that emancipatory education is an attentive concern in the momentary and 
to how the momentary, therefore, rewrites the possible future. It is a part of my 
teaching project to be engaged towards the student long after the encounter has 
ended as well as long before it has begun. The emancipatory teacher’s tact, therefore, 
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lingers and accretes beyond the direct encounter into other encounters in time and 
space. 
 The teacher’s attention towards creating, forming and attending to the student’s 
individual challenges and engaging with acts of dissensus happens inside and outside 
of the class/workshop room. Although many of the actions could be said to be 
‘instinctive’ or ‘momentary’ responses, they are also the result of engaged 
consideration and, in some cases, discussion outside of the teaching dialogue. 
Responses or problems are rehearsed by the teacher in order to ensure that the 
correct level of challenge, involvement and rigour is applied within the sessions. This 
type of teaching is immersive for the teacher; it consumes me. I reflect upon the work 
in many spare hours after the fact, curious as to what I might remember or consider 
on reflection. It is a phenomenological project because within it I ‘find memories that 
paradoxically, I have never felt or thought before’ (Van Manen, 1990:13).  
This reflection mainly happens when I am particularly made aware of the many 
different ways of approaching a situation. I do it by talking to my assistant, by writing 
in a journal - as I did to unravel my thoughts about the chalk - or, in most instances, 
by thinking it through. The act of teaching in this way demands a full and attentive 
investment in the young people that is time-consuming. Therefore it is, in economic 
terms, difficult to manage on a large scale. It is also exhausting, joyful and sober and, 
therefore, characteristic of my own anticipatory resolution.  
Manning’s proposition about tact is that it demands investment in the past, present 
and future. It demands that you have known, and will know, within the present 
moment of action. This notion of past, present and future clarifies the necessity for 
the teacher to be invested across the time frame of the student’s working relationship 
with me – and beyond into their future presence as a ‘do-er’. 
Projection into the future presents problems for Rancière, who believes that it is by 
projecting into the future that emancipative practices re-inscribe themselves into the 
inequalities of the past. The difference that I am proposing within this recognition of 
futurity is that a) it is individuated and consequently makes no pressure upon some 
communally prescriptive future, and b) that it is the recognition of a possibility, a 
potential action of dissensus, that is manifest in the projection from a momentary 
doing and does not have a target-driven outcome. As such, it returns to Heideggerian 
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eksasis, which underpins the temporality of resolution because:  
only an entity which is essentially futural, is equiprimordially in the 
process of having-been, can, by handing itself down to itself the 
possibility it has inherited, take over its thrownness and be in the 
moment of vision for ‘its time.’ (emphasis in the original 1962:437) 
The teacher is charged with holding the metaphorical potential for action for the 
student within this type of teaching. Although the potential belongs necessarily to the 
student, the teacher, by dint of her awareness of the potential for closing-down and 
opening-up caused by situations of dissensus, holds  the student’s strata within her 
map: she holds their potential towards future action. The teacher’s and student’s 
intentions are mutually intentioned towards futural action.  
6.4 Critical Incident 7: The Planche 
It  is  Day  2  of  the  practice,  our  first  visit  to  Central,  and  I  am  working  with  
a  student  who  is  very  familiar  with  the  trapeze.  He  is  the  student  whose  
mother   asked  me   to   ‘really   challenge   him’   [quoted   in  Chapter   5   of   this  
thesis].  In  an  attempt  to  challenge  in  this  manner,  I  choose  to  proffer  the  
move  of  a  front  Planche  to  the  student.  This  is  one  of  the  hardest  moves  in  
trapeze  because  it  involves  holding  a  horizontal  position  through  the  core  
stomach   muscles   (see   Figure   4).   The   student   is   unable   to   achieve   this  
move  on  the  first  attempt.  I  talk  him  through  the  movement  of  lowering  
himself   to  horizontal  from  the  fairly  simple  vertical   ‘needle’  position.  As  
the  student  moves  towards  the  horizontal  position,  the  change  in  weight  
causes  him  to  drop  through  the  shoulders  to  the  floor  (see  Figure  5).  
Over   the   course   of   the   four   days,   the   student   develops   the   strength   to  
lower   himself   further   towards   the   horizontal   and   hold   it   for   mere  
fractions   of   a   second   longer   each   time.   It   is   a   minute   progression,  
compared  with  his  usual  ability   to   ‘master’   the  moves   the   first   time  that  
he  tries  them.  There  is  a  tremendous  sense  of  satisfaction  generated  in  his  
determination  and  will  to  succeed.    
He  showed  the  move  to  his  mother  on  the  final  day  of  practice  and  her  joy  
was   demonstrated   within   the   phrase,   ‘Look   at   the   way   his   body   is  
trembling,  he’s  really  having  to  try  hard,  that  is  outstanding.’    
This moment, or spread of moments from the practice, highlights the developmental 
possibilities that result from a student having demands placed upon their ability, 
intelligence and will through the doing of an action. Following on from the last 
section, when I began to unpack the notion of futurity, this moment rests upon the 
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notion of a futural and progressive outcome over a long period of time and is 
represented by a momentary rupture for the student in the first and through each 
encounter. It is an act of shared will. This is the story of repeated failure and the way 
that the teacher and student reconcile or open this possibility within the dialogic act:  
[T]he ignorant schoolmaster [in this instance particularly] exercises no 
relation of intelligence to intelligence. He or she is only an authority, only 
a will that sets the ignorant person down a path, that is to say to instigate a 
capacity already possessed. (Rancière in Bingham, 2010: 3)  
The authority that I, as the teacher, possess within the action of the student 
attempting a Planche is that of an appreciator of the complexity and strength needed 
to perform certain trapeze moves. I have the knowledge of attempting this move 
myself and the voices of my teachers who attempted to support my performance of it. 
I also have the memory of repeated failure to achieve the movement. Consequently, I 
have the authority embedded within the doing of the movement, the being of the 
movement and the failure that the movement represents for me. I have a subjective 
knowledge of it. I am a master in as much as I know this movement in my 
experience, not that I would be able to tell the student how to successfully achieve it 
or, in fact, that I would be able to explicate to him the way that the movement is.  
It is as if, like Rancière’s Ignorant Schoolmaster, Jacotot, I am presenting something 
that I do not fully understand to a student for him to enact his intelligence upon. I 
am not teaching something which is unknown to me per se. I am teaching something 
that is unsayable by me  - something of which my knowledge is inexplicable and,  
consequently, I cannot become the master explicator of it. I am not transmitting the 
knowledge of the movement - the doing of the movement enacts that. The student 
develops an individuated understanding, learnt from his own struggle with failure in 
relation to it.  
Even if I proffer the suggestion that this is a difficult movement for all aerialists, it 
does not transmit the knowledge to the student because the truth of that is un-
sayable directly, the move itself enacting its own complexity. My focus is towards the 
ability, intelligence and will of the student as an equal potential in relation to the 
movement, in full personal knowledge of the impact it had upon me (my memory of 
frustration and joy) and knowledge of the potential that the move could have upon 
him. My knowledge is embodied and it remains unexpressed. I am aware that I am 
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setting the student up for potential failure and, therefore, potential dissensus, 
rupture and authentic understanding. But I do not suggest what that could mean in 
actuality for him.  
I use biological language in combination with physical touch and metaphor to teach 
the student the movement. I talk about engagement of the core muscles, the point of 
the toes, the straightening of the legs, in combination with physically touching him. 
At times I hold the student’s leg in place in order for him to see where the movement 
is placed in his body. The biological and anatomical understanding is not explicated 
as a knowledge transfer; it is done in combination with the student’s enactment of 
the movement.  It accretes through the doing rather than through a superficial 
‘knowing’.  
Rancière recognises that part of the explicatory teacher’s authority, or mastery, is 
within the knowledge of the processual development needed to learn specific 
material: ‘This topology itself implies a certain temporality’ (Rancière in Bingham 
and Biesta, 2010:4). The teacher understands that there are small steps towards any 
important knowledge development and talks the student through each of the stages. 
‘[T]he veil is lifted progressively, according to the ability attributed to the infantile 
mind... in other words progress goes hand in hand with a certain regress’ (2010: 4). 
This process of taking the student through in progressive steps could be seen as 
describing what I did in the example above. However, the move was presented to the 
student in its entirety. It was presented as a full challenge, not a stepped process 
towards a final move that he was not aware of. Therefore, the explicatory 
stultification is negated. The development is not designed by the teacher to be 
processual, but process is demanded by the student’s ability, thereby enabling the 
student to have a more attuned sense of what the move is to and for him in the doing. 
There is no ‘happy ending’ to this moment, no perfect example of the student 
mastering the move. However, this is not the success I sought from introducing the 
movement. I only sought to offer the student something towards which he really 
needed to enact his will. In that way, I succeeded.  
This moment of practice opened up a further stratum of learning within the rehearsal 
room  - that of the other students witnessing this student in failure. It gave them the 
opportunity to equalise with him through acts of support and celebration of that 
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failure, similar to the ones discussed in relation to physical pain in Section 6.2. The 
other students acknowledged the will and determination needed to keep attempting 
the movement. They goaded him to try again and were there to look at the marks on 
his hands and count the number of seconds that he held the pose for at each attempt. 
Although no other student was able to attempt the movement (a couple of them tried 
and one collapsed in fits of giggles in his attempt to get into the first ‘needle’ position 
required), they recognised a shared sense that the trapeze challenged them all at 
their individual level. It was an equalising proposition. The marks gained on his 
hands were similar to the marks gained on their hands in attempting different 
moves. In a sense they had all experienced the same ‘marking’ and adjustment of 
their physical selves in relation to the trapeze. It was just the subtle difference of the 
physical level required to impact upon the individual student’s physicality that made 
them different. The choice to activate their will towards learning the trapeze was 
identical. It was not the specific act that bonded the students but the shared sense of 
struggle, purpose and will within each individual moment of the work. Age, ability, 
gender and race were equalised by the fact that their hands were torn in the same 
places and their shoulder muscles ached in the same way through the successes and 
failures with the equipment. In observation of this student’s failure and struggle, 
equality was enacted on the wider social community of the group.  
This is possibly the simplest of the examples through which to discuss the relation to 
death. It involves two overlapping dialogues upon failure. The first is with a failure to 
sustain the student’s expectations of himself as highly competent at the first attempt 
with movements upon the trapeze. The second, and no less complex failure, is the 
moment of rupture within the movement itself. As the student lowers himself down 
towards the horizontal, there is a moment of hiatus, or pause, before the weight of his 
legs becomes too much to bear. At this point, there is a relaxation of the key muscles 
as he submits to gravity and he drops through the shoulders to the floor. He falls. As 
you can see from Figure 5, he doesn’t fall particularly far - less than a metre. But this 
falling is defined by the act of failure rather than the possibility of injury. The fall is 
the fall towards dissensus of the perceived social context. The fall is towards an 
authentic relation between the self and death for the student. Moreover, it also 
represents a rupture in the understanding of the teacher, who is expecting him not to 
fall and, consequently, the two have a momentary shared understanding of 
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themselves, entwined within this being-towards-death.  
This interrelation between the student and myself is interesting to notice and reflect 
upon for the moment. The shared investment of two people within a single person’s 
experience is one that I unpicked in Chapter 5, in relation to the aerial act, as one 
that opens the space for investment of the self from the audience. In this instance, 
the investment does not come from a performance of union. I do not see myself 
within the movement of the student. It is more than that - I am attentively focussed, 
unified with him within the act, for him. My attention to his performance is such that 
there is a union between us that extends beyond a desire for success. The student’s 
failure and fall, in this instance, is my own fall, but I am attentive to his experience of 
it. The repetition of this act transforms the student so the action also accretes within 
my mapped experience for my use in the future and for me to experience in the 
present. It becomes a part of the tactful engagement I present for other students and 
is intertwined within the relationship that I have with this student. As you can see 
from the pictures, it is also categorised by sobriety and joy. I understand my own 
resolution through an engagement with the student.  
 
    Figure 3. The Planche Attempt            Figure 4. The Planche Fail 
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6.5 Critical Incident 8: My Body  
Throughout the course of the sessions, I had to cope with an altered physical ability 
that challenged my relationship to the equipment and to the movements I was 
teaching the students. Four days prior to the Circus Space  
Induction, I had gone into hospital for routine and minor surgery but had ended up 
losing a great deal of blood and needing transfusions. This left me anaemic, very 
tired and unable to practice the trapeze for the foreseeable future. Consequently, I 
was unable to model many of the movements I would ordinarily have done for the 
students. Instead, I created propositions, questions and provocations for them to 
encounter the equipment as individuals, rather than in mimesis of my own practice: 
I wonder whether I should cancel the sessions? If I cannot effectively do 
the things that I am asking the students to do, then maybe I should not be 
working with them. Would I impact upon them negatively if I presented 
myself as fragile and incapable? How would this incapacity read to 
them?... If I do cancel the sessions, I risk the possibility of breaching the 
young people’s faith and trust in me. On the one hand, I would explain 
that it is for their own safety, and on the other hand it would take away an 
opportunity that they have been looking forward to.... the issue of safety is 
important, but having Dave in the room will ensure that all students are 
spotted effectively. It is purely the act of modelling or demonstrating that I 
would not be able to do. Is there another way? (Hartley, 2009:np ).  
This unexpected and surprising element ruptured the historical relationship that I 
had to trapeze teaching and to teaching in general. I experienced a dynamic 
relationship to physical death and to existential death as detailed by Heidegger. My 
weakened physical state made me challenge the preconceptions of my role in a 
number of ways: 1) I told the students that I was not allowed to get on the trapeze 
and that I must take breaks often and they should tell me if they thought I should sit 
down; 2) I devolved some of the pedagogic responsibility to the students themselves, 
rather than taking it upon myself to lead each situation; 3) following on from (2), I 
also made the students more responsible for engaging with the safety of each other in 
terms of spotting the movements; 4) my normal, highly energetic teaching mode 
became naturally softer and more thoughtful, quieter generally, which enabled me to 
be more attentive to the quieter elements in the room.  
This enforced rupture from my established norm, provided opportunities for 
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dissensus. Each of the students, at different points in the week, suggested that I 
should sit down during a warm-up, drink some water or pushed themselves forward 
to take over from me when they saw that I was weary. It was as if I had given 
permission or a Rancière based opportunity for them to assert their equality with me 
in terms of knowledge. I articulated that, in this instance, they were able to ‘see’ or 
‘notice’ me more clearly than I was able to see myself. It also intensified their ability 
to notice each other and, therefore, clarify the different modes of care or challenge 
that they could metre out to each other whilst teaching, spotting or playing. 
This is perhaps the largest and most important of my learning points discovered over 
the course of the work. It plays against the presumption that the teacher has more 
authority than the vulnerable students. The authority that I took, in the instance, was 
to give permission for pedagogy itself to be engaged with by the students. I stopped 
teaching as I had understood it to that point. 
Throughout the final chapter of The Ignorant Schoolmaster, Rancière asserts the 
nature of universal teaching as familial. This has been ignored by the critics, 
Bingham and Biesta, but conveys to me two propositions from Rancière that go 
beyond thinking about equality as a methodology doomed to fail if institutionalised 
and moved towards a more poetic excavation of the intimacy required to risk this 
type of teaching. He states that ‘[i]t must therefore be announced to princes, 
ministers and the powerful: they cannot institute universal teaching, but they can 
apply it to teaching their children’ (1995:106). This dynamic shift in attention, from 
the typical master-student relation into one of parent-child, proposes that the 
teacher’s investment goes beyond simple knowledge transfer. It speaks of care, of 
expectation, of determination and the contentious issue of love.  
It could be said that what I did during the practice was enact a ‘leap of faith’ of my 
own. I placed my safety into the hands of the young people with whom I was 
working. I trusted that they would catch me and of course they did. I risked the 
possibility that the students would let me die and I knew that this was a possibility 
prior to the event. I became attuned to my own open-ended future within the project 
due to my embodiment and to the social pressures at play within the room. This 
death was held by the students. It enabled them to see how the responsibilities 
changed when I was ill. It changed their understanding of themselves in relation to 
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this insurance and, for the first time, enabled them to see themselves as powerful, 
rather than vulnerable within it. They became a part of the dialectic, because I could 
synthesise it for them no longer.  
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Chapter 7.0 
 Guided Practices in Facing Danger 	  
I have looked particularly at the dialogue between emancipation and stultification 
within the practice of teaching through risk. I drew from key conceptual thinking 
around experience and knowledge from Paulo Freire, Jacques Rancière and Martin 
Heidegger.  I used the term ‘pedagogic tact’ to describe and delineate a nature of 
facilitation in eight critical instances of risk towards a deeper understanding of 
pedagogical practice.  I described this pedagogic tact as a version of ‘violent care’ 
(Freire, 1971), which appears to develop ‘anticipatory resolution’ (Heidegger 1962) 
within the student within a ‘police order’ (Rancière 1991) that might assign them as 
vulnerable. Moreover, I have argued that the act of rumination upon these terms, 
which I perform through my writing, itself exemplifies pedagogic tact.  I propose that 
pedagogic tact is a joyful, sober, poetic, violent and unsustainable pursuit enacted 
through concerned curiosity by the teacher towards the equality of the student.  
Through this thesis, many themes have emerged and been ruminated upon.  This 
final chapter ties together the mapped themes that I described through the course of 
the previous chapters. In this way, I orient my descriptions back towards the 
phenomena of pedagogy and how the teacher is able to guide students through 
territories of risk and danger. Over the course of the preceding chapters, I have 
mapped what these dangers are, and how they are typified by ambiguity and 
paradox. I have detailed how the attentive teacher is subject to the plays of this 
ambiguity and can, therefore, never assert towards future guidance, only guidance 
within the momentary. I continuously circulate around the proposition that any 
practice that seeks to emancipate students runs the risk of domesticating or 
stultifying them. The purpose of this section is to mark a brief pause in my mapping 
of pedagogy and attempt to isolate some of the key learning points that this practice 
has brought to light for me through the doing, being and seeing of the work. The 
points below work as phenomenological themes which reveal how I see myself, in the 
momentary, in relation to emancipator pedagogy which engages with risk. Through 
these points, I reveal where the territories of risk are and how they were managed 
through tactful practice.  
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The teacher ignites the will of the young person to choose. That is the 
primary goal of the work. Above all others, the teacher guides the student towards 
their own activated will and enables them to see the choices that are presented within 
encounters with risk, rather than simply the dangers that are held therein. In such a 
way, the student sees him or herself within the term ‘risk’. They are able to 
understand what risk and danger are by doing risky activities safely.  
Each student’s will may be engaged or stultified by the teacher; all are 
different and demand different kinds of attention. This point reminds the 
teacher that her attendant focus is to be curious about each student and the different 
dangers they face. She questions how the student is challenged and attends to risk in 
that manner. This is not a judgment of ability, intelligence or potential. It is an act of 
constant vigilance to the student as they appear, not an attention towards what they 
would or could become. The teacher has no end-point in mind except an authentic 
encounter with risk, be it on a trapeze or with the idea of a trapeze. Therefore, the 
teacher is able to set individuated challenges for the student based on the known 
possibilities each opportunity gives to each student as they appear to her. Moreover, 
in attending to the equality of will needed within the pedagogic process, the students 
notice their similarities rather than their different abilities. They are equalised.  
The teacher needs to know themself. The teacher’s experience of, and through, 
education is carried with her through the course of any educational encounter. She is 
an embodiment of her history, experience and potential within the moment of the 
risky encounter. She is subject to the social discourses that concern education and to 
the subject that she is teaching. Knowing this, attending to it, articulating it, 
challenging it and reforming her relation to it, form an integral part of the teacher’s 
ability to act in dissensus to her own concerns and focus on the student. So the 
reflective process of teaching is focussed both within the teacher’s attention to the 
student and within their attention to themselves; it is an enactment of Heidegger’s 
‘right kind of objectivity’ characterised by considerateness and forbearance 
(1962:159). Knowing how the police order impacts on me within my momentary 
appreciation of fear enables me to intention myself against it or towards it (Rancière, 
1999: 31). Knowing that there are social discourses that conflate risk with fear, and 
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recognising this in a moment when I may feel afraid, enables me to conduct myself 
within it. Knowing the impact that technical or biological language and aesthetic 
convention can have upon the student’s ability to take a leap of faith makes me 
attentive to metaphor, physical gesture and individuality in the moment. Knowing 
that I have the potential to domesticate a student makes me strive against it. 
Confronting these challenges takes an extreme act of will, consideration and 
forbearance from the teacher.  
Emancipatory practice is an act of will. The moments that I have described 
relate to a specific pedagogic intention over the past five years. The guidance given to 
the students is the result of this sustained engagement within their individual 
development as individuals, students and aerialists. Emancipatory teaching is, 
therefore, a reflexive, reflective and engaged project. It demands that the teacher 
attends to the students’ and her own understanding beyond the momentary, and 
acknowledges her and their potential towards development, or even dispute, in the 
future. The teacher acts in dissensus to herself above all. It is a sober, joyful and 
exhausting pursuit that is held within the paradox of violent care.  The role of the 
teacher is to contain, carefully, the potential ‘can do’ of both herself and the student. 
It is a fragile relationship born out of the teacher’s ability to care, to have faith in the 
student and in dialectical relation with damage and pain.  
Acts of dissensus are enacted through the doing. In order to leave the student 
free within the practice to extract unique meaning, the acts of dissensus come from 
the practice and not as a contrived layer placed upon it. They are not bestowed by the 
teacher but are allowed to ‘come into presence’ for the student (Heidegger, 1962: 
258). An awareness of societal power dynamics at play within the emancipatory work 
is, therefore, a possible corollary but not the motivating factor of the pedagogic 
practice. This is not explicated although it may be revealed. Emancipatory teaching 
is, therefore, a political act because it enables every choice and every action to be 
questioned through the doing of the work.  
In addition to this, emancipatory guidance of this nature has an open end-point. Its 
outcome cannot and should not be measured as something tangible against pre-
determined markers of success or failure. Each student will succeed and fail 
according to their own understanding of the terms and, therefore, they are subject to 
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personal rather than imposed ruptures in their identity formation. This enables them 
to work against stultification and to form an authentic resolution towards death.  
Know when to walk away. One of the most surprising elements that I discovered 
through the course of this work was the knowledge that there are times when the 
teacher does not need to be present within an activity. The individual learning of the 
students happens in and around the guidance of the teacher. It happens in the 
discussions during break and at home with their carers. It happens in enactments 
with their siblings and within the games that are created between the participants in 
the room. The chalk incident taught me that there is no need to be a part of all of this 
learning. It is transformative but the teacher has no role within it. It is, therefore, 
important that the teacher enables this space to be given when working in this way.  
The teacher knows that the guidance is temporally bound. More than 
simply recognising that the student is only with them for a short moment, this theme 
recognises that the contact with death and the equalising practices engaged with are 
also temporary. It is impossible to sustain attentive focus on a student’s learning 
beyond the momentary or the week or the practice. Consequently, I make no claim 
that aerial work develops self-esteem or engenders intimacy; it may have done in the 
momentary because it may not in the future. That is not to say that these changes 
cannot or do not take place but just that they are not the projected outcome of the 
practice.  
The student is able to know the self momentarily within the act of doing something 
dangerous: to be afraid, or strong, or fragile, or superhuman or all of these things. 
This is a momentary realisation. What changes, however, is the student’s ability to 
momentarily reconcile their unique self in the face of possible danger through having 
known and, therefore, ‘owned’ it.  
Pedagogic tact is accumulated and accreted temporally. The emancipatory 
teacher’s tact is experienced, reflected upon, known, destabilised, engaged with, not 
known, shattered, enjoyed and cherished through the process of encounters with 
students. It, therefore, lingers and accretes, beyond the direct encounter, into other 
encounters in time and space. It is a dialectical relation between the possibility of 
knowing the self to be emancipatory and knowing that there is a possibility of 
stultification within each guided practice. Each new experience should rupture and 
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shatter the teacher’s knowledge of her own possibility. Tact is exhausting and 
unsustainable; it is joyful, violent and emancipating. 
Guided practices in facing danger demand an act of faith from the 
teacher. This final point holds the strongest resonance with me because it is the 
simplest and perhaps the most clichéd. Engaged emancipatory pedagogy demands 
that the teacher learns from the student. More than that, it demands that the teacher 
is decomposed and recomposed through engagement with the students as equals. It 
is only through this act of faith that the student really encounters risk and, therefore, 
resolution.  
 
7.1 Limitations of the Study 
 
There are, of course, limitations. This study in its intertwining of theory and practice 
which both explicates, and is explicated by, the phenomenological method used. 
Measurement and evaluation are done through self-reflexive analysis and are 
intentioned towards the descriptions of the life as lived and meaning as it comes to 
clarity for me through the work. This written document performs the tactful 
engagement of my teaching. But, while this thesis does not propose a model of 
quantifying pedagogy, it does model ways of making and doing for pedagogic 
practice. It reinstates risk as an important discourse within the practice of pedagogy 
and worthy of theoretical consideration; because risk is perceptual and individual, it 
demands that a qualitative approach be taken. This thesis attempts to balance 
description with analysis.  
 
I am mindful that this project can be seen as idealistic. Rancière himself would 
suggest that passion, in this instance, takes me away from the project to free others, 
because an ‘attentive will can always do so much – and more - than what the 
passions do... everything is done by the passions, I know; but everything, even follies 
would be much better done by reason’ (1991:95). Passion is, however, what keeps me 
focussed on this project and enables me to attend to my will to emancipate, even 
when I am exhausted by it. I contend that the preceding poetic evocation of 
education, as it appears to me, serves to reinforce the more theoretical elements of 
this thesis because, as shown, the rational and analytical elements traditionally 
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favoured do not capture the vital personal dynamics within the discourse. Each risk 
experienced, or danger encountered, presents itself differently to each person. They 
therefore require different mechanisms under which it can be encountered, avoided 
or embraced. It is not as simple as to say that we should avoid all risk because life is a 
project in the face of death. To guide students through dangerous or risky pursuits is 
an enacted resolution towards encountering death for the teacher and for the 
students.  
 
I am mindful that within this thesis there are contradictions, Biesta reminds us that:  
 
the ingenuity of Rancière’s work lies first and foremost in the fact that he 
is able to show that what is done in the name of equality, democracy, and 
emancipation often results in its opposite in that it reproduces inequality 
and keeps people in their place. What matters, therefore, is not that we are 
committed to equality, democracy and emancipation, but how we are 
committed to these concepts and how we express and articulate this 
commitment. (Italics in original 2010:57)  
 
This thesis is the expression of my ongoing commitment to guidance and danger 
through circus and acts of risk-taking in pedagogy. In discussing how an engagement 
with the transgressive performance discipline of circus can destabilise the social 
normative, I am intending towards emancipation. I recognise, however, that I may 
simply have domesticated the students into thinking my way. They may simply have 
acquiesced to a different performative mode rather than recognised their possible 
resilience within the momentary. 
 
My embracing of phenomenological theory, performative writing and tactful practice 
aligns my research as an act of dissensus against a normative framework for 
education and for academic writing at PhD level. Whilst there is no intention to 
critique the form itself, I acknowledge that this new way of describing and 
articulating teaching is itself a new mode of presenting Practice as Research.  
 
 
  
 
 
7.2 Into the Future 
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This momentary pause to reflect upon the praxis of risk has enabled me to embrace 
the poetic and paradoxical elements that describe and develop my understanding of 
ways I might become a better teacher. It is, however, an unending pursuit. 
 
For each of the eight critical incidents that I discussed, there are five more that I 
learnt as much from. I could have written a whole chapter on the young woman who 
was reluctant to step from the flying trapeze platform. Her relationship with risk was 
formative in my section ‘Know when to walk away’; she would not attempt the static 
trapeze at all until the third day, when I left the room momentarily and she got her 
friend to support her. My relationship with this young woman had been part of the 
‘voices’ in her head that stopped her from trying. She wanted to please me so much 
that she wanted to do it all on her own. The expression of total happiness on her face 
when I walked in and ‘discovered’ her sitting on the trapeze was captivating: she 
radiated joy. A full analysis of this incident falls outside the time constraints of this 
work, and I am still ruminating upon what that moment is and was in my 
understanding of pedagogic tact. I have questions. If I am charged to keep the 
student safe, what happens to that charge when I leave the room? How am I present 
in the encounter when I am physically absent? How can I reconcile the expectation 
that I should be a physical presence? I leave this phase of the research with better 
questions about the nature of pedagogic tact in full knowledge that what I offered the 
student was the potential to do it for herself.  
 
If I were to start the research again, I would wish to conduct more formal interviews 
throughout the process in order to create a dialogue with the people who represent 
the police order in which the students and I am situated: the Technical Manager of 
Central School of Speech and Drama, the rigger who put up the equipment, the Dean 
of the School. Because my work is about dialogue and tact, then the conversations 
that I had informally for the first two years of the PhD, which built the trust between 
myself and the institution, are a practice in tact too. I feel that these conversations 
were formative in my understanding of the sympathetic relationship between tick-
box systems and the people within them. These conversations are repetitive, 
adversarial and supportive: they are the fabric of a practice in risk. 
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Alongside these interviews, I would like to explore further the wider consequences of 
the work with the young people’s parents and carers. Ongoing formal interviews with 
the wider community would enable me to see how the practice had been experienced 
by others; it would give me greater scope to understand the impacts that it had (if 
any) upon the young people. I would be interested to see the way that risk was dealt 
with in the home environment. The contradiction here is that, within my typical 
educative environment, I have very little contact with the wider social community of 
the students except for a ten minute formal meeting on Parents Evening in a school 
setting - or even less when directing a performance. So, although I feel that surveying 
the wider circle would provide excellent insight into the specific students I worked 
with, it would also pull me away from my intention to be a better teacher in every 
pedagogic circumstance.  
 
The next stage theoretically and academically would be a survey of the international 
literature on the educative value of circus. There have been many books and articles 
published in France, most notably La Fonction Éducative Du Cirque (The Educative 
function of circus) and Un Cirque pour L’Éducation (circus for education) by Hugues 
Hotier (2001, 2003), a translation of which falls outside the purview of this research 
(and the talents of the author) at this time. Hotier analyses the use of circus as an 
educative tool for working with young people who have learning difficulties and 
emotional and behavioural problems. He looks at the way that circus can construct 
and form the identities of young people in order to reconcile some of the issues they 
experience in their educational lives. As I have articulated throughout, this thesis 
does not seek to prove that ‘circus is good for you’ in some way although that had 
been my premise when I began the research. An investigation of how circus is 
conceived internationally would invigorate my pedagogic praxis and take this work 
on a new journey.   
 
The cartographic metaphor has been very useful as a rhetorical device for describing 
what I do through every encounter with students. As I learn more about the new 
developments in neuroscience, and especially in neurophenomenology, I have learnt 
that mind ‘mapping’ is the mode experts use to describe the way the brain sends, 
receives and stores information. Having read The Philosophical Baby by Alison 
Gopnik (2004), I have learnt that a child’s brain is created, formed and shaped by 
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their engagement with doing: the brain is a map of their intersubjective 
understanding. There is scope for a further layer of phenomenological analysis to be 
mined in addition to the existential, pedagogic and personal. I would like to see how 
each critical incident might be explained from a neurophenomenological perspective.  
 
This work is already complex, contradictory, impossible to manage and extensive. 
There are many areas that I would like to expand upon as I practise tact through my 
teaching career. I suppose that the simplest articulation of my place within the work 
is to say that I will continue to teach individual, equal students in different places and 
to learn from them how to become a better teacher.   
 
7.3  On Courage and Guidance  
 
The purpose of this thesis was to take inspiration from Plato’s assertion that courage 
could be taught to young people through guided practices in facing danger. I have 
questioned what constitutes danger, courage and guidance through the course of this 
thesis. And I have offered a model for the tactful engagement of a single teacher. Tact 
is a drawing together and enactment of equality between student and teacher. This 
can be done through the voice, in a subversion of Rancière’s proposition that ‘[t]he 
explicator sets up and abolishes this distance – deploys it and reabsorbs it in the 
fullness of speech’ (1992:5) and, most specifically, through the body, our site for 
meaning-making, risk-taking and our site for death. 
 
This final section articulates a momentary closure, in the full knowledge that political 
engagement through emancipation is an infinite project. In doing so, I return to a 
ninth critical incident from the young people with whom I worked and describe their 
evaluation of the work undergone, because their voice is significant, to elucidate 
upon trust and tact.  
 
It  is  a  few  weeks  after  the  practical  elements  of  the  work  are  over.  I  have  
invited  the  students  back  to  hear  me  talk  about  the  work  undergone  in  an  
academic  forum  and  to  answer  questions  about  the  work  from  an  invited  
audience   of   teachers   and   academics.   The   youngsters   are   excited   and  
nervous  about  what  I  am  going  to  say.  They  have  brought  school  friends  
and  relatives  to  the  presentation.  
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They  particularly  engage  with  the  photographs  and  film  of  the  workshops  
that  are  displayed  around   the   room.  They  seem  to  enjoy   the  notion   that  
they  are  performers  within  a  performing  arts  school  and,  therefore,  have  
status.  They  appear  to  value  being  seen  in  this  way.    
  
At  the  end  of  the  presentation  they  are  asked  a  myriad  of  questions.  The  
Deputy  Headmaster   of   one   of   the   schools   the   children   attend   asks,   ‘Do  
you  feel  more  confident  having  worked  with  Jess  in  this  way?  Could  you  
say   how   much   more   confident?’   This   elicits   a   nervous   laugh   from   the  
young  people   and  one  of  his   students   responds  by   looking   at  me.   ‘Was  
this  project   about  making  us  more   confident,   Jess?’   I   responded  with,   ‘I  
don’t  know,  what  do  you  think?’  Another  student  leaps  in:   ‘I  was  pretty  
confident  before  I  started’  and  another  says,  ‘Yeah,  lots  of  different  things  
make  you  confident.  I  don’t  think  that  question  is  relevant  and  I  certainly  
couldn’t  measure  it.’  
  
After  the  formal  questions  are  over,  a  parent  asks  the  students,  ‘Why  did  
you   call   the   project   Hello   Fatty?’   There   is   silence   before   one   of   them  
launches   into   a   lengthy   account   of   the   insult   game   they   played   in  
response  to  my  provocation  ‘The  young  people  love  and  hurt  each  other’.  
They   laugh  at   the   fact   that   the  parents  appear   to  be   shocked.  There   is   a  
short   silence   before   another   student   says,   ‘It’s   about   enjoying   and  
understanding  the  purpose  of  the  pain  we  all  experienced.  Like  this’  -­‐‑  and  
she  turns  around  and  slaps  me  on  the  forehead.  It   is  a  shock  and  I  gasp,  
and  I  blush  and  then  I  laugh.  We  laugh  together.  
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Appendix A 
Consent Letter 
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   9th	  June	  2009	   
Dear	  Participant,	  
Thank	  you	  for	  agreeing	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  guided	  practices	  project	  2009.	  This	  letter	  takes	  you	  
through	  the	  implications	  of	  working	  on	  the	  project	  and,	  once	  signed,	  constitutes	  informed	  consent	  
for	  yourself	  or,	  if	  under	  16,	  your	  child,	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  work.	  	  I	  appreciate	  your	  time	  and	  
consideration	  of	  the	  implications	  this	  has	  to	  you	  or	  your	  child,	  and	  hope	  that	  you	  feel	  free	  to	  ask	  any	  
questions	  that	  arise	  before,	  during	  and	  after	  the	  workshop	  period.	  Please	  sign	  one	  copy	  and	  return	  it	  
to	  me	  in	  the	  envelope	  provided	  as	  soon	  as	  possible.	  
The	  Project:	  There	  are	  three	  phases	  to	  the	  project:	  
18th	  July	  –	  10am	  -­‐1pm	  –	  Induction	  at	  The	  Circus	  Space,	  Hoxton	  London	  –	  Students	  try	  their	  hand	  at;	  
flying	  trapeze,	  static	  trapeze,	  diabolic	  and	  acro-­‐balancing.	  
23rd	  –	  25th	  July	  –	  10am-­‐5pm	  –	  three	  days	  of	  workshops,	  challenges	  and	  improvisation	  based	  on	  circus	  
skills,	  clowning	  skills	  and	  philosophical	  challenges.	  
	   4pm	  25th	  July	  –	  Process	  showing	  –	  All	  friends	  and	  family	  welcome	  
21st	  Sept	  –	  3rd	  Oct	  –	  Festival	  of	  Emergent	  Arts	  –	  The	  documentation	  of	  the	  work	  will	  be	  shown	  in	  the	  
festival	  over	  the	  two	  weeks.	  One	  evening	  TBA	  –	  lecture	  demonstration	  of	  the	  work.	  
What	  is	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  project?	  The	  participants	  will	  be	  challenged	  physically	  and	  emotionally	  
in	  order	  to	  develop	  the	  performance	  skills	  .	  The	  work	  will	  provoke	  them	  to	  think	  about	  their	  
identity	  and	  this	  may	  bring	  enhanced	  creativity	  and	  confidence.	  They	  will	  learn	  new	  
performance	  skills	  and	  learn	  from	  professional	  actors/performers.	  It	  will,	  however,	  not	  be	  
easy,	  that	  is	  the	  point.	  	  Each	  student	  will	  be	  taken	  on	  an	  individual	  journey,	  so	  that	  they	  feel	  
supported	  and	  challenged	  to	  their	  own	  unique	  level.	  
	   The	  research	  investigates	  the	  nature	  of	  provocation	  and	  safety	  within	  the	  student/teacher	  
relationship.	  I	  will	  be	  actively	  reflecting	  upon	  the	  role	  of	  listening,	  observing,	  challenging	  and	  
supporting	  the	  students	  within	  this	  relationship.	  So	  it	  is	  not	  the	  participant	  under	  
examination,	  but	  the	  means	  of	  communication.	  
What	  are	  the	  risks	  involved?	  There	  are	  risks	  involved	  in	  any	  physically	  demanding	  pursuit.	  These	  
risks	  are	  multiplied	  when	  the	  student	  is	  engaged	  with	  circus	  equipment.	  	  The	  risks	  will	  be	  
minimised	  by	  many	  factors;	  the	  teachers	  are	  trained	  professionals;	  the	  students	  will	  wear	  
harnesses;	  there	  is	  constantly	  a	  teacher	  present	  to	  support	  the	  student;	  there	  are	  crash	  mats	  
and	  safety	  equipment	  to	  limit	  the	  impact	  of	  any	  falls.	  	  
	   Nothing	  can	  be	  done	  to	  erase	  all	  risks	  from	  the	  process.	  Participants	  may	  strain	  muscles	  or	  
tear	  their	  hands	  from	  the	  new	  discipline;	  they	  may	  fall	  to	  a	  crash-­‐mat	  and	  shock	  themselves.	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Inattention	  or	  carelessness	  by	  the	  student	  constitutes	  the	  greatest	  risk,	  this	  could	  result	  in	  
serious	  injury.	  	  Participants	  will	  need	  to	  take	  responsibility	  for	  concentration,	  listening	  to	  
instruction	  and	  observing	  others.	  	  The	  student	  also	  takes	  responsibility	  for	  saying	  yes	  or	  no	  
to	  attempting	  everything,	  I	  will	  never	  expect	  people	  to	  try	  things	  that	  they	  are	  overly	  scared	  
of	  or	  are	  not	  physically	  strong	  enough	  to	  enact.	  If	  done	  with	  discipline	  and	  carefulness,	  
circus	  training	  is	  safe	  and	  very	  enjoyable.	  
I	  have	  read	  and	  understood	  the	  risks	  involved	  with	  this	  sort	  of	  work	  and	  agree	  /	  disagree	  that	  I/my	  
child	  can	  (delete	  as	  applicable)	  participate.	  
	  
Signed	  	  	  	  ........................................	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Name	  (printed)	  	  ...........................................	  	  Date.......	  
	  
Publication:	  	  Names,	  photographs	  and	  film	  footage	  of	  the	  participants	  will	  be	  used	  after	  the	  
workshops;	  for	  publication	  at	  the	  Central	  School	  of	  Speech	  and	  Drama,	  Festival	  of	  Emergent	  
Arts	  and	  for	  inclusion	  within	  the	  PhD	  thesis	  of	  Jessica	  Hartley	  (CSSD).	  A	  copy	  of	  any	  material	  
used	  will	  be	  offered	  for	  your	  approval	  prior	  to	  publication,	  and	  any	  further	  use	  of	  the	  
material	  will	  be	  subject	  to	  your	  agreement	  at	  a	  later	  stage.	  
I	  have	  read	  and	  understood	  that	  I/my	  child	  will	  be	  filmed	  and	  photographed	  and	  agree/disagree	  
to	  this	  being	  used	  for	  research	  purposes.	  
	  
Signed...........................................	  	  	  Name................................................	  	  	  	  Date......................	  
Responsibilities:	  By	  agreeing	  to	  participate	  the	  student	  MUST	  agree	  to	  the	  following	  responsibilities.	  
Failure	  to	  adhere	  to	  these	  jeopardises	  their	  safety,	  the	  future	  of	  the	  project	  and	  their	  place	  within	  it.	  
• To	  be	  on	  time	  –	  Participants	  should	  aim	  to	  get	  to	  the	  rehearsal	  or	  workshop	  half	  an	  hour	  
before	  it	  is	  due	  to	  start.	  	  
• To	  wear	  suitable	  clothes	  or	  bring	  suitable	  clothing;	  sports	  kit	  or	  clothes	  that	  you	  can	  move	  
freely	  in	  –	  no	  jeans	  please,	  they	  are	  unsafe	  for	  aerial	  work.	  
• To	  treat	  the	  other	  participants	  with	  respect	  
• To	  be	  honest	  about	  what	  they	  are	  thinking	  or	  feeling,	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  put	  on	  a	  ‘strong’	  
face;	  your	  safety	  may	  rely	  on	  it.	  	  
I,	  the	  participant,	  have	  read	  and	  understood	  my	  responsibilities	  within	  the	  project	  and	  
agree/disagree	  to	  adhere	  to	  them.	  
	  
Signed.............................................	  	  Name.............................................	  	  	  Date............................	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Expenses:	  	  CSSD	  will	  pay	  for	  all	  travel	  to	  and	  from	  the	  work.	  Please	  bring	  copies	  of	  receipts	  or	  tickets	  
and	  you	  will	  be	  reimbursed	  in	  full.	  Unfortunately,	  you	  will	  not	  be	  without	  a	  receipt.	  
	   The	  Induction	  at	  Circus	  Space	  will	  be	  paid	  for	  by	  CSSD,	  however,	  should	  you	  not	  attend	  you	  
will	  expected	  to	  reimburse	  them	  for	  the	  £50	  fee.	  	  
Talking:	  The	  young	  people	  involved	  on	  this	  project	  will	  be	  challenged	  in	  new	  and	  exciting	  ways.	  They	  
will	  return	  from	  rehearsals	  with	  sore	  muscles	  and	  tired	  minds.	  If	  there	  is	  ANYTHING	  that	  you	  
feel	  you	  wish	  to	  discuss	  with	  me	  or	  feel	  has	  impact	  on	  the	  work,	  at	  any	  stage,	  please	  ring	  or	  
email	  me	  (details	  above).	  I	  have	  the	  care	  and	  safety	  of	  the	  participants	  as	  my	  prime	  concern	  
along	  with	  an	  active	  interest	  in	  how	  this	  work	  may	  have	  affected	  them	  in	  ways	  they	  are	  
unaware	  of.	  
I	  agree/disagree	  to	  my	  child’s	  participation	  in	  this	  project.	  I	  have	  been	  offered	  opportunity	  to	  ask	  
any	  questions	  and	  understand	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  work.	  
	  
Signed.....................................................................	  
Name	  of	  Student	  ............................................................................	  
Address........................................................................................................................................	  
	  
Emergency	  Contact	  Number........................................................................................................	  
Are	  the	  participants	  taking	  any	  medication?	  Y/N	  	  	  	  	  Details	  .......................................................	  
Are	  there	  any	  health/physical	  implications	  or	  illnesses	  that	  would	  impact	  on	  the	  work?	  
	  	  Y/N	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Details...........................................................	  
Please	  keep	  a	  copy	  of	  this	  letter	  for	  your	  information;	  I	  look	  forward	  to	  working	  with	  everyone	  on	  
the	  project,	  and	  sharing	  the	  research	  findings	  with	  you	  in	  September.	  
Yours	  sincerely	  
	  
	  
Jessica	  Hartley	  
Research	  Student	  –	  Central	  School	  of	  Speech	  and	  Drama.	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Appendix B 
The Practice 
 
Aerial training. 
 Warm-up. 
Aerial training occurred on each of the three mornings at CSSD. Each morning, we 
worked with the static trapeze and corde lisse equipment. I spent half an hour 
warming-up the students. This involved cardio vascular activity which raises the 
heart rate and sends blood pumping through the body. This cardiovascular activity 
not only generates blood flow, but also starts the process of focus for the group. The 
first thing that they want to do on arriving is have a long chat, this is a literal 
manifestation of Heidegger’s falling towards the idle chatter of the everyday, which 
recognises that the social circumstances of being together is an essential element of 
being and, as such, it can obscure newness. I observed that the students kept chatting 
and socialising whilst they began to jog around the room, but then when other modes 
of jogging are introduced (knees up at the front, heels to the back, backwards, side 
swings etc.), the talking began to fade. This transitional phase, took the students 
from an attentive focus on themselves being for each other, socially as they arrive, to 
being for themselves whilst they begin to attend to their movement. After the talking 
had stopped, and I could see a relaxation within the limbs of all the students (the 
time for this varied according to the temperature, the work we did the previous day 
and the individual student’s physical ability) I then moved on to stretching. They 
were still working with each other, but in a different way. 
 
Stretching. 
The stretching is done to bring synovial fluid to the joints, in order to keep them safe 
during the impact of the work on the equipment. It is also done to lengthen the 
muscles, in order to prepare them for the rigours of the work. The stretches are both 
to ensure safety of muscles and joints and also to begin the conditioning needed for 
the trapeze work. Aerial practice demands many things, core and upper body 
strength, flexibility, kinaesthetic and proprioceptive awareness (the awareness of the 
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body in space), as well as creativity and stamina. At this point, I started by asking 
whether anyone fancied stretching a particular part of the body, first in response to 
the work undergone the day before, or to simply reflect how they were feeling. By 
asking these questions, I begin to focus the young people on the task of engaging with 
the feelings alive in their physical sphere. This generated an attentive focus, where 
the students become attuned to the physical needs of their body. Recognising that 
the student is an agent within the process of stretching enables them to see the 
choices available and they can resolve themselves to attending to these feelings and 
concerns. It enables them to see how attention can mobilise an awareness of self, and 
the choices that their unique embodiment provides. 
 
Conditioning. 
At this point, the students took it in turns to climb the rope. This is done to focus the 
students on their body in vertical space and as something that works in combination 
with its environment. It is also done to get the entire shoulder structure mobilised to 
the possibility of taking body weight. They all climbed the rope according to their 
differing ability. For two students, the first conditioning session developed technique 
and position which resulted in them hanging from the rope and attempting to get 
their feet into the correct position. Their relationship to the rope changed over the 
three days to the point where each of them completed a whole climb to the gantry 
successfully. Another student was able to do rope climbs before he arrived. In this 
instance, I created complex physical challenges for him, to climb with different feet, 
to climb without feet, to climb without feet in a straddle position and finally, to 
attempt a knee climb. This enabled me to playfully test the limits of his physical 
capacity, the nature of this testing I will explore, in greater detail, in the following 
chapter, through the example of the Planche.  
Further conditioning exercises followed that enabled the students to feel comfortable 
with the equipment and to build an appreciation of the movement needed to 
successfully complete positions or phrases upon it. At this point, I was attentive to 
the students’ need for challenge and for care. Each conditioning exercise was 
introduced with an explanation of purpose, but similar to the Eagle discussion from 
Chapter 4, I was attentive to personal temporal and spatial elements in the room. I 
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was keen that conditioning was useful rather than stultifying. For the student, it 
carried meaning, rather than was seen as a chore. The rhythm of the students’ 
attention was a textural layer for the way I saw them. By observing in this way, I was 
able to offer support, challenge, diversion or reinforcement when needed.  
Movements. 
At this point the students worked at their own pace towards the different moves or 
trapeze balances that they would like to achieve. This section and the following ‘play’ 
section are interchangeable. It does not matter which goes first, the one informs the 
other, and taken together they enable a personalised engagement with the 
equipment. New moves were introduced in this section to present personal 
challenges for the students who expressed a desire for unique involvement with the 
trapeze. I was attentive to their need for individuated ‘signature moves’. Much like 
the Eagle of the previous chapter and the Gazelle of Chapter 2, each student became 
the performer for a move that they felt challenged and defined their identity. They 
were free to choose from a repertoire of moves that I demonstrated to them, or they 
were free to make a move up, through playful engagement with the trapeze.  
Play. 
At this point, all attention to technique was abandoned. The students proposed 
different contact with the equipment together, in pairs or in isolation. They worked 
to see what the trapeze could be for them. Elements of playful engagement with the 
equipment were mobilised by my attention to the personalities of the student, 
communally and individually. This resulted in some very risky activities, such as 
students standing on each other’s shoulders on the trapeze, as well as some joyful 
recognitions of possibility, such as swinging the trapeze so high that the student’s 
feet touched the ceiling. These elements of the aerial training were focussed on the 
students’ discovery and ability to test things. There were moments of recklessness 
and rupture, as the young people tested their resolution despite, and because of, their 
anxiety.  
 
Devising provocations. 
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Prior to the discovery that circus/aerial provocation was most useful in the realm of 
revealing the discourses at play within pedagogic relationship, I devised a series of 
philosophical provocations as starting points for devising work in the afternoons. I 
isolated three themes which recognise the complexities of being, and fore-grounded 
my desire to introduce students and myself to dangerous interactions. My intention 
was to unsettle the young people, to bring about the painful process of disembedding 
conceptions, in order to free students’ attachments to the cultural or social contexts 
in which we were working. I outline them now because, although not directly 
referenced within the next section, they contributed to the whole experience of the 
three days for us all. Through these playful provocations, which resided outside and 
alongside the physical intensity of the aerial elements, connections were made and 
rehearsed, as I demonstrated in my first example in Chapter 1. The theme that I can 
extract or map from this part of the practice, is that one of the mobilising elements of 
pedagogic tact, for me, was that time spent with the students without the aerial 
provocations, enabled me to map their normal everyday attitude to play, against the 
way that they attended to the physical provocations. This gave me a clearer insight 
into their individual needs when being directly challenged. I was able to observe their 
differing modes of behaviour in a different context.  
The support mechanisms developed in the morning sessions were rehearsed and 
extended during this ground-based devising work, the students were able to move 
from being responsible for each other’s safety, through spotting and basing each 
other aerially, to attending to their creative support in the afternoon sessions. 
Physical engagement and tiredness ruptured the cultural or social boundaries that 
would have otherwise been more evident through the work.  
The provocations I used as a stimulus for the devising work reflected the key themes 
that resonate through this thesis: agency, death and taboo. As espoused in Chapter 1, 
an investigation of agency and resolution are indivisible from recognition of the 
possibility of death.  
 Provocation 1: The teenagers name the world. 
Provocation 1 serves as an opportunity for the pedagogue to witness the students’ 
interrogation of their philosophical or ideological place with the world. It is 
important that the teenagers are prompted to consider, not just their immediate 
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relation to the world, but the meaning they ascribe to their being in it. On a practical 
level, this first provocation inspired the students to think about the space or 
environment that they are in, namely a studio theatre in a drama school, with a corde 
lisse and trapeze hanging from the gantry. It enabled them to explore their genuine 
physical relationship and emotional response to the space and the opportunities it 
offers for exploration and performance. The objective of this ‘naming’ is more than a 
metaphorical act of ascribing a word to denote a space within an environment; it was 
an opportunity to explore a personal physical experience of that space. The students 
were able to claim it in such a way as to create a place where trust and risk could 
happen, it became a space for possibilities.  
An example of this is the way that they wrote all over the walls. Not content with 
physically exploring every nook of the room, from the gantry to the doors, they took 
the chalk that I had used in a previous exercise and wrote words and phrases on the 
walls and floor. They wrote Cynthia, boo-boo, MINE and my world in different places 
as if to name and claim it for themselves. Within this action, the students creatively 
responded to a metaphorical proposition by challenging aspects of ownership and 
responsibility. In marking the walls they acted in dissensus to commonly held 
notions of acceptable behaviour, although they colluded with one another about who 
would do the writing and what would be written. The black walls were a challenge 
that could be filled through the act of naming.  
Through this act the group also became more communicative and playful with each 
other. Roles were given to each other that were either cognisant of the physical 
hierarchy discovered in the morning, or worked to destabilise it. In this exercise, 
different qualities such as wit and amiableness were given higher status than the 
physical prowess demonstrated or experienced within the trapeze work. The 
physically ‘weaker’ students felt that they had an opportunity to compete or 
collaborate with the physically ‘stronger’ students. The physically stronger students 
were given the opportunity to demonstrate that they were ‘more than mere muscle’. 
In this devising scenario, the group were able to balance the perceptions of success or 
failure that they may have felt limited by in the aerial work.  
 
 Provocation 2: The teenager is hanging. 
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On a practical level, the student is invited in this provocation, to engage with the 
dangerous pursuit of ‘hanging’. Their engagement with hanging as a metaphor may 
result in ground-based performance because the student dictates their own level of 
physical engagement. This provocation serves as a physical challenge, but also a 
philosophical one on the nature of the word ‘hanging’ and an artistic challenge for 
the student to convey the nature of hanging to an audience.  
One of my intentions within this provocation is to interrogate the nature of death; 
this is in recognition of its pertinence within the philosophical framework of this 
research and in society at large. I further recognise that artistic and ethical 
considerations are raised by the representation of the death of a child or children in 
this manner, which I articulated in Chapter 2. I felt that this would provide exciting 
and dangerous material with which to engender ruminations about pedagogic tact. 
This provocation enabled the students to create three different narratives about how 
they might die. One was by their own hand, one was by accident, and one was at the 
hands of another. It is interesting to note that the death in each instance was 
parenthesised by a dramatic response to the notion of death. The students performed 
dramatic scenes of grief and funerals. The material elicited a performance of cultural 
expectation that appeared superficial. Their encounter with death, in this instance, 
was only superficially articulated. In this example, I recognise that some of the social 
constraints imposed within Chapter 1 distance young people from engaging with the 
material of their possibility towards death. They performed what they understood as 
a socially acceptable relationship to the death of a loved one.  
The way that the deaths were staged however, was more revealing pedagogically. The 
group auditioned each other to see who could create the most interesting and daring 
death sequence. Using the equipment, they challenged each other to be surprising, 
witty and shocking. This resulted in some very real risks being taken in terms of 
physicality, but also in terms of social acceptability. They performed both audacity 
and cowardice, which suggests that they were aware of the dialectical relation 
between the binary conceptions of self as either, but how both can lead to the same 
possibility: death.  
This provocation enabled me to see the students struggling with their identity in 
terms of failure and success, bravery and cowardice, and life and death. I could see 
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that these powerful themes released creativity, joy and passion within the students. It 
also balanced the superficial re-conscription of quotidian concerns within the face of 
the idea of death. In one way, the students were emancipated by the material, and in 
another way, they were stultified by it.  
 
Provocation 3: The teenagers love and hurt each other. 
This provocation offered opportunities for the young people to engage with the 
notion of love and pain, which is a constant dynamic within the action, moment and 
glory of the aerial and ground-based performance work. It is an opportunity for them 
to explore two of the prevailing problematic discourses within education in Britain 
today, those of sex and of death. It is important for my pedagogy to engage with a 
dialogic appreciation of the location of the teenage performers with regard to these 
two immense philosophical and ideological questions. The provocation to work 
physically with these themes offered an opportunity for engagement with the 
physical expressions of love and pain, and enabled the students to transgress the 
superficial and totalising engagement with these themes that they are subjected to by 
a risk-averse society. Tim Gill’s suggestion that risk-aversion focuses on the 
vulnerability of children, rather than the strengths gained through exposure to 
discourse and attention to risk-taking opportunities, reminds us that denial of 
children’s strength or understanding is formative within our aversion to risk in 
society.  
This provocation seemed to enable the students to respond more critically than my 
direct provocation towards death did in the previous section. For example, they 
played at finding the worst insult they could find for each other. This game created 
the title of the work for them: ‘Hello Fatty’. They articulated that this was an 
important name because it both invited and objectified the insulted person. In the 
insult ‘fat’, the insulted person is judged harshly in terms of a priori physical 
acceptability. They noticed that the insult is designed to make the insulted person 
hate their materiality, and, therefore, hate themselves. The students suggested that 
this title was appropriate for the whole experience of the workshops because they 
were allowed to question their bodies in relation to culture the whole way through.  
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Appendix C 
Circus Terminology 
 
Acrobalance : is the art of two or more people lifting each other acrobatically.  
Basing: is where someone is hanging from you on the equipment. The ‘base’ is the 
strong solid ground from which another person ‘flies’.  You base another when they 
swing or hang from you.  
Back balance: is where the artist drapes their body over the bar backwards. The 
bar is at the base of the spine, the legs are raise in a straight line and the back is 
arched with the arms outstretched.  
Beat or beating: is when the trapeze artist swings a part of the body in order to 
gain momentum and speed. You can beat from handing, by holding your body 
tonically and raising your toes in an arc, above the bar and behind it. You can beat 
from hocks position by arching your back raising your arms and again, proscribing 
an arc with your body.  
Catcher: is the name for the part of a trapeze duo who bases another aerialist, often 
when the aerialist is projected towards them from another trapeze. 
Catchers:  is a position where your legs are wrapped into the rope so that people 
can hang from you safely. 
Catcher’s cradle: is the rigid a rigid structure with an inbuilt steel bar from which 
the catcher can hang. The flyer is either projected to the catcher from a flying trapeze 
or throws themselves into the arms of the catcher from the cradle itself.  
Chalk: or resin is used by the aerialist to take moisture away from the body that 
might cause the artist to slip.  
Cloud swing: is a rope swing attached at both end to the rig (or ceiling), so that the 
rope transcribes an arc for the aerialist to move in. It is a swing made of rope, that 
artists can move, wrap and hang from.  
Corde Lisse: is the cotton rope used to ascend and descent from the static trapeze. 
It can also be used as a piece of performance equipment in itself. The performer in 
this instance wraps themselves into the rope, and cleverly creates drops and dynamic 
movement by manipulating the rope around the body. 
Diablo:  is a piece of floor based circus equipment which consists of a projectile, 
similar to a large yo-yo, shaped with two externally open cups which the artist ‘whips’ 
with a string tied to two sticks to project it through the air.
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Eagle: is a static trapeze move where the body is hung suspended within the trapeze 
ropes in the shape of a crucifix. (As demonstrated in Figure. 1. The Eagle on Page 
134). 
Flying Trapeze: 	  is a steel bar (covered in fabric) that is hung from steel wires. It is 
suspended from a framework opposite another trapeze or catcher’s cradle. The 
purpose of it is to move from one trapeze to the arms of the catcher in the other.   
Gazelle: is a static trapeze move where the body is draped over the bar sideways, 
and legs (one bent, one straight) are used to brace against the ropes. 
Hocks: is a static hang from the trapeze, where the performer is inverted and the 
bar rests behind the knees. 
Knee climb: is a way of climbing the rope through constant inversion. The student 
hangs upside down on the rope in a straddle position, places their hocks on the rope 
and throws their body up high to reposition their hands above the knee and then 
repeats the movement.  It demands a great deal of strength, stamina and 
proprioceptive awareness. 
Lunge or lunging rein: is the set of rope harnesses that are looped around a lunge 
belt for the aerialist to wear. These ropes are drawn through a pulley system to the 
rigger or teacher below. This person can then control the speed with which a student 
or aerialist falls if they miss the equipment. A lunge severely diminishes the severity 
of any fall.  
Needle position: is a trapeze movement that sees the aerialist holding the bar from 
below and directing their toes and legs vertically towards the ceiling, their head is 
towards the floor. This position requires a good amount of core strength.  
Pike or pike position: is when the aerialist is tucked under the bar with their nose 
to their knees and legs straight. 
Planche or planche position: involves the aerialist extending the legs vertically, 
so that the body forms a horizontal line. This can be performed from the back or 
from the front, depending upon whether the body faces the bar or away from it. The 
example used in this thesis is of a front planche, the aerialist has his back to the bar 
and face towards the ground (see Figure 4. The Planche Attempt: Page 232) 
Silk or tissue: is a long vertical length of fabric made of reinforced lycra, doubled, 
in which the aerialist wraps and drops in the same way as a corde lisse is used. 
Spotting: is a generic sports term used to define the act of supporting another. 
When attempting to lift or balance heavy weight (their own body in many instances 
from my practice) another person ‘spots’ the weight by placing their hand lightly on 
the weight being lifted. In that way, should the weight begin to drop, the spotter can 
add their support in lifting it to safety. In trapeze work for example, I place my hand 
on the small of the back when a student is in a pike position, it is there to ensure that 
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the student doesn’t overbalance and therefore fall from the equipment. This form of 
spotting does not require strength, it is intended to support the strength of the 
aerialist, so that they don’t panic.  
Rig: when used as a noun, the rig or rigging is the infrastructure from which aerial 
equipment is hung. It can also be a verb, to rig is the act of putting the equipment 
needed into the structure to support it. A rigger therefore is the name of a person 
who put the equipment up safely, but it can also denote a person who is attached to 
an aerialist via a lunge or lunge reign, who is charged with keeping the aerialist safe.   
Static Trapeze: A static trapeze is a horizontal steel bar with two vertical ropes at 
each end, padded at the joints (see fig.). It is suspended from two parallel rigging 
points.  
Tonic engagement: relates to the specific contraction of muscles in relation to the 
move engaged with. It relates to knowing exactly which muscles to use, and how 
much to apply them. It is a combination of strength and fluidity, so that the mover is 
not under or over exerting themselves.  
Toe-hang : is a balance on the trapeze where the bar is placed on the top of the foot, 
where the foot and leg meet, close to the ankle joint. The feet are flexed and the body 
is held.  Heel- hang is very similar except that the bar is placed between the heel and 
the leg, with foot pointed and the knees bent. 
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Appendix D:  CSSD Generic Risk Assessment Form 
The Central 
School of Speech 
and Drama 
HEALTH	  &	  SAFETY	  	  
Risk	  Assessment	  
	  
Dept:  
	   	   Activity 	  
	  
Description of operation 
	  
	  
	  
Who	  is	  affected	  by	  this	  operation?	  
	  
Employees	   	   Clients	   	   Public	   	   Young	  people	   	   Pregnant	  Women	   	  
	  
Description of hazards / risks Likelihood Severity Risk Factor 
Risk (before 
precautions 
have been 
taken) 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	   	   	   	  
 
Recommended precautions 
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Description of hazards / risks Likelihood Severity Risk Factor 
Risk (after 
precautions 
have been 
taken) 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	   	   	   	  
	  
Details of further action required 
	  	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Multiply Probability x Severity to obtain Risk Factor 
	  
Assessed 
by 
	  
Position 
	  
Signed 
	  
Date 
	  
Likelihood 
1	  Very	  
unlikely	   2 Unlikely 
3	  May	  occur	   4	  Likely	  
5 Very likely 6 Will occur 
Severity 
1	  Very	  
minor	  
injury	  
2 Minor 
injury 
3	  Lost	  time	  	  
to	  injury	  
4	  Major	  
injury	  
5	  Single	  
fatality	  
6	  Multiple	  fatality	  
Risk	  Factor	  0-­‐6	  Low	  	  
Risk	  factor	  above	  6	  
	  Improve	  if	  possible	  
Risk Factor 7-17 Medium  
	  Risk	  factor	  above	  12	  	  
Further	  action	  required	  
Risk Factor 18-
36 High  
	  Immediate	  
action	  required	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Appendix E 
IRATA Certification Levels.  
Level 1 rope access technician 
A level 1 rope access technician shall be capable of performing a limited range of rope access 
tasks required by his or her employers, under the supervision of an IRATA level 3 rope access 
technician. He/she is: 
• responsible for inspections of all his/her own personal rope access equipment; 
• able to assist in rigging and non-standard operations, under the guidance of a higher 
grade; 
• able to undertake a rescue involving descent by him/herself and have a knowledge of 
hauling systems. 
NOTE     A level 1 rope access technician is not allowed to supervise others 
Level 2 rope access technician 
A level 2 rope access technician shall be capable of rigging working ropes, undertaking rescues 
and performing rope access tasks (under the supervision of an IRATA level 3 rope access 
technician).  He/she should have some knowledge of legislation, safety requirements and quality 
assurance procedures relating to rope access. 
Level 3 rope access technician 
A level 3 rope access technician shall: 
• be capable of site supervision for rope access work projects; 
• be conversant with relevant work techniques and legislation; 
• be able to demonstrate all the skills and knowledge required of levels 1 and 2; 
• have a comprehensive knowledge of advanced rescue techniques; 
• hold an appropriate current first aid certificate, to show that suitable emergency first 
aid training has been undertaken; 
• have knowledge of the IRATA certification scheme; 
• have knowledge of the IRATA General requirements; 
• be familiar with the contents of the IRATA Guidelines. 
 
http://www.irata.org/training_syllabus.php - 21/07/13 
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